The world has approached the problem of disparity and developed means designed to reduce it; our nation has approached the problem of disparity and our confederation is adjusting to alleviate it; our province and municipalities must approach this problem squarely and be prepared for the adjustments to achieve the correct solutions to problems of disparity and change.

— *White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government*, tabled in the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick on March 4, 1965.¹

Within the government [of Louis Robichaud], important elements were predisposed towards changes. A radical rather than an evolutionary solution was made possible by three conditions: (1) integrated policy; (2) skillful program development; and (3) the relatively small size of the province. … Leadership by the premier was essential to this integration. Also, a reorganized civil service, in which a small group of influential officials were committed to work hard for reforms, gave thrust on the administrative side.

— “Municipal Reform in New Brunswick,” in *A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience: Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*, prepared for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs for the US Congress, 1974.²

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² Edwin G. Allen and Stewart Fyfe, “Municipal Reform in New Brunswick,” in *A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience: Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, February 1974), 80-81. At the time of publication, Allen served as Deputy Minister of New Brunswick’s Department of Municipal Affairs and Stewart Fyfe was a member of the Institute of Local Government at Queen’s University in Ontario.
ENGINEERING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY:

TECHNOCRACY AND MODERNITY IN NEW BRUNSWICK

DURING THE LONG 1960S

by

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ABSTRACT

The Program of Equal Opportunity (EO) marked a period of wide-reaching reform in New Brunswick for the areas of local government, education, health, social welfare, as well as province’s court and jail system during the Long 1960s. The province was considered by many observers to be the “social laboratory” of Canada. Devised by the government of Louis Robichaud, EO was entrenched by the Acadian premier’s immediate successor Richard Hatfield. While consistent with the literature, this project is more forceful in its assertion that the two governments constituted one policy regime. New Brunswick flirted with government by technocracy at mid-century. These technocrats, actually a cadre of officials, consultants, and bureaucrats from a wide variety of backgrounds, espoused the tenets of high and low modernism in an effort to engineer a modern polity. They provided the main bridge between the two administrations. By applying this framework and engaging with a broad literature, a nuanced account of social change in the province is revealed. Technocrats and government officials looked out and looked within the province and ultimately brought top-down change to New Brunswick during the era of Equal Opportunity.
DEDICATION

To my mother and father

and

To the memory of

Mary Victoria (Miller Bliss) du Manoir
October 18, 1931 – June 1, 2019

A loving grandmother, an enthusiastic student of History, and a proud New Brunswicker
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A project such as this requires a great deal of help and support from several communities. My time at UNB has been exceptionally rewarding both intellectually and socially. I have had the great pleasure to learn from a supportive group of outstanding historians. A profound word of thanks to Dr. Sasha Mullally, my advisor, for her criticism and constant desire to see this project through to the end. Your toughness, humour, and passion for challenging conventional narratives in Canadian history and making broader transitional connections has been enormously helpful. The University of New Brunswick’s School of Graduate Studies has been very helpful through their financial support of this research.

A broad network of professors has also supported this research. Drs. Huskins, Mancke, Morton and Parenteau have been key sounding boards for pursuing and refining research questions and throughout the writing process more generally. Dr. Mancke’s advice on writing still continues to reverberate. Roughly paraphrased, scholars should provide an intervention into the field to promote further research and questions. To write a “definitive” history is counterproductive, as it seeks to shut down further inquiries of a subject.

My graduate cohort in the Department of History at UNB was a great source of support. The staff of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick have been very helpful. Joshua Green and Tom McCaffrey as well as the frontline staff have gone above and beyond their obligations to make relevant materials available to me. Christine Dupuis at the Université de Moncton’s Centre d’études acadiennes Anselme-Chiasson provided me with critical primary sources related to the career of Alexandre Boudreau. A special word
of thanks is extended to Arthur Doyle and Charles Ferris who shed light on the political and cultural history of the province in the 1960s.

During the summer of 2017, I had the privilege to complete a work term at the Legislative Library at the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly. Ms. Kenda Clark-Gorey and her dedicated staff of the library gave me the opportunity to consult the collection and find key sources for this project. Also, I would like to thank the employees of the New Brunswick Legislature for extending me the opportunity to work as a page during the 59th Legislative Assembly during the period of October 2018 to March 2019. When the great chronicler of Lyndon Johnson, Robert Caro, sought to understand the Texas Hill Country, he turned to sleeping rough on a neighbouring property of the Johnson Ranch to get the lay of the land.¹ In some quixotic way, my time as a page gave me a tutorial in the New Brunswick legislative process and exposed me to the tenor of debate and the daily business of the House. It allowed me, in a small way, to contextualize the legislative initiatives of the Robichaud-Hatfield period. I thank the Assembly’s hardworking and professional staff for affording me this opportunity.

Finally, I want to thank my parents. Your love and support have been steadfast, without which I would not have such a profound love for History and Home. Thank you.

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CURRICULUM VITAE
INTRODUCTION

The Program of Equal Opportunity: “Frankly Based on Swedish Socialism.”¹

In February 1966, a cantankerous former British army officer-turned-newspaperman lambasted the New Brunswick government’s reform agenda. Brigadier Michael Wardell was the owner and publisher of The Atlantic Advocate magazine as well as the Fredericton newspaper, The Daily Gleaner. A friend of Lord Beaverbrook and K.C. Irving, Wardell was deeply critical of the Program of Equal Opportunity (EO). This comprehensive reform package sought to combat the disparities in public service delivery among New Brunswick’s municipalities and counties and saw the province assume administrative control over education, healthcare, social welfare, and justice. The program was the brainchild of Liberal Premier Louis Robichaud, who “revolutionized” New Brunswick’s government and sociopolitical order.² Equal Opportunity established government centralization in order to standardize the quality of and the access to public services. For Wardell, EO was “frankly based on Swedish socialism.” Later in the same editorial, Wardell opined that the reforms posed were “disastrous to human liberties.”³

Finally, the newspaperman was contemptuous of the architect of EO, Premier Robichaud, whom he called “a little man with a violently expressive mouth which grimaces as he articulates a torrent of words on any subject in French or English…” The British-born Michael Wardell’s ad hominem attack was informed by his partisanship and anti-French sentiments; however, his mischaracterization of New Brunswick’s adoption of Swedish socialism was curiously rooted in a half-truth.5

In an effort to modernize New Brunswick, the province’s bureaucrats and elected officials looked to other governments and jurisdictions for policy inspiration throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As above, they also looked to Sweden. The wide-reaching Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation (The Byrne Commission) laid out the challenges and possible solutions for New Brunswick’s sociopolitical woes. In 1963, Alexandre J. Boudreau, a university administrator at the newly formed Université de Moncton, submitted to the Byrne Commission a report of his study tour of Sweden. Published as an appendix to the final Royal Commission report, Boudreau’s study highlighted the government policies, approaches to public administration and social welfare in the Scandinavian country. Throughout the document Boudreau underscored the absence of corruption within the civil service and the overall high level of integrity expressed by Swedish public officials.6 Some senior members of Sweden’s Ministry of

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Social Affairs and Finance raised concerns with Boudreau when he outlined the state of public services in New Brunswick: “they unanimously expressed the conviction that to suggest an overall program of social welfare, with eight to ten per cent of the labour force unemployed, such as we have in our province of New Brunswick, inevitably leads to economic bankruptcy.” New Brunswick had social welfare backwards according to the Swedish bureaucrats.

For the Swedes, the extension of government services in the form of public education, healthcare, and employment insurance, was cast in moral terms. Professor Boudreau encapsulated the ethos of Sweden’s modern sociopolitical order by quoting Konrad Persson, the Director-General of National Pensions of Sweden:

I repeat that all social welfare rests on two pillars, humanitarianism and economic progress. It is my experience that it is quite impossible to conduct social welfare solely from an economic standpoint, even though outwardly it could develop well. It would be more like a sharp, unfriendly cactus in the desert, which can grow very high, but which one prefers not to come too close to. At the same time, it is impossible to take only the humanitarian point of view, because then you would have a tree bearing beautiful fruit, but which could not live long because it would lack nourishment and strength for its continued existence.

New Brunswick did not borrow any of the administrative practices or government policies of Sweden’s social democracy. The provincial government of Louis Robichaud, however, articulated his vision for New Brunswick in roughly the same language. The Program of Equal Opportunity was as much an effort to improve the economic wellbeing of New Brunswickers as it was a modernization program. The young Acadian Premier had a desire to enact wide-reaching progressive change with all the technical and

8 Ibid.
9 Boudreau, Appendix H, 22.
bureaucratic resources of government. This process can be largely examined under the concept of high modernism: the use of science and technical planning by the state to transform a population, an economy, or the natural environment in an effort to promote progressive change.\textsuperscript{10} From Fredericton to Stockholm and jurisdictions from around the world, policymakers and elected officials in the 1950s and 1960s utilized the power of the state to improve the lives of their citizens.

**The Era of Equal Opportunity: An Argument**

Both the governments of Louis Robichaud and Richard Hatfield pursued modernizing reforms in an attempt to uplift the province of New Brunswick during the mid to late twentieth century. Cast against a wider period of reform that swept throughout Europe, North America, and the Global South, these two premiers of New Brunswick sought to change the province during what heretofore will be known as the era of Equal Opportunity.

The election of Louis Robichaud ushered in the “Robichaud moment” in New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{11} Not unlike Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, New Brunswick struggled to absorb the sociocultural shifts of the 1960s. In part, Fredericton completely overhauled the administration of provincial services and adopted a robust welfare state. The program of


\textsuperscript{11} New Brunswick’s first Acadian Premier was Peter “Pierre” John Véniot, a Liberal who was appointed upon the resignation of Walter E. Foster. He served from 1923-25. Michel Cormier, *Louis J. Robichaud*, 14.
Equal Opportunity was formally instituted in New Brunswick between 1963-1970. The totality of the reform package included more than 130 bills that centralized and standardized public service.\textsuperscript{12} Rural francophones and anglophones were among the chief beneficiaries of government investment. The Acadian people have come to lionize Robichaud as a visionary and as a man of “destiny” who fought for the amelioration of French New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{13} Ultimately, Robichaud’s Liberal government attempted the creation of technocracy, a government which employed experts, consultants, planners, economists, bureaucrats, and engineers to draft legislation and implement law. While EO sought to empower technocrats to carry out reforms, this regime was often frustrated by political considerations and the requirements of elected office. The physical manifestations of progress and modernity in New Brunswick included: schools, hospitals, universities, parks, roads, bridges, and dams. On welfare reforms, the province at mid-century has been considered the “social laboratory” of Canada.\textsuperscript{14}

This period of development did not end with a change in government. Defeated in 1970, Louis Robichaud was replaced by the Progressive Conservative Premier Richard Hatfield. While the anglophone lawyer from Hartland, New Brunswick may have been tempted to repeal the reforms of the 1960s and satisfy his predominately English


\textsuperscript{13} Antonine Maillet, “Preface,” in Michael Cormier’s \textit{Louis Robichaud}, 8.

\textsuperscript{14} Michael Cormier, \textit{Louis Robichaud}, 205.
supporters, Hatfield entrenched Equal Opportunity and continued in the tradition of activist governments of the period. This project employs the scholarly periodization of the ‘Long 1960s’: This era “contains a unity of experience, defined by events, values, and political and social hierarchies.” For the authors of Debating Dissent, ‘the Long 1960s’ represent an “idea,” not simply a decade of time. Indeed, it is more effective to periodize the developments of the era of Equal Opportunity within this framework. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Canada and the world experienced momentous change—It is useful to employ this lens as a means to establish context.

This thesis argues that Equal Opportunity should not be viewed as a narrow period of reform from 1963-1970, the duration of the Robichaud program, but rather part and parcel of the wider legislative initiatives that span the Robichaud-Hatfield governments—and to a lesser extent precedes Robichaud’s first administration in 1960. While consistent with the literature, this project is more forceful in its assertion that the two administrations constituted one policy regime. This period reflected the sociopolitical climate in which New Brunswickers more readily engaged their government. This era of progressivism in New Brunswick was constructed during, what has been described as, a high modernist context of wide-reaching social change and legislative reform both in Canada and abroad that had roots in the 1950s. This aspect of the era of Equal

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Opportunity has received little attention in the academic literature and constitutes this project’s contribution to the fields of Atlantic Canadian History and the history of the expansion of the welfare state. Make no mistake, this thesis is not a work of hagiography. Both Robichaud and Hatfield, as well as the key architects of the era of Equal Opportunity, are not without their shortcomings or failings. This thesis takes the form of contextualized prosopography, a methodological approach that explores multiple individuals that share common traits; this group-based analysis highlights the wider significance of its constituent members and is more effective than simple biography.

The aim of this project is to explore the history of the interventionist welfare state at mid-century through international and regional contexts. Rather than employing a conventional chronology, this thesis presents its arguments in a thematic structure. The principal primary sources for this project include the papers of the Premiers of New Brunswick, oral histories of senior bureaucrats, government reports, as well as newspaper accounts. Finally, the memoirs, papers, and press reports of bureaucrats, public officials, and citizen-activists throughout New Brunswick’s Acadian and anglophone communities.

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18 Economic planning and industrial investment in the province were frustrated under the successive governments of Louis Robichaud and Richard Hatfield. For Robichaud, the province’s role in the Saint John Urban Renewal scheme is considered a glaring failure and a lesson in the politics of unintended consciences. The extension of loan guarantees to Fundy Chemical, according to the Acadian premier’s biographer, was a “financial and industrial disaster.” Della M.M. Stanley, *Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power* (Halifax, NS: Nimbus, 1984), 222. Richard Hatfield’s frequent travel outside the province and later his own legal troubles became a distraction for his leadership. Nancy Southham, ed., *Remembering Richard: An Informal portrait of Richard Hatfield by his Friends, Family, and Colleagues* (Halifax, NS: Formac Publishing, 1993), 76. See also, Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud’s *Richard Hatfield: Power and Disobedience*, trans. Daphne Ponder (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane Editions, 1992). Chapter nine, “The Accused,” details Hatfield’s infamous 1984 cannabis charge related to his shared flight with Queen Elizabeth II, 171-183.

will contextualize the impact of a progress-oriented regime. Civil servants devised and implemented these reforms; however, any ambitions for the establishment of a true technocracy in New Brunswick were largely dashed. Attention was drawn to the ‘Picture Province’ far from its borders. In sum, New Brunswickers looked outward and looked inward to institute landmark reform during the era of Equal Opportunity.
CHAPTER ONE

Towards a Historiography of the Era of Equal Opportunity

This project dialogues with four broad historiographies. First, the literature on high modernism traces the development of sociopolitical change within a global and national context. Experts and officials sought to use the tenets of scientific progress and the administrative powers of the state to change the physical and institutional landscape of a jurisdiction at mid-century. Physical change is not limited to space and place. Planners and politicians attempted to engineer culture and citizens. Second, the historiography of ‘the Atlantic Revolution’ effectively tempers the scholarly critique of high modernist planning. Historians like E.R. Forbes and Margaret Conrad reject regional stereotypes of ‘backwardness’ and shed light on the social and material improvements in Atlantic Canada during the 1950s, the “Decade of Development.” Third, the era of Equal Opportunity followed national reform and social change in the late 1950s, throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s. The launching of legislative reforms in New Brunswick paralleled the establishment of the federal Royal Commission on Bilingualism and

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1 The title of this chapter is inspired by the subtitle of the introduction to Lara Campbell, Dominique Clément, and Gregory S. Kealey’s Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties, “Time, Age, Myth: Towards a History of the Sixties,” 3.
Biculturalism in 1963 and policies of consolidation and standardization in John Robarts’s Ontario and Jean Lesage’s Quebec. Hatfield’s entrenchment of Equal Opportunity, the enacting of a provincial Official Languages Act, and leadership during the patriation of the Constitution took place in the climate of federal-provincial cooperation that saw evolving views of citizenship and rights. Furthermore, Equal Opportunity attracted national attention for its bold reforms.4 Finally, this project will engage with the political science literature that offers an assessment of the Robichaud-Hatfield period and the expansion of the welfare state in New Brunswick.

The Program of Equal Opportunity: A Summary

Writing in the mid-1950s, political scientist Hugh Thorburn profiled the systemic challenges of the sociopolitical life of New Brunswick. He decried the “pervasive localism” inherent in New Brunswick’s political culture.5 In the 1950s, New Brunswick’s demographic divide largely mirrors its contemporary population profile. Two-thirds of the province was English and one-third French. Defined by subsistence agriculture as well as work in the fisheries and forestry sectors, rural New Brunswickers eked out a precarious economic existence. Moreover, Acadians lived largely in rural coastal settings

5 Hugh Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 184.
in the north and south-east of the province. According to scholar Nelson Wisemen, the early 1900s looked like the late-eighteenth century to the political observer.6

Anglophone residents in the small urban centers of Fredericton, Moncton, and Saint John became more accustomed to better schools, health services, and a stronger economy in the 1950s.7 However, divisions between region, language, and religion produced a form of “parish pump politics” throughout the province.8 By demanding local infrastructure improvements—road grating and paving—and minor fixes to social services, residents supported political candidates who would enhance local life.9 Parochialism, social immobility, and a party system that defended the status quo made political reform challenging.10 Thorburn underscored the rise of incomes and material amenities in the late 1950s. The narrow focus on local concerns and party loyalty might be abated in the future, Thorburn argues; however, New Brunswick’s parochial character was deeply entrenched.11 Thorburn’s important study went to press in 1961. Though he profiled New Brunswick in the late 1950s, the Ontario political scientist believed that the results of the 1960 vote would produce stasis: “The dramatic election of 1960 is not covered- although I do not think it calls for any significant modifying of my

8 Hugh Thorburn, 9.
9 Thorburn, 48. However, he continues: “New Brunswick politicians spend most of their time promoting local, and often inconsequential projects,” 184.
10 Thorburn, 181-182.
11 Thorburn, 185.
conclusions.” Throughout the literature, scholars have posited whether Equal Opportunity represented a true break from the “pervasive localism” or simply a divergence. After all, the politics of New Brunswick are continually characterized as traditional.

Louis Robichaud’s election in 1960 was both a break in the narrow parochialism of past governments and a continuation of steady state-led economic development. Mid-century academics, like Hugh Thorburn, largely missed the similarities between Robichaud and his predecessors on economic policy. The Acadian premier from rural Kent County attempted to change the socioeconomic makeup of New Brunswick. Strictly speaking, the Program of Equal Opportunity was meant to address income and public service disparity. The Robichaud government sought to combat inequality through centralization of “services to people.” Most public spending occurred at the local level. New Brunswick’s counties, fifteen in total, ranged from wealthy anglophone urban jurisdictions in the south, like St. John and York, to impoverished Kent and Gloucester Counties in the north and east.

Nowhere was the disparity more pronounced than in the area of public education, which is the focus of much of the literature. County council governments in francophone New Brunswick often could only afford to fund students until grade nine. In 1962,

12 Thorburn, vii.
13 Thorburn, 184.
Acadian Gloucester County spent $144 per pupil whereas St. John County allocated $312 for each student. Most teachers in northeastern Gloucester and Kent Counties were young women who were ill-trained and poorly paid; a salary of $2,840 was just under half of the national median income. Furthermore, only 17 percent of residents in the northeast had been educated up to grade nine or higher compared to 33 percent of the Canadian population in 1961. County councils that encompassed urban centres had more stable fiscal capacities. In the 1950s, York and St. John Counties paid teachers more and extended public secondary education to all. Thus, among the Robichaud government’s first major reforms was “the reallocation of responsibilities and fiscal arrangements” between the province and the cities, towns, and villages.

To achieve a more equitable province, Robichaud tabled the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation to stabilize New Brunswick tax collection and streamline local government. Spearheaded by Bathurst lawyer Edward Byrne, the Commission was launched in 1963. The province’s first modern and comprehensive policy advisory recommended the consolidation of local government to standardize revenue generation and combat service disparity. So central was the Byrne Commission to New Brunswick’s development that UNB professor Murray Young used the final

report to teach the modern history of the province during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{21} Pointing to the wider significance of the Commission, Robert Young argues that during the research period and later at the report’s tabling, the “language of inequality dominated the discourse.”\textsuperscript{22} Local government was reformed into four jurisdictional forms: cities, towns, villages, and local services districts for the most rural communalities. Thus, Robichaud’s government abolished county councils. In urban centres, the opposition to centralization was profound. Many irate anglophones in the three largest cities denounced Robichaud’s efforts to consolidate and standardize services. Effectively, the Liberal government employed policies of wealth redistribution and investment in social programs.\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{The Saint John Telegraph-Journal}, “a letter to the editor” encapsulated the more strident English view that the Program of Equal Opportunity was “Robbing Peter to Pay Pierre.”\textsuperscript{24} In the public discourse, anglophone support for the Acadian premier rarely rose to the forefront. Notwithstanding, rural English-speaking New Brunswickers were aided by the extension of provincial social services.\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{22} Robert Young, 25.
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In 1965, Louis Robichaud outlined his activist government’s central ethos. The *White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government* served as a bridge between the enactment of the Municipalities Act and later legislative initiatives to reform education and social welfare. Robichaud and his government framed their policies in deeply moral terms—ones that were emblematic of government intervention throughout North America and Western Europe: “guaranteeing acceptable minimum standards of social, economic, and cultural opportunity without in any way restricting maximum opportunities for the individual, the community, or any sector of society.”26 A commitment to social improvement in New Brunswick mirrored national and international change. By 1970, historian Lisa Pasolli notes, a truly professional civil service had worked in concert with elected officials to bring about lasting change.27

The effects of Equal Opportunity were profound. The provincial government was able to finance this enormous reform package with the help of federal equalization payments and an activist government in Ottawa. Revenues to the provincial coffers increased by 297 percent towards the end of the Robichaud decade.28 A centralized government redistributed monies through unconditional municipal grants. Thus, the program of Equal Opportunity raised the expectations of citizens. Acadians were effectively incorporated into the political and economic life by the mid-1980s; Acadian communities saw transfers from Fredericton increase by 242 percent and anglophone

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28 Robert Young, 31.
centres saw spending jump to 236 percent. In education, teacher salaries were standardized. New Brunswick’s 433 school districts, where a one-room school house might constitute a single district, were consolidated into 33 across the province. In health, the province took over the administration of hospitals and the construction of new health facilities. Personal incomes did increase in the wake of Equal Opportunity.

Equal Opportunity was not without controversy. Political power and service delivery was consolidated by the provincial government. Cities like Moncton and Saint John lost control over certain policy fields such as direct property taxation. In fact, the capital city was the only urban centre that saw marked economic growth in the wake of EO. Scholars attribute this to the expansion of the provincial civil service. The most glaring failures of the era of Equal Opportunity were reforms that did not explicitly promote socioeconomic gains for women or Indigenous peoples. The expansion of social services, at mid-century, was all too uneven.

Though a reform-minded regime sought to unify the province, EO exposed the tensions between an activist government and a divided sociocultural community. In 1967, the Liberal government won a modest reelection on the platform of Equal Opportunity,

29 Young, 32.
30 Young, 24.
31 Young, 32.
32 Young, 33.
even though its support fell along linguistic lines. The election of 1970 was not as kind to Louis Robichaud’s government. Francophone New Brunswick had been uplifted but the Liberal’s approach to political change became too incremental for some Acadian youth—divisions within the French minority splintered. More significantly, disaffected anglophones in urban New Brunswick propelled the Progressive Conservatives to victory. In his own words, Louis Robichaud anticipated defeat: “I had been there for ten years. A change was inevitable. I’d done too much for the Acadians and the English wanted a break.”

Richard Hatfield, however, did not undermine the ‘Robichaud Revolution.’ By entrenching the program of Equal Opportunity and enacting the Official Languages Act, Nelson Wiseman argues a “bilingual administrative and policy regime” was preserved.

**Tracing High Modernism: From Global Change to Here at Home**

Equal Opportunity has received a great deal of attention from the historians of Atlantic Canada. Furthermore, it remains one of the most written about periods in the history of New Brunswick. Most scholars of history and political science have not sufficiency theorized this episode or placed in its wider context. Historian Tina Loo writes, “When it comes to theory and method, historians tend to be borrowers and not lenders.” This thesis carries on such a practice. Scholars who trace the spatial and sociocultural changes of the twentieth century have benefited from the academic work of

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34 Stanley, 212.
35 Nelson Wiseman, *In Search of Canadian Political Culture*, 139.
James C. Scott. Not satisfied with conventional understandings of material progress, the American political scientist and anthropologist developed a critical framework that stresses the transformational nature of modernity, where average citizens were no longer the chief architects of socioeconomic change. By mid-century, planners, engineers, bureaucrats, scientists—both physical and social—as well as a whole host of experts employed sophisticated methodologies to enact change on the broadest possible level. The results of this “muscle-bound” state-led change are mixed.37

High modernism and its ideas have been felt in the United States in projects ranging from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a community and energy development project, to Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society legislative initiative.38 In Canada, high modernist change has affected the physical as well as social landscape. From resettlement projects in Newfoundland and in the North to the destruction of Africville outside of Halifax, Nova Scotia, the entire country was shaped and remade by engineers working in alignment with the bureaucrat.39 In New Brunswick, hydroelectric projects damned rivers and attempted to jumpstart the provincial economy.40

The Program of Equal Opportunity can be interrogated under the rubric of high modernism in an attempt to transform the social and economic potential of citizens. While Robichaud, and later Hatfield, standardized and consolidated public services, the provincial regime sought to transform the socioeconomic makeup of New Brunswickers. Scholars like Tina Loo and Margaret Conrad effectively temper the critique of state-led change. Just as General Electric hoped, many residents of Canada and the Maritimes welcomed, as the G.E. jingle goes, “living better electrically.”\textsuperscript{41} While a modest literature on high modernist change exists for New Brunswick, a direct examination of EO under a more holistic assessment of state-led development represents this project’s intervention into the field of Atlantic Canadian History.

Narrow definitions of modernity that focus on the citizen-turned-consumer become insufficient to describe this systemized process of development in the twentieth century. In Scott’s landmark work, \textit{Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed}, he argues that high modernist change is brought about through highly technical and scientific planning. Confident state-led initiatives that advocated the remaking of the physical and social landscape were the norm.\textsuperscript{42} The totality of this system “seeks the mastery of nature (including human nature).”\textsuperscript{43} More importantly, Scott contends that, at its core, high modernism is concerned with rationality

\textsuperscript{42} Scott, \textit{Seeing like a State}, 4.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
and transformation. This ideology is situated principally within “the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws. It originated, of course, in the West, as a by-product of unprecedented progress in science and industry.”

Landscapes could be tamed, and natural resources could fuel material progress.

More significantly, states could remake citizens. Scott’s “High Modernist Social Engineering: The Case Study of the Tennessee Valley Authority” argues that planners, visionaries, and all manner of experts tried to transform the citizen in the hopes of spurring material and moral progress. In the 1930s, engineers, agronomists, planners, and economists descended on the Tennessee River Valley in the southeastern US to dam rivers for flood prevention and hydroelectric development. The building of schools, housing, and even efforts in hygiene instruction rounded out the program. Planners and officials used the language of reinvention: the aim was to “take a backwards region and ‘bring it into the twentieth century.’” Furthermore, Scott argues that the Tennessee Valley Authority desired to rehabilitate a backwards population and provide them the means for economic and cultural citizenship.

The TVA became a model for regional

44 Ibid.
48 Scott, 19.
49 Ibid.
development; indeed, as historian James L. Kenny and economist Andrew G. Secord observe, New Brunswick looked south to the TVA and other initiatives for technical and policy inspiration.⁵⁰

If the United States was the epicenter of high modernism planning and social engineering, then John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were the figureheads of modernity. The legacy of Kennedy’s optimism, realized by Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty, rippled throughout North America. Both administrations employed powerful state agencies to tackle poverty. Both governments, staffed with technocrats, attempted to remake the citizen. In New Brunswick, Robichaud and Hatfield evoked the images of these American liberal giants. Michel Cormier argues that Robichaud modeled himself after Kennedy. The Acadian premier made a conscious effort to tie his regime to the language and symbols coming out of Washington: “The idea of equal opportunity was everywhere. John Kennedy constantly preached equality in the US. That’s why we called our program the Program of Equal Opportunity.”⁵¹ Furthermore, political scientist Chedly Belkhodja notes that Robichaud conceptualized EO within the wider current of social and economic change. Mindful of the civil rights movement, the Acadian premier looked to the vision of JFK. New Brunswick’s 1965 White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government singles out development initiatives launched by the Kennedy Administration

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⁵¹ Cormier, Louis Robichaud: A Not So Quiet Revolution, 178.
to promote intercontinental cooperation in the fight against poverty.\textsuperscript{52} The American president worked hard to promote harmony and civility in a divided nation; Robichaud pursued the same goals in New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{53} Biographers of Richard Hatfield, too, argue the Hartland-born politician was an acolyte of the Kennedys. Hatfield had a profound appreciation for both John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy’s “idealism and unfinished social agenda.”\textsuperscript{54} During the era of Equal Opportunity political leadership deeply mattered. However, it was the technocrats and functionaries who implemented changed.

Throughout Canada, the high modernist planner used state-led schemes to transform citizens and depressed regions. In pre-Confederation Newfoundland, its government employed methods of “rationalization” to stabilize the fishery at mid-century through now-infamous Resettlement programs.\textsuperscript{55} Residents of smaller outports were physically moved to small towns, regional cities or the island’s capital for the purpose of consolidation and service administration.\textsuperscript{56} This was not only for settler communities. During the 1950s, the Inuit were forcible housed in permanent communities by the

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\item \textsuperscript{52} The Alliance for Progress was a joint US-Latin American partnership advocated for socioeconomic improvement. \textit{White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government} (Fredericton, NB: Queen’s Printer, 1965), 6.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Chedly Belkhodja, “The Right Responds to Change: Opposition to the Robichaud Reforms in New Brunswick” in \textit{The Louis Robichaud Proceedings}, 125.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, \textit{Richard Hatfield: Power and Disobedience}, trans. Daphne Ponder (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane Editions, 1992), 22.
\item \textsuperscript{55} James L. Kenny and Andrew G. Secord, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Kenny and Secord, 4. For more on the high-modernist practices of Newfoundland see \textit{Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of Newfoundland fishery, 1934-1968} (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press in Canada, 2001). This source is identified in Kenny and Secord’s “Engineering Modernity”, 4.
\end{itemize}
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federal government to assert Canadian sovereignty in the North.\textsuperscript{57} Neither was the focus entirely on rural areas. Urban Renewal schemes of the 1950s and 1960s ran diametrically opposed to Jane Jacobs’ tenets of organic city planning. Demolition and construction occurred in cities like Toronto, Montreal, Saint John, and Halifax.\textsuperscript{58} Entire city neighbourhoods were destroyed in the name of urban progress. Most notably, the historically Black community of Africville in Halifax was forcibly removed in an effort to clear a “blighted” region.\textsuperscript{59} And whole economies were remade. Hydroelectric projects in British Columbia changed the landscape and its society. Tina Loo argues that Premier W.A.C. Bennett and the business elite saw hydroelectric projects as a means to transform an economy based on natural resources, provide a stable supply of energy, and transform the people of BC.\textsuperscript{60} Even effecting family composition, hydro projects had the capacity to reform itinerant male labourers into breadwinners, thus encouraging nuclear families.\textsuperscript{61}


\textsuperscript{60} Loo, “High Modernism, Conflict, and the Nature of Change in Canada,” 39-40.

\textsuperscript{61} Loo, “High Modernism, 40.
The high modernist dream was transplanted from BC, Quebec, and the US to New Brunswick.

The Picture Province’s most pronounced physical impact of high modernism was hydroelectric construction. Historian James L. Kenny and economist Andrew G. Secord argue the provincial dam projects at Beachwood and Mactaquac “became tangible expressions of high modernism.” Vast structures of concrete and a large headpond became what historian David Nye has termed the “technological sublime.” At the same time, governments established provincial parks, sites which became popular with visitors. Returning to Scott’s high modernist social engineering, towns were razed and residents were forcibly removed—the state had to “rehabilitate” its citizens. Both Kenny and Secord as well as historian Ronald Rudin argue that the TVA was a direct inspiration for Louis Robichaud’s government. The Premier travelled to the United States on a “power tour” in 1963. Under the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, the engineers were the principal drivers of the Mactaquac project. Citizens’ concerns were dismissed as “backwards”; the development stood to open up private sector investment.

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62 Kenny and Secord, 4.
63 Loo, 40.
65 Kenny and Secord, 4; Ronald Rudin, Kouchibougouac: Removal, Resistance, and Remembrance at a Canadian National Park (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 101.
67 Kenny and Secord, 5.
In the economic sphere, provincial investment in Malcom Bricklin’s SV1, a gull-winged sports car, was a high-profile effort to modernize New Brunswick. Often read as shorthand for an economic boondoggle or the worst of state-led development, the prospect of automotive manufacturing in New Brunswick was met with “optimism” and excitement in the early 1970s. When Richard Hatfield and provincial planners were approached by the flashy Malcom Bricklin, whose most successful automotive venture was the introduction of the Subaru to North America, Fredericton was willing to take a chance. Why New Brunswick, why not? The gull-winged sports car, with its acrylic body, represented a “new beginning” for the province and driver of “industrial modernity” for the province. Planners and apparatchiks from Tokyo to Moscow and from Brasilia to Mexico City believed automotive manufacturing was the preeminent industry of a modern state; cars rolling off an assembly line singled that a country had “arrived.” The automotive industry, then as it does now, argues historian Dimitry Anastakis, represents the most sophisticated and demanding sector within a developed economy. Anastakis’s article “The Quest of the Volk(swagen): The Bricklin Car, Industrial Modernity, and New Brunswick” explores the 1973-1975 project as an episode of high modernist planning that went sideways. Anastakis cuts through the nostalgia and contextualizes the Bricklin as a project that might have put province on modern economic

69 Anastakis, “The Quest of the Volk(swagen),” 89.
70 Anastakis, “The Quest of the Volk(swagen),” 92.
71 Anastakis, 99, 108.
72 Anastakis, 91.
footing. Moreover, the project was in keeping with state-led efforts in the Maritimes to supplement traditional extractive industries.\(^{73}\) Indeed, Hatfield tied his own leadership to the gull-winged car in 1974: “I hope and believe the Bricklin car will now become a symbol of what New Brunswick and its people can do, an example of the risks we must run, the patience we must show, the faith we must keep if we are to become a province of economic opportunity and diversity.”\(^{74}\) New Brunswickers forgave Hatfield for the automotive dud and reelected the Progressive Conservatives in 1974. The project remains an important feature of the province’s high modernist moment.

The most significant recent work that uses the lens of high modernism to explore environmental and community change in New Brunswick is Ronald Rudin’s *Kouchibouguac: Removal, Resistance, and Remembrance at a Canadian National Park*. Rudin argues that the creation of a national park in 1969 on the Acadian coast, in impoverished Kent County, was pursued in the same aggressive manner as other mid-century development schemes. Land was expropriated from rural Acadian and Indigenous residents to establish Kouchibouguac National Park to spur economic development. Residents were displaced and forced to reestablish their lives elsewhere.\(^{75}\)

Ronald Rudin is among the few scholars to utilize the framework of high modernism when commenting on the Robichaud government, or on the Program of Equal Opportunity. Rudin argues that Robichaud’s language of equality did not enter into the public discourse during the creation of the national park. As a fellow resident of Kent

\(^{73}\) Anastakis, 100-101.
\(^{74}\) Anastakis, 104.
\(^{75}\) Rudin, 72-73.
County, the premier dismissed the Acadians threatened by dislocation as “destitute[s]” who would happily benefit from the jobs a park may bring. The author further notes that Richard Hatfield’s government was required to steward the development of the park and was more sympathetic to those displaced. In sum, Ronald Rudin presents Louis Robichaud as “an unqualified supporter of the high modernist vision.” In the context of the park, Rudin concludes that the Acadian premier showed “little interest in listening to poor people’s perspectives on their lives.”

Expressions of high modernism were manifested in the province’s physical structures. John Leroux, architect and art historian has written on the links between state power, built space, and design. In 1967, the New Brunswick government acquired a new headquarters for the provincial civil service, the Centennial Building. The physical structure, according to Leroux, “represents the culmination of the international style of high modernism in New Brunswick.” Speaking at the official opening of the Centennial Building, Robichaud heralded the new edifice: “New Brunswick’s Centennial Building stands as a monument to the honour of achievements past; a symbol of our future aspirations. More than that, it epitomizes the progressive spirit of our people and

76 Rudin, 133.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
indicates our confidence in our bright future." Paraphrasing Robert Pichette, Special Assistant to Premier Robichaud, John Leroux notes that the Centennial Building epitomized the spirit of progressive change in New Brunswick: “it was a visual manifestation of the Equal Opportunity program that would drastically reform the province.” However, Leroux argues the building’s aesthetic was not always well received by the general public. Della Stanley notes that Centennial Building became known as the “Glass Palace”—the domain of politicians and functionaries.

Historian James Kenny investigates Equal Opportunity through the lens of gender. Under one of EO’s ancillary economic development programs in northeastern New Brunswick, reforms to employment schemes promoted male breadwinners and forced women into the domestic sphere. Kenny argues that the Northeast Plan, used to promote economic development in an impoverished era of the province, also ascribed to the tenets of high modernism and social engineering. From Fredericton, technocrats worked in conjunction with the federal government to radically transform New Brunswick. An “alphabet soup” of federal agencies and initiatives attempted to transform the citizens of the Maritimes; these plans also targeted northern New Brunswick: FRED (Fund for Rural Economic Development) under the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA), tied into Conseil Regional d’Aménagement du Nord (CRAN)

in conjunction with the provinces’ CIC (Community Improvement Corporation) tried to rehabilitate residents by encouraging them to abandon rural life.\textsuperscript{86} Kenny argues that success of the programs was mixed. However, the extension of new financial relief payments fell along gender lines. Programs privileged married men, while unmarried women, single working mothers, and those who were separated or widowed saw no financial support in northern New Brunswick in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{87} Like other high modernist schemes, New Brunswick’s Program of Equal Opportunity disproportionately created opportunities for men. In defiance of the lopsided Northeast Plan, Acadian union activist Mathilda Blanchard, a single mother who supported herself as a hairdresser, criticized the province for extending insufficient aid to the rural poor. Notably, she was the first woman to run for the leadership of a political party when she unsuccessfully challenged Richard Hatfield in 1969. Blanchard, according to Kenny, typified female activism in the era of Equal Opportunity.\textsuperscript{88}

Transformation of the population was almost secondary to the recreation of an economic order in the high modernist tradition. In New Brunswick, the long-term goal of lawmakers was the stabilization of the economy. In fact, many have framed the program of Equal Opportunity as principally an economic development scheme. Robert Young argues politicians and bureaucrats tried desperately to combat the wasted potential of

human capital.\textsuperscript{89} To reference Robichaud’s first election slogan, “New Brunswick [couldn’t] wait.”\textsuperscript{90} By centralizing the delivery of public services, the Robichaud-Hatfield era tried to right the ship of state and make New Brunswick modern.

While James Scott and other scholars have presented the negative externalities of high modernist change in the era of Equal Opportunity, Tina Loo’s scholarship highlights some of the benefits that engineers and planners introduced. While massive change brought environmental destruction, it also afforded ecologists and public officials the opportunity to study the limitations of the natural world.\textsuperscript{91} Loo challenges Scott’s pessimistic assessment of mid-century change and refutes the “declensionist narrative” that presents high modernism in “terms of degradation.”\textsuperscript{92} In Eastern Canada many Maritimers welcomed the socioeconomic changes of the 1950s and 1960s. The impacts of modernity are, therefore, complex and varied.

\textbf{The Atlantic Revolution and Currents of National Change: The Roots of State-led Development in New Brunswick and Equal Opportunity}

In the 1940s, it was not uncommon for rural residents to only ride in an automobile once every four years. On election day, political candidates sent cars to round up voters. By the end of the 1960s, however, the trappings of modernity were commonplace throughout New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{93} Historians W.S. MacNutt, E.R. Forbes, and Margaret Conrad have challenged the regional stereotypes of Atlantic Canada, noting

\textsuperscript{89} Young, 26.
\textsuperscript{90} The slogan was “New Brunswick can’t want.” Stanley, \textit{Louis Robichaud}, 42.
\textsuperscript{91} Loo, 49, 53.
\textsuperscript{92} Loo, 34.
\textsuperscript{93} Margaret Conrad, “The 1950s: The Decade of Development,” 382.
how, in the 1950s, the region experienced a more adversarial relationship with Ottawa. Lawmakers in the East demanded a new relationship with Canada, one where economic and material prosperity were enjoyed in all regions. In the post-war era until the 1950s, the provinces became more active in the field of economic development and social investment.  

In New Brunswick, the period would lead to the establishment of Equal Opportunity. Dubbed ‘the Atlantic Revolution’ by historian W.S. MacNutt, bureaucrats and officials flexed the muscle of the state. Conrad writes that the people of the Maritimes were informed by a desire for equality among the provinces and material progress. Indeed, many families craved suburban life as well as the social standing that homeownership and modern technologies such as a dishwasher or television afforded. Maritimers felt incensed that the federal government had ignored their concerns. Under the leadership of Premier Hugh John Flemming (1952-1960)—prior to Robichaud—Conrad argues, New Brunswick experienced a new form of activist government. The civil service expanded, infrastructure took off, and the construction of hydroelectric projects spurred material progress. Flemming found allies in the form of experts from the University of New Brunswick. Change, although, was uneven. In anglophone New Brunswick, modernity had come to the cities. In francophone New Brunswick, the

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94 Conrad, 401-402.  
95 Conrad, 401.  
96 Conrad, 404.  
97 Conrad, 401.  
98 Conrad, 404.
Acadian Renaissance—an era of higher political engagement, cultural consciousness, and an active civil society—laid the groundwork for reform in the 1960s and 1970s.⁹⁹

Lisa Pasolli writes that the Atlantic Revolution was sustained through the professionalization of the New Brunswick civil service. Effectively, the 1960s saw the amelioration of the province’s bureaucracy along the lines of technocratic managerial practices that allowed the Robichaud and Hatfield governments to implement Equal Opportunities.¹⁰⁰ Having seen the gains in Saskatchewan’s sociopolitical modernization, Robichaud and other New Brunswick public officials successfully poached Donald Tansley, the chair of the Medical Care Insurance Commission under the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, to drive change in New Brunswick.¹⁰¹ Six other ex-prairie bureaucrats followed Tansley to Fredericton, known affectionately as “the Saskatchewan Mafia.”¹⁰² Pasolli argues that the era underscored the rise of professional public servants as key government functionaries.

On the social policy side, the governments of Louis Robichaud and Richard Hatfield constituted, by and large, a unified policy regime. In “Last Province Aboard: New Brunswick and National Medicare” Gregory Marchildon and Nicole O’Byrne argue the administrations of Robichaud and Hatfield subscribed to the same goals for social

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⁹⁹ Much has been written on the developments of Acadian sociopolitical engagement in the 1950s and 1960s. See Philip Doucet’s, “Politics and the Acadians,” in Acadia of the Maritimes: Thematic Studies from the Beginning to the Present, ed. Jean Daigle, 287-329 (Moncton, NB: Chaire d’etudes acadiennes, Université de Moncton, 1995).
¹⁰¹ Donald Tansley and his colleagues effectively spearheaded the implementation of Medicare in Saskatchewan under Tommy Douglas. Pasolli, 127.
services and health policy. Under Robichaud, New Brunswick became one of the earliest proponents of a national medicare strategy. Although, due to the totality of the Program of Equal Opportunity, the province’s fiscal capacity as well as Robichaud’s political capital was stretched too thin to pursue universal health care. Medicare as a policy initiative was within the wider aims of Equal Opportunity. Richard Hatfield enthusiastically supported the adoption of Medicare at the provincial level. His government saw the formal incorporation of Medicare into New Brunswick’s policy landscape, even though it was the last province to do so in 1971. As scholars of public policy, Marchildon and O’Byrne also describe the behind-the-scenes work of the province’s principal bureaucratic officials in the efforts to adopt universal health care. Indeed, some of these players were technocrats.

Technocratic regimes emerged throughout North America to facilitate state-led economic development and the establishment of social programs. In New Brunswick, Robert Young has argued that civil service reform was one of four key priorities for the Robichaud government. The construction of a new headquarters for the civil service was both symbolic and functional. Later under the Hatfield regime, francophone bureaucrats gained key leadership posts in Fredericton. The anglophone premier’s

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105 Marchildon and O’Byrne, 151-152.
106 Marchildon and O’Byrne, 164-166.
107 Pasolli, 127-128.
support of these key Acadian functionaries signaled the entrenchment of Equal Opportunity and the new bilingual and bicultural identity of New Brunswick.\

Total change came to New Brunswick in the 1960s and 1970s. Mirroring Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, the Robichaud era has been described in revolutionary terms. Michel Cormier titled his biography of the Acadian premier as *Louis Robichaud: A Not So Quiet Revolution*. Indeed, the social and cultural changes that convulsed New Brunswick society coalesced with the growth of the welfare state and the Acadian Renaissance. Jose E. Ignartua argues that the Quiet Revolution was an act of “collective dissent” against a conservative regime in the province; it also continued a form of “national emancipation” and was a driver of modernity. Jean Lesage, the father of the Quiet Revolution, held profound significance for New Brunswick’s leadership. Much of the literature notes that Robichaud’s approach to social investment mirrored that of the Quebec Liberal Premier. For instance, Fredericton modeled its hydroelectric development scheme after Quebec’s. More importantly, Lesage’s slogan, “*Qui s’instruit*...”


110 As a young law student, Louis Robichaud studied under Father Georges-Henri Lévesque at Laval University. The sociologist and educator to the leaders of public life in 1960’s Quebec advocated for complete societal change. Deeply influenced by his time in Quebec City, Robichaud came to view Lévesque as “the symbol of social progress equality and ... harmony in modern Canada.” Della Stanley, *Louis Robichaud*, 10-11.
s’enrichit,” to learn is to enrich oneself, encapsulated the new focus on education reform in anglophone and francophone New Brunswick.113

These innovations were part of a broader scheme. During the Robichaud-Hatfield era, as Desmond Morton argues more broadly for the national context, power had returned to provinces. In English Canada, the Robarts government of Ontario spent heavily on education and other social welfare. The “politics of grandeur,” high modernism by another name, defined this age of “cooperative federalism.”114 In Ottawa, the establishment of the federal *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* in 1963 and later discussions concerning the Canada Pension Plan paralleled New Brunswick’s road to official bilingualism and social investment.115 Yet, as Joseph Yvon Thériault points out, Acadians had to wait for the establishment of the Official Languages Act under Robichaud.116 A truly divisive policy for the province’s anglophone majority, many have suggested that it required an English premier, Hatfield, to fully implement official bilingualism in the province.117 Finally, the high-water mark of optimism and appetite for sociocultural change in the 1960s was Expo ’67. L.B. Kuffert argues that the festivities in Montreal were not simply a birthday party or long weekend.118

116 Joseph Yvon Thériault, 50.
was pushed as an “national stocktaking and redirection for the future.” While the glow of Expo radiated throughout Canada, its light shone brightly for New Brunswick’s reformers.

Towards a Definition of Technocracy

In jurisdictions as varied as New Brunswick, Quebec, and Sweden, policymakers turned to technocrats to facilitate change. The terms technocracy and technocrat require unpacking and contextualization. It is most often heard in the context of politics and bureaucracy. Readers of The Economist or the Financial Times might consider it when reflecting on the governments of East Asia, like Singapore, or regimes that look for stability, like in Greece following the Euro debt crisis of the 2010s. Etymologically speaking, technocrat is derived from the Greek root techne, which denotes craft or art. A conventional definition of technocracy, however, can be read as a shorthand for “rule by experts.” While the twentieth century saw the apogee of technocratic regimes, the expression of “rule by experts” was even explored by Plato where he favored philosopher kings as the paramount rulers of his Republic. Understandings of technocracy can be

119 L.B. Kuffert, 225.
traced to Enlightenment thought that embraced the rise of natural science, technology, and rationalism. The philosophy of Francis Bacon underscored these same tenets: scientific rationalism, order, and hierarchy and the centrality of the scientist. According to sociologist Beverly H. Burris, Bacon saw the need for a benevolent scientific elite who could “rule in the general interest” of society. Writing in the nineteenth century, political theorist Henri de Saint-Simon bemoaned the exclusion of the intellectually talented and creative from the center of power: “In the general interest, domination should be proportionate to enlightenment.”

In the early twentieth century, expressions of technocracy became directly entwined with the ideology and practices of engineering. Frederick W. Taylor, the engineer-turned-prophet-of-efficiency extolled the virtues of systematization to increase industrial output. Taylor, the father of what became known as Scientific Management, saw his work taken up by progressive politicians in the United States. His seminal 1911 text, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, was devoured in North America, Europe, and Asia. Taylor’s thought was later mutated by capitalist, communist, and fascist planners from Detroit, Moscow and Berlin. Closer to home, Beverly Burris argues that American progressives of the 1920s espoused the tenets of Taylorism in an

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125 Burris, *Technocracy at Work*, 22.
128 Olson indicates that Taylor’s 1911 text was “translated into at least ten languages,” 14.
effort to “engineer the transition to a new and ‘more rational’ form of governance … to replace… political irrationality with scientifically designed decision processes.”\textsuperscript{129}

The notion of engineering a better society in the twentieth century became even more pronounced through the infusion of economic thought and theories of power. Economists like Thorstein Veblen articulated the innate power of a technical elite to influence society. Veblen expressed the ease in which a scientific class could temper capitalism and revolutionize government. His 1921 \textit{The Engineers and the Price System} even proposed a “soviet of technicians.”\textsuperscript{130} In fact, the term \textit{technocracy} was coined by the American engineer William H. Smyth in 1919. He too advocated for the ascendancy of a scientifically and technologically literate governing class.\textsuperscript{131}

Later in the century, the work of the political theorist James Burham and economist John Kenneth Galbraith offered a more balanced assessment of technocracy within a managerial context. Burham especially saw the propensity for an educated elite to pursue economic planning that favoured centralization. He underscored the tensions in a managerial-focused regime—one that could minimize the role of democratic participation.\textsuperscript{132} The thought of Galbraith also sheds light on the capacity for technocratic rule to manage the many organizations of the welfare state. By quoting Galbraith’s 1967 text \textit{The New Industrial State}, Beverly Burris argues that education and scientific training

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\footnote{129}{Burris, 25.}
\footnote{130}{Burris, 27.}
\footnote{131}{Ibid.}
\footnote{132}{Burris, 35.}
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were the key components that produced mid-century technocracies. For Galbraith, the managerial class remains less valuable than the technocrats:  

[Management] includes … only a small proportion of those who, as participants, contribute information to group decisions. This latter group is very large; it extends from the most senior officials of the corporation to where it meets, at the outer perimeter, the white and blue collar workers whose function is to conform more or less mechanically to instruction or routine. It embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent, or experience to group decision-making. This, not the management, is the guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise … I propose to call this organization the Technostructure.  

Such descriptions of technocracy’s propensity to elevate technical expertise and education was by taken up scholars of bureaucracy. In the seminal 1954 text, *The Practice of Management*, Peter Drucker operationalizes the thought of Frederick W. Taylor. Drucker argues that it should be Taylor, the father of Scientific Management, and not Marx who ranked among the preeminent thinkers of the modern age along with Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud. The exultation of ‘efficiency’ was taken up by government and the academy in the new field of public administration.  

In the wake of mass urbanization in the early twentieth century, reform-minded mayors and public officials required a new way of approaching public oversight and service delivery. Frederick Taylor was approached to study and provide recommendations to improve civic employee efficiency in Philadelphia; however, Taylor pushed the city to choose his “collaborator” Morris Cooke to undertake the study.  

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133 Burris, 36-37.  
135 Olson, 1.  
136 Olson, 23-24.
Richard Olson considers Cooke to be the “First Public Administrator.”\textsuperscript{137} Cooke, as a student of bureaucratic planning, also praised the centrality of technical training and the need for Scientific Management to dictate planning: “the engineer above all others is qualified to be responsible to solve the great vital problems of our municipalities.”\textsuperscript{138} Scientific Management held enormous significance for the scholars and practitioners of public administration in the United States as the philosophy of pragmatism also infiltrated the ethos of public administration. Thinkers Charles Sanders Piece and George Dewey celebrated the practical over the theoretical; ironically, this stood as a key component of the ideology of the ‘objective and rational’ technocrat.\textsuperscript{139}

A comprehensive contextualization of ‘the technocrat’ owes much to the researchers of public administration in the middle and late twentieth century. A key scholar of the field is Robert Putnam. In his 1977 noteworthy article “Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy,” Putnam considers how bureaucrats navigated “data collection” and conceptualized their work. His study is comparative and looks at policy regimes in 1970s Britain, Germany, and Italy.\textsuperscript{140} For the purpose of this thesis, Putnam’s nuanced definition of the “technocratic mentality” will describe the motivations of the high modernist technocrats in Canada and New Brunswick during the Robichaud-Hatfield

\textsuperscript{137} Olson, 23.  
\textsuperscript{138} Olson, 24.  
\textsuperscript{139} Olson, 41.  
\textsuperscript{140} Olson, x.
era.141 Putnam argues that technocrats see themselves as unique functionaries within an “administrative state.” Possessing six key characteristics, he enumerates several key traits of the modern technocrat. 142 The desired operational environment of the technocratic official is apolitical where the challenges of the world can be remedied by a “scientific approach.”143 A technocrat holds political officials and elected representatives in low regard. He or she is also critical of “political institutions.”144 For Putnam, the technocrat believes that liberal democracy is a barrier to efficiency. The severity of social and political challenges is largely inflated and must be depoliticized to be remedied. Ideology is pernicious; practicality is a preferred motivation. Finally, the technocrat is driven by “technical progress and material productivity”; any matters related to social uplift are secondary concerns.145 The aforementioned characterizations, above all, emphasize the exclusionary power of the technocrat’s expertise.

Technocracy’s exaltation of expertise, however, belies a fundamental tension. For sociologist Beverly Burris, writing at the end of the Cold War, the division of work

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141 Ibid.
142 Originally explored by the scholar Dwight Waldo in his 1948 book of the same name, The Administrative State, he considers Taylorism to be the most important influence for public administration. However, Taylor’s thought problematizes what Waldo believed to be aims of public administration. The celebration of efficiency is not only problematic for the public sector, oftentimes, it seeks to conflate the actions of a state and a corporation. Waldo, too, wrote of the importance of democratic principles within the workplace- fundamental ideas not shared by Frederick W. Taylor. Richard G. Olson, Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century: The Legacy of Scientific Management (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), x-xi; 17.
144 Olson, xi.
145 Ibid.
within government and industry falls along an expert/non-expert dichotomy where credentials matter more than simply “bureaucratic rank.”

Centralization is key to any reform. The desired skillset of any organization, moreover, privileges technical training, ultimately, “displacing more traditional skills.” Here, the echoes of high modernism are clearly visible. Perhaps the most intriguing element of Burris’ understanding of technocracy is the notion that, as a system, it seeks to transcend “traditional politics.”

During the era of Equal Opportunity, New Brunswick was subjected to this tension where experts within the structure of government sometimes clashed with politicians or managerial bureaucrats. Among the most prolific technocrats that joined the ranks of bureaucracies were professional engineers. In 1930s America for example, President Herbert Hoover was so impressed by the calculating logic and ‘unimpeachable’ character of engineers that he said that the professionals “comprise a force in the community absolutely unique in the solution of national problems.” Here at home, engineers slowly entered the bureaucracy by mid-century, as Reg Tweeddale’s rise in the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, as Chapter Two underscores. Public servants with credentials in agronomy and the pure sciences also brought their training to bear in the development of policy regimes of the mid-twentieth century.

This project highlights how technocrats within the Canadian experience received scientific as well as more social science-based educations. Notably, Putnam argues,

146 Burris, 166-167.
147 Burris, 166.
148 Burris, 167.
149 Olson, 35.
economists constitute a unique class of technocrats whom are more compelled to solve problems that recognize the political dimensions of a policy challenge. More simply, mid-century economists could bring a latitudinous approach to policy making and public administration than their more scientifically-minded colleagues.\textsuperscript{150} For this thesis, men and women with training in public administration, made manifest through newly minted programs of Masters of Public Administration of the 1930s and 1940s, are themselves defined as technocrats. Professional accountants, for the purpose of this study, are also considered technocrats as the proliferation of schools of public administration pursued a scientific approach to the study government financing and accounting.\textsuperscript{151}

In the early twentieth century, the advocates of technocracy facilitated a nascent grassroots movement in the United States and Canada. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, this group extolled the virtues of ‘rule by experts’ in an effort to remake the sociopolitical landscape in the wake of the Great Depression. By the 1930s, the movement had an organizational structure and publications. Technocracy, Inc., as it was known, was led by Howard Scott who forged ties with academics and built a fringe political following.\textsuperscript{152} The rise of the Technocrat Movement became controversial. Howard Scott turned out to be more L. Ron Hubbard than a credible engineering after questions about his lack of credentials and fraudulent work history surfaced.\textsuperscript{153} At its height in 1933, the Technocrats

\textsuperscript{150} Olson, xi-xii.
\textsuperscript{151} Olson, 32.
\textsuperscript{152} Burris, 28-32.
claimed to have 250,000 members in seventy locations.\footnote{Burris, 31.} In Canada, support for the movement is difficult to quantify and assess. British Columbia and the Prairies, however, were the centres that saw the movement take root. In 1939, Howard Scott spoke to a crowd of 1,500 people in Winnipeg.\footnote{Ray Argyle, “The Last Utopians,” \textit{Canada’s History}, January 1, 2018, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.canadashistory.ca/explore/politics-law/the-last-utopians.} But as readers of \textit{The Moncton Transcript} observed in 1934, “the chief technocrat” and his movement’s teachings were called into serious doubt: “technocracy is just another trick of the upper class to dupe the working man and the country is about to see a ‘graceful usurpation of power’ in the interest of the plutocrats.”\footnote{“The Chief Technocrat,” \textit{The Moncton Transcript}, January 18, 1934, 4.} By the late 1930s, the successes of state-led investment in the US and Canada was the death knell to this fringe movement.\footnote{Burris, 32.}

\textbf{Conventional Readings of Equal Opportunity: The Political Science Literature}

Most writing on Equal Opportunity has been within the context of the biographies of Robichaud and Hatfield, or in political science. Indeed, no scholarly monograph has considered Equal Opportunity in its entirety from an historical perspective.\footnote{Popular history has interrogated the Program of Equal Opportunity as part of the Robichaud-Hatfield period. John Edward Belliveau, \textit{Little Louis and the Giant K.C.} (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 1980); Nancy Southham, ed., \textit{Remembering Richard: An Informal portrait of Richard Hatfield by his Friends, Family, and Colleagues} (Halifax, NS: Formac Publishing, 1993).} Perhaps one of the most intriguing publications of recent years is \textit{New Brunswick before the Equal Opportunity Program: History through a Social Work Lens}. This work by Laurel Lewey, Louis J. Richard, and Linda Turney presents the remarkable persistence of poverty and
inaccessibility of social services prior to the institutional reforms of the 1960s. But while this sheds light on the policy history of EO, social histories of the era of Equal Opportunity are neglected. The body of work on this transformative period in New Brunswick focuses on the changing political economy and political culture. The richest source is The Robichaud Era, 1960-1970: Colloquium Proceedings, a collection of essays presented at the Université de Moncton, written as a tribute to Louis Robichaud in 1999. These papers are very favourable to the architect of Equal Opportunity; after all, he was in the room during the conference. Yet, some scholars critically questioned the wider currents of change in New Brunswick. The remainder of the literature falls into two camps. Most political scientists simply reiterate the scale of EO’s reform against the backdrop of New Brunswick’s traditional political culture. Some contextualize and explain Equal Opportunity and the Robichaud-Hatfield period as part of a larger era of national change. Others take a more local, even personal, approach. Acadian scholar and former senior bureaucratic Donald Savoie is a unique figure as he was a participant in the waning days of the Hatfield administration; later he served as an observer to the entire era. In his memoir, he accords great significance to ‘Petit Louis’ as a driver of

community uplift in francophone New Brunswick. Therefore, it is essential for historical scholarship to dialogue with this literature.

In the Robichaud proceedings journalist Michel Cormier argues that the program of Equal Opportunity served as the high watermark of reform under Robichaud and altered government’s “social contract” with citizens.162 The Robichaud premiership ensured that equality of service accorded with the rise of individual rights and the reemergence of Acadian nationalism in the 1960s. Heightened economic growth during mid-century allowed for the Robichaud government to directly intervene in the economy and bolster the welfare state. This occurred in concert with federal support of the provincial state.163 The Acadian leader cemented the arrival of the francophones within the social fabric of the province. His creation of the Université de Moncton and the adoption of the Official Languages Act ensured that equality would be grafted onto the educational and legal structures of New Brunswick. That all other political leaders saw the reforms of the Robichaud government as a “yardstick” of social progress, is among the Acadian premier’s most significant achievement.164 But Maurice Beaudin interrogates Robichaud’s less than stellar economic development record. Associated with the Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, he grounds Robichaud’s

fiscal policy within the Keynesian tradition, in his effort to address social inequality.\textsuperscript{165} Indeed, most of the developed economies and many developing countries in the 1960s subscribed to this ethos. Describing the moribund social services that preceded EO as a contributing factor to the “wasting of human potential,” Beaudin notes that the social reforms were as much an effort to institute changes to the province’s economic system.\textsuperscript{166} When private industry failed to properly transform the provincial economy, the government often employed public money in “risky industrial projects.”\textsuperscript{167} Beaudin argues that it is difficult to assess whether the province’s economy truly “benefited” relative to other provinces in the 1960s. Despite modest growth, state-led economic development became perhaps the defining policy direction of subsequent New Brunswick governments. It saw its apogee during the Robichaud government.\textsuperscript{168}

Political scientists have paid particular attention to the bureaucratic structures that facilitated New Brunswick’s economic transformation. Pier Bouchard and Sylvain Vézina examine the fundamental changes to the province’s operation during the 1960s. They unpack the two modes of government administration during Robichaud’s premiership, namely, democracy and bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{169} A modern and professionalized bureaucracy was necessary to implement social change and address inequality in the

\textsuperscript{166} Maurice Beaudin, “The State as an Engine of Development: Louis Robichaud and New Brunswick,” 88.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Maurice Beaudin, “The State as an Engine of Development,” 108.
province’s underperforming regions. Bouchard and Vézine consider the “paradoxical and contradictory” nature of bureaucracy and democracy.170 The solutions required to ameliorate socioeconomic conditions became more technical and required competent civil servants to turn political vision into policy. The agency of the citizen to affect change was effectively reduced. During the 1960s, the two scholars argue that the Robichaud regime was largely defined by its democratic tendencies to ensure that citizens could more effectively participate in provincial life and receive much needed social services from the state. While the Acadian premier and his officials relied on bureaucratic expertise to implement reform, Robichaud “was concerned with consulting the citizenry” every step of the way.171 In all, this rich source denotes the positive historical memory that Acadian have ascribed to Louis Robichaud.

Political scientist Nelson Wiseman, Canada’s foremost scholar of political culture, provides astute insight on the era of Equal Opportunity which contrasts with the works described above. He argues that the sociopolitical amelioration of Acadie in the 1960s was as groundbreaking as Quebec’s Quiet Revolution.172 The entrenchment of Robichaud’s Equal Opportunity was the second most ambitious policy regime next to Quebec. Moreover, Wiseman echoes the literature that Hatfield’s party, formerly hostile to the francophone minority, successfully embedded Equal Opportunity within the

172 Nelson Wiseman, In Search of Canadian Political Culture, 139.
province’s policy apparatus.\(^{173}\) As language and education rights were included in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it has ensured that Acadians “have become power-brokers within New Brunswick’s ultra-conservative political system.”\(^{174}\)

As above, one such observer and participant in Canadian public life is Donald Savoie; the Acadian academic and former senior bureaucrat’s work remains an important source the era of Equal Opportunity.\(^{175}\) While his interests have been in economic development and public administration, he was a federal official in the last days of the Hatfield era. A technocrat who emerged out a rural Acadian context, Savoie’s rise is a testament to the social and political change of the 1960s: “In one generation, I saw a people literally transformed. To be sure, Robichaud was the catalyst, but his initiatives unleashed a series of events that sent shockwaves to every corner of Acadie, New Brunswick, and the other Maritime provinces.”\(^{176}\) Finally, recalling the hope for policy continuity during the Robichaud-Hatfield transition, Savoie recorded the New Brunswick Premier’s confidence in his successor: “Louis Robichaud told me that he was completely at peace with the 1970 election … Richard Hatfield … reached out to Acadians.”\(^{177}\)

As it employs the lens of high modernism to consider the profound social, economic, and political changes to New Brunswick, this thesis underscores the degree to

\(^{173}\) Ibid.
\(^{174}\) Wiseman, 152.
\(^{176}\) Donald Savoie, I’m from Bouctouche, Me (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 244-245.
\(^{177}\) Savoie, 75.
which officials both looked within the province and outside for creative policy solutions. Both Robichaud and Hatfield were key drivers of “muscle-bound” change; however, the professionalization of the bureaucracy and the rise of the Saskatchewan Mafia allowed for the implementation of more than 130 bills from 1963-1970. And, as Savoie alludes, even after the first-elected Acadian premier left office, his anglophone successor was uniquely positioned to entrench language rights and the policies of francophone transformation in New Brunswick. This project seeks to shed light on the continuous technocratic attention to and impact on policy evolution and socioeconomic change in New Brunswick. Technocratic regimes around the world bristled with optimism over state and citizen transformation, but, here as elsewhere, the actual results of change were, mixed. Remembering the words of union activist Mathilda Blanchard, the age of high modernism played out differently from across the continent to the disparate regions of New Brunswick. During the era of Equal Opportunity, Blanchard’s life as a socioeconomically disadvantaged woman was largely foreign to technocrats who occupied the Centennial Building in Fredericton. Nevertheless, technocrats, government officials, as well as elected representatives sought to bring the benefits of the modern welfare regime to as many citizens as possible.
CHAPTER TWO

Highs and Lows: Technocrats and Reform during the Era of Equal Opportunity in New Brunswick

“Reg, you might be a good engineer, but you don’t know anything about politics.”

Reginald Tweeddale, the former Chairman of the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (the forerunner to the province’s crown corporation, NB Power), had a career that mirrored the rise of a truly modern interventionist state in the late 1950s and 1960s. The electrical engineer, trained at UNB in the 1930s, witnessed rural electrification, spearheaded the construction of vast hydroelectric dam projects and became the deputy minister of Economic Development in 1967. In a 2000 interview, Tweeddale sheds light on the international outlook of New Brunswick’s era of modernization. The interviewer raised the matter of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and how the vast multipurpose American development scheme was perceived by New Brunswick policymakers. Tweeddale feigned modesty: “I don’t want to leave the impression on tape that I am trying to blow my own horn, or that I was more involved than I really was.” But then, in a remarkable exchange, the former chairman of the New

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1 Louis Robichaud uttered these comments to the engineer-turned-civil-servant Reg Tweeddale. PANB MC2923, “Reg Tweeddale Interview by Janet Toole,” October 2, 2000, Transcript I, 1. This source was referenced in James L. Kenny and Andrew G. Secord’s article, “Engineering Modernity: Hydroelectric Development in New Brunswick, 1945-70.”


3 “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 3.
Brunswick Power Commission recounted how he and his first wife, Faye, along with Tubby Cutherbertson, a friend and colleague from NB Power and his wife, took a detour to the annual meeting of the TVA in Chattanooga, Tennessee after vacationing in Florida. The career civil servant offered a sentimental account of the warm reception extended by TVA officials. Tweeddale also underscored the leadership role that New Brunswick took in facilitating pan-Canadian interest in the TVA—the “high modernist experiment and granddaddy of all regional development projects.”

He recounted how the Chairman, you know, the top people at this TVA thing, just greeted us like long lost brothers, like. So anyway, in the course of the conversation, why, they explained to us all about TVA was about, what they did, and so on, and said, “Why don’t you people in Canada come down and spend some time with us? We’d be glad to have you come.” So we, of course, we had no authority to say anything, except, “Well, that’s kind of you.” But when I got back, we’d had association with other utilities. Of course, we always tried to keep in touch with the other utilities in Canada. We got to know them. And at one meeting, I mentioned this incident, that we had an invitation to go to TVA. And my gosh, before you know it, I was getting letters from BC, Ontario, and so on, “Why don’t we do- Why don’t we pick up on that? And before we knew it, we had a whole delegation, I think every province was represented except PEI; had one or two delegates that were ready to go to TVA. And we went. And they just couldn’t have treated us better the whole shebang!

In this interview, Tweeddale, who was named “Electrical Man of the Year” in 1961, highlights the intense interest in high modernist planning in New Brunswick and desire to

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4 “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 3. This account of Tweeddale’s recollection of the influence of the TVA is featured in James L. Kenny and Andre G. Secord’s “Engineering Modernity: Hydroelectric Development in New Brunswick, 1945-1970,” *Acadiensis* 39, no. 1 (Winter/Spring, 2010): 14. It is taken up in note 34. Tweeddale notes that he discovered that the TVA was meeting by reading about the annual gathering scheduled in Tennessee in a local newspaper in Florida.


6 “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 3.
look towards other jurisdictions in the Long 1960s. Tweeddale typified the rise of the
technocrat and the ascendancy of expertise throughout the North America, Western
Europe, and the Global South.

Yet, Tweeddale’s oral history interview also reveals the inherent tension between
technocrats and elected officials: “I got called into Louis Robichaud’s when I was- that
was after I left the Power Commission and was down with government. And I was just
giving him my views on this certain project, that what the government was doing was not
in the public interest.” The New Brunswick technocrat recalled that Robichaud had said,
“Reg, you might be a good engineer, but you don’t know anything about politics.” Reg
Tweeddale, along with a coterie of other key officials, helped facilitate the era of Equal
Opportunity in New Brunswick. But he left the politics to Robichaud and Hatfield.

**Highs and Lows: Technocrats and the Era of Equal Opportunity**

The prevalence of men, and a few women, who joined together during the Long
1960s to advance expert-driven change has received renewed attention following
widespread attempts to theorize state-led development. As the previous chapter
illustrated, under the framework of high modernism, bureaucrats, consultants and
functionaries employed scientific approaches to tame the natural and social spheres. From

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7 “A Life Lived for Others,” Obituary of Reginald Tweeddale, University of New Brunswick,
8 James L. Kenny and Andrew G. Secord’s “Engineering Modernity: Hydroelectric Development in New
9 “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 1.
combatting illness to providing cheap electricity, as well as addressing problems of rural poverty and national cohesiveness, technocrats employed top-down approaches to find solutions.

New Brunswick was no stranger to the presence of technocrats within provincial power structures. While the framework of high modernism has been popularly employed by scholars since the 1980s, this chapter challenges narrow conceptualizations of the motivations and practices of public servants and consultants within the context of New Brunswick. Then as now, public servants were often distant from citizen groups James Scott explains: “Officials of the modern state are, of necessity, at least one step—and often several steps—removed from the society they are charged with governing.”

Popular perceptions of the mid-century policy regimes have often employed the trope of the malevolent bureaucrat who advocates for centralization and obfuscation. In New Brunswick, many of the senior bureaucrats in the Office of Government Organization (OGO), a key department that stewarded reforms during the Robichaud Government, were maligned: “These experts were denounced throughout the province as outsiders. O.G.O. was generally seen as a Machiavellian conspiracy.”

This chapter seeks to problematize the dominate narrative of the removed technocratic. Indeed, many of the agents of change operated within a low modernist framework, to use a new term coined by Jess Gilbert. Unlike, their high modernist


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counterparts, low modernists pushed for changed from the ground up and emerged out of rural contexts. While their aims were often the same as high modernist practitioners, low modernists sought to uphold the agency of the citizen. In Gilbert’s *Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal*, we learn about a category of interwar and midcentury American technocrats who had training in the fields of public administration, economics, or agronomy advocated state-led reform that focused on citizen participation. Many of the members of FDR’s Department of Agriculture subscribed to this perspective like policy intellectuals including: Henry A. Wallace, the department’s secretary; M. L. Wilson, undersecretary and director of the Federal Extension; as well as a Carl C. Taylor, a sociologist whose work on rural policy drove progressive reform.\(^{12}\) Their commitment to change grew out their own rural upbringing and sense of agrarian allyship.\(^{13}\) Many of their policy prescriptions focused on adult education programs and training initiatives that empowered workers. In the context of New Brunswick, several functionaries operated within this low modernist framework. This chapter considers several that span the Robichaud-Hatfield era.

Both leaders were exponents of change and used the power of the state to enhance the lives of citizens. New Brunswick, like other domestic and international jurisdictions, pushed for expert-driven progress in matters social and material. While Robichaud had considerable political vision, he “enjoyed the power of his office” to enact change; this

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\(^{13}\) Jess Gilbert, 13.
frustrated any true technocratic approach to government. This notion is reinforced by historian David Frank: “…the politics of New Brunswick in the 1960s involved tensions between technocratic and democratic priorities—a dilemma that is generally characteristic of the high modernist liberal state.” Technocrats, planners and functionaries with training or expertise in economics, public administration, or more traditionally, science and engineering, became the principal architects of change in New Brunswick. Many of these officials, however, did not fully embrace the tenets of high modernism. Indeed, many of New Brunswick’s technocrats embodied “low modernism.” Key functionaries who had a greater concern for the social and political agency of citizens and a commitment to democratic participation.

These next two chapters take the form of prosopography for the technocrats Reg Tweeddale, Alexandre Boudreau, and Donald Tansley. Later, a group of francophone bureaucrats in the 1970s and 1980s, once dubbed, the “inside-outsiders” continued to negotiate high and low modernist change in New Brunswick. While some of the oral histories of these technocrats have been used in past studies, this thesis reads their accounts as a complete source and does not simply isolate some of their experiences.

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16 Jess Gilbert, 8-9.
17 Jess Gilbert, 8-9.
18 This structural approach has been adapted from Gilbert’s form of “collective biography” of agrarian intellectuals in his Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 25.
Also, the contributions of Alexandre Boudreau have not yet been fully integrated into the literature.

**A More Humane Modernity: From High to Low Modernism**

For Robichaud and his government, technical expertise was required to reform public services and pursue infrastructure projects that would transform the citizen’s relationship to the state. As Pasolli observes, “We do not yet know enough about the machinery of the government that managed those reforms.”¹⁹ Thus, there is a need to complicate the assessment of this “machinery.” In New Brunswick, as well as jurisdictions across the globe, these agents of change, were in large parts members of the technocratic class. Technocrats pushed for rural electrification, rural economic development, and the laid the foundations for socioeconomic improvement in the Byrne Commission.²⁰ Seen in this light, technocratic change was not necessarily malevolent.

Out of the rural contexts of American Midwestern farming, the philosophic pragmatism of John Dewey, the large-land grant universities, and the American Department of Agriculture emerged the “low modernists.”²¹ In his ground-breaking study *Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal* sociologist Jess Gilbert, seeks to complicate the “easy dichotomies” that colours analysis of the

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agricultural technocrats of the New Deal era, placing them into stark contrast, “namely citizen/expert, local/federal, and even democracy/bureaucracy.” For Gilbert, twentieth century high modernists were “social engineers” who rejected local knowledge and used rational objectivity and scientific training to impose top-down solutions on citizens. While James Scott characterized the federal department as a site of high modernist planning, Gilbert argues that the experiences and motivations of the technocrats within the Department of Agriculture (who possessed farming backgrounds themselves) were largely at odds with the urban intellectuals who shaped policy in the same era. The low modernists possessed training in agricultural economics, rural sociology, statistics, and animal science, among other social science and agricultural-based disciplines. Notable members of this agrarian cadre included: Henry A. Wallace, who climbed the ranks of the Department of Agriculture and served as its secretary from 1933-1940; M.L. Wilson, who occupied posts in the Wheat Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and worked on the Subsidence Homesteads file and served as Undersecretary of Agriculture from 1936-1940; Carl C. Talyor held a PhD from the University of Missouri and from 1935-53 served in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics’ division of Farm

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22 Jess Gilbert, *Planning Democracy*, 3. Interestingly enough, James C. Scott served as the publisher of the Yale Agrarian Studies Series, which published Gilbert’s book. In his review Scott acknowledges the rich contributions that Gilbert has made to a more nuanced understanding of modernity in the twentieth century: “We are unlikely ever to have a superior account of the effort to square democratic participation with technical expertise. Gilbert's searching history of the ‘agrarian intellectuals’ in Roosevelt's New Deal administration—what they achieved and how they were undone—is definitive, scrupulously documented, and revelatory…” This review is found on the back cover of *Planning Democracy.*

23 Gilbert, 7.
24 Gilbert, 72-73.
25 Gilbert, 27, 40, 53.
Population and Rural Welfare. These are just a few of Gilbert’s subjects. All were shaped by their rural upbringings and their intellectual development in social science. Under the FDR Administration, these officials encouraged rural solutions to bolster family-farm ownership, land reform policies, and the latest scientific practices to ensure agricultural success in the lead up to the New Deal.

Perhaps the chief tenet of these low modernists was democratic planning; much of this was achieved through educational initiatives. Only by way of democratizing technical expertise, so the low modernists believed, could the citizen play his role on the planning capabilities of within areas of the Department of Agriculture. However gendered their approach was, the low modernists were steadfast in their commitment to education; by encouraging grassroots engagement and adult education programs, the citizen could play an effective role in their material and political improvement through democratic planning. The low modernists’ adult education schemes touched the lives of nearly three million people. However, Gilbert argues that the plans and goals of the low modernists were frustrated by conservative politicians as well as bureaucratic high

26 Gilbert, 27.
27 Gilbert, 13.
28 Gilbert, 9-10.
29 Gilbert argues that the rural upbringings of the agrarian intellectuals cemented gender and racial inequalities through their policy initiatives in the early twentieth century: “gender inequality was built into the family farm. The fact that these family farm boys grew up in patriarchal households doubtless contributed to their lack of sensitivity or awareness of gender bias in their New Deal. Moreover, since the rural Midwest was so racially homogenous, its denizens often had little exposure to or sympathy with nonwhites.” Planning Democracy, 34.
30 Gilbert, 142-143.
31 Gilbert, 142.
modernists and a wider sociopolitical culture that favour top-down change. A similar process occurred in New Brunswick a generation later.

By complicating the motivations and experiences of technocrats, an account of reform in New Brunswick and the rest of Canada becomes more nuanced. The low modernist framework can be adopted to study policymakers, particularly, those who forged the era of Equal Opportunity. The notion of diversity within the policymaking sphere at mid-century is also taken up by scholars of Canadian history. Historian Daniel MacFarlane seeks to deconstruct monolithic approaches to the study of modernity. In his analysis of the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, MacFarlane argues that for certain development schemes scholars must consider “negotiated” high modernism. While the development of the seaway fits the traditional definition of high modernism, complete with land expropriation, and technocratic planning (the project even relied on Robert Moses’s expertise on the American side), MacFarlane writes that policymakers required a certain level of participation from the public. He out-and-out dismisses the aims of low modernism or any role for democratic planning in the St. Lawrence Seaway project. Notwithstanding, MacFarlane cites prominent scholars of Canadian high modernism, Tina Loo and Meg Stanley. They suggest that the construction of hydroelectric projects in the Pacific Northwest required a “high modernist local

32 Gilbert, 238-239; 256-259.
33 Daniel MacFarlane, Negotiating a River: Canada, the US, and the Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2014), 227-228.
34 MacFarlane, 227.
35 MacFarlane, 227.
knowledge” of the complex landscapes and hydrologies of the Columbia and Peace rivers to facilitate development. Thus, their work challenges James C. Scott’s contention that high modernism dismisses local systems of knowledge. The role of planning and the motivations of the technocrats in New Brunswick is closer to Gilbert’s model rather than Loo or MacFarlane’s “negotiated” high modernism. The next section of this chapter will consider the collective biography of the New Brunswick officials during the era of Equal Opportunity. One notable aspect of the technocrats’ experience is the degree to which they pushed for a more humane modernism.

“I might have ended up a subsistence farmer up in Victoria County:” Returning to Reg Tweeddale

Most of the agrarian low modernists in the United States came from farming backgrounds; and many of the technocrats during the era of Equal Opportunity emerged out of rural contexts. The prominent Canadian political scientist Nelson Wiseman argues though that the Maritimes was not a prominent locus of rural activism during the midcentury, “The simultaneous weakness of agrarian radicalism and the isolated, concentrated presence of socialism in the Maritimes is indicative of the region’s relative conservatism.” In 1960s New Brunswick, many of the technocrats had been born to families outside of the centres of economic or political power. The contributions of the

36 Tina Loo and Meg Stanley, “An Environmental History of Progress: Damming the Peace and Columbia Rivers,” Canadian Historical Review 92, no. 3 (September 2011): 399-427, quoted in MacFarlane’s Negotiating a River, 227.
high and low modernist technocrats and officials were characterized by progressive activism that considered citizen engagement in an effort to reorient the relationship to burgeoning welfare state. Wiseman notes that, compared to the Prairies, the Maritimes’ lack of widespread surplus-yielding agriculture ensured that an “agrarian revolt was inaudible.” This reading of citizen activism in the Maritimes more broadly, and New Brunswick specifically, ignores the experiences of Acadians within the credit union movement as well as the francophone presence within student rights movements of the late 1960s, as well as citizens who voiced opposition to the development of the Mactaquac hydroelectric project. While smaller in scale than Western Canada’s community-driven activism or that of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, New Brunswick was not devoid of bottom-up change.

Reginald Tweeddale is seemingly the quintessential high modernist technocrat of mid-twentieth century New Brunswick. The electrical engineer’s personal and professional experience parallels the development of New Brunswick as a modern political and economic jurisdiction. In a brief retirement message from 1990, a colleague noted the central role that Tweeddale enjoyed: “I often look back at the very happy days, as we made our first entries into the interconnected field … exciting times indeed.

39 Wiseman, “Provincial Political Cultures,” 40.
Certainly much of the modern era of the utility followed your appointment as General Manager [of the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission].”\textsuperscript{41} Yet, Tweeddale’s own rise was directly tied to the expansions of public education and infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{42} Born into farm life in Arthurette, in Victoria County in 1914, Tweeddale received his high school education in Plaster Rock, New Brunswick. He underscored the role that the University of New Brunswick played for his own prospects: “I always give UNB a lot of credit for my career because otherwise I might have ended up a subsistence farmer up in Victoria County.”\textsuperscript{43} This unique figure stands in opposition with some of the low modernist technocrats during the era of Equal Opportunity.

Jess Gilbert juxtaposes the urban liberal high modernist class with the agrarian low modernists. Members of an urban liberal cadre populated the growing ranks of the American civil service in the early twentieth century. Their pedigrees were punctuated by wealthy upbringings, private universities, and early success in the professions.\textsuperscript{44} Tweeddale, like the agrarian low modernists, received his education from a public university outside of the academic pull of major metropolitan spheres. Graduating with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering in 1935, Tweeddale’s choice of study, however, accorded more to the high modernist’s propensity for the pure and technical sciences.\textsuperscript{45} Foreshadowing the technician’s work in provincial megaprojects of the 1950s

\textsuperscript{41} PANB MC2923 Box 4, NB Power 1, “Thank You Letter to Reg Tweeddale, December 4, 1990,” 1.
\textsuperscript{42} “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript 1, 1.
\textsuperscript{43} “Reg Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript 1, 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Jess Gilbert, 63-64.
\textsuperscript{45} Kenny and Secord “Engineering Modernity,” 8; PANB “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript 1, 1.
and 1960s, the young Tweeddale completed an undergraduate research project that considered the possibility of damming the Tobique River for hydroelectric purposes.\textsuperscript{46} Notwithstanding his professional training, Tweeddale struggled to find work after his schooling.

Unlike the early professional bureaucrats in Canada or the United States who joined the civil service after graduating from elite universities, Tweeddale was influenced by his years as a highways supervisor and his wartime service. Approached by Minister of Lands and Mines Frederick Pirie to complete contract work developing the provincial highways system in Victoria County, he was hired despite the fact he was not a civil engineer. In his 2000 interview, he reminisced enthusiastically about starting his first engineering job.\textsuperscript{47} As a young engineer, he decried the role that patronage played on highway crews: “You were dealing with a lot of people … from the old political system of superintendents, supervisors, and highway road supervisors … who were political appointees after an election.” While noting that they “were farmers” and “good guys,” he lamented that they did not know anything about highway construction.\textsuperscript{48} Urged to write a letter to the deputy minister to highlight the problems of political patronage within technical jobs, Tweeddale suggested that change come to the hiring practices and work experiences for highway technical supervisors. These officials, at least, were appointed to full-time positions “first in Victoria County” then to the rest of the province.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover,\

\textsuperscript{46} Kenny and Secord, 8.  
\textsuperscript{47} “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 2.  
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
the insistence of merit-based hiring for technical roles within the public sector was a critical component of the personnel reforms during the era of Equal Opportunity. Interrupted during the Second World War, Tweeddale saw service in the Middle East, North Africa, and England gaining experience in radar operations. The veteran returned to Canada where he climbed the organizational ladder first in the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission and then as a senior official in the bureaucracy.

Rural electrification was tied to the wider era of Equal Opportunity. In Victoria County, Tweeddale, the freshly minted engineer, only saw electricity come to his home after he graduated from UNB in the mid-1930s. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the province struggled to promote industrial expansion in a jurisdiction with a spotty electrical grid. For instance, Tweeddale recounts how Milton F. Gregg, the former war hero and member of parliament for Fredericton, was instrumental in the federal government’s development of the Gagetown military base. Due to modest levels of electrification during the war, New Brunswick, according to Tweeddale, was not an industrial behemoth. The military base, was essentially a make-work project after men returned from service. The wider criticism was that by post-war, “we didn’t have the vision to build pulp mills, to build smelters, to build all these industries…we had to have electricity.” Joining the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, the young technician entered public service when there were only three engineers on staff at the utility. Rural electrification became a key goal for the Commission. However, unlike, in

50 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 2-3.
51 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 9-10.
52 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 10.
53 Ibid.
the United States, where the Rural Electrification Act ensured massive investment from the federal and state governments, New Brunswick largely had to borrow capital to pursue projects like the Beechwood Dam in order to extend electricity to large swaths of the province.\textsuperscript{54}

Tweeddale’s experiences tie into the broader current of change during the Robichaud-Hatfield period. As a high modernist who possessed some of the traits of a low modernist, Tweeddale shaped electrification policies and was a key advocate of multilevel megaprojects. He indirectly tied NB Power to aims of the Program of Equal Opportunity. In an article entitled “The Big Dam and Politics,” journalist Bert Burgoyne of The Toronto Globe and Mail provided an overarching interpretation of the social and industrial improvement schemes:

New Brunswick is doubling its power output with the big Mactaquac hydro dam on the St. John River … But even though it is the biggest construction project in the province’s history, it can’t hold a candle for size to the really vast program of of Premier Louis Robichaud’s Liberal Administration- the reorganization of municipal government and its relationship with provincial departments. By any reckoning, it is the largest undertaking in prospect for the new year, and by present indications, the noisiest and toughest as well.\textsuperscript{55}

This argument is also bore out in the historical literature. Samantha Bourgoin’s 2013 master’s thesis considers the oppositional perspectives of local residents whose homes were expropriated for dam construction in the 1960s. In contrast to the ethos and goals of EO, Bourgoin argues that “The Mactaquac project was the government’s greatest

\textsuperscript{54} For instance, Tweeddale recounts that he was tasked to go to Ottawa with another official William Smith, to secure government loans to finance the beechwood project. “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 10.
material manifestation of its modernization initiatives.\textsuperscript{56} As a junior engineer, Tweeddale denounced the unambitious scope of early hydro projects that preceded the “big dam” at Mactaquac. In his oral history, for example, the technocrat suggested that the government fumbled the Grand Falls dam in the late 1950s, describing it as a “67 megawatt” installation “could have been 400.” For Tweeddale, the main problem was with elected officials who “didn’t have a real vision on where electricity was going.”\textsuperscript{57} Tweeddale speculated that the drive for hydroelectric development would open them up to criticism from the citizen, saying “oh yes, those guys just wanted to build an empire for themselves, and they built all these big plants.”\textsuperscript{58}

Not content to sit on the sidelines of development during the ‘Robichaud Revolution,’ Tweeddale became a champion of linking hydroelectric development with citizen improvement. The Tennessee Valley Authority became something of an obsession for Tweeddale. As alluded to previously, he became the principal figure to organize study tours and meetings with TVA officials (elements of this partnership are taken up in Chapter Three). Recalling the roots of the TVA in the United States, the New Brunswick technocrat quoted one of the leading proponents of state-led development Senator George Norris. The New Deal-supporting senator, according to Tweeddale, led the charge to invest in the Tennessee River and not let it fall into the hands of private industrial development: “Senator Norris- I’m sure that’s his name- said, “If that’s a good thing for

\textsuperscript{56} Samantha Bourgoin, “Disregarded Sentiments: Discovering the Voices of Opposition to the Mactaquac Dam” (master’s thesis, Saint Mary’s University, 2013), 49
\textsuperscript{57} “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript I, 7.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
Henry Ford. It’s a good thing for the people of the Tennessee Valley.” And he was the
guy who proposed the TVA…”59 In 2000, the aging technocrat and his interviewer
decried the lack of “vision” by the time multipurpose development projects flowed to
Canada at mid-century.60

The roots of the TVA-NBEPC connection came first in the 1950s through the
International Joint Commission’s exploration of cross-border hydroelectric projects.61
This bilateral body, established in 1909 by Canada and the US, continues to provide a
framework for resolving boundary disputes and managing water resources.62 Reports in
1953 explored the possibility of development projects along rivers close to the Maine-
New Brunswick border. It was here that Tweeddale saw the role of private utilities and
the US Army Corps of Engineers’ responsibility for the development of hydroelectric
related infrastructure.63 Interestingly enough, it was the earnest Tweeddale, while
interacting with these American private power companies, who had to assure them of the
capabilities of a public utility.64 As the era of government-led hydro development slowed
in the US during the late 1950s and 1960s, Tweeddale, nevertheless became more

59 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript II, 6.
60 Ibid.
61 Kenny and Secord, 6.
Notably, Louis Robichaud served as the Canadian Chairman of the IJC after resigning the premiership in
1971. He looked forward to the role as it allowed him the opportunity to consider hydroelectric matters and
boundary disputes that could impact New Brunswick and the wider Canada-US relationship. Della Stanley,
63 Kenny and Secord, 6-8. The US Army Corp of Engineers played a significant role in the development
projects related to TVA. Kenny and Secord, 7.
64 PANB “Tweeddale Interview,” October 2, 2000, Transcript II, 2.
compelled by the development model. His own interest in state-led development fits squarely in the era of Equal Opportunity. Already a senior engineer with NBEPC, Tweeddale convinced Louis Robichaud to travel to the TVA on a “power tour” in 1963.66 A provincial delegation was sent to the United States on several occasions and included an official from the Department as Agriculture, as the TVA represented a multifaceted development regime. On the outcome of the tours, the high modernist Tweeddale exclaimed: “Anyway, we got a good indoctrination.”67

At home in New Brunswick, policymakers attempted to capitalize on multipurpose development. One of the chief aims of the Robichaud regime was to jump start economic growth in regions that lacked industrial capacity. Rural development in the northeast as well as central New Brunswick benefited from federal assistance as well as targeted provincial policies. Beginning under the Diefenbaker government in 1961, the Agricultural Rehabilitation Development Agency (ARDA) extended federal money for infrastructure to alleviate rural poverty. The discourse surrounding these currents of regional development employed the high modernist language of rehabilitation of people and spaces. Indeed, historian James Kenny and economist Andrew Secord argue the centralizing plans of the ARDA, which New Brunswick joined through appointing a provincial committee under the federal framework, sought to change the “backwards” nature of rural jurisdiction.68 The Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE)

66 Kenny and Secord, 17.
68 Kenny and Secord, 15.
first took a centralized approach to regional development with funding and planning stemming from government offices in Ottawa. By 1972, the Department was largely decentralized as high modernist planning suffered a setback.69 Nevertheless, Tweeddale joined ARDA. As a member of this agency, he was a key official within the NBEPC apparatus, discussions of linking hydroelectric development to community uplift became a focus by 1963.70

The Mactaquac Dam project shared many parallels with the high modernist planning of projects under the Tennessee Valley Authority. While the multipurpose approach to development in the United States began to wane by the mid 1960s, New Brunswick deputy ministers, elected officials, and technocrats considered all options. Reg Tweeddale directly appealed to “tie in Mactaquac Power Development with the other multiple uses.”71 These multiuse schemes included: a provincial park; a historic village, King’s Landing, to curate loyalist-era properties that were expropriated from a flooded river valley; as well as a golf course. Another such ‘dream’ for the Mactaquac site was a planned town. The engineering firm H.G. Acres and Company helped design a village complete with a school, church, stores, and a motel in its 1965 community development report.72 The first phase of this planned settlement sought to accommodate 65 households.

69 Donald Savoie, I’m From Bouctouche, Me (Montreal, QC & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 129.
70 Kenny and Secord, 15.
71 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript II, 4.
that were relocated due to the creation of dam’s headpond. The planned Mactaquac “townsite” never materialized. Further up the river, however, the village of Nackawic was established in the mid-1960s by the provincial government to accommodate families displaced by hydroelectric development. Its central industry was planned around a paper mill. With funding from the federal government, and provincial buy-in, Tweeddale internationalised the project: well “that’s how that got started, and that’s the tie with the TVA.” The provincial body that stewarded these changes, according to the senior technocrat, was the Community Improvement Corporation tasked with further combatting ‘backwardness’ in rural New Brunswick.

Many technocrats in Canada and with training and experience in science or engineering transitioned into government during the mid-twentieth century. Reginald Tweeddale took a turn within the bureaucratic machinery. He was appointed deputy minister of Economic Growth by Louis Robichaud in 1967 and was asked to provide the same approach as he employed as General Manager of the New Brunswick Power Commission. In his oral history, Tweeddale looked back on his time as a cog in the machinery of government with sadness: “I guess, I showed an interest in Economic Growth … but it was a bad move for me … It just didn’t fit my way of getting things

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75 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript II, 5.
76 “Tweeddale Interview,” Transcript II, 5.
done.”  Ever the high modernist, the engineer-turned-deputy-minister struggled to negotiate economic development and the wider political culture of the 1960s. Recounting the way in which a government member wanted job creation for his region in the north, the deputy minister flat out refused his case. Moreover, when politicians and citizens tried to convince a wood veneer plant to relocate to Charlotte County instead of investing in suburban Saint John, Tweeddale and his minister Robert Higgins largely denounced the plan. By the late 1960s, the high modernist ethos of state-led development had reoriented to the politics of localism: “… that maybe turned me a little bit towards- away from government getting into business … It doesn’t seem to me that that’s the role that government can best provide society.” After the change in government under Hatfield, the anglophone premier suggested that the electrical engineer transition to the forestry file.

This was a better fit. The New Brunswick Government was keen to develop the province’s natural resources, particularly within the forestry sector. Tweeddale expressed concern with the new job as he was not a forester, although the Deputy Minister of Lands and Mines, Bob Bishop assured him that he could lean on the competencies of his staff or outside consultants: “You can always buy professional expertise.” One of Tweeddale’s tasks was to find recommendations for the industry. One of the key priorities was the establishment of the Maritime Forestry Complex and improve overall expertise with in

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79 Ibid.
the forestry sector. Here again, Tweeddale ran into opposition with elected officials. Always interested in bolstering UNB, Tweeddale wanted to tie in the new complex with the existing Forestry Ranger School and wider expertise at the provincial university. Again, he became frustrated by the machinations and considerations of politicians. While Romeo LeBlanc, federal Minister of Fisheries, wanted to see the project go ahead in northern New Brunswick, the high modernist technocrat preferred to centralize the machinery of government and he did the same with forestry education in the provincial capital. The New Brunswick engineer turned-reluctant bureaucrat typifies the role of the high modernist technocrat of the mid-twentieth century. Reg Tweeddale’s complex legacy as a senior official traces the arc of state-led development and its later decline during the era of Equal Opportunity. When considered against a backdrop of other mid-century technocrats in New Brunswick, Reginald Tweeddale, the high modernist, becomes a more nuanced historical actor during the Robichaud-Hatfield period.

**Alexandre J. Boudreau: The Model Low Modernist**

After considering the quintessential high modernist, it is necessary to examine the life and contributions of Alexandre Boudreau. He served as a key figure in the development of the Byrne Commission and proposed sweeping changes to New Brunswick during the 1960s. He pushed for more citizen-focused changes to the local

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government organization as well as the administration of social welfare. His approach was largely rejected for more top-down improvement schemes.

Born in Chéticamp, Cape Breton in 1910 into a “pure laine” Acadian family, Boudreau’s early life was marked by simplicity and strong communal ties.83 A proud son of Acadie, the future technocrat left school at the age of 15 to take a job at the small branch of the Royal Bank of Canada in his hometown. He climbed the ranks quickly, receiving transfers to other branches in Cape Breton and was offered a job in Saint-Léonard, New Brunswick’s branch in 1927.84 However, it was a scholarship to the College de Lévis, a classical college run by the Catholic Church in Quebec, that would change his trajectory. Like many of the high and low modernist technocrats, the prospect of a formal education unlocked later opportunities for intellectual growth and a career in government. Alexandre Boudreau was no exception. With an initial plan to study for a year and return to the life as an aspiring banker, Boudreau’s path was scuttled after learning that Moncton’s Société d’Assomption offered a scholarship to Acadians who wanted to study agronomy. So, the young Acadian continued on to the School of Agriculture at Sainte-Anne-de-la-Pocatière, at the Université Laval in Quebec City in 1929.85 There he took courses in agricultural economics and even spent time on the college’s working farm. However, the prospect of a career as a credentialed farmer did

84 He goes on to say that an offer to study Spanish and a position in the Caribbean was a possible through RBC. Boudreau, À l’assaut des défis: Notes autobiographies, 17-18.
85 Boudreau, 20.
not appeal to Boudreau; he wanted to help men and women like himself from rural backgrounds: “Mais ce qui m’intéressait surtout c’était l’économie rurale, l’analyse des problèmes dans les milieu ruraux et les moyens d’y rémedier. J’avais déjà la hantise d’aider les miens, en leur donnant des idées neuves, en les aidant à se bâtir des monuments qui pourraient améliorer leur sort.” Armed with a Bachelor of Science in Agriculture, Alexandre Boudreau would put his education to use in the fields of rural economic development and labour organization and adult education.

An appointment as an agronomist in Chéticamp in 1934 brought the Acadian back home and exposed him the conditions of Nova Scotia’s sclerotic civil service. Jokingly referring to himself as a “persona non grata,” he butted heads with his superiors and was forbidden to experiment with different methods of communal organization that he had witnessed previously in Quebec. Nevertheless, his exposure to the innovative work of Rev. Moses Coady and the Antigonish Movement allowed Boudreau an outlet to experiment in social movements for the amelioration of life in Acadian Cape Breton. An integral component of Father Coady’s mission was the support of credit unions as well as adult education programs for workers and the rural poor. The push for educational

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86 Translation: “What interested me most was rural economics, the analysis of problems within rural contexts and how to solve them. I was already obsessed with helping my people, giving them new ideas, helping them to use tools that could improve their lives.” Boudreau, 21.
87 Boudreau, 23-24.
attainment later found an outlet through ties to St. Francis Xavier University. This became known as the Antigonish Movement and it deeply influenced the Acadian agronomist and organizer. Boudreau believed that the francophone residents of rural Cape Breton were largely excluded from the benefits of this predominately anglophone grassroots movement. Boudreau spearheaded “study circles,” and borrowed the pedagogical tool. In a francophone context, the all-male study circle, which included members of the clergy, examined the utility of credit unions as well as the consumer needs of rural Chéticamp. However, Boudreau eventually came to distrust the “Antigonish Gang” whom he argued sought to assimilate Acadians into English Nova Scotian communities. The influence of grassroots improvement initiatives pushed Boudreau into community and labour advocacy.

Involvement in the labour movement and more sophisticated development schemes ensured that Alexandre Boundreau opened the doors to further professional and academic advancement. In the mid-1930s, the Acadian moved to the Gaspé to help organize the Quebec Fishers Union. An ambitious program of labour organization and educational enrichment took him throughout the Gaspé Peninsula on tours and seminars. A sample of his planning documents denoted the seriousness of his role: “Recrutement en Gaspésie d’une cinquantaine de futurs chefs, qui viendraient à Sainte-Anne suivre un cours de leadership de six semaines.”; “Création à l’École des pêcheries d’un service

90 Boudreau, 27.
91 Boudreau was inspired from literature he acquired from friends and colleagues that had ties to Alphonse Desjardins, the founder of the first credit union in North America in Lévis, Quebec. This culminated in the establishment of a Caisse Populaire in Chéticamp in 1936. Boudreau, 27-28.
Communication and the dissemination of news pertaining to unionism among the fishers of Quebec inspired the leadership to launch a journal *A Pleines Voiles*. Forced to take a medical leave from the *Pêcheures-Unis de Québec*, the young organizer found himself in Boston. In 1942, he became aware of Harvard University’s new faculty of public administration, and the possibility for young professionals to attend on scholarship if sponsored by a government official. Recommended by the federal minister of Fisheries, he was even permitted to receive his salary while studying for his master’s degree.

Alexandre Boudreau wrote a thesis on federal-provincial relations while at Harvard. He proudly noted in his memoirs that he was the first French Canadian to receive a professional degree in public administration. He returned to his role in education projects under the *Pêcheures-Unis de Québec* which took him back to Cape Breton to organize a more formal course on the cooperative movement for the fishing industry *en Français*. The tenacity which Boudreau employed in his work brought the attention of senior government leaders. A call from Louis Saint-Laurent gave him the opportunity to join the Civil Service Commission as a francophone member in 1949.

The bureaucratic landscape of the 1940s both federally and provincially required serious reforms; Boudreau was tasked to look out and look in to recommend changes as a

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92 Translation: “Recruitment of roughly fifty future leaders on the Gaspé Peninsula, who would come to Sainte-Anne to attend a six-week leadership course.”; “Create a social-economic program at the Fishers School that would be mainly educational.”; “Establish cooperatives.” Boudreau, 32.

93 Boudreau, 35.

94 Boudreau, 35.
political appointee. Indeed, while in Ottawa, the Acadian was determined to change the proportion of francophone participation within the federal civil service. He became an ardent advocate for the rights of French bureaucrats and, as such, Boudreau was sidelined by the two anglophone commissioners, President Charles Bland and Stanley Nelson.  

Many of Boudreau’s recommendations for senior appointments were flat out ignored or passed over. In 1951, he welcomed a change of scenery. A study tour to Pakistan under the auspices of UNESCO saw Boudreau travel east to advocate for an adult education initiative. The international delegation exposed him to the world of diplomacy and global approaches to agricultural planning. In December of 1951, he was struck by the modern facilities at the Agricultural College of Lyallpur as well as the poverty and working conditions of agriculturalists: “Le Pakistan a du chemin à faire avant d’approcher le Canada.” A return to the Commission sadly produced little effect. Boudreau was largely ignored by the commission and he accepted another UN-sponsored mission, this time Cambodia. Dubbed “Mister Expert” in an audience with the Cambodian King in 1954, Boundreau worked with the mission to provide recommendation for civil service modernization. Meetings with the provincial governors allowed the roving agronomist from Chéticamp to explore the southeast Asian kingdom. However, the draft legislation that Boudreau prepared to modernize the civil service was of limited interest to the Court. He gladly welcomed his return to Canada in 1955.

95 Boudreau, 49.
96 Translation: “Pakistan has a long way to go before it looks like Canada.” Boudreau, 52.
97 In a bizarre aside, the technocrat recounts that his recommendations became almost a secondary concern for Cambodian officials. Before the termination of his study mission, the king met with Boudreau who wanted him to secure work permits for a troupe of performers and dancers to travel to the United States. Boudreau, 55.
Labour organization and education remained Boudreau’s chief interests even after his exotic exploits. The defeat of the Liberal government saw Boudreau’s lackluster time in the Civil Service Commission come to an end. The new prime minister, John Diefenbaker, offered him another term in Ottawa or time in the diplomatic service. He chose the latter, and Diefenbaker appointed Boudreau to the position of Consul General to Boston. He was given an honourary doctorate at the Université Saint-Joseph in 1958 and where he made key contacts with Rev. Clement Cormier and other influential Acadian educators.  

Just before settling in New Brunswick to begin administrative work on the new Université de Moncton, the low modernist’s job offer was postponed. He quickly responded to a post at the new institution of the University of Sudbury to work within the university’s extension service that offered programming to the community. Arriving in the midst’s of a strike by the workers of Inco Limited, Boudreau exclaimed: “À quelque chose, malheur est bon,” dit le proverb. Je croyais fermement que c’était la main de Dieu qui m’avait poussé jusqu’à Sudbury, et j’étais tout feu, tout flamme!”

His teaching was infused with Catholic social teachings as well as community-based learning that was present back in his study circle days in Chéticamp and Gaspé. His leadership course for miners was well received and he even produced a ten-part television lecture series on the impact of Marxism. A low modernist through and through, he was quick

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98 This small francophone college was one of the constituent members that later formed the Université de Moncton in 1963. Father Cormier is considered the founder of the modern Acadian university.
99 Translation: ‘Like the saying goes “every cloud has a silver lining.’ I strongly believe that the hand of God had pushed me to Sudbury, and I was on fire with passion.” Boudreau, 60.
100 Boudreau, 60-65.
to return to New Brunswick and the centre of the francophone education movement. Boudreau left his miners to take up his post at the Director of Extension and Public Relations at Université Saint-Joseph.101

In June of 1960, Boudreau travelled to Moncton and found Acadia in the midst of its own Quiet Revolution. A keen supporter of Louis Robichaud, Boudreau had made his acquaintance while both were at the Université Laval in the 1940s. The Cape Breton Acadian was bullish on Robichaud’s vision for government. Boudreau came under the influence of Father Clement Cormier and the transition from the relatively small site of the classical college at Memramcook to the Université de Moncton’s temporary facilities on Church Street in the downtown. As Director of Extension, Boudreau took the same model as his previous posts: deliver theoretical and practical course offers to adults. In New Brunswick, the majority of his students were members of the civil service and labour leaders. His hectic teaching schedule underscored his commitment to grassroots and communal uplift:

[T]rente heures en administration publique pour employés civils, et trente heures de leadership aux membres et aux gestionnaires des union ouvrières … une série de cours de perfectionnement pour les instituteurs et institurices. Et avec mon ami Prémélite Robichaud, agronome à Bouctouche, je donnais un cours de deux heures par semaine sur les coopératives, devant une sale paroissales pleine. Même une cinquantaine de cultivateurs de la région de Rogersville s’y rendaient en autobus.102

101 Boudreau, 67.
102 Translation: “Three hours of public administration courses for civil servants, and thirty hours of leadership training for union members and managers … A series of refresher courses for teachers. And with my friend Prémélite Robichaud, an agronomist in Bouctouche, I gave a two-hour class each week on cooperatives, in front of a full parish hall. Even about 50 farmers from the Rogersville area travelled by bus.” Boudreau, 69-71.
The committed technocrat was committed to see the lives of rural residents and Acadians improved during the Robichaud Government of the 1960s. In model low modernist form, Boudreau was supportive of the mandate of *The Royal Commission on Higher Education* in which John Deutch, the Principal of Queen’s University recommended the overhaul of post-secondary education in New Brunswick. The 1962 report laid the groundwork for the creation of the Université de Moncton. As an experienced government commissioner, Boudreau was offered a place on what would become the main planning body that would establish the legislative framework of the era of Equal Opportunity, the *Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation in New Brunswick*.

Under the leadership of Commission chair Edward G. Byrne, a lawyer from Bathurst, Dr. Alexandre Boudreau proposed radical change to the restructuring of New Brunswick’s welfare state. The recommendations that Boudreau proposed came about through a study tour of Sweden (described in Chapter Three); however, his experiences abroad and with his fellow commissioners point to the stark tensions between high and low modernist change. The additional problems of governmental consolidation versus decentralized service delivery structures was laid bare in 1960s New Brunswick. Other members of the Commission included Charles Wilson of Saint John, the former owner of Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, as well as Arthur E. Andrews of St. Stephen and Uldéric Nadeau of Baker Brook, Madawaska County.103

103 Boudreau, 71.
Radical change was necessary for Boudreau to ensure that francophone New Brunswick enjoyed the same socioeconomic rights as anglophone residents. To join the province on equal footing was paramount so he earnestly joined the commission: “…je n’aurais pas voulu manquer cette chance pour tout l’or du monde.” Curiously enough, Alexandre Boudreau underplayed the political tensions and the behind-the-scenes negotiations of the Byrne Report. From other sources, however, we know it was rancorous. Ed Byrne chose the Acadian technocratic for his sharp mind and his academic training; although, the two disagreed on fundamental aspects of the recommendations.

While the county councils were abolished, Boudreau preferred an intermediary level of government to administer social services between municipalities and the province. One of his takeaways from his six-week study tour of Sweden was the administrative apparatus known as the commune, similar to a region, which served as a jurisdictional go-between for Stockholm and residents. Boudreau’s dream of fully bilingual departments within the New Brunswick government was also swiftly rejected by Chairman Byrne. Nevertheless, Boudreau recounts in his memoir the totality of the Program of Equal Opportunity, which was a result of the Commission’s report: “Ce n’est pas un hazard si le premier minister Robichaud baptisa toute de suite l’ensemble de notre programme du nom d’Égalité d’opportunité. Pour la première fois depuis la dispersion de 1755, les Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick devenaient des citoyens “à part entière,” et serient traités également devant les lois provinciaux.”

104 Translation: “I would not have missed this opportunity for all the gold in the world.” Boudreau, 72.
105 Translation: “It's no coincidence that Premier Robichaud immediately named our entire project Equal Opportunity. For the first time since the Deportation of 1755, New Brunswick’s Acadians became “full-fledged” citizens and would be treated as such under provincial law.” Boudreau, 73.
recommendations of the Report. Speaking before the New Brunswick Agricultural Federation as well as a meeting of citizens in Woodstock, Boudreau defended the changes. He was even given the privilege to brief the cabinet, an honour not even extended to the chairman, Ed Byrne.106 After his services to the Commission, Alexandre Boudreau returned to the Université de Moncton and stepped back into the classroom to educate a generation of young Acadians within field of public administration who would later populate the provincial civil service long after Robichaud and Hatfield left the scene.

“At first blush, the civil servant is wrong. The member of the public is right.”107

On paper, New Brunswick already had a functioning computer to perform the tasks of a growing provincial state. Donald Tansley, the newly arrived technocrat from Saskatchewan, thought New Brunswick did not effectively capitalize on the power of the computer. His drive to modernize his newly adopted province saw the need for a more sophisticated data processor. By securing the services of the Toronto consultancy, KCS, Tansley brought the computing power of General Electric’s 415 Information Processing System to Fredericton. This room-filling computer, complete with consul, card reader, and printer, systematized property assessment data for tax purposes.108 Before the

introduction of this computer, every aspect of tax season was carried out by hand. For Tansley, the computer signaled a new way to make sense of the “Joe LeBlanc, on the hill, and Joe LeBlanc in the valley, and Joe LeBlanc down by the dock…” From streamlining the mundane tasks of taxation to overhauling the structure of government, Donald Tansley appears to be a traditional technocrat. But, in fact, just like there was not one, but many “Joe LeBlancs,” these prairie-reared technocrats exhibited many of the dichotomous traits of the high and low modernists.

Donald Tansley’s tenure in New Brunswick was relatively brief (1964-1968), though, his influence enshrined a fully professionalized civil service and a progress- oriented government. Born in Regina in 1925, the young Tansley saw service overseas in the Second World War, like other technocrats who engineered the era of Equal Opportunity, notably Reg Tweeddale. Returning to Canada, he received undergraduate degrees in arts and commerce at the University of Saskatchewan in 1950. Indeed, his time in school saw him focus on economics and business administration, a proven training ground for the high modernists. Yet, his experiences within the government of Tommy Douglas saw him employ high and low modernist tendencies, namely centralization and policies that uplifted the lives of rural and low-income citizens. One dictum that Tansley relayed to his elected ministers: “At first blush, the civil servant is wrong. The member of the public is right.” The quotation originally, from Tommy Douglas himself, underscored Tansley’s balance of the needs of citizens with top-down reforms.

109 Pasolli, 97.
111 PANB “Donald Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 3.
Tansley was actively sought out to join the new government of Louis Robichaud after the defeat of Saskatchewan premier Woodrow Lloyd of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in 1964. While in the prairie province, he served as the chair of the Medical Care Insure Commission. In his 1990 interview, the retired mandarin was tasked to usher in changes to the healthcare system: “You may recall we had the Doctors’ Strike and the beginning of Medicare in’62 … They couldn’t find any prominent figure, so they dumped a bureaucrat in as chairman.” His actions brought about remarkable reform which attracted the attention of Fred Drummie, a principal figure in Louis Robichaud’s inner circle. Drummie was keen to bring Tansley to Fredericton to turn Robichaud’s plans into policy. Upon meeting Robichaud, Tansley outlined how he wanted to remake New Brunswick policy along the lines of Saskatchewan and listed off the following: “hospital care, medical care, government insurance.” Donald Tansley, in his 1990 interview, argued that reforms made by Robichaud “were worthy of any Socialist Government.” Drummie, too, echoed this characterization of the Liberal premier that Robichaud was a “socialist in all but name.”

Prominent ex-civil servants of the former CCF government in Saskatchewan flowed to New Brunswick. Along with Tansley, this “Saskatchewan Mafia” included

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113 “Donald Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 1.
114 “Donald Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 5.
115 “Donald Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 5.
“Robert McLarty, Paul Leger, Graham Clarkson, Nancy Bryant, Donald Junk, and Desmond Fogg”. Tansley and many of his prairie colleagues did have some choice in their professional development. Asked why he simply did not migrate to Ottawa, Tansley said matter-of-factly, that “New Brunswick would be more fun than the Federal Government.” While they were considered “outsiders” and met with “usually a few four-letter words,” Tansley and his colleagues were keen to transform a jurisdiction.

In her groundbreaking thesis, sections of which were later published as a journal article, Lisa Pasolli presents the Saskatchewan Mafia as the main agents of change for New Brunswick in the mid-1960s. While Pasolli does not situate their contributions within the framework of high and/or low modernist reform, her argument nevertheless echoes the characteristics of the agrarian low modernists in the United States. Donald Tansley was attractive to New Brunswick leaders because of “his experience with stage-managed programs such as medicare and government insurance” in Saskatchewan. Ultimately, Tansley and his colleagues facilitated social engineering in New Brunswick. Pasolli argues forcefully that they brought the skills of bureaucratic planning and departmental reorganization to another part of the country: “Without the presence of this mafia, the New Brunswick Bureaucracy would not have transformed as efficiently and

117 Pasolli, 127. As to the effectiveness of this group of civil servants, Saskatchewan political insider Allan Blakely remarked that the budgeting process in the province was “the best college of public administration in Canada at the time.” Pasolli, 136.
118 “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 1.
119 “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 8.
120 Pasolli, 127.
rapidly as it did.” Prior to the initiatives of the Robichaud government, patronage was a stifling problem as was the tiny size of the bureaucracy. Fred Drummie went so far as to call the pre-1960s civil service “inbred.”

These Saskatchewan bureaucrats had spent decades perfecting their approach to public administration. In the magisterial text, Dream No Little Dream: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan, A.W. Johnson—himself a member of the Douglas Government—chronicles the development and implementation of the CCF’s activist agenda. Granted academic leave from the bureaucracy, Johnson completed a study of the internal workings of the Douglas Government at Harvard University in 1963. His PhD dissertation served as the core of the text that was only published in the early twenty-first century. In the foreword to the 2004 publication, Gregory P. Marchildon argues that the CCF Government of Saskatchewan represented “Canada’s most important social policy laboratory from 1944-until the early 1960s.” Johnson, the scholar-bureaucrat (who also fits within the low modernist tradition) documents the totality of Douglas’s reforms. The professionalization of the machinery of government and the codification of the “institutionalized cabinet” in Saskatchewan are key areas for Johnson.

122 Pasolli, Acadiensis, 132.
125 Marchildon, xvi-xvii.
In all, this biography of the Douglas Government explores the training ground for Saskatchewan officials before arriving in New Brunswick. Driven by socially progressive models of public administration, the prairie-based bureaucrats and technocrats often tempered their ethos with pragmatic solutions to government reform. Johnson deftly records the migration of Saskatchewan’s fiscal policy planners in the early 1960s:

Other Budget Bureau graduates went to other provinces—notably Don Tansley as deputy ministry of finance in New Brunswick, Paul Leger as deputy minister to the premier of New Brunswick, and Nancy Kenyon [Bryant] as a senior official in New Brunswick and then in the federal department of Indian and Northern Affairs. Two others became deputy ministers to premiers of Saskatchewan: Wes Bolstad to Premier Lloyd and Mel Derrick to Premier Blakeney. This was quite a record for one agency in a small government.

New Brunswick and other jurisdictions benefited immensely from the Saskatchewan experiment. These prairie technocrats helped facilitate ambitious reforms that sit at the intersection of the high and low modernist traditions.

The most important first step in Louis Robichaud’s policy revolution came in the form of the systematic restructuring of the civil service to ensure a centralized delivery system of public services. The burgeoning technocratic government of Louis Robichaud turned to the Chicago firm Public Administration Services to produce a report of recommendations for overhauling the civil service. The voluminous report, entitled *Organization and Administration of the Public Services of the Province of New Brunswick*, underscored the need for monumental reform. Change in staffing and

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126 A.W. Johnson, *Dream No Little Dream*, 43.
127 A.W. Johnson, *Dream No Little Dream*, 198.
personnel were key. The expert consultants noted that this change needed to be brought about through the province’s moribund Civil Service Commission.\textsuperscript{128} “Training, recruitment, and discipline” were key to a successful overhaul. Even Louis Robichaud reiterated his aims to the CSC: a “search for high-quality candidates should not be confined to native sons of New Brunswick.”\textsuperscript{129} Staffing and new management strategies were emphasized throughout the Chicago-based report.\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, in order to promote uniformity throughout the bureaucracy, nearly all civil servants were brought under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Act.\textsuperscript{131} The government of the day rejected any notion of a low modernist citizen-focused approach to bureaucratic reform.

Complete with organizational charts and comprehensive recommendations, the 1962 PAS report was a high modernist manifesto for mid-century government reform. It was Donald Tansley’s responsibility to act on its recommendations. The scope of the project sought to study the principal pieces of legislation and consult with the government departments, from Education and Labour to Agriculture as well as Youth and Welfare Services.\textsuperscript{132} In all, there were ten parts to the report and PSA offered comprehensive restructuring of fifteen departments across government.\textsuperscript{133} The organization charts became much more hierarchical to accommodate the growth of the welfare state and improve service delivery in New Brunswick. Along with many of the

\textsuperscript{128} Pasolli, \textit{Acadiensis}, 132-133.
\textsuperscript{129} Pasolli, \textit{Acadiensis}, 133.
\textsuperscript{130} Pasolli, \textit{Acadiensis}, 133.
\textsuperscript{131} Pasolli, \textit{Acadiensis}, 133.
\textsuperscript{132} Organization and Administration of the Public Services of the Province of New Brunswick: Report I, Administrative Organization of the Provincial Government (Chicago, IL: Public Administration Service, 1962), iii.
\textsuperscript{133} Pasolli, \textit{Acadiensis}, 134.
reforms, the consultants’ report focused significantly on the economic capacity of the government’s administrative structures:

It is not unlikely that among the present handicaps of the Province of New Brunswick in its pursuit of a flourishing economy is insufficient attention to economic study and planning. These functions now are lacking in quality and intensity and are performed in a less than fully coordinated manner … To reduce these difficulties and, more importantly, to provide for effective performance of a badly needed function, an Office of Economic Research and Planning, as a staff aid to Cabinet, should be established and supplied with a small staff of specialists…\textsuperscript{134}

Expertise became desperately needed in the areas of economic planning and policy implementation.

As Louis Robichaud’s Deputy Minister of Finance and Industry, much of Tansley’s planning strategy was orchestrated to improve the province’s government structure to promote economic growth. The coupling of government reform to wider aims of industrialization in the 1960s is a core function of the era of Equal Opportunity. While he exhibited many of the traits of a high modernist planner, Tansley often advocated for policies that were group focused. For example, he was a champion of collective bargaining for public employees: “I talked the government into the idea that unionism in the Public Service was not necessarily a bad thing.”\textsuperscript{135}

The Regina native was an articulate witness to Robichaud’s “energetic” exercise of power in the 1960s and his tendency to centralize authority: “The more he was doing, the more he wanted to do.”\textsuperscript{136} The premier consolidated power in his office and rarely

\textsuperscript{134} Organization and Administration of Public Services of the Province of New Brunswick: Report I Administrative Organization of the Provincial Government (Chicago, IL: Public Administration Service, 1962). I-6-7.

\textsuperscript{135} “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 7.

\textsuperscript{136} “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 9.
deferred to his ministers. Tansley, instead, noted that Robichaud relied more heavily on bureaucrats. As to why the premier relied more on his professional staff rather than his cabinet ministers, Tansley gave a telling answer in his 1990 interview:

In a province that size, and indeed in Saskatchewan as well, there’s no sharp cut-off between politics and management. You’re involved in politics up to your ears, whether you want to be or not, far more so than the case with the Federal Government … So you do become half politician, half bureaucrat.\(^\text{137}\)

In terms of the Program of Equal Opportunity, Donald Tansley helped to lay the groundwork for Robichaud’s vision. He was one of the authors of the 1965 *White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government*.\(^\text{138}\) This document, as stated previously, was the blueprint for EO and established the general tenor of government reform in mid-twentieth century New Brunswick. Tansley noted that Equal Opportunity restored the pride of Acadians, but more importantly, he agreed with Richard Hatfield’s observation that EO “started a whole process of reform in New Brunswick.”\(^\text{139}\)

Donald Tansley’s high ethical standards proliferated into the sphere of economic development. Donald Savoie writes that Tansley was cozy with New Brunswick business tycoon Harrison McCain. Yet, while other bureaucrats had extended loan guarantees to McCain’s agri-food company with few oversights, Tansley wanted to add safeguards to mitigate the province’s risk. McCain was entirely supportive of Tansley’s adoption of

\(^{137}\) “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 10.

\(^{138}\) Pasolli, “Bureaucratizing the Atlantic Revolution,” *Acadiensis*, 130.

\(^{139}\) “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 12. Of note, Donald Tansley believed New Brunswickers were more tolerant of individuals, and thus the drive for programs that promoted individual rights. He opined that people in Saskatchewan were more tolerant of groups to which he identified the vitality of Jewish and Ukrainian communities in the province. “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 15.
best practices for financial accountability, ostensibly saying “Goddamn it, you’re right. Let’s fix it. You do what you have to do and you tell us what we have to do and well do it, no questions asked.”

Thus, Donald Tansley, who brought high modernist change to New Brunswick occupies a middle ground within the broad spectrum of technocrats during the era of Equal Opportunity. His upbringing, professional experiences in Saskatchewan, as well as his approach to policy planning sought to extend the benefits of the welfare state to rural citizens; although often, these solutions emphasized consolidation, efficiency, and steep hierarchical bureaucratic structures. When asked “Did you regard what you were doing in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan as Development Economics?” the retired civil servant downplayed his expertise, but like the generation of American low modernists before him, focused on the personal: “Not really, because I’m not much of an Economist, but I just had a fairly broad experience. I had finance experience, I had the crown corporation experience, running Saskatchewan’s Industrial Development Fund, all the things that happened in New Brunswick. I had a short assignment in 1960 in Ghana.” Therefore, Tansley occupies a middle ground between high and low modernism. The province benefited substantially from the contributions of Donald Tansley, the Saskatchewan Mafia and the other technocratic officials during the Robichaud-Hatfield regime.

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141 “Tansley Interview,” Transcript I, 26.
142 After his retirement from federal and provincial public services, Donald Tansley turned his focus to international affairs. One such commitment he pursued was the cause of peace in the Middle East and in South America. He joined the Canadian Committee for Five Days of Peace that advocated for the extension of a “five-day moratorium in both Palestine and El Salvador.” Donald Savoie, Harrison McCain, 109.
CHAPTER THREE

Looking Out and Looking In: Currents of Global Change during the Late Era of Equal Opportunity

New Brunswick: The Roots of the “Minnesota Miracle”?  

On Thursday October 30, 1969 five “top-ranking” officials from the midwestern state of Minnesota made their way to Fredericton, New Brunswick.¹ A two-day tour of the province was undertaken to study reforms in education. The delegation included:

State Senator Stanley W. Holmquist, chairman of the senate subcommittee on school aids, State Representative Harvey B. Sathre, Chairman of the house subcommittee on school aids, Steven Szarke, consultant to the education committees of the Minnesota senate and house of representatives, S. Walter Harvey, research director, state aids and statistics of the state department of education, and William A. Wettergren, executive secretary of the Minnesota School Boards Association.²

The members of Minnesota’s bureaucratic and political elite arrived when EO was in full swing. This key policy initiative saw the province centralize the delivery of public services in the areas of health, education, social welfare, and the administration of courts and jails away from the often ill-financed county governments. Earlier in the week, the Minister of Education, W.W. Meldrum, announced to a Miramichi group of merchants that the Minnesotans were on their way to the New Brunswick and that he was “proud to

¹ Michel Cormier, Louis J. Robichaud: A Not So Quiet Revolution, 152.
show them” the government’s reforms to education. Changes to education had been among the chief goals of Louis Robichaud’s tenure. Robichaud ensured that a centralized funding mechanism was applied across New Brunswick to standardize the policy field.

The provincial government also financially assumed teachers’ salaries. The members of the American delegation paraded around the provincial capital meeting with Premier Robichaud and Leader of the Official Opposition, Richard Hatfield, members of the New Brunswick School Trustees’ Association as well as the Teacher’s Association. Interestingly, the Minnesotan lawmakers were briefed by officials from the powerful Personnel Policy Division (a product of provincial reforms) as well as the Treasury Board of the newly strengthened civil service. The Moncton Telegraph also recounted that the Department of Education hosted a dinner at the University of New Brunswick’s faculty club for the visiting officials. In the days that followed, The Daily Gleaner reported the delegation’s aims for the visit: In Minnesota, the public was becoming less tolerant of the tax structure used to finance education. Tied to property tax, “an ever-increasing percentage of school costs” represented challenges for the state. The lead delegate, State Senator Holmquist, expressed his interest in the New Brunswick approach to education reform during the era of Equal Opportunity:

You have a program of education now that will ensure some person living in northern New Brunswick of the same opportunity as the person living here in Fredericton. We had areas in Minnesota where those same discrepancies in

educational opportunities were evident, so there is a definite comparison, and we are hoping to minimize those discrepancies like you are.\textsuperscript{7}

There is a silence in the provincial archives related to the 1969 study tour. There are no speeches, communiqués, or addresses in the papers of the premier or the among the senior ministers on the occasion of the Americans’ visit.\textsuperscript{8} What this suggests is a provincial government consumed by an ambitious reform agenda. Not prepared to roll out the red carpet, Fredericton facilitated a brief introduction to its policy changes in local government and public services. While it is difficult to determine the impact of the delegate’s official visit to the province, the state of Minnesota forged a similar path of reform in the fields of education in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Stanley Holmquist, a former small town school administrator-turned-legislator, was among the key lawmakers to usher in the “Minnesota Miracle.”\textsuperscript{9}

Considered a “miracle” by the American press, Minnesota embraced a culture of reform during the 1960s that culminated in changes to local government and the state’s tax regime; revenues were increased on such diverse areas as business and personal income as well as the various ‘sin’ taxes.\textsuperscript{10} The young Democratic-Farmer-Labor Governor Wendell Anderson was able to work across ideological differences in the

\textsuperscript{8} The author has gone to considerable lengths to find any evidence of the study tour among the materials of the New Brunswick government. Across the upper echelons of government, there is no mention of the Minnesota delegation in the papers of W.W. Meldrum, Minister of Education or Louis Robichaud.
legislature to provide equal opportunity for the state’s children: he argued that it was necessary to implement “a general and uniform system of public schools.” Commenting on the contributions of Senator Holmquist, a conservative-leaning lawmaker of Swedish heritage, the former House Minority Leader Martin Sabo praised the contributions of the longtime Senate Majority Leader: “He was very key to making what happened in 1971. I don't think there's any way you would achieve the bipartisan support without Stan Holmquist's involvement.” As to what role New Brunswick played as a model for reform, it is difficult to determine. The Austin Daily Herald newspaper, out of the small city of Austin, Minnesota, noted that the delegates looked towards New Brunswick as a jurisdiction that “pays local school costs” in its discussion of education reform. Yet, this unique episode of the 1960s suggests that officials looked with curiosity to the small Canadian province poking out into the Atlantic.

**Looking Out and Looking In: An Argument**

During the era of Equal Opportunity, the Province of New Brunswick was a laboratory of social innovation. The landmark changes to the sociopolitical contract that occurred in the 1960s and lasted well into the 1970s and 1980s ensured that lawmakers and civil society with few ties to New Brunswick turned their gaze to Fredericton and the residents of the Picture Province. Moreover, civil servants, politicians, and citizens

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pushed government to consider best practices from the rest of Canada as well as jurisdictions further afield to craft legislation or undertake studies on policy fields as diverse as hydroelectric development, local government, and education. Again, the rise of activist governments that emerged throughout North America, Europe, and the Global South at mid-century challenged the status quo of service delivery and citizen engagement. While some regimes were more amenable to ‘democratic planning,’ others took the physical manifestations of progress like dams, hospitals, and universities, and focused on top-down reform. The actions of technocratic officials brought scientific planning to bear in the fields of sociopolitical reform. New Brunswick in the era of Equal Opportunity accomplished both. In the context of New Brunswick, this chapter concludes by exploring two key events that marks the Robichaud-Hatfield period. The first explores the TVA-Mactaquac focus on high modernist planning in the early 1960s during the Robichaud Government. Then, a critical reflection of Alexandre Boudreau’s 1963 study tour to Sweden highlights the low modernist’s interest in decentralized government service delivery as experienced in Scandinavia. Notably, Boudreau’s low modernist agenda was scuttled by the chairman of Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation in New Brunswick in favour of a more centralized approach to government reform. The Robichaud administration’s 1965 White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government, served as a declaration for the government’s ethos as well as a plan for the Program of Equal Opportunity. It urged officials to look out and look within the social fabric of the province to find solutions: “The rapidly changing nature of life in the world, our country, and our province demands re-examination of our objectives and our means to achieve them. We must take the lessons of the international and national experience
and apply them to our own similar problems.”

Many of the reforms ushered in by the governments of Robichaud and Hatfield, pursued vigorously by curious civil servants, remain the most profound legacy of the wider era of Equal Opportunity.

“Why shouldn’t highly skilled economists, engineers, chemists, foresters, agronomists, biologists, and others, be concentrated in an area such as the St. John River Basin…”: The TVA Comes to Town

Extolling the need “to stimulate the economic growth of retarded regions,” Reginald Tweeddale joined a chorus of scientists and officials from the United States and Canada “to discuss the problems and possibilities of multipurpose development of the St. John” River Basin. The two-day conference at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton in 1962 marked a high modernist meeting of the minds for North American technocrats. On the ever-expanding campus of UNB in the early 1960s, the delegates gathered to compare the nature of change in complex landscapes that took advantage of top-down planning initiatives. After the conclusion of the conference, senior New Brunswick officials forged close ties with the Mactaquac Dam engineering firm, H.G. Acres and Company of Niagara Falls, ON, as well as officials from the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1963 and 1964. From these fruitful meetings, Louis Robichaud, Daniel Riley

(Chairman of the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission) and Reg Tweeddale, (NBEP’s General Manager) embarked upon a site tour of the test facility of H.G. Acres and Company at Niagara Falls. The trio continued on to view hydroelectric plants along the Columbia River Valley in Oregon as well as sites on the West coast in 1963. The vision of what could be accomplished on the St. John River was not tempered by small expectations. Indeed, experts hired by the province and technocrats within the government devised a comprehensive recreational plan, a scientific research station, as well as a model town to service the vast dam and its ancillary facilities. While only a few aspects of the multi-purpose scheme came to fruition along the St. John River, the dreams of high modernism planning complemented the social engineering project made manifest by Equal Opportunity.

The TVA was considered the gold standard for other jurisdictions seeking to develop their own people and resources. However, the literature pertaining to multi-purpose engineering projects in the US now suggests there were two phases to the TVA. The pre-1930s version embraced complex multi-planning schemes that focused on citizen uplift through adult education and training as well as improvements to health care and farming practices. These motivations typified low modernist approaches to change. By 1938, the TVA shifted focus to providing inexpensive electricity for

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19 Samantha Bourgoin, (master’s thesis, Saint Mary’s University, 2013), 16.
20 Samantha Bourgoin, 41-42.
21 Samantha Bourgoin, 41-43.
America’s industrial expansion. Furthermore, its power generation facilities went into overdrive during the Second World War. Samantha Bourgoin argues that New Brunswick policymakers in the 1960s embraced the second iteration of the TVA. Citizenship improvement became a secondary concern for the Mactaquac as the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission pushed for “power for industry” to expand the industrial capacity of the province. Throughout the planning stages of the Mactaquac project, policymakers employed the “socially-minded” language and goals that marked the first phase of the TVA; however, few social development initiatives were realized by the time Louis Robichaud threw the switch to open Mactaquac in 1968. Ultimately, low modernist goals were thwarted by high modernist mentalities along the St. John River.

If the Mactaquac project is a study in the frustration of low modernism, then the 1962 conference at UNB had raised expectations for the total transformation of the St. John River Valley. In the introduction of the published conference proceedings, Y.W. Smith articulated the potential for New Brunswick:

By North American standards, the level of income of the people living in the St. John River basin is low. The idea of developing the river on a multipurpose basis to raise income levels as the T.V.A. has done in the Tennessee Valley, has stirred the imagination of people living on both sides of the border. Moreover, multipurpose development by a joint U.S.-Canadian authority could demonstrate to the world a new form of international cooperation.
The objectives of the conference were ambitious: explore the economic conditions of New Brunswick and compare to Maine or Quebec’s South Shore; consider the “experience of Multiple Developments” from other jurisdictions; take stock of the resources of St. John River Valley through a panel discussion; and consider the St. John River’s future development. By 1962, the St. Lawrence Seaway Project had been completed and technocrats on both sides of the border were keen to tackle international projects on the same scale.

The participants of the conference at UNB brought their experience and expertise to bear to tackle the problem of unproductive people and an underdeveloped river valley. The technocrats possessed training in economics, engineering, and public administration. For example, Andre Marier, an economist in Quebec’s Department of Natural Resources, spoke on the regional economy of the St. Lawrence basin and the immediate benefits of the Seaway project. Public officials from the US Department of the Interior made the trip to New Brunswick. Joseph E. Guidry, the Project Engineer of the Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee of the US Department of the Interior, talked up the American experience with multipurpose development. Dr. Robert Barlow, an economics professor from Colby College, outlined the recreational potential of the St. John within a wider hydroelectric scheme. Morgan Dubrow, Engineering Assistant and Chief Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, highlighted the complex international treaty negotiations that took place across North America to get hydro projects off the ground.

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These technocrats left no stone unturned. In fact, Dr. Austin Peck, Vice President (Academic) of the University of Maine, outlined the possibility of mineral exploitation along both sides of border of the St. John River.\textsuperscript{28}

Four New Brunswickers were slated to be active conference participants, although only three gave presentations. D. W. Gallagher, an economic advisor for the government, did not mince words about the province’s financial state: “the economy has not known real prosperity since the decline of the era of wooden sailing ships in the 1870’s.”\textsuperscript{29} Dr. J. S. Bates, the Chairman of the New Brunswick Water Authority, outlined the pollution and flooding concerns of the St. John River. Dr. Bates offered his professional opinion as to possible sites for hydro development that would mitigate the effect of flooding.\textsuperscript{30} For the New Brunswick technocrat, preparing for floods required sufficient planning and only a few changes to the riverscape. He reiterated the position of the federal and provincial governments in the early 1960s that the best way to prevent flooding was to not build on a flood plain.\textsuperscript{31} However, he underscored that flood mitigation was only one area in the high modernist task of developing a river valley and could “fit into multi-purpose development along with recreation, fishing, wildlife, power, clean water supplies, industries, housing, highways and all other attractions.”\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] J.S. Bates, “Flood and Pollution Control,” 53.
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participant with the technical expertise to articulate the totality of the high modernist project was Reg Tweeddale.

Technocrats informed by high modernist mentalities understood the scientific aims of the multipurpose development of the St. John River Basin. They also considered the benefits to natural resource development and recreational schemes. Tweeddale praised the approach taken by the TVA which promoted a “scientific approach” to resource management. In New Brunswick, a megaproject on the St. John River could apply a high modernist approach to investments in agricultural and forestry development. Indeed, there exists an already rich literature on industrial development of the province’s forestry sector and the use of high modernist techniques within the silviculture. The work of Bill Parenteau and Mark McLaughlin trace the rise of industrialization and state-based development schemes within the Province’s forestry sector. At mid-century, for instance, provincial officials consulted with New Brunswick-based experts and outside technocrats to develop insecticide practices during the “Battle of the Budworm.” On the recreation angle, Tweeddale opined that the province could benefit economically and culturally: “I believe that we have, in the St. John River Valley, a valuable recreational asset which, … would rank among the best in North America.” The 1962 meeting offered an opportunity to internationalize New Brunswick’s high modernist ambitions.

35 Reginald Tweeddale, “Multi-purpose Development,” 34.
In a sweeping account of the potentiality of multipurpose development, Tweeddale offers a global contextualization of the TVA. In his remarks, the New Brunswick Electric Commissioner noted that the development along the Tennessee Valley was a “guide” for similar hydroelectric and regional improvement projects in “Afghanistan, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, China and Chile.” On the Chilean example, he informed his colleagues that the TVA ties ran deep. Two hundred officials from the South American country had travelled to the United States to consult with the directors of the American hydroelectric project over a decade. He continued to rattle the locations where TVA expertise had made a concrete contribution. For the international projects, where still ongoing, Tweeddale mentioned that representatives from Colombia, El Salvador, France and Ghana had taken firm steps to investigate the TVA’s model to transform riverscapes and citizens. TVA technocrats from the United States had been dispatched to see if their expertise could be brought to bear even further afield: “And so it has been with India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan (TVA has had nearly 1,700 visitors from Japan in the last 10 years), Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, The Nile Valley, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, and others.” The desire to rehabilitate a landscape – including flooding it – and make it productive was Tweeddale’s chief takeaway: “As was the case for the Tennessee Valley Project, so it might be for the St. John River Basin which if

37 Tweeddale, “Multi-purpose Development,” 36.
38 Tweeddale, “Multi-purpose Development,” 36.
developed could be made an example of properly managed resources for all the world to see and to follow.”

Ultimately, the dreaming and planning of concrete change ran concurrently to Robichaud-Hatfield era’s social engineering scheme.

“I never read that report:” Alexandre Boudreau’s Study Tour of Sweden and the Frustration of Low Modernist Change

Edward Byrne, the head of the Royal Commission of Finance and Municipal Taxation, recounted emphatically in his memoirs that the Byrne Report and its recommendations were all original and not inspired by any Scandinavian model: “Some people have told me that we copied Sweden. Frankly, we copied no one.” By distancing his Commission’s ties to the Report on Study Trip to Sweden by Alexandre Boudreau, completed in 1963, Byrne discounted the work of the Acadian academic. Boudreau’s own curiosity propelled the low modernist to consider what was ongoing in other parts of the world. Alexandre Boudreau joined the Byrne Commission due to his credentials and recommendations. Edward Byrne was taken with his thought process and thoroughness, though he became rather disillusioned with his colleague’s ideological bent.

Several key technocrats were hired as researchers to lay the groundwork for the Byrne Report. Milton Moore, an economist at the University of British Columbia, served as the lead consultant with support coming from John Graham, a specialist in municipal

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organization from Queen’s and Dalhousie Universities, as well as Philip White, who was Byrne’s go-to on taxation matters.43 The chairman purposefully rejected the appointment of UNB professors for his staff and turned to outside experts.44 In true high modernist fashion, the final report released in 1963, employed “medical allusions” in the foreword.45 This was appropriate for a failed medical student, lawyer and senior public official.46 Byrne noted that in his Royal Commission report the aim was to “diagnose, the ailment, its causes, effects and remedy” for New Brunswick’s weak municipal tax structure.47 As to the “surgeons,” the people of New Brunswick, they had to take up the call to action. For Byrne, the medical allusion was taken further, writing how “the legislature is the operating theatre and the government, and the members of the legislature are the instruments.”48 As for the recommendations of the final report and the independence of the drafting process, it was truly separate from government. The Acadian premier ensured that the high modernist Byrne and his three commissioners had free reign.49

43 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 146.
44 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 146.
45 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 147.
47 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 147.
49 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 149.
The appointment of Boudreau marked a fine balance between expertise and local knowledge. Byrne initially looked for an “entirely fresh approach.” Notwithstanding, Byrne was urged to seek officials at the commissioner’s level who had experience in the province. Finally, Byrne, the Bathurst lawyer, agreed upon linguistic equality for the commission. Two anglophones and two francophones provided a language balance. A regional mixture on the commission was also ensured. Uldéric Nadeau and Alexandre Boudreau as well as Charlie Wilson, Arthur Andrews and Byrne himself rounded out the staff. In his own memoir, the Chairman praised Boudreau but undermined him throughout the drafting process, even going so far as to dismiss the new academic institution with which Boudreau was affiliated. In high modernist fashion, Byrne rejected the outcome of the Deutsch Commission that sought to modernize university education in New Brunswick. He opined that the newly created Université de Moncton “helps divide the province.” He wanted a centralized institution in Fredericton at UNB that brought English and French students together. Throughout the drafting process of the main report, Boudreau advocated for separated systems of education for anglophones and francophones matched with total duality in the civil service, a recommendation that was...

50 One of the only secondary sources that takes up the 1963 study tour is Rankine M. Smith’s Equal Opportunity Revisited (Sussex, NB: Royal Printing, 1992). The book, which was published in English and French editions, offers a close reading of the Byrne Report and explores the content of its appendices. A teacher, Smith’s comments related to the study tour are noteworthy: “A desire to reach beyond Canada’s borders saw the Commission send Professor Boudreau to Sweden to study the administrative policies of that very advanced country. His report contained many interesting ideas some of which were adopted by the Commission.” Rankine M. Smith, “Introduction,” in Equal Opportunity Revisited (Sussex, NB: Royal Printing, 1992), viii.
51 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 150.
52 “Memoirs of E.G. Byrne,” 151
later realized during the era of Equal Opportunity. In fact, the suggestion of duality in service delivery and bureaucratic “decentralization” was taken up by the Poirier-Bastarache Report.54

The undertaking of a travel study during the drafting of the report was always in the back of the Chairman’s mind; while he thought about a visit to Vancouver to contextualize west coast public policy, Boudreau had been a persistent advocate for the entire commission to visit Sweden. Apparently, Byrne used the tour as a form of bait to ensure that the Moncton-based academic signed onto the final report. At a meeting in Saint John’s Admiral Beatty Hotel, Byrne announced his plains: “I want you to go to Scandinavia … When you come back, I want you to write a report, and it’s going to be put in our report as an appendix.”55 In recounting his plans to the premier, Byrne assured Robichaud: “He’s going on a witch hunt looking for information. You’re lucky the whole bloody Commission didn’t go to Sweden.”56 As a biting end to his description of the organization of Boudreau’s diplomatic mission, Byrne recounted the fact that the Moncton professor had an unlimited expense account. More significantly, he denounced the work of his fellow colleague: “He enjoyed himself immensely. He came back, and this is the Gospel truth, I’ve never read that report he prepared.”57

Boudreau travelled widely throughout Sweden in 1963. He consulted the heads of government departments and met with a wide array of civil society members; the Acadian technocrat produced a nuanced portrait of Sweden’s social welfare regime in the 1960s. Regardless that the Chairman’s aims for the Sweden tour in 1963 was professional subterfuge, Boudreau’s report with observations of Swedish public policy serve as a useful artifact from the era of Equal Opportunity. His recommendations sought to temper the high modernist approaches to government reform. His terms of reference were quite broad and in his introductory message of the final report, Boudreau explained in his nebulosity account of this work: “I found it impossible to study, or to give a clear picture of Social Welfare in Sweden, without establishing the atmosphere and conditions within which the whole program operates.” In his memoirs, Boudreau noted that he had a longtime interest in the Scandinavian nation and that his six week tour of the country afforded him a rich cultural immersion.

Boudreau’s draft final report, which runs 54 pages and includes 14 specific recommendations, largely differs from the appendix later published in the Byrne Report.

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58 Scholar Erin Morton examines a Nova Scotian, Mary E. Black, who embarked on a tour of Sweden in 1937, a generation before Boudreau, to learn about craft and design matters. An occupational therapist by profession, Black later returned to Nova Scotia in 1943 and assumed the directorship of the province’s Handicraft Division within the Department of Trade and Industry. While in Sweden, Black enrolled at the Sätergläntan Vävskola, a craft institute, in Insjön. Unlike Alexandre Boudreau, Black was interested in Sweden’s “antimodernist ideals.” Morton, 780. Black’s chief interest was weaving practices in Sweden. The art form in the Scandinavian country celebrated ties to nature and rurality and subscribed to the antimodern. These values formed a component of Nova Scotia’s policy on craft-based economic development in the 1940s and 1950s. See Erin Morton, “Not a Vacation, But a Hardening Process”: The Self-Empowerment Work of Therapeutic Craft in Nova Scotia,” Culture Unbound 6 (2014): 773–789.

59 Alexandre Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 1963, Centre d’études acadiennes Anselme-Chiasson, Université de Moncton (CEAAC), Alexandre Boudreau Fonds 904, i.

60 Upon landing in Stockholm, the Acadian meet with the Canadian Ambassador and relevant introductions were organized. Interestingly enough, the proceeding of nearly all of Boudreau’s meetings were conducted in French. He heaped praise on his multilingual hosts. Alexandre Boudreau, À l’assaut des défis: Notes autobiographies (Moncton, NB: l’Editions Acadie, 1994), 72.
Boudreau’s time abroad took him to the centers of political, economic, educational, and bureaucratic power as well as rural areas. Six chapters provide a comprehensive overview of the country. From “Geography and Historical Background,” to the “Government and Public Administration,” “Fiscal Policy” as well as “Education” and “Economy,” the report is exhaustive. Perhaps, the area of chief concern was “Social Welfare in Sweden.” This section runs 21 pages in length and gives a breakdown of the stark difference between social insurance and social assistance. His account of the unitary state’s cabinet shed light on the operation of high-level political affairs. The cabinet was made up of fifteen members, two more than Robichaud’s first cabinet in 1960.  

The Swedish approach to government that Boudreau found novel was their focus on collectivism: “The principal of collective responsibility applies to cabinet.” This approach also expended to their organization of local government.

Perhaps one of the principal takeaways from the report was the Swedes’ propensity for collectivism within the jurisdictional organization of the country. As a unitary state, power and social services flowed from Stockholm down to municipalities; however, the institution of the commune, which traced its origin from the parish at the time when Christianity was introduced to Sweden, existed in its modern form since 1863. Boudreau recounted that it was, in fact, the “primary unit of government.”

61 As a mark of reform, the Acadian premier formed the first near-linguistically balanced cabinet in the Province’s history with five anglophone ministers and seven francophone ministers, himself included. Robichaud Proceeding, 193; Don Hoyt, A Brief History of the Liberal Party of New Brunswick (Saint John, NB: Keystone Printing, 1999), 73.

62 CEAAC Fonds 904, Alexandre Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 6.

63 Ibid.
commune could be considered a geographic region, but it also, normally included a city. In 1952, the number of communes in the Scandinavian nation number in excess of 2500 with an enormous range in population. The commune encompassing the capital, Boudreau reported, had a population of 800,000, while the smallest commune had only 69 residents.64 At the time of writing, Boudreau noted the that country was in the process of modernizing the system to reduce the number of communes throughout the country and bring the total number of inhabits down to a “minimum of 3,000 each.” Moreover, with 1029 communes in Sweden in 1963, an effort was underway to merge neighbouring administrative units to promote efficiency. Anglophone New Brunswick, perhaps, might have been receptive to this policy solution as English residents lamented the loss of local control over certain public services. The proposal of the commune was never implemented, however, and New Brunswick public services were centrally administered. Ultimately, the government of Louis Robichaud worried that these communes and their administrative functions would frustrate the professionalization of a centralized bureaucracy.65

As to political organization of this level of government, the Acadian low modernist underscored the grassroots composition of commune. An elected council composed of at least six officials had jurisdiction over the following: “Direct services to property, elementary education, care of the poor, and child welfare.”66 Not the only layer

64 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 6-7.
66 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 7.
of government organization, the Swedish state, at mid-century, possessed 25 provinces. These jurisdictions were at least responsible for the organization of communes and the organ of service delivery in the areas of health care, such as administering hospitals and secondary education. Provincial administrative boards, government bodies elected by citizens, exercised political control. Public safety was overseen by governors of the provinces appointed directly from Stockholm and these officials also attended to the allotment of monies from department of finance.67 The bottom-up approach to governing and consensus-building absolutely transfixed Alexandre Boudreau.

At the core of the Swedish model of public administration in the 1960s was the reliance on the representative board. Across all policy fields, around fifty boards sought to implement the directives of Stockholm. Diverse areas such as labour, social services, and workers protection each had an “autonomous board” headed by a director general and composed of five to ten representatives who were all appointed by the central government.68 Boudreau recounted with great interest their operation: “As a rule, the boards are representative. For example, on the Labour Market Board, employers, employees, and farmers will be represented.”69 It was through these organizations that social services were implemented. Government ministry only established the policies and possessed around 500 civil servants. The lion’s share of the 300,000-strong Swedish bureaucracy in 1963 was dispersed throughout the communes and staffed the

67 Ibid.
68 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 9.
69 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 10.
administrative boards. With astonishment, Boudreau thought these government appointed boards would tend toward an “autocratic” mode of operation. However, he assured his readers that the Swedish “constitution and subsequent legislation” enriched a highly transparent political culture for the execution of government decisions.

The principal aim of the Acadian technocrat’s tour to Sweden was to find best practices within their social welfare system. He provides a comprehensive history of social welfare that would be easy to follow for his readers. He provides a quick overview of the development of social welfare from the European context from the establishment of the Poor Laws in seventeen-century England to the completion of the Beverage Report in 1940s Britain. In his travel study, Boudreau declares: “In no country in the world have the recommendations of the Beverage Report been more fully implemented than in Sweden.” He was struck by the humane approach to the administration and aim of social services. For the Swedes, he focused on their desire to seek full employment. For the Scandinavian country a well-supported citizenry allows for such labour market conditions. In his meetings with senior government officials, the wider philosophy of social welfare in the country was pressed upon Boudreau. The Director-General of the Swedish National Pension Board, Konrad Persson, provided an articulation of their national ethos:

All social welfare rests on two basic pillars: humanitarianism and economic progress with full employment. In a full-employment society, it is much easier to carry out first-line defenses for its handicapped members, that is, to restore their

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70 Ibid.
working ability, put them back into gainful employment, and perform all the other things that are collectively known as rehabilitation … It may be said to synthesize the twin pillars of humanitarianism and economic progress, for work is essential not only to our livelihood and sound physical and mental health, but also to the economic well-being of the whole population.

This expression of state intervention for the improvement of citizen wellbeing foreshadows a speech made to launch the Equal Opportunity Program in the New Brunswick Legislature in 1965. Louis Robichaud bellowed before his ministers and the MLAs assembled that “The standards and equality of our education system, are at present, directly dependent upon those limited resources and must be raised significantly, otherwise our economic future is dim.” Indeed, this approach to government reform, and the goals for economic and social development through education and employment, was shared by citizens and public officials on both sides of the Atlantic.

When Swedish officials were briefed by Boudreau on the state of affairs in Pre-Equal Opportunity New Brunswick, they were horrified. Swedes believed that New Brunswick’s unemployment rate of eight to ten percent, coupled with its pre-EO welfare regime, was a recipe for bankruptcy. The Swedish officials also reacted with concern when the Acadian technocrat outlined the pre-EO social assistance scheme. In Sweden, money extended to the unemployed was linked to work programs; this was not the case in New Brunswick and the Swedish officials thought that such a lack of work-based aid would be irresponsible and harm the province’s “moral fiber.” Only a broad-based

73 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 37.
75 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 37.
social welfare program could uplift citizens, according to the Swedes, one that did not
discriminated based on the economic health of a jurisdiction: “penalizing underdeveloped
areas solely because they have been neglected or did not possess the same natural or
economic advantages” was unthinkable.\textsuperscript{76} One of the key takeaways from Boudreau’s
political and cultural immersion was his advocacy the role of an activist state that
promoted investment for rural residents.

Perhaps what surprised the Acadian low modernist the most was how effectively
Sweden’s Welfare system operated. With what he considered a “loose jurisdictional
arrangement” between the communes, the provinces, and the central government, there
was little “waste” of crucial money for social programs and aid.\textsuperscript{77} The transparency
afforded to operation of government and the integrity with which officials executed
public decisions was striking for Boudreau. Notably absent from the final report
submitted as an appendix to Byrne Commission were Boudreau’s 14 recommendations
arising from his time in Sweden. The technocrat laid out his recommendations for his
fellow commissioners to review in 1963. He urged his colleagues Byrne, Nadeau,
Andrews, and Wilson to include within their broader recommendations for welfare
reform the findings of the Chicago-based Institute of Public Administration from 1961 as
well as an earlier report from the Canadian Welfare Council. He outlined the need for
change in the federal funding formula for the unemployed. He wanted to see provincial

\textsuperscript{76} Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 38.
\textsuperscript{77} Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 53-54.
commitments fall by “5% for each 1% of employment above 3%”; this recommendation wanted an equalization in federal funding of unemployed aid based on provincial need.78 Enamored by the representative board system in Sweden, Boudreau proposed that the administering of aide be depoliticized and composed of a seven-member board. Membership would be extended to two members representing the clergy as well as two social workers with a gender balance where the woman representative be “trained in child welfare.”79 He recommended two representatives to come from the fields of education and medicine, so that a teacher and doctor could serve on the board. All members of the Provincial Welfare Board would serve under the auspices of the Minister of Youth and Welfare. The minister would be appointed an ex officio member. Continuing from his provincial board, the technocrat wanted to see local boards represent welfare recipients in each, town and city as well as across New Brunswick’s counties.80 Harkening back to his discussions with officials, Boudreau suggested that the recipients of welfare be encouraged to conduct “relief work.” Monies extended to unemployed citizens should be granted based on a “means test.”81 Federal changes to employment laws would be necessary to model New Brunswick’s welfare funding after Sweden’s system. Boudreau encouraged a broader participation in the administration of social service. Another recommendation pushed for children’s aid groups along with other benevolent organizations to “cooperate” with the provincial or local boards.82 Boudreau wanted the

78 Boudreau, “Recommendations for New Brunswick,” in Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 55.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
welfare regime to be strong but also visible in the lives of citizens. This approach is truly representative of ‘classic’ low modernism.

Creativity marks Boudreau’s suggestions for social programs for the young and old. One of his more interesting recommendations was for the eventual adoption of a “Home Samaritan” program in the province. This was taken directly from the Scandinavian country’s program to help the elderly. Home Samaritans were effectively home-care workers paid for by the Social Assistance Boards in each commune. The Home Samaritans extended aid to senior citizens who could remain in their own homes but need help with more challenging household chores or light physical care. These workers, Boudreau discovered, were trained by the state to be Home Samaritans.83 Not forgetting the needs of youth, Boudreau noted the utility of a specialized youth committee under the umbrella of the Welfare Boards to provide programing for young New Brunswickers relating to “leadership training, leisure-time organization, and cultural promotion.” The ultimate aim of these activities, according to the report’s author, was to prevent young New Brunswickers from seeking social welfare funding in the future.84

The draft report also offered ambitious recommendations in the fields of health care. Before any adoption of Medicare in Canada (save Saskatchewan), Boudreau thought it prudent to have a least a “token” fee for hospital services. A three dollar a day user fee would be incurred in hospitals for those who could afford the tax; New Brunswickers living in poverty could have this payment defrayed by a local welfare

83 Boudreau, Report on Study Trip to Sweden, 52.
84 Boudreau, “Recommendations for New Brunswick,” 57.
board. He saw the need for a stand-alone hospital director in each provincial facility to professionalize the administration of care. His Swedish-acquired obsession with administrative boards permeated his tenth recommendation as well. The hospital administrator could strike a board to support his or her operation of a hospital.\(^85\)

Returning to a novel Scandinavian innovation, Boudreau proposed the creation of “Cottage Hospitals” affixed to each public hospital in the province.\(^86\) This development would provide support for senior citizens and function as a nursing home within the operational structure of a hospital. After his six-week tour, he recounted that Cottage Hospitals offered nursing care without “the costly hospital care.” These institutions were devoid of complex technologies or facilities; however, clients were cared for by nurses and a visiting doctor.\(^87\) In New Brunswick, Boudreau wanted to see 25% of patients in each hospital facility moved into these Cottage Hospitals to lower the cost of healthcare.\(^88\)

\(^{85}\) Ibid.

\(^{86}\) The cottage hospital was already employed in Newfoundland from the mid-1930s to well into the 1960s. Over twenty-three of these publicly funded cottage hospitals provided rural care for nearly half of the population. Linda Kealey and Heather Molyneaux’s “On the Road to Medicare: Newfoundland in the 1960s,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 41, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 95. First, missionary led-care under Wilfred Grenfell and his teams of doctors and nurses from Briton provided aid for sections of northern Newfoundland and coastal Labrador. Developed by the Scots, the cottage hospital was seen as a low-cost facility for rural locations in 1930s. J.T.H. Connor, Jennifer J. Connor, Monica G. Kidd, and Maria Mathews, “Conceptualizing Health Care in Rural and Remote Pre-Confederation Newfoundland as Ecosystem,” *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies* 30, no. 1 (2015): 117-118. There exists a rich literature on this subject. See also the survey Gordon S. Lawson and Andrew F. Noseworthy, “Newfoundland’s Cottage Hospital System: 1920-1970,” *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 26, no 2 (October 2009): 477-498.


\(^{88}\) Boudreau, “Recommendations for New Brunswick,” 57.
The last three recommendations in the technocrat’s report represented changes to a more diverse area of social policy. Boudreau wanted to see improvements to professional education at the Université de Moncton. These included “a bilingual School of Social Work and Public Administration.”89 He desired a specialized appeals board to reconsider the work of the various other provincial and local boards in the province as well as the complete reorganization of a few government departments. Since his recommendations focused on the areas of social welfare, the low modernist technocrat wanted to make service delivery more effective by amalgamating Labour, Youth, and Welfare. Finally, he wished to adopt a powerful Labour Market Board similar to the one he observed in Stockholm.90 These innovative recommendations were met with silence by Edward Byrne, an official more enamored by high modernist change than grassroots initiatives.

Drafting the final Report of the Byrne Commission was a fraught affair. Upon his return to New Brunswick, Boudreau briefed his fellow commissioners on his tour of Sweden. While bold in his draft, Boudreau’s recommendations were completely eliminated from the final Report handed over to elected officials. While the Chairman did not read Boudreau’s summary of his travels in April 1963, his intent was not malicious: “I don’t mean that as being derogatory or anything, but I was so bloody busy, trying to finalize the Report.”91 Indeed, just getting Boudreau and his fellow French commissioner Nadeau to sign onto the official document was a difficult process. Byrne recounted in his

89 Boudreau, “Recommendations for New Brunswick,” 58.
90 Ibid.

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memoir that Boudreau and Nadeau became close allies upon the Commissioner Boudreau’s return to the province. In January 1964 at a private signing ceremony on the upper floor of Saint John’s Union Club, Byrne lambasted his French colleagues: “Alex, this is the Report and it’s going to be, I hope, a majority Report ... I’m not going to change one iota on the Report except I will put an addendum after the signatures that I don’t care what your reasons are but ‘Messers Boudreau and Nadeau refused to sign the Report.’”

The two stepped out to consult one another, but in the end the Acadian officials signed the final report on that night. Unfortunately, there is no mention of this episode in Boudreau’s papers. It might be surmised that the Acadian official worried about the top-down approach to reforms and the rejection of his recommendations. However, he ultimately celebrated the centrality of the Royal Commission and its outcomes in uplifting rural and Acadian populations.

In a final effort to set the record straight, the opinionated Edward Byrne was adamant that the name “Equal Opportunity” came from him. He pointed to the fact that the 1965 White Paper emphasized the need for a “Program of Evolution.”

In a briefing at Robichaud’s Fredericton residence, Byrne suggested a name change: “I don’t like that word ‘evolution’: it’s too close to ‘revolution.’” The Bathurst lawyer rejected the notion that Charlie McElman, a key political advisor to the premier, was the originator of the program’s unique name. Though a small issue, one over credit for a single title, the

93 Boudreau, À l’assaut des défis, 73-74.
anecdote illustrates the jostling for influence among senior political figures in the technocratic classes during the era of Equal Opportunity.⁹⁶

CONCLUSION

“The government of New Brunswick is conscious of the responsibility it has to the taxpayer, it is equally conscious of the responsibility it has to the less fortunate members of our society.”: Summing up the Era of Equal Opportunity

In a scrawling hand, a middle-age woman from Saint John wrote Louis Robichaud to complain about the state of welfare payments in May 1969. Not like the many letters of appeal in which the petitioner requested aide or assistance with government benefits, this correspondence denounced government’s commitment to the economically marginalized: “I can’t understand men in your position in “cabinet” who are well my age and older when I have lived through a depression in the thirties and know well by now that the world doesn’t owe anyone a free living and that as shocking as it seems there is no Santa Claus.” Knowing over sixty individuals or families who were recipients themselves, the woman complained that tax money should not go towards “a lazy good for nothing useless rig.” While she saw some role in the use of public funds for the improvement of the province, she simply returned to the theme of self-reliance: “If I can work and meet my obligations so can other people.” The dismissal of public spending directed to aide less fortunate citizens emerged, in earnest, as a backlash to the

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
growth of the welfare state. In the late 1960s, for example, historian Sharon Hays argued that poor single mothers in the United States increasingly utilized benefits that were “precisely the purposes for which it was originally intended” to care for their children at home and accord to normative understandings of motherhood. However, this increased the charges of laziness and the immorality of benefit recipients. Suggestions that government assistance encouraged dependence was propagated through the conservative scholarly discourses and popular understandings of welfare. Indeed, the Saint Johner’s comments are reflected in another letter to the Premier Robichaud from another resident of the Port City: “You say New Brunswickers were never better off than they are today? We never were in such a mess and our grandchildren and great grandchildren will be paying for the mismanagement of the present government.” However, Robichaud’s response to the letter from May offered a full endorsement of the reforms taken up by the Program of Equal Opportunity.

The expansion of government in the 1960s during the Robichaud and later Hatfield administration showed a willingness to uplift the citizen through government intervention. Indeed, this phenomenon was practiced in North America, Europe and in different iterations throughout the Global South by the mid-twentieth century. High modernist change has been out-and-out maligned by scholars of mid-century public

6 Sharon Hayes, *Flat Broke with Children*, 17.
policy. Some jurisdictions, however, infused high modernist perspectives within their social development. In his response to the Saint Johner’s May letter, Robichaud acknowledged the risk that governments take whereby “certain classes of people” abuse social assistance. Nevertheless, he articulated the totality of a mid-century sociopolitical ethos that was taken up by New Brunswick:

The first principle we must accept is that a modern democratic society must provide its members, through its various levels of government, a reasonable standard of living. This principle should not be construed to mean that citizens have a right to live off the state. It does mean that government and the taxpayer must, due to the very nature of our modern society, provide a reasonable level of security for all citizens.9

This statement of principle would be made manifest throughout his time in power. During the Robichaud Revolution, bureaucrats and heady technocrats were tasked to translate vision into action. This ethos was not confined to the Government of Louis Robichaud but it both briefly preceded and succeeded Petit Louis’s time as premier. This too continued in earnest during the tenure of Robichaud’s anglophone counterpart.

It is important to note that the technocracy spanned more than one administration, and more than one Premier. Richard Hatfield upheld the gains of rural francophones and anglophones. Within the ranks of the civil service, francophone technocrats and even New Brunswick-born officials oversaw changes during the late phase of the era of Equal Opportunity. Hatfield’s “French lieutenant,” Jean-Maurice Simard, was appointed Minister of Finance.10 In Simard’s Department of Finance, Hatfield brought in a powerful

9 Ibid.
deputy minister and future secretary to the cabinet. Marcel Massé, a bureaucrat from the federal civil service, came to the province in 1973. Massé conformed to what political scientist George M. Betts characterized as an influential group of 1970s and 1980s bureaucrats—“inside-outsiders, Francophones who in some cases have received their education and professional training elsewhere, e.g., Quebec or Ottawa.” Massé came to New Brunswick with a strong pedigree and the enthusiasm to completely overhaul the department. The McGill and Oxford-trained economist came with work experience at the Washington, DC-headquartered World Bank. As a senior official for Premier Hatfield and Treasury Board President Simard, Massé attended cabinet meetings as well as closed door sessions with the premier to outline spending and key initiatives. In his oral history, Simard noted that Massé also altered the machinery of government: “You know, this Montrealer, who came from the Federal Government … He proceeded with the committees system … and the split of the Treasury Board and all that.” Massé stayed only four years in New Brunswick before he returned to the federal civil service. The Quebec-born bureaucrat was one of the many technocrats who implemented the ‘Robichaud Revolution’ during the Hatfield premiership.

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15 In Ottawa, he served as the Clerk of the Privy Council under Joe Clark. Cormier and Michaud, 61-62. Perhaps one of the many “inside-outsiders” to follow in the wake of Massé was Donald Savoie. The
As the Long 1960s waned, by the mid-1970s, these “inside-outsiders” were forced to accept fiscal policies that marked a departure from welfare state expansion. Jean-Maurice Simard engaged in the technocratic practice of accepting the recommendations of an American consultancy firm to find efficiencies within the New Brunswick bureaucracy.\footnote{Richard Starr, \textit{Richard Hatfield: The Seventeen Year Saga} (Halifax, NS: Formac Publishing, 1987), 190.} This study was commissioned by the Office of Government Reform (OGR), which was pejoratively referred to as “ogre” by skeptical English-speaking residents.\footnote{Richard Starr, 161-162.} In 1984, the consultants recommended the government eliminate well over ten percent of the civil servants.\footnote{Starr, 190.} While the report suggested these cuts could be brought about through scheduled retirements and staffing changes, this “streamlining” represented a substantial blow to a bureaucracy of “10,000” public employees.\footnote{Starr, 190.}

As North America went into recession by the mid-1970s, the Program of Equal Opportunity was preserved but cuts to other services signaled a stark departure from the early days of the ‘Robichaud Revolution.’ Nevertheless, domestic and international jurisdictions had taken notice. In a curious 1974 report to the US Congress, Canadian officials outlined local administration reforms across the country.\footnote{A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience: Substate Regionalism and the Federal System, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, February 1974).} Indeed, New


\footnote{Richard Starr, 161-162.}

\footnote{Starr, 190.}

\footnote{Starr, 190.}

Brunswick officials included a report on bold changes undertaken during the Robichaud-Hatfield period.\textsuperscript{21} New Brunswick’s then-deputy minister of municipal affairs, Edwin G. Allen, and Stewart Fyfe, a Saskatchewan-born academic at Queen’s University, laid out the New Brunswick model to American lawmakers.\textsuperscript{22} They praised the reforms made to local government and the wider legislative agenda of Robichaud and his successor. The authors did not offer a clear answer on the exportability of New Brunswick’s model for reform: “Whether the program would function well in another province is a matter of conjecture.”\textsuperscript{23} The study noted that the long-term achievements of EO would only be manifested perhaps within another “ten to 15 years.”\textsuperscript{24} However, they provided a positive assessment of the direction taken by the province:

The Equal Opportunity Program was basically concerned with reducing inequalities in the levels of services and redistributing tax burdens, together with cutting away much confusing and outdated underbrush. In general, it has been successful. Levels of services have improved, many inequitable features have been eliminated, and property taxes have been reduced. These benefits have been most noticeable in the poorer rural areas, but urban municipalities too have benefitted from the more defensible distribution of responsibilities and financial resources.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Edwin G. Allen and Stewart Fyfe, “Municipal Reform in New Brunswick,” in \textit{A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience: Substate Regionalism and the Federal System}, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, February 1974), 80-81. At the date of publication, Allen served as Deputy Minister of New Brunswick’s Department of Municipal Affairs and Stewart Fyfe was a member of the Institute of Local Government at Queen’s University in Ontario.
\item[23] Allen and Fyfe, 82.
\item[24] Ibid.
\item[25] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
The era of Equal Opportunity afforded citizens a new opportunity to engage with their government. This thesis represents a new way of thinking about the History of New Brunswick. EO spanned three Robichaud governments and one Hatfield government and was comprised of high and low modernists. Although it required an army of technocratic officials, initially from outside the province, by the end of the Long 1960s, a new generation of francophone and anglophone New Brunswickers joined the ranks of a professionalized bureaucracy. The expansion of social services was curbed by macroeconomic conditions in the mid-1970s, the Robichaud-Hatfield period of bold change sparked an interest from officials in the province’s state-led social engineering. Policymakers and elected representatives far from Fredericton and the St. John River Valley looked to the province with curiosity. The technocratic dreams and plans of the era of Equal Opportunity helped make New Brunswick truly modern.
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