PAKISTAN AGAINST ITSELF:

THE RISE OF EXTREMISM

By

Sasha J Paul

Bachelor of Arts, Dalhousie University, 1997

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Supervisor:  David Charters, PhD, Department of History

Examining Board:  Gary Waite, PhD, Acting Director of Graduate Studies, Chair
J. Marc Milner, PhD, Department of History
Lawrence Wisniewski, PhD, Department of Sociology

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ABSTRACT

An analysis of Pakistan’s political, social, institutional and regional history reveals two principal problems facing the state: first, the enmity that developed between Pakistan and India following partition, has morphed into an overwhelming national obsession with India which has supported unbridled growth of Pakistan’s security institutions at the expense of Pakistan’s ability to govern its own people. Second, despite the lofty aims of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to build his country into a modern democratic and secular state, the confluence of certain key factors have prevented Pakistan from ever moving towards this ideal. This study will examine the complex web of factors that have spawned Pakistan’s current situation as a failing nuclear state such as: the outstanding grievances from the partition of colonial India and subsequent conflicts, support of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the social, institutional, and economic domestic factors. Pakistan’s overt and tacit support of extremists is a double-edged sword that undermines any semblance of stability for this country as it grapples with a growing number of suicide attacks, targeted killings, kidnappings, increased criminal activity and rising drug addiction, yet the status quo continues with little expectation of positive change. The Talibanization of Pakistan has already begun.
DEDICATION

To my wife Sheila, who helped me spiritually, morally through very difficult times throughout our lives together and by being the glue that maintains our family. The love of my daughter Emily, and my son Christopher, sustains my life and they always made me proud. To my family for their endless love, support and encouragement who have at one time or another been a widow or orphan to this project and my profession.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing and completion of this thesis would not have been possible without assistance, support and encouragement of a few very special people in my life. I would like to show my gratitude to God, for giving me the strength and capability to complete this piece of work and my late beloved parents who taught me the value of an endless pursuit of knowledge at a very early age in my life. David Charters who pushed me beyond any limits I thought I ever had. Your insights, invaluable comments have made this possible. Lee Windsor and Lisa Todd who provided me encouragement to return to academic work. Thank you for reading through many, many papers on military history and always being prepared to listen to my uncrafted ideas and thoughts about the Armed Forces and future endeavors. The writing of this thesis would not have been possible without your unconditional belief in my academic abilities. Notwithstanding the extensive help from my advisors, I am responsible for any errors and omissions in this study. I own all the findings.
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<th>LeT</th>
<th>Lashkar-e-Taiba</th>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All Parties Conference</td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>NFIU</td>
<td>No-First-Use</td>
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<td>ASPD</td>
<td>Anti-Social Personality Disorder</td>
<td>NIFA</td>
<td>Pakistan Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture</td>
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<td>BLA</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Army</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>United States Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Pakistan Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federal Administered Tribal Area</td>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Federal Investigation Agency</td>
<td>PDPA</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>United States Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Pakistan’s People Party</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>SATP</td>
<td>South Asia Terrorist Portal</td>
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<td>GID</td>
<td>General Intelligence Directorate of Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>US Navy’s Sea, Air, Land Team</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Index</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba</td>
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<td>NACTA</td>
<td>Pakistan National Counter-Terrorism Authority</td>
<td>TeT</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban</td>
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<td>NISP</td>
<td>Pakistan National Internal Security Policy</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Pakistan Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Haqqani Network</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUA</td>
<td>Harakat ul-Ansar</td>
<td>USDoD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
<td>USDoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>The Directorate for Inter-Services</td>
<td>UTN</td>
<td>Ummah Tamir-e-Nau</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>Pakistan Jamiat-e-Uleema-e-Islam Party</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKLFP</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally NWFP)</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>LeJ</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make… You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State.¹

As evening approached on 27 December 2007 in the city of Rawalpindi, Pakistan, the uparmored vehicle carrying Shaheed ‘Benazir’ Bhutto 54, an iconic politician who had twice served as prime minister (1988-90, 1993-96), slowly navigated its way through thousands of supporters at a rally for the elections scheduled in January 2008. As the daughter of the former Prime Minister and President of Pakistan, Zulfika Ali Bhutto, she “didn’t choose [political] life; it chose [her].”² Benazir Bhutto, a Shia Muslim and chair of the Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP), promised to restore democracy, dispense with dictatorship and empower the disenfranchised masses.³ The PPP was poised to challenge President Pervez Musharraf’s six year authoritarian rule, which gleaned its base support from the state’s security establishments. Elements inimical to this potential political change rocked the city of Rawalpindi with a massive suicide bomb explosion detonated by a 15 year old boy that killed or wounded dozens of Benazir Bhutto followers as she made her way through the crowd following the rally. By then, however Benazir Bhutto was already dead, shot by an assassin’s bullet as she waved to supporters from an open top vehicle.

At the time, Pakistan’s government, supported by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), accused fighters allied to Baitullah Mehsud and al-Qaeda (AQ) of killing Benazir Bhutto as part of an organized campaign to undermine the stability of Pervez

Musharraf’s regime.⁴ A subsequent United Nations inquiry into her death failed to determine the responsible group, however the commission condemned Pakistan for failing to provide adequate security measures, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for impeding the search for the truth, and the police for deliberately failing to investigate effectively.⁵ As the world mourned the loss of “Pakistan’s sister” and symbol of democracy, Bhutto became the latest victim of endemic terrorism within a country of 190 million that has gone from crisis to crisis throughout its short history. Pakistan is currently perceived as one of the most dangerous places in the world and as a country under siege. It is the number one country in the world supportive of terrorism and the number one victim of terrorism as Islamic militancy, defined as extremism combined with intolerance,⁶ continues to spread from its frontiers to its urban centers.

This analysis of Pakistan’s political, social, institutional and regional history reveals two principal problems facing the state: first the enmity that developed between Pakistan and India following partition, has morphed into an overwhelming national obsession with India which has supported unbridled growth of Pakistan’s security institutions at the expense of Pakistan’s ability to govern its own people. Second, despite the lofty aims of state founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah to build his country into a modern democratic and secular state, the confluence of certain key factors have prevented Pakistan from ever moving towards this ideal. These factors include the focus on security and military concerns has handicapped social and economic development, hindering any development of national identity and resulting in the current reality that Pakistan is merely a fractious assembly of semi automatous regions with little loyalty to the central

government.

The historiography of Pakistan (discussed throughout the study) directly reflects the ever-changing degree of importance the region has been afforded within the international political community. Substantial literature has been written on Pakistan with a view to gaining insight into the underpinnings of the complex regional dynamics. Many scholars continually revisit the same historical analysis, which often is limited to selective facets of the historiography such as economics, security or governance. The bulk of these works outline the India-Pakistan wars fought since 1947, the Kashmir dispute, and, more recently attempt to understand the Pakistani supported/tolerated Islamic-based insurgencies in a post 9/11 environment. Numerous authors outline the emergence and dominance of the Pakistan security institutions and the ISI within domestic politics often leading the reader to conclude that these security agencies, designed for the protection of Pakistan are in fact destabilizing the state and undermining the central government.

As with all major areas of conflict, Pakistan has been studied, assessed and reevaluated following major crises such as the Kashmir crises, the United States (US) covert and overate invasions of Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks within India commonly associated with Pakistani support. India’s current Army Commander, General Bikram Singh stressed this point in 2013 while conducting a news interview: “[e]very infiltration [terrorist] bid has the support of Pakistan Army.” The problem within Pakistan’s historiography is that scholars often focus on selective facets in Pakistani society such as economics, governance, security, religion or regional influences that contribute to the rise of extremism. More importantly, however,

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Anatol Lieven claims the historical record is devoid of sociological studies outlining what is happening in terms of social, economical, religious and cultural narratives within such a diverse state. “The basic research on a lot of key issues in Pakistan has not been done. They are simply not there.” One key aspect that has not been explored is how the formation of Pakistan based upon a religious ideology has ultimately led to the rise of radical Islamism throughout the region as the state gradually digressed away from Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s vision. What is further lacking in the literature is any meaningful exploration into how Pakistan’s lack of investment in social welfare has ultimately contributed to the rise of extremism. This study, by contrast, is different in the historiography as it attempts to incorporate all of these elements, which can be ultimately tied to unresolved issues around Pakistan’s ideological birth as the foundation for the current instability.

What follows is by no means a comprehensive study of that country given the complexities of its historical record, nor will it attempt to summarize the abundance of scholarly research completed on this state in the past sixty years. Rather, the author will challenge some of the conventional thought on Pakistani religious extremism and highlight the conditions which have given rise to communal polarization within the state of Pakistan. Although this study will not introduce an abundance of new source material that would alter the prevailing historical record, it will attempt to broaden our understanding of Pakistan’s ideological birth, the rise of a restrictive religious society, the growth of its security institutions, its obsession with India, and Pakistan’s reluctance to cease support for religious extremism in South Asia. The contention of this thesis is that there is no single factor that has given birth to religious extremism within Pakistan but rather it will demonstrate that the idea of an Islamic Pakistani state, failure to divert sufficient resources away from defense spending towards the development of a welfare state, and Pakistan’s insufficient understanding of the secondary effects of supporting asymmetric...
warfare within the region has contributed to the internal communal violence that is destabilizing Pakistan (see figure 1). As Ahmed Rashid notes,

[F]rom being a very small group controlling a small area they [Pakistan Taliban] have expanded. They now have enlisted the support of militant groups in Karachi, in Punjab, in Sindh, Kashmiri groups who are fighting the Indians in Kashmir. There is now a full scale extremist movement in Pakistan that is trying to overthrow the State.\(^\text{10}\)

All nations have a variety of extremism within their societies, as the term can describe any action based upon an exaggerated belief. The spectrum of extremism is very broad ranging from ‘radical’ environmentalist organizations like Green Peace or a ‘peaceful revolution’ such as Idle No More to supplementary violence or criminal activity including kidnappings, shootings, bombings or mass killings. Regardless of the degree of extremism a nation faces, addressing the grievances that gave rise to extremism is important to establishing long term stability. The problem is that Pakistan’s approach to curbing extremism and militancy is through selective, ad-hoc military operations rather than through cohesive nation building activities such as investments in education, poverty eradication and employment opportunities. This focus has given rise to terrorism, a resurgence of religious violence and growth of the Pakistani Taliban. This study will raise questions about the determination and effectiveness of Pakistan’s efforts to combat religious extremism. Further, it will demonstrate how Pakistan’s strategic importance within the international community has fluctuated throughout the 20\(^{th}\) and 21\(^{st}\) centuries, which has created indifference and tolerance by Western democracies towards military dictatorships, religious extremism and nuclear proliferation within the geo-political context of South Asia. Finally, it will illustrate how the ongoing and continual focus of Pakistan towards India, manifested in the Kashmir dispute, has contributed to the political interference and elevated importance of security institutions within the state to the detriment of strong democratic central authority.

The remainder of this thesis will be broken down into three chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 will outline some key extremist groups operating within Pakistan and Kashmir/India, some of which enjoy passive or active support of Pakistan’s security institutions. There are numerous sources on extremists groups operating within the region and this study will provide a collective summary of works compiled by various historians, political scientists, security think-tanks and governmental reports outlining the different facets of the selected groups. The author will rely predominantly on the comprehensive mapping compiled by Stanford University that traces the evolution and interactions of extremist groups within Pakistan. In addition, this study will be supported by Afghanistan-centric sources of Amand Gopal et al, the Mansur Khan Mahsud studies of the Taliban operating in the Waziristan regions of Pakistan, and the South Asian Intelligence Review, a grassroots Indian institution that provides raw data on all extremist activities within South Asia from 2000 onward. All three sources, along with others, will be used in this chapter to illustrate that the number and influence of extremist groups operating in Pakistan has increased in the past 20 years and has accelerated dramatically since the latest Afghanistan conflict began in 2002.

Chapter 1 will also analyze Pakistan’s defense expenditures from 2004-2008 that highlight the fact, that despite the deteriorating situation and international pressure, Pakistan failed to resource and conduct a comprehensive population-centric campaign aimed at the root causes of extremism. Instead, the state preferred dialogue with extremist groups that ultimately interfered with the writ of government by accommodating and legitimizing of extremist groups. This could be based upon either the fact that Pakistanis appear to consider India as their biggest security threat, or that extremist organizations have become multidimensional, providing social services normally the responsibility of legitimate government, ultimately influencing the local narrative and domestic policy makers. Regardless, the reader will gain a sense of the security situation within Pakistan, perceived Pakistani public opinion and understand some of the failures of the state in addressing extremism to date.
Chapter 2 will examine the rise of the Islamic state of Pakistan and extremism: the struggles with religious ideologies, institutional developments and its failure to improve social welfare programs. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework of Pakistan itself and an understanding of the various frictions within its society that contribute to religious extremism. While there is an abundance of scholarly material written about non-state actors within Pakistan that support extremists and their allies within Pakistan’s powerful security institutions, there is little detailed examination of the one of the underlying causes of these ongoing insurgencies: failure of the Pakistan government and the international communities to divert sufficient resources and develop policies to address religious extremism, which is further influenced by the ideological idea of an Islamic state (Pakistan). From this examination, an understanding of how the increasingly prevalent notion of Pakistan as a theocratic state as well some of the policies of General Zia-ul-Haq, in particular the blasphemy laws, have come to define and contribute to religious extremism.

With the exception of its security organizations, Pakistan has not been very successful at building viable institutions to provide services such as education, civil service or governance. By examining employment statistics, social expenditures and literacy rates in Pakistan, it becomes clear that the state failed to invest in public welfare, resulting in the disenfranchised becoming disenchanted with democracy and turning to extremism for a sense of value and purpose. As a result, Islamic extremist groups within Pakistan enjoy broad support amongst the poor, unemployed and illiterate. This remains true but it is not the complete picture either, as Jessica Stern noted while conducting research for her book detailing her travels and interviews with members of extremist groups in Pakistan. “I talked with Ahmed, the young recruit, he tells me he has a master’s degree in engineering; from a wealthy family and is doing computer work

for fund-raising and recruitment on the web, who came to [extremism] intellectually.ÔÇª One western misconception is that only warriors lead extremist organizations, and what is often forgotten in the literature research is the intellectual capacity and governance ability of extremist leadership, resulting in some degree of institutional development. Highlighted by the fact that extremist and ethnic groups within Pakistan often assume the responsibilities of the central government such as education, governance and judicial services, filling the service void that the legitimate government of Pakistan is unable to fill. The extremist groups rely upon these quasi-official institutions for influence activities and legitimacy to the impairment of strategic peace and stability.

The inability of the Pakistan’s central authority to impose governance over its frontier regions has supported the movement towards forming an ethnic state within the region for the Pashtu (Pashtunistan). Tribal identities within the frontiers of Pakistan remain paramount however, centuries of tribal governance is being replaced by radicalized shar’ia law as extremist groups continue to enjoy freedom of action within these areas. Therefore, as the unrest and communal violence within the frontier regions shifts to the urban centres, through migration, Pakistan is becoming destabilized and a failing state. This chapter will focus on major scholarly works (Charles Liebman, Golam Choudhury, Louis Hayes, Ahmed Rashid, et al.), primary sources such as speeches from its key political leaders during its founding through to contemporary times (Jinnah, Pervez Musharraf and Salmaan Taseer), international governmental and agency reports.

Chapter 3 will focus on establishing events within the regional framework of Pakistan in South Asia that have continued to focus Pakistan’s attention away from its internal difficulties. At the forefront is Afghanistan’s Cold War legacy of the mujahedeen, which were trained, resourced and operated out of Pakistan with the aid of its security institutions backed by the

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CIA. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only popularized the idea of jihad within Pakistan and institutionalized asymmetric warfare as an extension of state foreign policy but also increased the strategic importance of Pakistan within the regional context. Pakistan has always maintained an interest in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, not only because the two nations are interdependent due to the various social, economic and ethnic ties, but because Afghanistan has been an unwitting strategic player in the Pakistan’s great game against India. Finally, the dominant ethnic group that transcends both Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Pashtu. Not only do the Pashtu not recognize the Durand line (the international border) but the notion of an independent Pashtunistan is promoting a secession extremist movement within Pakistan’s frontiers, where the lack of adequate border security between the two countries allows refugees, extremists and criminal enterprises to move freely.

Religious tension is the essential feature of the political climate between India and Pakistan. Its roots lay in the disagreement over the two-nation theory that farmed the bases of partition in 1947, and unresolved partition issues focused on the Kashmir dispute. Over the course of a short history, Pakistan and India have engaged in numerous skirmishes, border disputes and four wars, one of which brought the two countries to the brink of nuclear confrontation. This unrest has resulted in regional and religious extremists that are based within the regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir and India. The dispute in Kashmir is the most important in terms of understanding extremism, as it is the epicenter of Pakistani state-sponsored asymmetric warfare to date. As the issue of Kashmir remains unresolved, Pakistani leaders continue to view Islamic fundamentalism and militancy as a means of mobilizing against India in the Kashmir region in the latter part of the 20th century and more recently, deeper into India itself. But the threat for a greater conflict remains as pointed out by Lalit Mansingh, former Indian Ambassador to the US, “this is the nightmare that we have, if a demented
[Pakistani] general takes over the nuclear weapons and decides to use them, well we have no option but to respond to that.”\textsuperscript{13}

Obsession with India has precluded real economic development, the creation of a social welfare state and addressing the fundamental needs of its citizens. Further, the arms race between India and Pakistan has not only distracted the latter from curbing the increasing extremist movement within its borders, but rather Pakistan has come to view asymmetric warfare as a viable arm of its foreign policy. This chapter will continue to use the same methodology as previously indicated to validate its arguments by focusing on major scholarly works (Graham Fuller, Alastair Lamb, Ahmed Rashid, et al.), primary sources such as commentary from diplomats, world leaders and United Nations and governmental reports.

Finally, the conclusion will be draw on the factors laid out in the previous chapters to argue that Pakistan is a failing nuclear state. Asymmetric warfare tends to lend itself to extremism and is the most prevalent threat in a post Cold War era, in both the frontiers and urban centers of Pakistan. The failure of Pakistani leaders to understand the implications of extremism, which is not represented by any particular individual or organization but is rather a mindset, has created a sense of militancy, violence and instability within the region. Should Pakistan continue with its failure to establish central control over its frontier regions and to develop a true democratic and not an ideological Islamic state, the events of 9/11 will pale in comparison when Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is controlled by religious extremist political leaders. It would become a new age of terror if control of weapons of mass destruction and the materials to make them appeared to be slipping away. As extremists groups around the world are seeking to obtain and develop these weapons, the nightmare is that Pakistan is potentially becoming a source of nuclear material. In 2001, al Qaeda courted Pakistani nuclear scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed (members of the Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (UTN)

network) for bomb-making expertise.\textsuperscript{14} Abdul Qadeer Khan was arrested in 2004 for smuggling nuclear material to anti-western states.\textsuperscript{15} The failure of Pakistan to deal with extremism and militancy will continue to cause social and political polarization within the state, destabilize the region and cause reverberations throughout the international community as security concerns for its nuclear capabilities increase.

The author recognizes that the terms used to identify religious extremism referred to in this study are continually evolving and there is a distinction between extremism and militancy (the latter will be discussed first). Violence and in particular religious or communal conflict has become an everyday occurrence within today’s society. It can be defined as a social process that serves as a mechanism for change where participants are either labeled a freedom fighter, dissident, terrorist or Islamic extremist. Iran, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Libya and Indonesia are all victims of a civil strife that is rooted in a form of militant extremism. Although each of these countries is experiencing different levels of civil disobedience, one common thread amongst them all is that they have a form of militant extremism as defined by Gerard Saucier, which is a zealous adherence to a set of beliefs and values, beyond the norm and an intention and willingness to resort to violence (i.e. militancy).\textsuperscript{16} Saucier’s study came up with 16 different themes that characterize the militant mindset, and although it is beyond the scope of this study to explore this concept in detail, these themes can be summarized into four facets pertinent to Pakistan. First, violence is seen as an acceptable means to achieve a desired end state. Second, the goal must have divine justification or supernatural intervention—i.e. Jihad. Third, there must be something wrong with the perceived enemy i.e. corruption, religious moderation, or a

\textsuperscript{15} “Abdul Qadeer Khan: 'My name is clear',' \textit{Aljazeera}, 18 May 2013 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2013/05/201351715345475821.html accessed 01 Feb 2014.
perceived evil which results in an underlying aim of achieving utopia. Finally, martyrdom and the glorification of the dead for the cause explain how “religious violence differs from violence in the ‘secular’ world by shifting the plane of action from what is mundane, and hence negotiable, to the area of cosmic struggle, beyond the political realm.”

These themes are all prevalent within Pakistan’s extremist movements that ultimately have left its citizens in a constant state of fear as attacks on schools, markets and religious or state institutions demonstrate the central government’s inability to provide enduring security. For the purpose of this study, Pakistan has been and currently is the victim of militant extremism. No place is safe within Pakistan given that militant groups are able to conduct indiscriminate suicide operations or even large-scale complex attacks aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the democratic government.

The next key component is gaining an understanding of religious extremism. The problem goes beyond determining what is a good or bad religion and rather can be framed as a paradox of multiculturalism and globalization. Societies in general are becoming multi-faceted groups of social, religious, and ethnic elements rather than homogeneous states. Although Pakistan was formed with the objective of becoming a religious state, Sunni Islam is not the only religion in play, and the challenge the state has been facing is trying to harmonize the religious pluralism that came out of partition with a moderate view of Islamization. Ultimately, Pakistan has not been very successful and instead has gradually shifted towards a fundamentalist view of Islam, which may ultimately lead it to becoming a theocratic state.

This study will not fully address all the psychological aspects (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral) of religious extremism other than to note two key aspects, spirituality and mental health. First, spirituality is not a universal concept amongst humans, and inherent within its definition is recognition that religion and a person’s beliefs are unique. Consequently, this can

17 Ibid., 13-26.
18 As quoted by Barry Cooper, New Political Religions or An Analysis of Modern Terrorism, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 56-57.
create discord within extremist groups as they evolve and develop ideological shifts which often results in a friction within a group’s leadership and the development of splinter movements. On a more basic level, this implies that group dynamics within an extremist environment influence the actions of individuals. As Robert Prus says, “it becomes apparent that those who remain in more sustained contact with these groups are likely to be resistant to other, perhaps more moderate or diffuse, versions of those religious standpoints.”19 However, an individual participating within an extremist activity remains responsible for his actions regardless if the motivation for his actions is based upon a spiritual belief, monetary gain or by the use of use of force or intimidation.

Second, there is a growing belief within the medical community that extremists (‘terrorists’) may possess a form of anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). “Individuals with ASPD have some characteristics in common with terrorist such as social alienation, early disturbance of social development process, narcissistic range and hostility/violence.”20 The author does not profess to have the skills to challenge psychosocial and neurobiological correlations other than to state that within Pakistan’s historiography, there appears to be no causal link between mental disorders and extremist violence, and any link on an individual level is the exception rather than the norm. This is not to say that the underlying factors that result in extremism may not be the product of a group or individual’s social, economic and political environment which may have led to social alienation, disenfranchisement and hostilities. But on the contrary, this study will argue that Pakistan’s failure to address such fundamental grievances is one of the main causes of the current situation. The psychology of extremism is an important factor to understand as it provides insight into extremists’ motivations, narcissistic goals and perhaps lack of empathy. Extremist organizations are not only fully aware of the psychological

difficulties in conducting suicide attacks but have adjusted their method of operations to ensure success. Osama bin Laden stated this very clearly. When writing to his ‘regional brothers’ he urged them “not to send a single brother on a suicide fida’iyya operation (‘amaliyya fida’iyya); they should send at least two…we tested this in many operations and their percentage of success was low due to psychological factors that affect the brother in such a situation.”

For the purpose of this study, religious extremism is prevalent when a state, a group or individual ignores the moderate views of most religious people and those who espouse no religion at all. Religious extremists will have an uncompromising approach to politics, the rule of law, and in particular, and the application of religious laws. They deny fundamental rights and freedoms as expected within western democratic societies. Religious extremists will have an intense sense of ideological fervor and participate in a sustained set of activities to redress a perceived shortcoming or to condemn a particular audience perceived to be responsible for invoking a grievance. These groups have a cohesive nature and are secretive about their teachings or activities, as they often operate outside of the rule of secular law. Religious extremists by definition do not necessarily need to be violent, as observed by the recent Arab springs sweeping Northern Africa and the Middle East. But within a post 9/11 environment and within the Pakistani context for the purpose of this study, the focus will be on religion-based terrorism/militancy, religious persecution and on communal unrest. As William Inboden notes, religious extremists define themselves by intolerance of persons of different religious identities, claim a monopoly on truth, and deny any rights of dissent.

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22 Prus, 49.
Lastly, it is important to understand the evolution of extremist activities in order to contextualize such activities within Pakistan and to understand scope of the threat to the state. Barry Cooper provides a good summary of the evolution of classic extremism, defined under the umbrella of terrorism, which can be summarized as follows: traditional terrorists’ acts are the propaganda of a deed where the object is to terrify a large number of onlookers. However, explosions possess a limited ability for damage, and if the shock of these acts through desensitization no longer achieves the desired effect then weapons of mass destruction are a logical next step.\(^{24}\) Without conducting a substantive statistical study of open sources, it remains difficult to determine if Pakistani extremist attacks are becoming more violent and destructive, resulting in a greater loss of life or damage to infrastructure. Notwithstanding the argument put forward in chapter 3, that extremism is on the rise, the statistics employed to support that argument do not provide sufficient detail to determine if the rise of terrorist incidents in Pakistan within the 20\(^{th}\) century has also resulted in a correlated rise of “spectacular” attacks. Anecdotally, that may be the case within a post 9/11 environment, however the three datasets used in this study, Global Terrorism Database, South Asia Terrorist Portal and Terrorist Data Bank do not provide sufficient insight to quantify that argument without additional study.

\(^{24}\) Cooper, 50 and 68.
CHAPTER II
THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF PAKISTAN AND THE ORIGINS OF EXTREMISM

Islam and its idealism have taught democracy. Islam has taught equality, justice and fair play to everybody. What reason is there for anyone to fear democracy, equality, freedom on the highest standard of integrity and on the basis of fair play and justice for everybody. Let us make [the future constitution of Pakistan]. We shall make it and we will show it to the world.¹
~ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 25 January 1948

Pakistan is one of the most controversial and misunderstood nations in modern history. The range of material on the subject is vast, and the tendency of academics is to focus on the events and friction of partition from India in 1947 rather than on the idea of Pakistan becoming a Muslim state. Examining extremism in Pakistan without understanding the foundations in which the state was born presents challenges. Throughout Pakistan’s history, and contrary to the pluralist, constitutional and democratic vision of its founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, there has been gradual Islamization of the state that gained momentum recently under General Zia. How and why this occurred can be linked to four key watershed events: the partition of British India, the entrenchment of Islamic religion, the gradual increase of the power of the security institutions, and failure to invest in the development of a welfare state.

Partition and the Failure of Pluralism

The hopes, dreams and vision of Mohammad Ali Jinnah remain difficult to clearly articulate, given his death took place only months after the birth of Pakistan. The historical record is largely reliant upon his speeches and statements around 1947-48 to provide some insight into his intent for Pakistan. Jinnah’s first and foremost demand from the colonial state was an arrangement with India that would provide a protection mechanism for Muslims until they could compete with the Hindu majority. As his daughter Dian Wadia believes, “[Jinnah] never really wanted to break away, he thought everyone could live together and come to terms

¹ Quoted in Burke, 97.
with the [Muslim] Congress Party or Hindu government or whoever was going to be in charge, as history tells us it was not to be.”² For Jinnah, the Muslim separatist movement was a political issue rather than a religious one.

1946 was the defining moment for the establishment of a Pakistani state. Britain’s Cabinet Mission to India proposed a system of semi-autonomous regions that would assure Muslims political protection within a united India. Initially, the Muslim League accepted this proposal as outlined by Yusuf Haroon, then President of the Muslim League in Sindh, “we accepted that situation instead and if there are the safe guards, we would give up the Idea of Pakistan and wait. If the safe guards which Mr. Jinnah had put forward were accepted, I think the masses would have accepted it.”³ But at a press conference shortly thereafter Jawaharial Nehru, then President of the Congress sabotaged the plan by declaring, “[Congress] agreed to go into the Constituent Assembly and we have agreed to nothing else….What we do there, we are entirely and absolutely free to determine. We have committed ourselves on no single matter to anybody.”⁴ This hardened the Muslin League’s demand for independence and turned its back on a constitutional arrangement that would have enabled them to remain within a united India. As Jinnah stated, “Some people might think that the acceptance of the 3 June [1947] plan was a mistake on the part of the Muslim League. I would like to tell them that the consequences of any other alternative would have been too disastrous to imagine.”⁵

In February 1947, the British government declared that they would leave India, and on August 15, 1947 two independent nations were born out of the British Raj. From the moment partition was announced in 1947, ethnic and religious tensions erupted, resulting in communal violence as huge population shifts occurred when British India imploded. It should be remembered that the political decisions of 1947 were made under unique circumstances, as the

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³ Ibid.
⁴ As outlined by Burke, Iv.
⁵ Mohammad Ali Jinnah as quoted in Burke, 70.
political process completely collapsed when religious cleansing began to occur in the streets. Communities who had lived together for centuries turned on each other, neighbor turned on neighbor, there was a mass migration of both Muslims and Hindu’s to their ancestral lands. Snedden estimates 600,000 Muslim refugees were “hounded” out of their homes in Indian occupied areas of Kashmir, and an additional 200,000 were massacred or have remained unaccounted for from the northern areas of India alone. These numbers pale in comparison to Ishtiaq Ahmed’s estimates of 12-15 million people being forcibly moved to either Pakistan or India, at least 75,000 women raped and some two million people killed. “The systematic massacre of defenseless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrants known to history.”

India established a democracy that continues to this day, while Pakistan transforms, according to Ishtiaq Ahmed, into a post-colonial garrison state. It is well documented that Jinnah wanted Pakistan to become a pluralist state, inclusive of all religions, classes and ethnicities. The meaning of that concept is something that Pakistan continues to struggle with and cannot be viewed through westernized definitions. It is evident however that Pakistan has lost the principal of religious neutrality and thus set the conditions for a theocratic state. The loss of religious neutrality has facilitated the growth of religious extremism within Pakistan, which seeks to replace the constitutional democratic government with a Sharia dictatorship. The author believes that democracy in Pakistan has different underpinnings than the rest of the

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6 “The Muslim Massacre of 1947” is something that historians continually debate. The exact number of causalities that fell victim to religious persecution remains contentious. Some estimates are as low as 30,000 while others put the number up to 1,000,000. Regardless what is common within the historical record is that both Muslims and Hindus were victims of religious violence during the turbulent period of India’s partition. Christopher Snedden’s article, “What Happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local identity, “the massacre” of 1947 and the roots of the ‘Kashmir problem’,’ South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 24 no. 2 (2011), 111-134 highlights the challenges in determining the extent of refugees and human genocide that occurred when India was partitioned.


8 Mohammad Ali Jinnah as quoted in Burke, 70.

modern world it can be corrupt and incompetent but democratic rule is better than any form of military dictatorship. Although it goes beyond this study to elaborate on this notion in more detail, it is important to understand Jinnah’s ‘vision’ within a regional context. Because Pakistan has an immensely diverse population (see images 2 and 8), ethnic, provincial, cultural and religious ties are equally important and arguably more relevant than the idea of being a Pakistani. Arguably, Pakistan can be considered pluralist state, given that every province is ethnically divided and that Islam is not a monolithic religion within the state, however, it is not reflective of Jinnah’s egalitarian vision because of its shift towards theocracy. Nationalism, however, in broad terms is really only prevalent within the Army and is demonstrated through response to its perceived threats. As Anatol Lieven states,

> Pakistan is divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely oppressive toward the poor and women, and home to extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism-‘and yet it moves,’ and is in many ways surprisingly tough and resilient as a state and a society. It is also not quite as unequal as it looks form outside.\(^{10}\)

This however, raises an interesting contradiction given that the underlying premise for creating Pakistan was that Muslims were not able to remain within a unified Hindu-dominated India. Yet somehow, Jinnah and others believed that Pakistan could be developed into a pluralist state? There remain only two explanations. First, it maybe that Indian Muslims never truly envisioned a pluralist Pakistani state, and the idea of theocratic state was the true motivation for Pakistan. This concept would be supported by the religious ideology outlined in the “objective resolution” of 1949 which served as the preamble for Pakistan’s constitution of 1956, 1962 and 1973. It states that,

> Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; and whereas it is the will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order.\(^{11}\)


The objective resolution as a whole could be considered a moderate view of Islam as it outlines provisions for religious minorities, equality and tolerance, but Pakistani history clearly defined those provisions in relative and not absolute terms. Inkram articulates this notion by saying “the entire approach of the objective resolution was that, while Pakistan should be a progressive, modern state and not a theocratic, medieval government like the former Saudi Arabia or Yemen, every attempt should be made to translate the people’s dream of an Islamic social order into action.”\(^\text{12}\) This was supported by Sheikh-ul-Islam Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani during the Pakistani assembly debates on the objective resolutions when he said, “Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private affair between man and his Creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political relations of human beings.”\(^\text{13}\) It is important to note that the objective resolution was introduced and passed after Jinnah’s death in September 1948, and therefore it is unclear what influence he would have had on the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949.

Second, perhaps the idea of partition was really about protecting the economic and political interest of the bourgeois classes within a Hindu-dominated India. This notion is supported by a review of Jinnah’s speeches, and while they abound in references to the preservation of Muslims, their culture, economic interests and the requirement for division from Hindu India, references to the formation of a pure Islamic state are minimal.\(^\text{14}\) Statistical analysis compiled at Yale University on the 1951 census after the partition of India indicate migrants into Pakistani and Bangladeshi districts were not only significantly more literate than


\(^\text{14}\) This statement is a result of a search of Jinnah speeches and statements restricted to the birth of Pakistan as outlined by *Burke*. 
the resident population but also less likely to be employed in the agricultural industry.\textsuperscript{15}

Therefore, on the surface it would appear the Muslim bourgeois classes gravitated towards Pakistan but unlikely solely for ideological purposes and rather in the interest of self-preservation, given that there was a fear amongst Muslims that they would become second-class citizens under a united India. They feared a Hindu-dominated India would overshadow them unless they were granted a form of autonomy.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, the protection of the Muslim bourgeois classes within a united India at the very least was a contributing factor for partition despite the inherent contradictions of partition. As a result, when the British partitioned India, under intense lobbying from the Muslim league,\textsuperscript{17} it was divided along religious lines – the Hindu dominated regions would form modern day India and the Muslims majority would be incorporated in “The Land of the Pure” known as Pakistan. Although it is possible to deduce that Jinnah envisaged a secular state, whose purpose was to provide a secure homeland for Muslims and other communities who became citizens of Pakistan after partition, Pakistan actually was founded under a religious ideology that has developed into the underpinnings of both the political and social structure of the state.

Given the religious violence that accompanied partition, the majority of the Pakistan’s historiography deals with the issue of religion and the perceived incompatibility of Hinduism

\textsuperscript{15} According to the 1951 census data in some cases the differences were quite large: A case in point is Larkana district, which received more than 600,000 migrants and had a difference of 21% in the literacy rates between migrants and residents. Migrants tended to engage more in all non-agricultural professions, except the production of raw materials. Statistical tests reveal that these differences are in-deed large and significant: for Indian and Bangladeshi districts, the percentage of migrants in agricultural professions was about 28% percentage points lower (compared to residents). The corresponding difference for Pakistan was only 7 percentage points as outlined in Prashant Bharadwaj, Asim Khwaja and Atif Mian, “The Partition of India: Demographic Consequences,” Unpublished Paper, (Harvard University, 2008), 10. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/akhwaja/papers/BigMarchOct2008.pdf accessed on 14 Nov 2013.


\textsuperscript{17} Nilanjan Raghunath outlines the importance of the Muslim League in defining the region, in her article “Jammu and Kashmir: Competing Concepts of Nationalism,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, (2006), 45 attributes the genesis of the Jammu and Kashmir’s Islamic national identity to 1906 when elites from various Muslim communities joined to form the All India Muslim League.
and Islam. This has been coined the “one or two nation debate,”18 and is the reason why Kashmir is a good example of the religious confrontation occurring within Pakistani society or under the control of its institutions. Unfortunately, it can be argued that partition was rushed, which resulted in many border disputes not being resolved at the time of Pakistan’s birth, which has in turn contributed to the rise of Pakistani state-sponsored religious extremism towards India. This chapter will explore this notion in detail, however it is important to note at this stage that partition cannot and should not be restricted to the events of 1947. Rather it should be considered an evolution of thought within Pakistani society towards India, religion, western ideals and democracy.

**From Islam to Islamism**

With the passage of time, Pakistan has become more aligned with extremism, intolerance and hostility towards various groups of its society and its regional neighbors. Contrary to the original pluralist idea of a democratic Pakistan, the state has been transformed into a modern country based on a particular interpretation of religion. In order to bring the full effect of the principles of Islam to society, it could be argued that Pakistan must become a fully sovereign Islamic community, having the sanctions of a state to implement Islamic laws.19 To understand how Pakistan exposed itself to religious and ethnic extremism over the past sixty

18 David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 3 describes the irreconcilability of Muslim and Hindu as going back centuries. “As religions, they differ deeply. Islam is, like Christianity, monotheistic and lays stress on the basic equality of human being before the law and its God, Allah. Hinduism, in contrast, has many gods or, at any rate, a flexible attitude to the concept of God, and in its caste system positively exalts, exploits, and perpetuates supposedly immutable human inequalities. And Islam, like Hinduism, is more than a religion. Both are codes of living, which affect everything important and even much that is not important in life. And this, of course, exacerbates their incompatibility.” For a complete analysis of the two-nation theory and its role within Pakistan society, culture and politics see Anwar Hussain Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), especially chapter 5.

19 M. Munir and M.R. Kayani, “Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” *Government of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Punjab Government Printing, 1954), popularly known as “The Munir Report” outlined that implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic State. “Some speeches of important leaders who were striving for Pakistan undoubtedly lend themselves to this construction. These leaders while referring to an Islamic State or to a State governed by Islamic laws perhaps had in their minds the pattern of a legal structure based on or mixed up with Islamic dogma, personal law, ethics and institutions.” 201. http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf accessed 11 Oct 2013.
years it is imperative to study some of the characteristics of religious extremism. Charles Liebman, writing about Judaism in Israel, articulated three dimensions to religious extremism. It entails first an expansion of religious law, in this case demonstrating that Islam is distinguished from other religions and cultures by its particular code of law. Second, it encourages social isolation in relation to those elements of society that do not accept extremist views, although isolation is tempered during recruiting or ‘conversion’ activities. Third, it promotes cultural rejection of values not perceived as indigenous to the religious tradition.\(^{20}\)

This study will further Liebman’s work by associating it with Pakistan’s history to demonstrate missed opportunities to promote religious moderation and address unresolved social or political issues resulting in a geopolitical framework that has facilitated the rise of religious extremism.

In order to understand the foundation of the growing insurgency within Pakistan it is important to understand the historical relationship, interference by and grievances between the State, its institutions and its people. Religious conflict has become almost a defining characteristic of Pakistan’s history. Since its founding, there has been ongoing friction within its Islamic community and between believers and other non-Muslim groups. Although the choice would seem to be simple - the development of a strict theocratic state or not - moderate views of Islam have always been a friction within Pakistani politics. During its formative years (1950-1985),\(^{21}\) as the state wrestled with the Jinnah’s idea of democratic secularism, defined as religious neutrality, it became problematic for its leaders to determine what citizenship within Pakistan actually meant. Pakistan was originally a state of Islam with many religions and many languages, but its common unifying religious identity turned out to be divisive, as “[n]o one who has given serious thought to the introduction of a religious State in Pakistan has failed to notice


\(^{21}\) There is no recognized period of time within the historiography that outlines Pakistan’s formative years as noted. Given the constitutional changes, governance agreements with the FATA, political unrest and the focus on Islamization until the end of General Zia’s rule, it is possible to deduce this the most important period of time within Pakistan’s history.
the tremendous difficulties with which any such scheme must be confronted.” It was as though Pakistan had an identity crisis that remained unresolved until the authoritarian rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1978 who believed that “Pakistan’s binding force has always been Islam. Without it Pakistan would fall.” If Pakistan was to be converted into an Islamic State in the true sense of the word. According to the Munir Report of 1954, the Pakistani Constitution must contain the following five provisions:

1. That all laws to be found in the Qur’an or the Sunna shall be deemed to be a part of the law of the land for Muslims and shall be enforced accordingly;
2. That unless the Constitution itself is framed by Ijma’-i-Ummat, namely, by the agreement of the Ulama and Mujtahids of acknowledged status, any provision in the Constitution which is repugnant to the Qur’an or Sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
3. That unless the existing laws of Pakistan are adapted by Ijma’-i-Ummat of the kind mentioned above, any provision in the existing law which is contrary to the Qur’an or Sunna shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void;
4. That any provision in any future law which is repugnant to Qur’an or Sunna shall be void; and
5. That no rule of International Law and no provision in any convention or treaty to which Pakistan is a party, which is contrary to the Qur’an or the Sunna shall be binding on any Muslim in Pakistan.

If the idea of an Islamic Pakistan was to remain true, it became essential to determine what that meant and the first step was to define a Pakistani citizen. The Munir Report of 1954, in response to secular violence of 1953 within the Punjab district, wrestled with the idea of a theocratic state, and identified the status of “non-Muslims” within such a framework.

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22 M. Munir, 201. The Munir Commission was formed to probe the causes of civil unrest in Punjab, Pakistan in 1953 that resulted in 12 killed and 66 wounded from police or military intervention. The disturbances were the direct results of Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, rejecting an ultimatum by the Majlis-i-Amal that demanded the Qadiani Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslims. The central government arrested the prominent members of the Majlis-i-Amal and the disturbances commenced immediately after as a direct result of these arrests. The Commission was tasked to determine the circumstances leading to the declaration of Martial Law, responsibility of the civil unrest, and study the response of civil authorities to prevent and deal with the disturbances. The Munir Report is used as justification for discrimination by Pakistani extremists who have subsequently engineered the ideology of Pakistan as an Islamic State. It is important to note that the Punjab civil unrest occurred shortly after Pakistan’s birth as the state struggled with its identity and the inherent contradictions in Jinnah’s vision.


24 M. Munir, 210-211.
The position of non-Muslim in the Islamic State of Pakistan will be that of *zimmies* and they will not be full citizen of Pakistan because they will not have the same rights as Muslims. They will have no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold Public offices. That the form of Government in Pakistan, if that form is to comply with the principles of Islam, will not be democratic is conceded by the *ulama*.  

Although the *Munir Report* did not declare who was entitled to Pakistani citizenship, given that it was an inquiry into communal violence, religious extremists - such as the anti-Ahmadiyya movement - employed the report to promote hatred against the Ahamdis Muslims in Pakistan. It was not until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 1974 amendment to the constitution, which defined what is a Muslim for the purposes of the law, that Pakistan created a three-tier society: Muslims (as defined in law), the Ahmadis community, and minorities that were not specifically identified in law. Religion therefore became the basis for defining citizenship, and in effect has resulted in institutionalized discrimination against minorities. This is an important facet of Pakistani politics in terms of religious extremism, as it provided the ideological basis for religious violence within Pakistan as the state retreated from sectarian democracy. Laurence Iannaccone and Eli Berman summarized this point, noting that religious militancy is a by-product of religious extremism when a state favors one group over another.  

Notwithstanding the legal rights inherent in citizenship, the social importance that is derived from a sense of belonging contributes to a person’s cultural identity, morality, values and loyalty. In other words, in 1974 Pakistan for political reasons failed to take advantage of an opportunity to develop a cohesive, inclusive model in favor of a fragmented religious-based society. The cost of defining a religious Muslim or Pakistani citizen was the state losing the ideal of religious neutrality, which contributes to bigotry and religious violence. Once a state decides on inclusion or exclusion of groups there is no immunity to legal discrimination. This achieves social isolation as a condition of religious extremism, as outlined by Liebman.


Both General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and recent president Pervez Musharraf relied on the Islamic base for political support and for legitimacy during their tenures. As a result, within Pakistani society the dominant Punjabis have used Islam to exercise political power and further the entrenchment of Islamist policies. Golam Choudhury argues that both leaders institutionalized different aspects of Islamism, such as the Blasphemy laws of 1980-86, the declaration of Islamic laws as the supreme law of Pakistan in 1988, and fundamental changes to the pillars of society – banks, universities, etc,\(^\text{27}\) to give Pakistan an Islamic character. He further states that Islam is a religion of society, and in order to bring the full effect of the principles of Islam to human society there must be a fully sovereign Islamic community, having the sanctions of a state to implement Islamic laws.\(^\text{28}\) One point worth noting is that these reforms were institutionalized in a permissive environment, as the vast majority of the population was Muslim, so government religious policies were not completely alien. Islam became the cornerstone of Pakistan society and politics, cemented in their constitutions that have been gradually reinforced by Islamic reforms through the later part of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

As part of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s 11-year authoritarian rule, in the 1980’s he introduced the Blasphemy laws, and amended the constitution as part of his Deobandi Islamization of Pakistan. “…Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.”\(^\text{29}\) Further supported by General Zia’s 9\(^{th}\) Amendment to the constitution in 1985 that Islamized the rule of law, “…and the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for

\(^{28}\) *Ibid.*, 77.
General Zia’s vision was contrary to what Jinnah had envisioned for Pakistan as social, political, religious and economic egalitarianism was replaced with regulations that were punitive, oppressive and perhaps extremist. The Blasphemy laws fundamentally altered Pakistan society as the state retreated further from liberalism and moderation towards extremism masked religious idealism by regulatory changing of Pakistani social beliefs. This nurtured a fundamentalist view of a religion, which makes it is a person’s duty to protect Islam and to persecute the non-believers, which fostered communal violence and intolerance. As noted in the Munir Report of 1954, “[t]he spread of Islam by arms is a religious duty upon Muslims in general.”

A Pakistani official speaking to a United Nations organization in 2009 stated “defamation of religion is a serious affront to human dignity leading to a restriction on the freedom of adherents and incitement to religious violence.” The Blasphemy laws were put into place to protect the Islamic religion within Pakistan, but their vagueness has promoted an atmosphere of fear, discrimination and oppression within religious minorities. According to Dawn, a leading Pakistani news source, 1,274 people have been charged under the Blasphemy law and another 51 were murdered before their trial from 1986 to 2010. The expansion of religious law within Pakistan contributes to the nurturing of religious extremism by legalized discrimination against “non-believers”, although arguably inherent within the notion of religious blasphemy in Pakistan is the requirement to be Muslim.

A contemporary example of how the perception of religious defamation within Pakistan contributed to violence occurred in July 2012, when a man who had mental health issues was

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31 M. Munir, 222.
caught burning papers, allegedly including pages of the Qur’an. It was considered an act of blasphemy; an angry mob gathered, stoned the man to death and subsequently burned the body.\textsuperscript{34} The Blasphemy laws, which made any criticism of Muhammad a capital offense, is an example of Liebman’s condition of religious law being expanded to the detriment of minorities.

On October 9, 2012 the world proclaimed outrage when the TeT shot Malala Yousafzai, a 14-year-old girl from the Swat District of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province who believed in the “right to education, play, sing, talk, go to market and the right to speak up.”\textsuperscript{35} The TeT claimed to target Yousafzai not because of her access to education but because she “inviting Muslims to hate [the] mujahedeen” and “her pioneer role in preaching secularism and so-called enlightened moderation. And whom so ever will commit so in the future too will be targeted again by the TeT.”\textsuperscript{36} Although these sentiments have been lost in the story covered by the Western media outlets, which focused on Muslim women’s right to education, they are important in demonstrating how moderate views are giving way to extremism within Pakistan.

It is well known that females in Muslim countries are discriminated against. The following three Pathan proverbs that come from the same area that Yousafzai was from, highlight the challenges to achieve moderation within Pakistan. “Women have no noses - they will eat [feces]. One’s own mother and sister are disgusting. Women belong in the house or in the grave.”\textsuperscript{37} Yousafzai would survive the attack on her young life and has been transformed by the international community into a global icon against ignorance and oppression, and for the right to education. Perhaps not surprisingly, this view is not shared widely within Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{34}“101 East Investigation into Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 03 Apr 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oYJO1wK_Ys accessed 23 Nov 13
Association of Pakistan Private Schools claimed Yousafzai was representing the views of the West and not Pakistan, and has banned her recent memoir co-written with British journalist Christina Lamb in 2013.\(^{38}\) Her story is amongst many examples within contemporary Pakistan that illustrate how the cultural rejection of values perceived as injurious to the religious tradition gives rise to religious extremism as outlined by Liebman. As one militant explained: “[w]e are against co-education and secular education system, and Shariah orders us to be against it”\(^ {39}\).

Combined with the geographical challenges of Pakistan, is the fact that is the universal primary education system still has one of the lowest literacy rates within the developing world. In 2009, the national average had “improved” the literacy rate to 57% with rural rates being much lower illustrated by a 45% rate in Baluchistan.\(^ {40}\) By contrast, India boasts literacy rates of 72%.\(^ {41}\) Pakistan has always struggled to overcome its colonial legacy of low literacy and lack of industry, both of which ultimately contribute to the steady rise in unemployment.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) report in 2012 compared Pakistan’s military to primary education expenditures at a ratio of 7 ½ to 1. This education deficit is a significant contributor to religious extremism and a contributing impediment to democracy within Pakistan. As Emily Hannum and Claudia Buchmann note, educated people are to some extent more likely to vote and voice more tolerant attitudes and democratic values.\(^ {42}\) This belief is also shared within the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community. Jennifer McKay, working in Pakistan’s remote regions, believes that

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\(^{39}\) Synovitz, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Rationale for Shooting a Schoolgirl,”


\(^{42}\) Emily Hannum and Claudia Buchmann,"Global Educational Expansion and Socio-Economic Development: an Assessment of Findings from the Social Sciences," \(World Development\), vol. 33 no .3 (2005), 334.
“education’s a critical part of peace building and stability…education is really critical to countering extremism and just generally the future prosperity and peace, so it’s a very useful investment, important investment.”

The United Nations estimates that “just one-fifth of Pakistan’s military budget would be sufficient to finance universal primary education.”

Ignorance facilitates extremism because the uneducated are credulous and inclined to accept unquestioned dogma from authority figures. Not being able to make an informed decision due to a lack of awareness (ability to read) and reason (access to education) often contributes to the masses being manipulated to accept authoritarian rule or ‘radical’ ideas. Placed within a Pakistani context, the bulk of Islamization and authoritarian dictatorships occurred when literacy in the state were at its lowest points.

Given that Pakistan has been in political flux since its inception, the instability has allowed the security agencies within the state to solidify their dominance in domestic politics. Numerous authors explore the emergence and supremacy of the Pakistani military and the ISI within domestic politics, often leaving the reader with the conclusion that these security agencies, designed for the protection of Pakistan, are in fact destabilizing the state. As Shuja Namaz wrote,

[t]he paradox that hobbled Pakistan’s political development was that as the army grew in strength and size, it started the growth of the political system whose leaders made no attempt to redress the power imbalance between the institutions of the state and that of the army, making the latter effectively the center of power; or worse, they invited the army to settle political differences amongst themselves.

Golam Choudhury asserts that Pakistan’s security institutions purport to rationalize their continual military intervention through the last sixty years as protecting the nation at a time of

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43 As interviewed by Eric Campbell, “The Enemy Within.”
social, economic or political crisis.\textsuperscript{46} This assessment is likely incomplete and not based upon discernable evidence. What is a more likely cause is Pakistan’s inability to institutionalize democracy as the core of the nation, given the fact that: “if civilian institutions are not capable of asserting themselves on the military, the military by virtue of its qualities dominates the civil institutions.”\textsuperscript{47} In other words, Pakistan has a security institution that dominates the geopolitical sphere and that continually challenges the democratic process, which is ultimately undermining its national unity.

At the time of partition, the Pakistani security institutions were not involved with politics, but that changed over time, and the how and why needs to be briefly highlighted. India and Pakistan initially shared the same institutions and political structure, however Pakistani politics were riddled with factionalism from the very beginning as groups vied for control of the state. Competition for power occurred between and amongst the civil and military bureaucracies and/or actors along with the political class and/or groups.\textsuperscript{48} This friction within Pakistani society ultimately created a political vacuum in the first decade of Pakistan’s birth. Within the historiography, it is well articulated that Pakistan at the time of partition was “a country with a weak political structure, feeble political parties and politicians, but a strong feudal class and civil and military bureaucracy.”\textsuperscript{49} As a result, the Muslim League “had to abdicate in favor of a stronger giant, the Pakistan Army,”\textsuperscript{50} which was off spring of the British Indian Colonial Army that recruited based upon the doctrine of the “martial races”. This resulted in the Indian Army recruiting two-thirds of its soldiers from the Punjab region\textsuperscript{51} dominantly comprised of Muslims. What is less studied, however is why the Pakistan Army was an effective organization in 1947. Expanding on the Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkison

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\textsuperscript{46} Choudhury, 27. \\
\textsuperscript{47} Stephen Philip Cohen, \textit{The Pakistan Army}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107. \\
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 32. \\
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 21.
\end{flushleft}
study linking combat experience with organizational skills, it becomes evident that given the experience of combat in the Great War and World War II, the veterans of the British Indian Colonial Army developed enhanced collective organizational skills and the ability to improvise in rapidly changing circumstances.\textsuperscript{52} In other words, at the time of partition the security institutions in Pakistan established within the British Indian Colonial Army were robust, mature and capable organizations compared to the weak emerging political system. “Understanding the value of veterans and how best to mobilize the distribution of skills they acquired in war, even if these are not as valued in times peace, may be vital for policies aimed at both maintain political stability and engendering institutional change.”\textsuperscript{53} In the absence of a strong visionary leader such as Jinnah, the security institutions became an acceptable leadership alternative. The administrative and political weakness of Pakistan at the time of its birth created opportunities for military interference. From then on, Pakistan’s security institutions, in particular the Army, never gave up the practice of imposing martial law whenever it wished.\textsuperscript{54}

Bruce Riedel believes as early as 1958 the ISI began its rise to “power” when Major General Ayub Khan used the intelligence service to spy on his enemies inside the state after toppling the Pakistan government.\textsuperscript{55} Pamela Constable goes so far as describing the ISI as a “state within a state” while reinforcing its covert role within domestic politics,\textsuperscript{56} and Mazhar Aziz has dubbed the military in Pakistan as a parallel state. All this is by the way of saying that the security institutions within Pakistan are without a doubt the main power broker within domestic politics. As noted by a Pakistani politician in 1986: “[t]he armed forces may not have a formalized role in social affairs like Turkey or Indonesia, but their authority cannot be

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 906.
\textsuperscript{54} Abbas, 10.
denied.” This view is reinforced by Juan Cole,

The three-decade-long U.S. project of building up the Pakistani military, training its officers and equipping it with high-tech weaponry has helped unbalance the Pakistani state, creating a vast military-industrial complex that makes repeated claims on the prerogative of rule, rather as if it were a political party in its own right.

Within a colonial context British rule in India was focused on the development of an effective system of defense and internal security to provide an administrative system. As a result, the Pakistani security institutions and civil bureaucracy that matured under colonial rule failed to become subordinate to a nurturing Pakistani political establishment, resulting in the formation of a garrison state. As Ishtiaq Ahmed notes, “[a] garrison state is characterized by the military dominated in the state in all aspect of life and does not necessarily terminate civilian rule; [the state] can subordinate to military hegemony.” However, this simplistic view of the rise of authoritarian politics is incomplete without understanding whether democracy is a viable alternative in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s geography, lack of infrastructure and social institutions has resulted in a nation that is dominated by tribal governance, tribal loyalty and tribal justice within regions outside of the urban centers. When Pakistan was formed in 1947, the various tribes in what is now known as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa pledged allegiance to the central state but did not abandon their political autonomy. This unique system has ultimately limited the Pakistani government involvement the KPK region and has further isolated the tribes from the central authority. As Amitai Etzioni notes, there are seven tribes in Waziristan that govern themselves,

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57 As quoted by Choudhury, 75.
60 Ahmed, “The Pakistan Military in Politics: Predicament of a Garrison State,”
61 The instruments of accession, signed in 1948, granted the tribal areas a special administrative status. Except where strategic considerations dictated, the tribal areas were allowed to retain their semi-autonomous status, exercising administrative authority based on tribal codes and traditional institutions. To the tribal agencies of Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan were later added Mohamed Agency (1951), and Bajaur and Orakzai (1973).
have considerable armed forces and do not recognize the authority of the Pakistani
government.62 This was a hold over from British rule. As Pamela Constable writes, “[u]nder
the semiautonomous system set up during colonial rule, seven tribal “agencies” were allowed to
govern their internal affairs through the tribal jerga system…”63 One of the more dominant
tribes in the region is the Pashtu, whose traditional lands transcend the border region between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This region, known as the Pashtun belt, is of strategic importance as
Pashtu jihadists are increasing amongst the disenfranchised refugees from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s failure to secure these transnational tribal borders contributes to the extremists’
freedom of movement. However, the borders could be secured according to the US diplomatic
sources, “there are only "40 jeepable" border crossing between the two nations, and these points
could be controlled if the provincial governments were not "riddled with corruption', from
smuggling.”64

Pakistan has failed to provide enduring security in its frontier region, and the rule of law
as exercised from Islamabad simply does not run in vast areas of Pakistan. Although Pakistanis
still view the Talibanization of their country as a threat to their way of life (see figure 7), the
failure of Pakistan to take decisive action and reform its nation contributes to that process.
Having said that, this transition could only be achieved if Pakistan is reformed to reduce the
dominant and counter-productive influence of the security institutions towards a political system
that is responsive to the needs of its own people. The ISI has indeed developed into a
government within a government’s running not only the Afghan war but also dominating the
numerous other internal intelligence agencies in Pakistan that monitor domestic opposition.65

In reality, there is a lack of political will within Pakistan to commit the required

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63 Constable, 186.
64 U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable PTQ4199, “Afghanistan: Describes Pakistan's Current Thinking,” 09
2014.
resources to a sustained campaign to remove the militants that they have created, and this appears to be supported by the ISI. A concerted effort may well be impossible because it could risk destabilizing the state itself. In October 2006, when pressed during an interview, President Musharraf relented and stated that he had reviewed reports that some dissidents and retired people who were prominent in the ISI between 1979 and 1989 might be helping to leak intelligence to the Taliban.\(^6^6\) A recent International Security Assistance Force Commander (ISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, reported in September 2009 that Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. These two observations further support the claim that some Taliban groups are aided by elements of Pakistan ISI.\(^6^7\) Therefore, it is clear that the Pakistani government has lost what little control it possessed of most of the areas along the Afghan border and more importantly of its internal security agencies that were designed for the protection of the state. It has disintegrated to the point that the Pakistani Taliban have blown up 200 girls’ schools, hung policemen and teachers, set up shai’ra courts and now effectively runs a parallel government along with openly challenging the Pakistani security forces on its own terms.\(^6^8\) Under such a disjointed framework it would be difficult to establish a strong centralized democratic government in Pakistan, which could explain its political history of periodic authoritarian rule.

This is a complex problem for Pakistan to resolve. It must balance the continual demands from the West to apply pressure to the growing extremism along its border regions with the reality that every military incursion or operation it conducts is viewed as contrary to the expansion of Islamic extremism and results in a call for Jihad against Pakistani security forces.


Pakistan’s only Christian minister Shahbaz Bhatti and Punjab province Governor Salman Taseer were both killed in 2011 after speaking out against the country’s blasphemy law. The Red Mosque siege of 2007 is an excellent case that illustrates how the extremism that had been restricted to the frontier regions is not only spreading to Islamabad and other parts of Pakistan but is growing in intensity. While criticizing the Pakistani military operation at the Red Mosque, Commander Maulvi Abdul Khaliq Haqqani stated,

Mujahedeen of the North and South Waziristan agencies will avenge the martyred brothers, sisters and sons. Praise be to Allah, Mujahedeen have launched activities and have been conducting guerilla and suicide attacks against the army and paramilitary forces. They will take revenge for the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa operation.

After the government captured the mosque, suicide bombers targeted Pakistani security forces in reprisal, ultimately killing hundreds of people, all of which is counter-productive to achieving support from the local population. Should Pakistani security forces continue to prove unwilling or unable to respond, the prospect of increasing cross-border extremist operations from Pakistani tribal areas into Southern Afghan regions is a real possibility.

After examining the geo-political dynamics in Pakistan that are contributing to religious extremism, it is important to focus attention on the social and economic factors that are systematically marginalizing those people who represent the recruitment base for extremist groups. Underdevelopment, poor education and lack of infrastructure caused either by high levels of corruption or inadequate bureaucracies have created a social/economic need for services which is being filled by extremist groups in Pakistan’s remote regions. As Peter Fritsch notes, the near collapse of public education in Pakistan has transformed to a corresponding rise

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71 Cole, 235.
in influence of the madrassas.\textsuperscript{72} This should not come as a surprise, as Iannaccone highlights that “sectarian communities successfully engage in [providing concrete goods and services] especially where poor government or civil disorder undermines the secular provision of schooling, health care, poverty programs, police protection, [etc…]”\textsuperscript{73} It is worth noting that researchers Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff do not share the popular belief that the number of madrassas has risen to fill the gap in public education, but do acknowledge there exists a “demand for education within Pakistan that far exceeds the government’s ability to provide it.”\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, the influence of the madrassas has increased out of proportion with the actual number of these establishments due to the unmet demand for educational opportunities. It may be logical to conclude that for the poor of Pakistan, the madrassa is the most achievable means of education. Every dollar Pakistan spent on its security institutions was investment taken away from education and economic development, causing the state to regress to high levels of unemployment. Figure 17 indicates an acute rise in Pakistan’s unemployment for all ages. This is not surprising given Pakistan spent as much as 36% of its central expenditures on its military in the 1990s before gradually decreasing to the norm within South Asia by 2011 (see figure 18).

It is beyond the scope of this study to fully address the radicalization of Taliban Islamism, other than to note that following Pakistan’s military coup in October 1999 General Pervez Musharraf actually was increasing support to the Taliban by considering authorizing the use of its territory to outflank Northern Alliance positions in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{75} The Taliban benefit from political support in Pakistan’s Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) party, a Deobandi group with

\textsuperscript{73} Iannaccone, 19.
a strong support base among the Pashtuns. It continued to recruit personnel primarily from the
madrassas that served as ideological centers and non-formal education institutions operating in
the KPK. The Taliban support in Pakistan is strongest in this region because it benefited
heavily from trade under the Taliban regime and the residents continue to conduct a vast
smuggling trade across the borders.\textsuperscript{76}

In a country that is 70\% rural, the extremist recruiting base is largely focused on under-
employed, economically disadvantaged youths. Incomes are crushingly low. A third of the
Pakistanis make less than a dollar a day while food inflation was running at 20-25 percent in
2008.\textsuperscript{77} Subsistence is difficult as farmers and factory workers have been badly affected by the
rise in energy prices. Some parts of the country are lush, with vegetation fed by monsoon rains,
while other parts are arid and mountainous. The geography impacts on the ability of all regions
to become self-sufficient, and as a result the average Pakistani spends 43 percent of his/her
monthly income on food alone.\textsuperscript{78} This has resulted in a large recruit base for extremists groups,
as a senior manager for the Harkat-ul-Mujahidden stated in an interview to \textit{Stern}: “Most of the
people who join these [extremist] groups are from the poorest classes. Eighty-five percent come
from below the poverty line, twelve percent are from the middle class and around three percent
from the rich.”\textsuperscript{79}

According to the Asian Development Bank, Pakistan for the past 20 years had the
lowest employment to population ratio (40\%) within Asian pacific region. This is relevant and
significant in understanding the linkage to religious militancy, given the ‘relative deprivation’
theory argues that unemployment causes a loss in status and feelings of deprivation. As a result,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk et al, \textit{Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal
Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes,} (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), 133.
\item \textsuperscript{77} State Bank of Pakistan, “Interim Monetary Policy Measures,” May 2008, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Rashida Haq and Nabeela Arshad, “Inequality and Welfare by Food Expenditure Components,”
\item \textsuperscript{79} Stern, 214.
\end{itemize}
the disenfranchised develop a preference for authoritarian leaders, an anti-foreigner ideology, and a violent predisposition.\textsuperscript{80} This is representative of Pakistan’s history and indicative of an anti-western bias.

Some \textit{madrassas} in Pakistan, as other areas within the Islamic world, are in effect religious indoctrination centres that breed ignorance about the moderate teachings of Islam. There is also recognition amongst Pakistani leadership that the term ‘religious scholar’ is abused. As former Pakistan President Musharraf said, “[t]he majority of religious scholars are very enlightened people. They looked at the Taliban as if they were the renaissance of Islam and at those who were against the Taliban as…not Muslims. The Pakistani people were let down by these so-called religious scholars.”\textsuperscript{81} Although this is an accepted view within the scholarly literature, Marika Vicziany argues this is too simplistic a view and that government curriculum is partially to blame for the problem of communal violence,

Ironically, it is these government texts that are imported into the \textit{madrassas} and private schools of Pakistan by reform-mined teachers wanted to expand their curriculum in modern directions…During the last three decades, [government] curricula have assiduously promoted military values and \textit{jihad}. In raising religious-military heroism to national prominence, the government controlled school curricula of Pakistan have created their own communal monster.\textsuperscript{82}

It is important to note that often it is external contributors that place resources in the hands of fanatical clerics in order to facilitate recruitment efforts who fund these ‘radical’ schools. According to the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Report, (9/11 Commission report), poor education in Pakistan was identified as a concern especially amongst those with little money who send their children to \textit{madrasas}. “Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as


\textsuperscript{81} As quoted by Owen Bennett Jones, \textit{Pakistan: Eye of the Storm}, (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 30.

\textsuperscript{82} As quoted by Philip Oldenburg, \textit{India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths}, (London: Routledge, 2010), 157.
incubators for violent extremism.\textsuperscript{83} There are even claims by Pakistan’s current Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, that Benazir Bhutto’s assassination was planned in Maulana Samiul Haq’s seminary Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak.\textsuperscript{84} This raises an interesting dichotomy for Pakistan given that \textit{madrassas} are being used for accessible education by the very group that are the most susceptible to radicalism – the lower peasant classes. As a result, if accessible secular education in Pakistan is unattainable and the \textit{madrassas} that propagate radicalism are fulfilling the need, the effect on Pakistani society is obvious: a growing militant population that believes in a rigid form of Islam. Pakistan’s response historically has been to deal with the symptoms of religious militancy through the instruments of the state, in particular its security and defense institutions, and not address one of the underlying causes – lack of social investment.

Defense expenditure for Pakistan has been traditionally high due to due to potential and perceived threats including the arms race with India and internal incidents of religious militancy. As briefly mentioned earlier figure 18 from the World Data Bank pegs Pakistan’s military benefiting from as much as 36 percent of government expenditures in the 1990s, with a gradual decrease to the norm of the region at 17 percent by 2011. The reason for such high expenditure was that Pakistan perceived India as a potential threat to its sovereignty see figure 7. Shalini Chawla notes:

General Zia-ul-Haq refused to impose any cut on defense expenditure as he stated that no one can fight a nuclear submarine and jets with sticks so [Pakistan] had to match our arsenal capabilities with [Pakistan] adversaries [India], so Pakistan cannot afford any reduction in defense spending, as you cannot conceal the security threats to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{85}

A fuller analysis of the regional dynamics and impact India and Afghanistan had on Pakistan’s internal security dilemmas will be the subject of the next chapter. It is only worth noting at this point that India’s perceived security threat to Pakistan is one contributing factor to why defense expenditure remained high throughout the 20th century to the detriment of social expenditures and the development of a welfare state.

The Asian Development Bank highlights Pakistan’s government social expenditures for the year 2000 at around 3% of its GDP compared to the average for Central and West Asia of 7.8%. Expanded in figure 19 data illustrates Pakistan’s government social expenditure for the past decade demonstrating it was below the average for the region (South Asia) or its neighbor India. This results in limited economic development or aid, poor housing, lack of educational opportunities, increased poverty and poor community services. Failure to invest in social programs confronts dissatisfied youth with economic stagnation, political instability and anti-government activities. As in much of the developing world, Pakistan has a disproportionate percentage of the population that falls in the age group of 15-29 (see figure 20). Members of this demographic tend to be highly politicized, outspoken, and motivated by perceived social, economic, and political injustices. In particular, unemployed young men are a great source of social instability. The unemployment rate of Pakistan significantly increased to 8.8 percent in urban areas and 4.7% in rural areas in 2011, which translates into 3.4 million unemployed Pakistanis. Given the historical record of Pakistan, it is no surprise that its youth, faced with a dismal future, turn to religion for hope and become susceptible to extremist ideals.

Islam has become the cornerstone of Pakistan society and politics. It has been cemented in their constitutions, which gradually reinforced Islamic reforms throughout the later part of the 20th century. The Blasphemy laws in the 1980s, the declaration of Islamic law as the supreme law of the Pakistan and other Zia Islamic initiatives made fundamental changes to the pillars of society – banks, universities, etc. The University Grants Commission issued a directive to prospective textbook authors as quoted by Azhar Hamid,

To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather in the shared experience of a common religion. To get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with Slogans. To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan – the creation of a completely Islamicized State.

Pakistani banks were tasked with removing ‘interest’ from their transactions in order to conform with Islamic laws, however Pakistani banks have been exercising legal loopholes in order to disguise charging interest. Truly Islamic banking has yet to be fully implemented. Ahmed attributes these changes as a necessity given the ideal of Islam is “organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a policy on national lines,…is simply unthinkable to a Muslim.” It is worth noting that none of Pakistan’s past presidents, including Benazir Bhutto, nor its current president Nawaz Sharif dare repeal the Blasphemy laws, which highlight how entrenched religion has become within Pakistan’s society. Pakistan failed to adequately invest in the development of a social welfare state, ultimately giving rise to an increasing rate of unemployment, the disenfranchised and extremist-funded and run social institutions. The state has been in a gradual decline since its founding and this can be attributed to poor policies, a failure to establish the state identity (pluralist or theocratic state) and a misunderstanding of where the real security threat is within a regional framework. Extremist groups, like

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88 Choudhury, 129.
89 As quoted by Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 171.
90 As quoted by Cohen, The Pakistan Army, 91.
organizations, are living things that seek continuity and growth. An organization, whether it is
ISI, al Qaeda or the Taliban, will seek to grow and amass influence regardless of its stated goals.
Thus, even when “peace” agreements are made, these groups will seek another raison d’etre to
perpetuate their power and influence. The failure of Pakistan as a state, its Talibanization, its
corrupt and misdirected security apparatus and its Islamization has created a perfect breeding
ground for dissent and extremism.

By examining the factors around partition and the lack of clarity in Jinnah’s vision for
Pakistan, the author seeks to explain how ultimately the state has lost religious neutrality and
has both implicitly and explicitly supported the rise of extremism. This should give the reader a
sense of how Pakistan shifted away from Islam to Islamism. Further, by considering the
increasing dominance of the security institutions in politics it becomes clear that Pakistan’s
obsession with India has compromised effective governance, handicapping social and economic
development.
CHAPTER III
THE EXTREMISTS AND PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL SECURITY POLICIES

Tonight I can report to the American People and to the world, that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and a terrorist who is responsible for the murder of thousands innocent men, women and children.¹ ~ U.S. President Barrack Obama, 02 May 2011

Just after midnight on May 1st 2011, The United States conducted a Special Forces operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, the face of global terrorism, leader of al Qaeda, jihadist and Taliban believer. How the most wanted individual in the world was able to live and direct strategic terrorist operations within walking distance of Pakistan’s Kakul Military Academy raises some interesting questions about Pakistan itself. Recent declassified US state documents indicate that as early as 1998 Pakistan was not especially helpful on the matter of terrorist Osama bin Laden, then thought to be living in Afghanistan, where the ISI had excellent sources. According to Pakistani sources, "all took the line that the issue of bin Laden is a problem the US has with the Taliban, not with Pakistan."²

The attack on the US in September 2001 does not seen to have changed Pakistan’s indifference. Perhaps this is why Osama bin Laden escaped to Pakistan after the fall of the Afghanistan Taliban in 2002. The US security apparatus became aware of Osama bin Laden’s compound early in 2010, and continued to develop the target for a year and half before acting. During that period, Pakistan was kept in the dark about US activities around Abbottabad and only after the extraction of the US Navy SEAL raid team was Pakistan informed of their operations. The US did not trust Pakistan with its intelligence because it appeared Osama bin Laden had passive support from Pakistan’s security institutions in that he was able to avoid capture for so long. It

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is common knowledge that during the raid at Abbottabad, “thousands” of documents were recovered and of the 17 declassified to date, there are references to “trusted Pakistani brothers” giving credence to an extremist support network existing within Pakistan. This notion was clearly articulated by President Barrack Obama in a 60 minute interview shortly after the raid,

The compound was there for 5-6 years and we believe bin Laden was there that long...we think that there had to be some sort of support network for bin Laden inside of Pakistan.

The Scale of Extremism

It came to no surprise to western intelligence organizations that Osama bin Laden was found within Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations are well known to have a base of support in the country, and how and why they are able to operate within and out of Pakistan is a subject that was developed in other chapters. However, in order to lay the foundation of this study, it is important that the reader understands some of extremist organizations in Pakistan, and how the Pakistani government has tried to deal with them. As of 2012, unclassified estimates put the number upwards of 48 different extremist elements enjoying freedom of movement within Pakistan. What is difficult to ascertain is their relative strength given their clandestine nature. Standard metrics such as resources (personnel, material, training facilities, financial), efficiency, effectiveness, cohesion and culture are subjective qualified estimates influenced by the knowledge and the biases of the analyst interpreting the intelligence data. Leveraging Syed Hussain’s trend analysis and characteristics of terrorist incidents sourced from Global Terrorism Database for Pakistan (see figure 2), it is clear that the overall trend is increasing and has been since the 1970s. According to a Stanford University study, over the course of the past three decades the number of extremists groups in Pakistan has increased over

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3 Lahoud, 47.
4 As interviewed by Steve Kroft, “President Obama on the Raid that Killed Bin Laden,” 60 Minutes, 09 May 2011.
300% (figure 3). When combined with the exponentially increasing number of terrorist incidents in the past decade (see figure 4), these two factors are clearly indicative of a growing extremist problem within Pakistan. The resulting 23,000 fatalities of extremist violence in the past decade (see figure 5) contributed to The Institute for Economics and Peace ranking Pakistan as the second highest country in the world for extremist activities for 2002-2011, just behind Iraq but ahead of Afghanistan (as shown in figure 6).

This growth in extremist capability in Pakistan has occurred despite domestic and international initiatives\(^6\) to curb them. Part of the problem is that Pakistani security institutions appear to delineate between groups hostile to its national interests like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and those of potential strategic value to Pakistan such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), that conduct asymmetric warfare within India, and those organizations that operate in traditionally semi-autonomous tribal areas, such as the Haqqani Network (HN). Although the information is now dated, according to a classified CIA message from 1996, "diplomatic reports indicate that ISID provides at least $30,000[USD] - and possible as much as $60,000[USD] - per month" to an anti-Indian extremist group operating in Kashmir.\(^7\) The majority of extremist groups enjoying sanctuary in North Waziristan (district in the Province of Balouchistan - see image 1), a mountainous tribal agency, tend to be focused on conducting operations in Afghanistan and only conduct defensive Jihad inside Pakistan when necessary. As a result, they are generally left alone by Pakistan’s security forces. As Anana Gopal notes, “…the relationship between militants and the Pakistani military has been relatively cooperative in North

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\(^6\) Terrorist designation imposed by Pakistan or the international communities allow the state to seize material assets and make it a criminal offence to provide resources to these organizations. This is an effective solution at a moment in time, however extremist groups often conduct a name change and continue to conduct operations unimpeded.

Waziristan.” This cordial relationship in North Waziristan is a source of growing friction between Pakistan and the international community. Despite an increasing number of US cross border drone strikes in the past decade, the region remains, in the words of US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, “…the epicenter of terrorism.” While some of the extremist locations are well known to intelligence agencies, unless the fundamental causes of extremism within Pakistan are addressed, targeting their location will only disrupt the flow of supplies, personnel and resources for a short period of time until replacements are found.

It is evident that Pakistan remains the vital ground for the Taliban operating both inside and outside of Pakistan, and responding kinetically and influencing operations within the frontier region is critical to long-term regional peace. John Negroponte, then Director of United States National Intelligence, concluded in 2007 “eliminating the safe-havens that the Taliban have found in Pakistan’s tribal areas is a necessary part of tackling the insurgency [in Afghanistan].” Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry echoed these sentiments at the US House Armed Services Committee hearings on 13 February 2007. “I do emphasize that Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remains a significant problem,” Eikenberry stated, “that must be addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan.” There is, however, a level of frustration that remains within western military leadership regarding the known areas of Pakistani Taliban activity. Nicholas R. Burns, the undersecretary for Political Affairs in the

United States Department of State, outlined these concerns in a press briefing given on 26 January 2007.

There is a problem of forces coming from Pakistan into Afghanistan to attack and then to return to Pakistan to seek refuge and refitting. We [US government] are of course making a concerted effort to strike at those terrorist training camps in North and South Waziristan and in Balouchistan.\textsuperscript{12}

Before understanding the root causes of extremism and Pakistan’s failure to counter the appeal of terrorism it is important the reader obtains a sense of the extremist landscape. Pakistan’s extremist movements are networked in terms of communication, logistics and are to some degree jointly financed. However, notwithstanding numerous affiliations, the Quetta and Peshawar Shuras, generally the extremists’ movements within Pakistan remain fractured and lack a centralized command and control element that would provide a synergy across all lines of operations. Despite the best efforts of prominent extremists such as Osama bin Laden, Pakistani groups have not yet been able to develop into a cohesive fighting organization operating under a comprehensive campaign plan with a view to overthrowing the democratic state. Recognizing the problem between extremist groups, bin Laden expressed his growing frustration in 2010 with regional \textit{jihad} groups in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions: “I plan to release a statement [announcing] that we are starting a new phase to correct [the mistakes] we made; in doing so, we shall reclaim, God willing, the trust of a large segment of those who lost their trust in the \textit{jihadis}.”\textsuperscript{13}

The dissention within the extremist movements can be attributed to different spiritual beliefs, operational methods and ultimately the real objective of the organizations. This is not to say that the extremist movements do not pose a threat to the state of Pakistan, or to its citizens. Rather, the inability to integrate effects and implement organizational change is contributing to the tension that currently exists between movements. Having said that, the extremist groups


\textsuperscript{13} Lahoud, 4.
within Pakistan remain effective, adaptive and interfaced with the local population and narrative, but they have yet to maximize their effectiveness despite their improved reach and ability to conduct operations in the past two decades.

A person’s beliefs, comprised of attitudes, cultures and prejudices, are how they perceive the activity around them. Within Pakistan there is a strong conservative base. Islamic extremists are not necessarily the ‘true’ conservatives as perceived in a western context. In the Pakistan society, however, they are radical. Most Pakistanis still are attached to a local tradition of worship, which is contrary to the ideology of extremists, especially al-Qaeda and the Taliban. A survey of Pakistan’s public opinion in all four provinces, reflective of the actual urban/rural population distribution, indicated that India, followed by the Taliban, are viewed as the greatest threat to Pakistan (see figure 7). Given the history of military conflict between the two countries it is not surprising that roughly 8 out of 10 Pakistanis (79%) say India is a serious threat, including 57% who believe it is a very serious threat. This blood feud runs deep in Pakistan’s mindset and is possibly a result of religious differences, a perception of Hindu dominance in Northern India culminating in the Kashmir dispute, and the economic disparity between the two nations. The regional dynamics will be the focus of chapter 3 but at this stage it was important to gain a sense of the security perception of Pakistanis that ultimately influences the domestic and international policies of the state.

The next section of this chapter will highlight a sample of the extremist groups operating in Pakistan grouped under four strategic objectives and their multidimensional facets. First of these are transnational organizations aimed at destabilizing Afghanistan and anti-western interests. The second group is comprised of separatist movements trying to achieve a state of autonomy from the central government by leveraging violence to win concessions. The

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14 As interviewed by Harry Kreisler, “Conversations with History: Pakistan with Anatol Lieven.”
third are organizations that enjoy the patronage of Pakistani security institutions and leverage the anti-Indian sentiment to conduct asymmetric warfare within India over the issue of Kashmir. Finally, these are those elements in Pakistan that contribute to the communal violence with the aim of overthrowing the democratic government and creating a theocratic Deobandi Islamic state. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of Pakistan’s internal security policies.

**The Extremist Landscape**

**TRANSNATIONAL**

One of the most prominent and longest established extremist groups in Pakistan is the Haqqani Network (HN), led and established by the Afghan mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and more recently led by Mawalal Jalaluddin Haqqani. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan this network is reported to have had extensive links with the Pakistan ISI, the American CIA and Arab fighters within the region including Osama bin Laden. The group was and is based out of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan with its headquarters suspected to be in the predominately Pashtun area of Miram Shah. With a strength estimate of several hundred core members and thousands of fighters, the HN currently restricts its operations to eastern Afghanistan in order to disrupt military and political initiatives with a view

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16 Darul Ulum Deoband pedagogy lay in the writings of and teachings of Shaikh Ahmed Sirbhindi, a 17th century Sufi. His ideas formed the basis of Mujaddidiyya shaakh developed by Shah Wali Ullah who re-introduced the Qur’an and hadith into Sufi tariqa. As outlined by Sana Haroon, “The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and Its Implications in Colonial India and Pakistan 1914-1996,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 18. no. 1 (Jan. 2008), 48. Deoband is neither a creed (madhab) nor a sect but it is an offshoot of Sunni Islam with lineage to Deoband India. The ‘ulama of Deoband are adherents of one of the four imams of figh: Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Shafi’, Imam Malik and Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and follow the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools of creed as described on http://www.deoband.org/about-2/ accessed 11 March 2014.


to establishing a sharia-law based state. However, if successful it remains possible that this Pashtu tribal based group would evolve towards the idea of creating Pashtunistan. Such a transition would have consequences for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This potential ethnic unrest remains a strategic risk to Pakistan should it continue to ignore international pressures for decisive action against Haqqani and continue to tolerate the network.

Ideologically linked to the Taliban, during the 1990s the senior Haqqani leader held the role of Afghanistan’s Minister of border and tribal affairs, and subsequently served as a Taliban’s military commander during the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The network has enjoyed being the benefactors of Taliban fiscal support since 1994, and combined with criminal enterprises including kidnapping, drugs, extortion and smuggling, the network has become one of the best connected and funded extremist groups within the region. Anana Gopal notes, however, that the US view the Haqqanis as more socially tolerant than the rigid Taliban and are likely to allow women access to education. 19 This may be considered as a somewhat redeeming characteristic by western democracies.

Some believe that elements within the Pakistani security establishment view the HN as a proxy force representing Pakistani interests in Afghanistan and within North Waziristan. To this end, Haqqani forces have repeatedly targeted Indian infrastructure and construction projects in Afghanistan, as highlighted in 2010 attack on the Indian guest house in Kabul which left 16 people dead. 20 In a 2011 appearance before the US Senate Armed Services Committee Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “the Haqqani Network acts as

19 Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Taliban in North Waziristan,” in Talibanistan, 137.
a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.”  

Ahmed Rashid expands on this statement by claiming the Pakistan ISI has asked the HN to intervene in conflicts between local Taliban commanders in the Waziristans, and between extremists and the state.  

To this end, the HN not only appears to be the main powerbroker within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) but an extension of Pakistan’s security institutions.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban (TeT or TTP), popularly known as the Pakistani Taliban, led by Maulana Fazlullah is the largest, deadliest indigenous extremist group operating within Pakistan. Since its formation in 2007, it has an estimated strength upwards of 35,000 personnel united from various factions of the Pakistan Taliban with a view to synchronizing offensive operations in Afghanistan and defensive jihad against the Pakistani security elements.  

The group aims to impose strict Islamic law throughout Pakistan, and often assassinates moderate state leaders such as former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in order to slow the pace of reform. Further, it appears the TeT is willing to attack Muslim tribes who are believed to be anti-Taliban, which causes a rift within the extremist community. As Osama bin Laden wrote: “…it does not justify the operation in view of the non-combatants who died, for that would contradict the [Islamic] legal basis of our politics,”  

Al-Qaeda leadership expressed its displeasure to the TeT about its “ideology, methods and behaviour” and stressed the group’s errors is “cause of great corruption of the Jihadi movement in Pakistan.”

With its strong Sunni and Deobandi ideological beliefs, the TeT poses a serious threat to a democratic Pakistan. The group runs a shadow government in North Waziristan and parts of South Waziristan where they collect taxes, provide a judiciary for disputes and enforce Islamic

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22 As quoted by Anand Gopal, et al., in Talibanistan, 139.  
24 Lahoud, 7.  
25 Ibid.
or Sharia law.26 Operations by the Pakistani security agencies in 2008 and early 2009 in the Swat valley failed to dislodge the TeT and other extremist groups and ultimately ended in a peace agreement (Malakand Accord), resulting in the withdrawal of legitimate government in parts of the KPK. Such appeasement of extremist groups allows these organizations to maintain their freedom of movement, continue to recruit in the madrassas, and impose Islamic law to the detriment of sustained peace, security, stability, prosperity and national unity. The message the Government of Pakistan sent to the local population in the Swat valley in April 2009 by signing the Malakand Accord was that the TeT is not only a legitimate institution but that their long term future rests with the TeT. This likely encouraged hesitant locals to join the movement. Such peace accords are indicative that Pakistan’s current anti-extremist policy focused on dialogue usually results in a greater degree of judicial, religious and educational autonomy for extremist groups which facilitates their long term objectives.

**SEPARATISTS**

The southwestern province of Balochistan in Pakistan has an astonishing territorial landmass of 43.6% of the country and is home to over half of the estimated Balochi population. The Baloch are a tribe whose traditional territory extends into Afghanistan and Iran. The Balochistan population, according to 1998 census, is 6.5 million, resulting in the lowest population density per square kilometer in Pakistan, calculated at 18.9 compared to the national average of 166.27 With rugged terrain, sporadic villages and a predominantly rural population, the inhabitants of Balochistan have become accustomed to indirect tribal rule, and low economic development. The lack of central government investment and grievances over the region’s mineral resources in the 1970s led to separatist armed conflict aided by Iran that lasted until General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq assumed power in 1977. Discontent with the central

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government, especially over natural resources royalties remains high in Balochistan and failed uprisings have taken place in contemporary times before assuming new vigor in 2000. As a Baloch Khan stated to Mary Weaver during a visit:

We have vast amounts of minerals, copper, marble, uranium, gas and oil. One day we’ll be prosperous, and that is the day that we’ll be listened to by the world. No one is going to give us anything on a plate. We will have to fight for it.  

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is just one of several Balochi ethnic extremist groups that have been linked to a serious of guerrilla attacks at the Chinese-funded Gwadar port, the bombings of Quetta market, and attacks against the Pakistani security forces.

The stated objective of the BLA is the establishment of an independent Balochi state encompassing the Balochi areas of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The region therefore possesses a threat to the stability of Pakistan. Tactically, the BLA has an estimated relative strength under 1000 extremists but strategically, the province of Balochistan remains a safe haven for numerous extremist groups including the Quetta High Shura (the leading Afghanistan extremists), sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and international organizations such as al-Qaeda. The linkages between these organizations are not well understood but it is clear that they share at least a symbiotic relationship based upon mutual benefit of sanctuary, supplies and a recruitment base.

**Kashmir**

One of the most notorious extremist groups based in Pakistan is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The group, founded in 1990 by Hafez Muhammad Saeed, is based upon the Ahle-Haith

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28 Weaver, 103.
30 Ibid.
31 The Afghanistan Taliban Leadership Council operating in Pakistan is broken into two main groups. The Quetta High Shura and the Peshawar High Shura. From Quetta, operations are directed in Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Farah provinces, from Miranshah, leaders oversee the insurgency in Khost, Paktia and Pakitika while operations in Nuristan, Kunar, Nangaher, Logar and Laghman are managed from Peshawar. Subsequent detail can be found in Ananad Gopal, The Taliban in Kandahar, Talibanistan.
interpretation of Islam and as such, unlike the Deobandi groups operating in Pakistan, LeT aligns its ideological goals with the interests of the Pakistani state. Their stated purpose is to “liberate” Kashmir and have it subsumed by Pakistan. To this end, the organization is reportedly resourced by the ISI and supported by the Pakistan Army to carry out operations in the Indian-controlled Kashmir region. Benefiting from state support, the LeT is able to execute complex, high profile attacks against India. In 2001, LeT took part in a commando-style attack on the Indian Parliament that killed a dozen people. More recently, in 2008, the Mumbai massacre, attributed to the LeT, resulted in 179 people killed and 300 wounded in a rampage across hotels, a train station and a Jewish center, heightening tensions along the border between India and Pakistan. There is, however, a direct correlation to tactical success and anti-terrorism efforts. The ability of extremists to besiege hotels within a cosmopolitan city and the resulting carnage over a three day period brought global attention to the extremist activities in the Kashmir region, just as 9/11 made al Qaeda a household name. As a result, figure 8 illustrates a strong declining trend in the number of extremist incidents that have occurred in the past decade within the India-controlled part of Kashmir. Although the greatest decrease in incidents occurred prior to the Mumbai massacres, the number of civilians and security forces killed tapered off after 2008, suggesting subsequent Indian responses to the massacre were effective.

While conducting research for her book, Terrorism in the Name of God, Jessica Stern traveled to Pakistan and interviewed LeT members. Her insight is invaluable in understanding the dynamics of and sometimes, the western misconceptions about, extremist groups. When asked what is the main objectives of the LeT, Emir Hafez Sayeed responded, “…in Kashmir our goal is to end the butchering of Muslims…[w]e train [mujahdeen] in Islamic thought; we prepare their minds for jihad. Once the mind is prepared for Jihad, very little additional training

33 Ibid.
is required." In other words, religious extremism is a fundamentalist mindset whereas violence or terrorist acts are just the symptomatic manifestations of a Jihadist culture. This mental conditioning (indoctrination) begins at a very early age as some extremist groups prefer to recruit children. During her interviews, an unnamed extremist group operating in the Kashmir region indicated to Stern, “[o]nce a young man subscribes to our journal, we know he is mentally prepared. We prefer to recruit children at the age of eleven or twelve. We start preparing them mentally and physically…and [they] fight at age eighteen or twenty…” This provides an insight into how these organizations develop the strong sense of fanaticism, loyalty and bravery that is required to conduct suicide attacks.

The relative strength of the LeT is unknown, but they benefit from the dominant anti-Indian sentiment widely held within Pakistan. The anti-Indian sentiment as outlined in figure 9 clearly indicates almost 2/3 of Pakistanis have an unfavorable attitude towards India. Some of this resentment could be attributed to the bloodshed that occurred during partition in 1947 or the repetitive conflicts between the two nations. Perhaps the underlying cause is an inherent incompatibility between Hindus and Muslims. As Paul Brass points out, “anti-Muslim pogroms have been endemic in India since Independence with a frequency and intensity that hardly a month passes in which a Hindu-Muslim riot does not occur.” Such fundamental religious resentment gives rise to hatred ultimately manifesting in violence. In addition, Pakistan appears to have a systematic policy of anti-Indian rhetoric within its institutions founded upon a deep level of mistrust. A survey of Pakistan’s education curricula in 2002 found that the ideology of Pakistan is closely related to hatred towards India and Hindus. Pakistanis school texts include the following phrases: “Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam,” “Hindus always desired to crush the Muslims as a nation,” and “while the Muslims provided all type of help to those

34 Stern, 115.
wishing to leave Pakistan, the people of India committed cruelties against the Muslims (refugees).” Such propaganda which resembles the anti-Semitism movement in Nazi Germany during the 1930s, influences the contemporary and generational attitude of Pakistanis towards its neighbor.

Like other extremist groups in Pakistan, the LeT provides social services to maintain local popular support, secure safe havens and facilitate recruitment. Humanitarian work or social services provided by extremists’ organizations are designed to strengthen the group’s primary effort and objectives, which is similar to western military’s conducting information or influence activities. The point is, extremist groups within Pakistan have evolved into multidimensional organizations focused on achieving and maintaining local support marking the population as the vital ground for institutional security effectiveness. According to Steve Coll,

> With its hospitals, universities, and social-services wings, Lashkar is akin to Hezbollah or Hamas; it is a three-dimensional political and social movement with an armed wing, not merely a terrorist or paramilitary outfit.38

**RELIGIOUS**

The Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), also known as the Army of the Friends of the Prophet was founded in the 1980s in an attempt to counter the rising influence of Iranian Shia.39 It is reported that the SSP is an umbrella political organization with over 100,000 workers in

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39 The battle of Siffin in 657 is not only the birth place of Islamic dogma but the rupture of the Muslim community into two major branches. One branch believed that Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, descendents are the right heir of the Prophet while the other branch maintains that Abu Baker was the legitimate successor. Ali’s close partisans formed the shi’at party. Along with the general Islamic belief in Allah, Muhammad and the Qur’an the Shottes believe in the office of iman as the true leader of the faithful and the interpreter of the Qur’an. Sunnis believe Abu Bakr, a friend of the Prophet Muhammad and father of his wife Asiva, inherited both the political and religious office of Islam. Sunnis rely heavily on the practice of the Prophet and his teachings (the “sunna”), the Shia see their ayatollahs as reflections of God on earth. This has led Sunnis to accuse Shia of heresy. As described by Anne Marie Schimmel, *Islam: an Introduction*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 75-93 and *The Economist* at [http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19 accessed 13 March 2014.](http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19)
Pakistan that supports various extremist groups including the LeJ.\(^{40}\) The aim of the SSP is to “restore the Khilifat system, while protecting Sunnis and their Shariat (Islamic laws). SSP members declare that Shias are non-Muslims and must be violently converted or suppressed.”\(^{41}\) The SSP has influence in every province of Pakistan, and despite being declared a terrorist organization by President Pervez Musharraf in 2002, the SSP is considered to be the most powerful extremist group in the country given its ability to influence political elections in the Punjab and the KPK.\(^{42}\) As a result, many prominent assassinations and attacks on Shia mosques and government/security officials have been attributed to the SSP.

The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), formed in the 1990s, is a radical Sunni Islamic extremist group with the stated objective of transforming Pakistan into a strict theocratic state. The group operates predominately within the South and Central Punjab provinces, and routinely targets Shiites and Ahmadi religious/community leaders, western institutions and Pakistani security agencies.\(^{43}\) It is a relatively small group with likely less than 1000 members but the LeJ is responsible for some of the worse religious violence in Pakistan in the past decade. It has been linked to the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and more dramatically in January 2013 when hundreds of Shia Muslims were killed in Quetta by a series of bomb blasts that locals described as “Hell on Earth.”\(^{44}\)

Not surprisingly, their counterparts from the Shia sect of Islam match Sunni extremists in their fervor. The Tehreek-e-Jaferia (TJP), formed in 1979, is a Shia extremist organization


\(^{41}\) Ibid.


aimed at the protection of the social, political and religious rights of Shiites.\textsuperscript{45} The group was formed during the Deobani Islamization of Pakistan under General Zia that will be discussed in the next chapter. Olivier Roy noted that the radicalization of the Shia movement in Pakistan actually began in the 1980s as a result of the Iranian Islamic revolution with a view to pursuing the same ideological goals. But over time, the movement has transitioned into defending the Shia minority in response to persecution from Sunni radical Islamic extremists.\textsuperscript{46}

The holy war (\textit{Jihad}) and \textit{us vs them} mentality is what Pakistan has leveraged throughout its history by supporting these groups, essentially making them extensions of the state. There are, however, inherent risks in such an approach. If the perspective of extremist groups changes to view the State as a threat, then democracy is in peril. As Sayeed goes on to say, “[rulers of Muslims countries] are not true leaders. They are puppets of the West. We want our leaders to raise their voices on behalf of all those who are trapped by the West.”\textsuperscript{47} A senior Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) leader has “publicly advocated an Afghan-style change of government in Pakistan that would remove the political, bureaucratic and military hierarchies.”\textsuperscript{48} In other words, despite their stated objectives, some Pakistani extremists will demand that Pakistan to be transformed into a theocratic state possessing a militant mindset ultimately focused on defeating India and combating western interests. The LeJ, SSP, LeT, and other religious extremist groups pose the greatest threat to a democratic Pakistan. These organizations aim to transform Pakistan into a strict theocratic state, not by political reform but through subversion and violent action aimed at weakening the legitimacy of the central government. They often establish local civil administrations and target the minority Shia community, the government and the security institutions with a view to establishing a competing system of “shadow” government based upon

\textsuperscript{47}Stern, 119.
\textsuperscript{48}MORI Doc ID: 1218415, 4.
their ideals. Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to extend control or influence over these areas and population where these extremist groups operate ultimately legitimizes them and discredits the central government by hindering its ability to provide services to its people. As a result, violence begets violence. Often, groups that are targeted by the extremists or are in the minority develop their own protective organizations, such as the TJP, when there is a perception that the state cannot provide for their security or if they are being disadvantaged by state policy. Therefore, the continual erosion of minority rights and the neglect of unresolved grievances by Pakistan are indirectly supporting the development of extremist movements.

One of the areas that require comment is the number of Afghan refugee camps where disenfranchised Afghans continue to be influenced, manipulated or coerced back into Southern Afghanistan as out-of-area fighters. Pakistan has experienced five waves of Afghan refugees that have resulted in up to 3.5 million people making their way across the border. These began in 1980 with the Soviet invasion and ended with the final group commencing migration when the current conflict started in October 2001. Despite repatriation efforts, Pakistan currently hosts approximately 1.6 million Afghans in various refugee camps. It was not prepared for the large influx of desperate people and initially restricted them to the poorest regions of the country, particularly KPK and Balouchistan, resulting in further stress to the local economic, social and infrastructure systems. Although not every refugee participates in extremist activities, the camps remain a base in which the Afghan Taliban enjoys a type of communal support. This support is manufactured through propaganda that resonates amongst the population who has been affected by fighting in Afghanistan. Bombs dropped on Afghan or Pakistani villages that result in civilian casualties are a great propaganda tool to arouse a sense of outrage or injustice within the refugee camps, the occupants of which are part of a tribal society where honor is the first and foremost concern. The point is that Afghan refugee camps

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are a hotbed for extremist activity, and although their current focus is to conduct operations within Afghanistan, a recent survey completed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2012 indicated that over 80% of the refugees will not return to their homeland.\(^{50}\) If this remains true, it will not only further stress Pakistan’s inadequate social welfare system but also has the potential to become a larger source of recruits for Pakistani based extremist groups. As noted by Ahmed Rashid,

Safe passage was provided to al Qaeda by not deploying Pakistani forces on the border in South and North Waziristan…thousands of al Qaeda and Taliban were allowed to settle in Waziristan, create bases, and restart military operations. Young Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen who had guided al Qaeda out of Tora Bora became rich as they provided logistical services for a price. Within a few years these guides had become commanders of the armed groups that emerged as the “Pakistani Taliban.”\(^{51}\)

### Pakistan’s Internal Security Policies

An historical analysis of the Pakistani security institutions (ISI and Army) demonstrates a reluctance to take decisive action to flush out the extremists within its frontier regions. In fact, peace agreements in Pakistan with the Taliban (Shakai 2004, Srarogha 2005 and Mirahshah 2006) have served only to grant the extremists time to rebuild, recruit and rearm for operations in Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself to further the goal of creating a theocratic state based on interpretations of morality, dogma and legal framework in the Qur’an.\(^{52}\) In response to western pressure, Pakistan did increase its military operations within its frontier regions and combined with cross-border drone strikes, it appears that the combined operations achieved limited success in reducing the capabilities of some extremist groups. Privately in 2010 Osama bin Laden was preoccupied with ensuring that “talented brothers” to be evacuated safely from Waziristan or, if they had to stay, for stringent measures to be taken to avoid being captured or

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killed, even if that meant the group’s activities “should proceed at a slower pace during this period.”  

Having said that, these types of kinetic operations ultimately were designed to address the symptoms of extremism and not the root causes via a comprehensive population-centric approach as identified in subsequent chapters. Sameer Lalwani believes Pakistan cannot adopt a population centric counterinsurgency strategy given the prohibitive costs in resources, organizational lags and trade-offs with its grand strategy and military doctrine ultimately misdirected towards India. The latter point (focus on India) remains true and will be discussed in chapter 3, but Lalwani errors on the side of caution in stating it was too cost prohibitive to develop a population centric counterinsurgency strategy.

If one considers the resource cost to the state of providing an enduring heightened level of security investment throughout the country, prolonged military operations, lost productivity and economic investment due to perceived instability, the most cost effective approach becomes less clear. Having said that, in 2008, Pakistan quantified the cost of participating in the “War on Terror” for four years at approximately 33.3 Billion US dollars (see figure 10). That number may appear to be substantial. However if one considers the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Pakistan and narrows the focus to actual direct cost, Pakistan spent only 1% of their GDP to fight the “War on Terror” and ultimately reduced that figure to less than 0.5% in 2008. It is worth noting, however, that the percentage of the defense expenditures dedicated to the “War on Terror” increased from 26% to 33% during the same time period (see figure 11). When considering these numbers holistically, they show that Pakistan did increase the demand on its security institutions to conduct counter-extremist activities, but failed to provide sufficient additional resources to ensure operational success. Further, even at the height of international pressure in 2008, only 1/3 of the defense expenditure for Pakistan was dedicated to the counter

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53 Lahoud, 17.
the growing extremist movement. These statistics are used to illustrate the fact that despite political rhetoric to the contrary, Pakistan did not properly resource an effective “War on Terror” campaign, and the numbers do not support Lalwani’s assertion it was cost prohibitive. Rebeca Krisel examined the cost-benefit structure of counterinsurgency campaigns and determined there is an optimal point where after the long term strategic costs of an ineffective counterinsurgency campaign undermines democracy and the rule of law (see figure 12). The question appears to no longer be whether or not if Pakistan has reached that point. In February 2014, Pakistan acknowledged that its economy has suffered a loss of more than “US$78 billion in the last ten years alone and more than 50,000 Pakistanis were affected or sacrificed their lives due to its internal security paradigm.”

There may not be an off the shelf recipe for successful counterinsurgency operations but security experts typically agree that it requires a combination of military, political and economic efforts. As noted in US military joint doctrine:

Insurgent strategies are composed of interdependent political and military dimensions. The relative emphasis on each of those aspects and exactly how they are linked in shaped by a combination of opportunity/motive/means factors, and the nature of the insurgent objectives.

By contrast, the Pakistan Army has conducted ad-hoc, selective, limited in duration, steamroller military campaigns that failed to achieve civil-military synergies for any lasting effect to ultimately secure and protect the population from extremist violence or shadow governance.

Figure 13 outlines what the author coins as operational outcomes from military and extremist activities that occurred in 2003-2011. It would appear Pakistan is conducting an attrition campaign against extremism and, on the surface, extremists appear to be able to inflict an equal number of Pakistani casualties. It is likely that Pakistan’s Army, long focused on the Indian

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nuclear and conventional threat, fails to appreciate the difficulties inherent within stability operations. This problem is further complicated by the absence of a comprehensive strategy, but more importantly by the lack of a consistent, state anti-extremist policy that addresses the multifaceted approach needed to neutralize extremism rooted in political, economic, cultural/ethnic or religious grievances.

Despite promoting a counter terrorism strategy that called for the Deterrence, Development and Dialogue (3D), Pakistan acknowledged in 2013 that traditionally it employed a “mono-faceted approach” that relied exclusively on the use of force, as explained by Baqir Sajjad Syed in a 2013 article on the “new” Pakistani National Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Policy.57 Yet dialogue, likely concessions and appeasement appear to be Pakistan’s “new” policy. As noted in September 2013 at an All Parties Conference (APC), “‘[g]ive peace a chance’ would be the guiding central principle henceforth and that dialogue must be initiated to negotiate peace with our own people in the Tribal Areas.”58 The question becomes which extremist organizations will have a seat at the negotiating table. The answer is, those groups that Pakistan decision-makers deem to be of strategic value to the state. In other words, there will be a continuation of the status quo, in which Pakistan directly or indirectly supports or tolerates extremist activities it deems of value to the state, without fully appreciating the long-term strategic consequences.

In February 2014, the Pakistani government reinforced this message with its passage of its augural National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-2018. The policy is based upon the integration of all “national efforts” to achieve:

1. Dialogue with all stakeholders [extremist organizations];
2. Isolation of terrorists from their support systems [including madrassa reform];
3. Enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralize the

threats to internal security of Pakistan.59

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) will be the lead implementer of the NISP with the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) becoming the organization responsible for the integration of the security resources. Structurally, this appears not to be a shift in Pakistan’s security sector governance but rather the massing of resources to address the current extremist threat. Constitutionally, the maintenance of internal security in Pakistan remains the responsibility of provincial authorities (see figure 14),60 with each territory fielding a police force that is supported by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is akin to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In reality, the NISP has enshrined the Pakistan’s Army long-defended claim that it is the best organization suited to address internal or external threats to the state.

In some parts of the country hostile networks have also challenged the writ of the state. Nonetheless, a national security apparatus including Ministry of Defence (MoD) is dealing with this situation under political oversight. Other relevant state institutions will address social, economic and environmental and external security aspects.61

Military forces are mandated to keep their citizens safe and secure while defending the sovereignty of the state. This normally entails focusing on external threats while civilian authorities provide internal security. However, despite persistent and growing internal security challenges, Pakistan has failed to invest in the development of a modern police institution that has the equipment, training and personnel to be responsive to the various security threats.62 Extremists groups that continued to be nurtured by Pakistan’s military for their expected utility against India and within Afghanistan, remain a concern. As a result, the state has relied on its

59 “National Security Policy (NISP)– 2014-18”, 1, emphasis have been added by the author.
61 NISP, 2
military forces to address short-term “crisis” interventions while not achieving sustainable security that is based upon a reformed judicial structure and an effective policing framework. This has resulted in an imbalance of resources being diverted to the Army to address its increasing internal security mandate. This is not a new phenomena given that Fazal Muqeem Kahm wrote in 1963, “the more [the Army] wanted to stand aloof and devote its energies to the real duties of any army, the more it found itself entangled in civil tasks [natural or man-made calamities].” 63 This has contributed to the belief within the Pakistan Army that its civilian democratic institutions are unable or unwilling to deal with the challenges of running the state. Stephen Cohen wrote, “the very fact of calling in the [Pakistani] military implies civilian incompetence or a failure to apply corrective measures before things got out of hand.” 64

There are armies that guard their nation’s borders, there are those that are concerned with protection their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three. 65

The above quote summarizes what the role of the Army is within Pakistan. Although the utility of maintaining Pakistan’s Army domination over nearly all facets of Pakistan governance remains questionable, there is little disagreement within the historiography that Pakistan’s military is a state within a state. The Army has directly or indirectly governed the state of Pakistan almost since the time of its founding in 1947.

Subordinate to Pakistan’s military institution is the ISI Directorate. Formed in 1948, its original role was limited to augmenting the capabilities of Military Intelligence (MI). However, by 1958 when General Ayub Khan staged Pakistan’s first coup, he permanently changed the mandate of the organization by directing it to safeguard Pakistan’s interests, monitor political opposition and sustain military rule in Pakistan. 66 As Shawn Gregory notes, the ISI “viewed its raison d’etre first and foremost in terms of the Pakistan military rather than in relation to any

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63 As quoted by Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 49.
broader concept of the defence and security of the nation-state or the people of Pakistan. As a result, it has transformed into the pre-eminent intelligence institution within Pakistan, led by a Pakistan Army Lieutenant General, that manages both domestic and external affairs. Assuming the Pakistani military maintains positive control over the ISI, such a relationship becomes generally problematic but is also beneficial when called upon to conduct counter insurgency operations against the growing extremist movement. It is likely that the Pakistan military conducts operations only against those groups the security institutions no longer supports or deem of value.

Pakistan is on a downward spiral; the central government is not able to adequately address the root causes of the internal violence, nor does it appreciate the second or third order of effects of resourcing, training and providing sanctuary to extremist groups in the “Great Game” with India. Extremist organizations are not only winning, as illustrated in the increasing number of terrorist incidents and fatalities (see figures 4 and 5), but they are also gradually being viewed as legit part of society within the region, as popular opinion shifts away from viewing extremism as a concern (see figure 15). As a result, as long as the root causes of the militancy remain in the frontiers of Pakistan, including political and economic stagnation, extremist groups will continue to expand. Public opinion and support for state interventions in Pakistan is beginning wane in favor of support for extremism. Figures 15 and 16 are interdependent and the correlating relationship is indicative of a domestic crossroads in which the future structure of Pakistan is at stake. The growth in extremism in the frontier, border, rural and ethnic regions of Pakistan is symptomatic of a multifaceted problem facing the state. There is not one center of gravity causing extremism within Pakistan but many – ethnic unrest, the disenfranchised, poorly developed regions, an overwhelming hatred of India and anti-western sentiments are contributing to Pakistan’s growing instability.

The extremist groups often use the local narrative to gain popular support and recruits

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67 Ibid, 114.
for their cause, while providing social services such as education, which the central government is unable to provide. The state faces a triad of internal pressures: separatism in Balochistan, autonomous movements in the KPK, and, the most dangerous, is religious groups that desire to establish a theocratic state. The internal extremist attacks are ultimately designed to bring the central government to the negotiating table and achieve concessions. The reconciliations following Pakistan’s selective security operations often result in peace arrangements where Sharia law is enforced, greater autonomy institutionalized and extremist groups legitimimized. The late Governor of Punjab province, Salmaan Taseer, summarized the risk to the international community if Pakistan fails to address its emerging extremist problem. Speaking at that the Middle East Institute in 2010 he said, “if we don’t succeed in building a stable Pakistan, if Pakistan implodes the fires will be lapping on the shores of the US and Europe.”68 More telling is the fact some Pakistani extremists are seeking weapons of mass destruction. The Emir of LeT is in favor of exporting nuclear technology to other Islamic countries so they can resist Western oppression. “We should export nuclear technology to Iran and other Muslim countries. If Iraq had nuclear weapons, it would solve all their problems.”69

The extremist groups described in this chapter have been growing in numbers, size and influence. This growth, without any likelihood of limitation in the future, supports the conclusion that stability in Pakistan is unlikely in any reasonable term. Exacerbated by this growth, the lack of social development within the state has legitimatized extremist groups who are filling the void in governance. Dialogue with extremist groups detracts from Pakistani unity and merely supports the breakdown of Pakistan into fractious semi-automatous regions without ties to the central government.

69 Stern, 121.
CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Everyday since 1959 security forces from India and Pakistan high-kick, stamp and quick march through a choreographed routine that ends in the lowering of flags and the slamming of the gates in what has become known as the “retreat” ceremony at the Wagah border crossing. The spectacle of precise drill movements, immaculate uniforms and attention to detail has become a tourist attraction, drawing thousands of spectators every evening on both sides of the border. Although recently some of the historically aggressive activities have been toned down as clenched fists have transitioned into handshakes, the underlying mistrust and grievances remain.¹ The aggressive nature of the pomp and pageantry at the border is a visual representation of the contempt between the two countries that will be highlighted in this chapter.

Any study on Pakistani extremism devoid of the regional context is incomplete. Within South Asia, religious and ethnic tension is the essential feature of the political climate that is manifested by the ongoing Kashmir dispute with India and by the unrest within the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and KPK regions. This unrest has resulted in active Taliban, al Qaeda, and regional religious extremists who straddle the regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir and India. Ultimately these groups are destabilizing Pakistan, setting the conditions for it to become a failed state. Kashmir, however, is the most important in terms of understanding religious extremism, as it has suffered from the most prolonged Pakistan state-sponsored asymmetric warfare to date.

The whole South Asian region is volatile and multifaceted, hosting a diverse set of challenges that are compounded by political, social and economic instability, weak civil institutions and a deteriorating security situation. In particular, two of Pakistanis immediate neighbors have serious internal problems themselves. Afghanistan is in the midst of a nation

building exercise that is facing significant challenges of insecurity, exclusion, and the rule of law. Communal unrest within Pakistan and Afghanistan has resulted in the internal displacement of over one million people and 600,000 people respectively.²

Overpopulation in India combined with a high level of poverty (see figure 21) may ultimately lead to increased social unrest there, too. India’s vast economic disparity, its caste system, and a dysfunctional, fractious government that allows politicians to fan discord to promote their agendas, has the potential to destabilize the state and ultimately the region. According to a United Nations report, 165 million Dalits continue to face segregation and violence. In 2005 alone there were 110,000 cases of violence, murder, rape and other atrocities committed against Dalits.³ Dalit, the modern term for the caste formerly knows as the ‘Untouchables’, is the lowest group in the traditional Indian hierarchy. This group was historically confined to degrading and low-paying labour and is not from one ethnic group or area of Indian society but comprise of different social groups, races and religions. Such discrimination against India’s ‘Untouchables’ creates institutional disparities towards a group representing almost 40% of the poor in India. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore if a casual link between extremism and poverty in more detail, other than to note, that a perceived deprivation can lead to widespread discontent that sometimes can turn to a violent nature. Relative deprivation theory has been well argued by Ted Robert Gurr in Why Men Rebel.⁴ The point is, any increase in India’s social unrest domestically will have regional implications.

This is the context in which this study seeks to analyze the following questions: First, what is the strategic importance of Afghanistan in understanding the rise of extremism within

the regional context? Second, to what degree does religion influence the actions of Pakistan, India, and the inhabitants of Kashmir, where most scholars propose viable solutions to the issue while offering dire predictions resulting from inaction and continuation of the norm. Finally, how does Pakistan’s continual asymmetric operations within India continue to influence religious extremism at home.

**Afghanistan**

In order to understand the strategic importance of Pakistan within the region writers often point to its involvement in the first contemporary Afghanistan conflict. Beginning in the 1950s, Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Daoud Khan asked and received Soviet military support in response to the US arming of Pakistan and Iran. In fact, the Soviets provided more than $1 billion in military aid, $1.25 billion in economic aid and training for 3,700 Afghan officers and 6000 technicians in the two decades leading up to the Soviet invasion in 1979.\(^5\) Daoud was a known supporter of the Pashtun Nationalism and when Pakistan closed its border to Pashtun nomads in 1961 he responded, unsuccessfully, with military forces that attempted to reopen the border. In 1963, Daoud was asked to step down by Afghanistan’s King Zahir with a view to establishing a new decentralize government, that ultimately gave way to the rise of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965.\(^6\) Daoud’s absence from the political arena did not last very long. In 1973 he seized power from King Zahir, in a bloodless military coup when he was out of the country. Daoud established Afghanistan as a republic becoming its first President.

In the 1970s, Daoud banned all political parties except his own, the National Revolutionary Party, and forced all opposition groups underground including the PDPA that actually help him, ascend to power. By the mid 1970s, Daoud concluded that Afghanistan had become too aligned to the Soviets and tried to move the state to be more neutral footing, forging

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\(^6\) Ibid., 227,228.
stronger ties with nations belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This angered the Soviets, which led to a famous 1977 meeting between the heads of state as described by Stephan Tanner.

In 1977 Daoud was called on the carpet by Leonid Brezhnev, who complained about the Afghan leader’s seeking ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries. Daoud raged back that Afghans made their own decisions, and at one point banged his fists on the table for emphasis. Brezhnev is said to have stared in cold fury, and some consider this meeting the beginning of Daoud’s downfall.⁷

Jeffery Roberts points out that as a result of Daoud’s 1973 crackdown on opposition groups, including the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan movement, right-wing Islamist groups responded with a series of violent acts in Kabul including several abortive coup attempts.⁸ However, when the funeral procession in April 1978 of a leading Communist activist, Mir Akbar Khyber, turned into a 15,000 strong Communist demonstration, it alarmed Daoud who fatefully ordered a heavy response by security forces.⁹ In response, pro-Marxist elements of the Afghan military staged a bloody coup on April 27, 1978 and within 24 hours Daoud was dead and power assumed by the factious PDPA in what has become known as the Saur Revolution.

Peace would remain illusive within Afghanistan. As the fall of 1978 approached the PDPA unveiled a reformed political agenda that was not only unrealistic and anti-Islamic but culturally insensitive to Afghanistan social structure. As Larry P. Goodson commented, “these reforms truck at the very heart of the socioeconomic structure of Afghanistan’ rural society; indeed, their sudden nationwide introduction, with no preliminary pilot programs, suggest that this was their real purpose.”¹⁰ This created another revolution with large segments of Afghanistan beginning to take up arms against the government. Large sections of the Afghanistan Army began to defect to the resistance movement or mutinied. Because of the

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⁷ Tanner, 230.
⁹ Tanner, 230.
¹⁰ As quoted in Tanner, 231.
PDPA repression, an exodus of refugees, including many religious leaders, fled to Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan began aiding the Islamic movements that opposed the PDPA regime.\textsuperscript{11} By 1979, PDPA was losing ground, unable to gather sufficient resources to counter a growing insurgency. The Communist revolution was failing, which left the Soviets only two options; abandonment or massive soviet intervention. On December 12, 1979 Brezhnev decided to send the Red Army into Afghanistan, although it really had no choice within the Cold War context as Stephen Tanner wrote,

\begin{quote}
If the PDPA fell after a bloody struggle, all the influence the Soviets had worked for and paid for in Afghanistan since 1919 would be irrevocably lost. A more traditional tribal government, effectively no longer neutral, might well invite American replacement of aid and expertise. In the worse case scenario, U.S. missile silos carved into the Hindu Kush would comprise a lethal threat to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

1978 marked the commencement of Pakistan’s armed interference in Afghanistan politics, that culminated when the ISI and the US provided weapons to the seven Pakistani-based Sunni factions that comprised the \textit{Mujahedeen} after the Soviet invasion in 1979.

The US encouraged and was dependent upon Pakistani involvement in the clandestine Afghan-Soviet war during the 1980s, and almost every book on the history of Pakistan makes reference to its relationship with the Afghanistan \textit{Mujahedeen}. The relationship as described by Riedel was “the bilateral ISI-GID (General Intelligence Directorate (GID) of Saudi Arabia) which became a trilateral one between the CIA, ISI and GID in which Washington and Riyadh provided matching grants of money and purchased arms, while Islamabad handled distribution and training.”\textsuperscript{13} Nawaz attributes Pakistan’s willingness to fight against the Soviets to a fear of invasion after the Iranian revolution in 1979.\textsuperscript{14} Although the coming to power of Shia clerics in Iran paved the way for the revival of the religious tensions within Pakistan, which has a Sunni majority population, it is also likely that President Zia’s eagerness to respond to the Afghanistan

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\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 236. \\
\textsuperscript{12} Tanner, 234-35. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Riedel, 27. \\
\textsuperscript{14} Nawaz, 371.
\end{flushright}
Jihad was a way of acquiring military aid and pursuing an enhanced nuclear program ultimately without the US objecting too seriously. It would appear that Zia's approach was successful. In 1980, due to Cold War interests, the US stepped back from its nonproliferation policy for Pakistan, as discussed in a meeting between US Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and China's Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping in 1980, "we will set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being and concentrated on strengthening Pakistan against possible Soviet action...we will also provide aid to Pakistan..."\textsuperscript{15} It is important to note that India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation agreement in 1971 in response to US interests in Pakistan and likely as a result of the 1962 Chinese invasion in Northern India. As a consequence, a cordial relationship developed between China and Pakistan.

Pakistan was an important ally to the US in the context of the Cold War competition with the Soviets. It is well known that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA – led at that time by William J. Casey) was the lead US government organization facilitating Afghanistan’s \textit{Mujahedeen} based out of Pakistan. The main support provided was the provision of weapons, eventually including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and financial support. What is not popular knowledge was the actual degree of success of the campaign. By 1984, both the US and Saudi Arabia had invested 400 million USD towards this initiative, and according to Steve Coll, was beginning to achieve the desired effects against the Soviet Union. The \textit{Mujahedeen} had secured approximately 62 percent of the Afghan country side, downed 350-400 aircraft, destroyed 2750 armored vehicles and 8000 light support vehicles causing about 17000 Soviet casualties at a cost to the Soviet Union of approximately 12 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{16} But as the tri-state sponsored insurgency progressed, two factions dominated the movement: the Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami) primarily comprised of Pashtu, and the Islamic Society (Jamiat-I-Islami) who were mainly


\textsuperscript{16} Coll, 89.
Tajiks from the Northern Afghanistan regions. Pakistan’s support leaned towards Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hezb-e Islami, which not only began to cause a rift in the combined Mujahedeen effort but also ultimately resulted in the Jamiat-I-Islami agreeing to a pact in 1983 with the Soviets that led to a temporary ceasefire.\(^\text{17}\) It is important to note however, that this ceasefire was in reality a tactical redeployment and resupply of personnel rather than a cessation of hostilities. The Mujahedeen movement was never a unified resistance based upon a common ideology but rather a fractious group of warlords who were being manipulated by covert forces such as the CIA and the ISI. Pakistan supported the Pashtu Hezb-e Islami group and its leader Hekmatyar due to his family’s tribal roots within the Pashtun community (domestic reasons) and the ISI wanted to build up Pashtun clients outside of Afghanistan’s traditional tribes (regional reasons).\(^\text{18}\) Pakistan continued to support the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. As a result, Jihadism was popularized within Pakistan and actively promoted within the madrassas, marking the beginning of religious extremism as official state policy and facilitating a closer relationship of the state and religion.

When the Soviets withdrew in 1989 from Afghanistan, it did not mark the end to the violence between the Soviet backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) security forces and the Mujahedeen. For three years, the US and Soviets continued to supply resources to the fight in Afghanistan until the US became preoccupied with the Saddam Hussein and the first Gulf War. As Steven Tanner writes, the Soviet aid “through 1989 approached $300 million a month in contrast to the US aid to the Mujahedeen which slipped to level of $40-$50 million.”\(^\text{19}\) By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had collapsed due to a slow process of democratization led by Boris Yeltsin. A failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev by the hard line Communist elite left Gorbachev in an untenable position that eventually contributed to destabilizing the Communist


\(^{18}\) Coll, 119.

\(^{19}\) Tanner, 273.
party control over the Kremlin. As a result, the DRA no longer enjoyed the support of the
Soviet Union and Afghans would have to get on without their proxy sponsor. Capitalizing on
the opportunity, powerful warlords turned against the Afghan government, which resulted in the
DRA authority disintegrating in key areas provinces such as Herat and Kandahar. Eventually,
a power sharing agreement among the Mujahedeen (known as the Islamabad Accord) was
negotiated by Pakistan in 1992 with the aim of establishing stability in Afghanistan. The
Accord ultimately failed as fresh hostilities between the tribal factions not only sent more
refugees into Pakistan but also demanded a new strategy. This resulted in Pakistan shifting its
support to the Taliban movement by providing training, weapons, financial assistance, and
logistical support. This is supported by a 1996 US intelligence report, (recently declassified)
stating that Pakistani “Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training;
and when necessary - combat [in Afghanistan].”

The Pakistani ISI continued to actively recruit Pakistani youth for the Taliban from
primarily Sunni madrassas in the Pashtun region. Prior to its removal from power in Kabul
November 2001, the Taliban continually received military assistance and supplies not only from
Pakistan and but also from supporter groups based outside of the region such as al Qaeda. As
noted by the US embassy in Pakistan: “The Taliban have received support form a number of
sources, including Pakistan, the business community, Commander Naqib [Pashtun commander
in Kandahar], and even nominal NIFA [possibly the Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture
located in Peshawar, Pakistan] elements.” It is commonly known that during the 1990s al-
Qaeda's terrorist training camps were openly operating in Afghanistan but the linkages to the
Taliban movement are not fully known. Michael Elliott claims that “…bin Laden's forces and

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20 Ibid., 276.
21 United States Intelligence Information Report to DIA Washington, D.C. "IIR [Excised] Pakistan
Involvement in Afghanistan," USDoD, 07 November 1996,
22 U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, "The Taliban - Who Knows What the Movement Means?"
November 28, 1994 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal1.pdf
money were vital to sustaining the Taliban's offensives against Massoud [Northern Alliance opposition movement to Taliban].”  

This may well be the case given it was in al-Qaeda’s interest that the Taliban remain in power. In fact, it appears that by 2001 prior to the 9/11 attack, al-Qaeda was the main power broker in Afghanistan. According to Francesc Vendrell, the U.N. secretary-general's special envoy on Afghanistan, “it was al-Qaeda that was running the Taliban, not vice versa.”  

As an Islamic nation, Pakistan has always supported Muslim causes such as the Afghanistan struggle and even after the Soviet troops were forced out, Pakistan saw value in continuing to support its allies in the Mujahedeen. A confidential US assessment of Pakistan’s endgame in the 1990’s is indicative of why extremists continue to enjoy institutional support in Pakistan, “…for Pakistan, a Taliban base government in Kabul could be as good as it can get in Afghanistan.” Although the current Afghanistan war has been continuing since 2001, regionally the ethnic and religious unrest has been going on for the past 35 years and is logically linked with General Zia’s initial support to the Mujahedeen. As a result of the Afghanistan experience, Pakistani leaders began to view Islamic fundamentalism and militancy as a discrete means of mobilizing against Hindu India in the Kashmir region. As outlined in chapter 1, with Pakistani support, Islamic resistance movements were created that began participating in an insurgency, conducting guerrilla and terrorist operations against Indian authorities since the 1980s. Scholars have argued that the underlying reason for supporting the Mujahedeen was to influence Afghanistan to become a regional partner against its perceived enemy India. As Juan Cole states,

24 As quoted in Ibid.
26 Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: Its Character and Prospects, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 5. 29.
Even the Pakistani military’s policy of encouraging the Taliban in Afghanistan and winking at al Qaeda’s presence in the mid to late 1990s was in part aimed at creating strategic allies for Pakistan in its struggle against India. Elements in the Pakistani military began secretly deploying Muslim terrorist groups in Kashmir against Indian troops there in the 1990s and were happy enough for them to get training in the al Qaeda camps of Afghanistan.27

Pakistan has always maintained an interest in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and has continually attempted to manipulate its geopolitical environment with a view to establish a favorable Pakistani strategic partner sensitive to its regional politics. As suggested by Marvin G. Weinbaum, a study of Pakistan devoid of India and Afghanistan is incomplete. He argues that in any potential conflict with India, Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan as its strategic depth that could counter-balance the conventionally superior Indian forces through the use of maneuver within Afghanistan territorial boundaries.28 However, this notion is challenged recently by Muhammad Sadiq, Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, who asserted that: “Afghanistan doesn’t offer strategic depth.”29 Richard Olson, US Ambassador to Pakistan also believes “that the Pakistani military and Pakistani government has moved away from that [Afghanistan strategic depth].”30 It is more likely that Pakistan’s rejection of the no-first-use (NFU) nuclear policy and its willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons in a dispute with India neglects the requirement to conduct conventional maneuver warfare against India using Afghanistan for freedom of movement. In May 2002, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, stated, “We have not said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India...”31

27 Cole, 225.
Afghanistan is not only an unwilling partner within a bi-lateral Pakistan/India discourse but also is of importance regionally given the extremist unrest within the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. A reinvigorated Taliban operating out of the KPK and Balochistan, participating in the current Afghanistan civil war, has resulted in the region being fragmented, unstable and Pakistan becoming an incubator for extremism, this is further exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan’s security institutions are complicit in providing support to these groups. Therefore, it can be argued that the current unrest within Pakistan is a failure of the state to understand the long-term strategic effect of recruiting, training and resourcing extremists to achieve short term political goals ultimately intended to counter India’s influence.

Safe passage was provided to al Qaeda by not deploying Pakistani forces on the border in South and North Waziristan…thousands of al Qaeda and Taliban were allowed to settle in Waziristan, create bases, and restart military operations. Within a few years these guides had become commanders of the armed groups that emerged as the “Pakistani Taliban.”

Similarly, Pakistan like Afghanistan is a fragmented state in which its people are often sharply divided along regional and ethical lines, where traditional alliances have great importance in localized conflicts. The tribal people in both countries have always enjoyed considerable independence from the control of their central governments, which is the direct result of loosely defined and poorly integrated frontiers. One of the more dominant tribes in the region is the Pashtu, whose traditional lands transcend the border region between the two states. This borderless region, known as the Pashtun belt, is of strategic importance as pro-Taliban sentiment remains strong and jihadists are increasing amongst the disenfranchised refugees from Afghanistan. As previously indicated, approximately 1.6 million still reside in Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are interdependent due to their various social commonalities as well as their multiple trade and economic ties. Both states are Islamic republics and the relationship between the two has been affected by many different events: the establishment of

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32 Rashid, Descent Into Chaos, 268.
33 UNHCR. “2014 Country Profile - Pakistan.”
the Durand Line border, the issues of *Pashtunistan*, Baluchistan, the 1980s Soviet war, the rise of the Taliban, the present war in Afghanistan and perceived bias in relations with Indian and Shia Iran. In fact, during King Zahir Shah’s reign (1933 to 1973), Afghanistan even promoted Pashtu secessionist movements in Pakistan as an effort to regain their traditional territory carved up by the Durand line. Sardar Najibullah Khan, the Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom, outlined their position in 1955:

[1] Until 1947 the Pakhtuns [Pashtus] relations with the British were uneasy and occasional outbursts had to be settled by resorting to arms; [2] Pakhtuns of Pakistan are different from the rest of the Pakistanis; as such, they are a separate nation and should be independent; [3] Pakhtuns were compelled to join Pakistan in 1947; [4] the Durand Line is not the real frontier, since British writ never had any validity in the tribal area, and [5] the support that Afghanistan gives the Pakhtuns is purely altruistic and based on ethnic grounds.34

This sense of nationalism was manifested into a movement to establish *Pashtunistan*, which could be absorbed by Afghanistan or at the very least become an independent province within Pakistan. Naturally this has been opposed by Pakistani authorities and therefore has been a source of contention since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

Quetta, and Peshawar, as well as the rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border regions have become sanctuaries for the Taliban, al Qaeda and other indigenous extremist groups and criminal enterprises. Hussain’s geo-spatial analysis of the terrorist incidents pre- and post-2001 US invasion of Afghanistan clearly illustrates a monumental increase in incidents occurring within the frontiers of Pakistan, including the border with Afghanistan (see figure 22). Extremist groups’ ability to conduct cross-border infiltrations to conduct asymmetric warfare either into Afghanistan, India or Kashmir is based upon strong lines of communications, international finance, training and material support but most importantly, with at least the passive approval of Pakistani security institutions. Although these groups seek to oust the Pakistani government through acts of terrorism and assassinations of top officials, the security

institutions of Pakistan appear to be unmotivated towards taking meaningful counter terrorist activities, notwithstanding Pakistan’s continual assertion that Army operations in Swat against Maulana Fazlullah in 2007 and South Waziristan in 2009 were aimed at confronting internal terrorism.

According to an UN report, Afghanistan retained its position as the world producer, cultivator and smuggler of opium with 74% of the world’s illicit production in 2012. The same report lists Pakistan as second behind Afghanistan as the most frequently mentioned country for transportation of heroin and 13\textsuperscript{th} in the world for cannabis from 2001-2012 and the problem is getting worse (see Figure 23).\textsuperscript{35} The problem of illicit drugs is that the criminal element associated with the production, transportation and marketing of the product is usually either closely associated with extremist groups or parts of them. In Pakistan, like Afghanistan, these groups are indistinguishable from traditional extremist groups, tribal factions or warlords, as the activity is becoming an increasing source of revenue. The Library of Congress supported this notion in 2002, when it stated that Kashmir militant groups are likely to participate in the drug trade to finance their activities because the region is a center of gravity for that trade. It further expanded upon the mutually beneficial relationship between drug-trafficking organizations or cartels and extremism groups given the illegal exchange of arms for transactions, use of the same smuggling routes and assistance from the same corrupt government officials.\textsuperscript{36}

The revenue stream for extremist groups is almost impossible to quantify, but the numbers are astonishing. In 2011 the opium production economy for farmers in Afghanistan was estimated to be at $1.4 billion USDs (see figure 24). This point was highlighted by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which wrote in 2013 that while “it is difficult to


establish how widely terrorist groups are involved in the illicit drug trade, or the breadth and
nature of cooperation between these two criminal groups, the magnitude of the numbers
involved make the relationship worrisome.”\textsuperscript{37} Given the close proximity of Afghanistan to
Pakistan, and the fact that the latter is the southern route for illicit drug movement to Africa and
Europe, the growing nexus between Pakistani extremists and the illicit drug industry is being
recognized by the international community as a legitimate threat to the state. In 2009 the World
Bank reported that “Pakistan faces very significant risk of terrorism financing. Particular risks
for proceeds of crime in Pakistan include corruption, narcotics, fraud, smuggling, vice, weapons
trafficking… Pakistan has not yet sufficiently taken into account…terrorism financing…”\textsuperscript{38}

The problem of illicit drugs is not limited to the criminal enterprise or fundraising when
considering the causes of extremism. If the premise in chapter 2 is accepted, that since Pakistan
failed to invest and develop social or economic programs to service the needs of its citizens, this
void is being filled by multidimensional extremist groups. Then, the fact that Pakistan is not
just the southern drug corridor, but also that Pakistanis are increasingly becoming consumers of
the drug itself (see figure 25), is further indication of the state’s failure to develop an adequate
welfare state. Considering this argument further it is also possible that extremist groups are
making illicit drugs readily available to the Pakistani population to support strategic goals, as
suggested in 2002 at a US Senate hearing: “[s]ome terrorist groups believe that they can weaken
their enemies by flooding their societies with addictive drugs.”\textsuperscript{39} This contention is
corroborated by the fact that extremism is on the rise in Pakistan and the anecdotal evidence
amongst security experts is those who conduct suicide attacks are often users or at least under


\textsuperscript{39} As quoted by “A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups,” 2.
the influence of illicit drugs. Mian Iftikhar Hussain, the KPK Minister for Information highlighted this point after a arrest of five “young boys” who were being prepared for a suicide attack, “[n]owadays terrorists kidnap boys to turn them into suicide bombers. For this they even drug the boys when they are about to be used for suicide attacks.”

Finally, Afghanistan may hold the strategic balance in the bilateral relationship of Pakistan and India. Both nations have been jostling for influence in Afghanistan since the Cold War and the current war on terror has presented an opportunity for India to become a soft power in Afghanistan by contributing billions for infrastructure, humanitarian and security force training initiatives. With an economy much larger than that of Pakistan, India has the ability to strengthen its historically cordial relationship with Kabul through development aid. A survey conducted for ABC News and the BBC in 2009 indicates that Afghans overwhelming have a more positive opinion of India as opposed to their opinions on Pakistan (27% and 5% respectively see figure 26). This may be because of the economic development donations or perhaps the perception of Pakistan providing sanctuary within its frontiers for the Afghan extremists. Regardless, the reason may not very clear but within a strategic context it does not really matter why Afghans like India better than Pakistan. The point is, India is currently viewed favorably amongst the Afghan population and its leaders, which is causing resentment in Islamabad given their waning influence in Afghanistan. The impending withdrawal of Western military forces from Afghanistan may allow Pakistan to reassert its traditional level of influence with its neighbor. A more powerful India-Afghanistan relationship is a cause of concern for Pakistan, as it fears encirclement with potentially strong allied states on both sides. As Rifaat Hussain notes, a friendly political dispensation in Kabul is viewed by Pakistan as essential to escape the strategic dilemma of being caught between a powerful adversary in India in the east

and an irredentist Afghanistan with claims on the Pashtun dominated areas in the Pakistani west.\textsuperscript{42}

**India**

Pakistan and India have been obsessed with each other since partition. It has been one of the most enduring rivalries in the modern world. Scholars point to the disagreement over the two-nation theory as being the origin of the conflict, given that the Indian National Congress sought to have an unified nation at the time of partition. As T.V. Paul states, “[t]he roots of the India-Pakistan rivalry lie in the two visions of statehood that arose within the context of the nationalist movement in Indian subcontinent.”\textsuperscript{43} This has created not only a sense of mistrust between the rival states and institutionalized their grievances, but also has contributed to a growing sentiment within Pakistan that given the opportunity, India would subsume its neighbor. As noted by General Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US, “…[t]he security elements are not so enamored by the idea [peace with India]. They feel India never accepted Pakistan, and given half the chance [the Indians] would undo it.”\textsuperscript{44} This could explain why Pakistanis continue to view India as the biggest threat to their state (see figure 7) and remain supportive of large security institutions focused externally rather than addressing the quagmire of domestic extremism. In addition, Pakistan views the Kashmir as an unresolved issue stemming from the hasty partition that has resulted in four wars during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), numerous skirmishes and border disputes. Pakistan has been unable to win a conflict with India conventionally and every war it has lost entrenched a deeper obsession with India. As a result, Pakistan believes there are only two options remaining over the issue of Kashmir, nuclear war or asymmetric warfare.


The Kashmir region is situated in the northwest corner of South Asia and rests at the strategic juncture between Central and South Asia, sharing borders with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. The Kashmiri people are of various races and according to the 1941 census, the population was approximately four million inhabitants of which 77% were Muslim, 20% Hindu, 3% Sikh and other minorities. Although the issues surrounding Kashmir and partition will be discussed shortly, it is important to note that there was a period of unrest from the time of partition to October 26th 1947, when the Hindu Maharaja of this predominantly Muslim-populated region acceded to India without the people being granted any pretense of self-determination. Shortly after partition, in September 1947, Muslim peasants of Southern Kashmir rose in rebellion against their Hindu landlords. In response to communal violence, religious persecutions and ethnic cleansing, Pakistan facilitated and mobilized Pashtun tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier to go into the region under the auspices of religious Jihad. Christopher Snedden believes it was out of fear of communal violence and a post partition plot to eliminate the Muslims within the Kashmir region, that they opted to defend themselves and take up arms against the Hindu Maharaja. The exact extent of the communal violence is not known, but according to the court records in 1948 at The High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir: “Over a quarter million Muslims were massacred in Jammu Province alone. The orgies of bloodshed were initiated by hired gangsters imported by the State administration…at times and on occasions by the [Indian State] troops themselves with the

45 Snedden, 116.
46 Kashmiri self-determination is a multi-facet term that scholars continually referred towards the 1949 UN resolutions that decrees a public plebscite is to be held to determine if Kashmir should join either Pakistan or India.
47 There is a huge scholarly debate around the meaning of Jihad versus Jihadism. Although it does not appear to be any literature analyzing the Kashmir dispute in terms of a religious Jihad based upon Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman assertion in their article, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 10 no. 3 (2005), 328 that the “totality of Jihad ideology represents a religiously sanctioned aggressive war to propagate or defend the faith. In fact so strong is the ordinance to use aggressive war, that as-siyar (Islamic international law) values are regarded as synonymous to those of the Jihad” that an argument could be put forward articulating Pakistan is in fact fulfilling its religious obligations in waging war against India over Kashmir.
48 Snedden, 114.
When the Pashtun tribes intervened in Kashmir it created a moral alliance between the tribes and the Muslim nationalists within the region. They were met and reinforced by Kashmiri Muslims and, by many accounts, troops of the newly established Pakistan army, although not in uniform but were members of the British Indian Army units that transferred to the new state.\(^{50}\)

Historians agree that initially Kashmir sought independence and only after Pakistani interventions combined with communal violence during the first two months after partition did the Maharaja accede to India in return for military defence. As a result, the Kashmir dispute is about really determining Kashmiri’s place within the region. The three uncontested bodies of scholarly opinion on Kashmir, as summarized by Alastair Lamb are as follows:

…[First] the Hindu Maharaja, supported mainly by those Hindu families who had flourished during the past century of Dogra rule wished to maintain his independence…[second] the National Conference looked towards a liberal, secular and independent Kashmir associated with an independent Indian regime of like mind…[and finally] there can be no doubt that some felt that the best hope of Kashmiri Muslims lay either in or in close association with Pakistan.\(^{51}\)

When reviewing the politically charged climate of India’s partition, the role and perception of Britain during the process and the resulting negotiations, as well as the UN debates that arose in direct response to the military aggression that commenced in 1947 need to be addressed. Some historians argue the British were not ready for partition, which implies that the resulting Kashmir conflict was perhaps avoidable. Alistair Lamb stated, “…the Kashmir dispute was a direct consequence of the inefficiency with which the process of partition in the Indian subcontinent was ill prepared and executed.”\(^{52}\) This is likely the result of Britain losing the capability to govern effectively once its aura of power and omniscience dissipated when it commenced negotiations on its withdrawal in 1945. As already mentioned, if partition is

\(^{49}\) As quoted by *Ibid.*, 121.


\(^{52}\) *Ibid.*, 12.
accepted as a mind set rather than an event in time, then Lamb’s argument that the partition of
British India is not complete would be correct. This is unfinished partition business that needs
to be resolved for long-term stability in the region. Kashmir remains the justification for the
growth of misguided security institutions within Pakistan to the detriment of economic reform,
development and the creation of a social welfare state as mentioned in previous chapters.

It is important to note that at the time of partition, since the Kashmir state was
dominated by Muslims but was under the monarchial rule of a Hindu Maharaja, Britain argued
they did not have the constitutional authority to force the accession of the monarchy in order for
Kashmir to be absorbed by either India or Pakistan. Britain and its western allies, primarily
the US, therefore were only in a position to influence a process to achieve an outcome of the
Kashmir problem. Gowher Rizvi illustrates Anglo-American antipathy toward for India when
the issue was brought to the UN.

There are two reasons for the lack of Anglo-American sympathy for Delhi’s
point of view. First, the British delegation was unconvinced that the crisis was
provoked by a Pakistani-inspired invasion of the tribesmen. Indeed they cited
the atrocities of the Maharaja as the real cause of the conflict. A second and
perhaps a more important factor…that the Kashmir disputes became entangled
in the rapidly escalating East-West cold war rivalry. Since India persistently
refused to participate in the Western strategy for the containment of
communism, the West began to pin its hope on Pakistan.

Without a doubt, the partition of India was a complex and challenging issue for Britain, but it is
pure speculation, conjecture and perhaps wrong to state that they were ill-prepared. In fact,
Britain put forward a dedicated and concrete effort to bring the former princely states, including
the Kashmir region, into an all-embracing Indian Federal Union as early as 1935. It is only
because the monarchies could not agree on common terms that the process proved

53 Burki, 182.
54 Gowher Rizvi, “Nehru and the Indo-Pakistan Rivalry Over Kashmir 1947-64,” Contemporary South
There has been some minor debate over the legality and right of the Hindu Maharaja to accede to India. Lamb is at the forefront in the scholarly literature, arguing that the Maharaja did not sign the “Instrument of Accession” on 26 October 1947, a day commonly attributed in the historical record. The arrival of Indian troops the next day, could be viewed as an invasion and contrary to the Independence of India Act of 1947. Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, a political scientist, reviewed Lamb’s book and considers his argument to be unfounded based upon the historical evidence. In reality, the intent of the Maharaja was to accede to India and if the paperwork was not actually signed until Monday, as India was deploying its military forces to check the Pakistan advance at the request of the Maharaja, rather than Sunday, then historically it is really a minor point.

One of the most interesting issues within the historiography is the common Indian belief that Britain possessed a bias towards Kashmir accession to Pakistan during this dynamic period. Prem Shankar Jha asserted that Britain had favorable links with the Muslim League of Pakistan and considered it as a ‘friend.’ He believed Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan was therefore desirable and naturally supported by the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi, Grafitey Smith who on 28 October 1947, telegraphed London that Kashmir’s accession to India would make Pakistan unviable as it would make the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contiguous to India. This is a common theme within India’s historical record, but it was difficult to discern if it was official policy or just perception. C.S.R. Murthy, Peter Brobst, and Prem Shankar Jha’s analyses of the British grand design for the region, are reflective of its desire to check communist expansion within Central Asia and that Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan would serve

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British interest best through the formation of a ‘military crescent’ of Islamic states.\(^{58}\) There is little scholarly research that dispels this belief. It is probable that this assertion is really based upon anecdotal connotations rather than hard evidentiary fact. Interestingly though, when the British accepted the accession of Kashmir to India on October 27\(^{th}\) 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, made it clear to the Maharaja that the issue of Kashmir accession should be settled by a reference to the people once law and order was restored and the region freed of military interventions.\(^{59}\) This implies Britain viewed Kashmir’s accession to India as a temporary measure until confirmed through some form of public referendum.

Once Kashmir acceded to India, India reacted to Pakistan’s incursions by mobilizing its army to the region. Ultimately, India did bring the issue to the UN for resolution and a ceasefire was brokered in January 1949, where the future of the region was to be determined by a public plebiscite as decreed by UN resolution S1996. Despite initially being supportive of a plebiscite, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru eventually changed his position and to date, the peoples’ will in Kashmir has never been determined. Michael Donelan and M.J. Grieve summarize the Indian Prime Minister’s 1957 position that “the idea of a plebiscite was obsolete though partition [of Kashmir] might be possible, and had argued in 1957 that the electoral victory of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed sufficiently confirmed the desire of the Kashmiris for integration with India.”\(^{60}\) This sentiment is representative of the one thing that remains constant and undisputed throughout the historiography of this region, the intractable position of Pakistan for the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and India’s failure to respect the spirit of partition by allowing the referendum to occur before Pakistan withdrew its occupation forces.\(^{61}\) Pakistan’s position is based upon the underlying assumption that the dominant religious group (Muslims) within the Kashmir region desired to join Pakistan. This belief is founded upon the

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 99.
\(^{59}\) For a reproduction of the letter see Lamb, 46.
\(^{61}\) Wolpert, 117.
Islamic religious ideology that;

[T]here is, in fact no dichotomy between a Muslim’s personal faith and his responsibilities to the Umma or his membership in an Islamic state. An orthodox Muslim cannot truly live as a Muslim unless he inhabits a Muslim land, nation, state, Dar-ul-Islam (“land of Submission”). If he is living in Dar-ul-harb (“Land at War”), then he should wage Holy War (Jihad) against the rule, whose lack of righteousness makes him unworthy of kingship, or else he should leave the impious land to join his brethren elsewhere."

Scholars, however do not necessarily agree that the ethnic and religious breakdown of Kashmir will actually develop into India’s strategic worst-case scenario of Kashmir acceding to Pakistan. Olaf Caroe, former Governor of the Pathan North-West Frontier Province of India, during the last two years before the transfer of power in 1947, thought it was impossible that a plebiscite would result in Kashmir acceding to either India or Pakistan. “[Kashmir] is by no means homogenous and by no means certain that even the Muslim population wishes to adhere to Pakistan.” As such, it is probable that the Kashmiris preferred choice would be to fulfill the desires of their late Hindu Maharaja and to seek independence from both India and Pakistan.

Nilanjan Raghunath believes the current separatist movements in the Kashmir region are ignoring their multiple cultural identities in order to constitute an undivided Islamic majority. The result is, “factionalism and fundamentalism, which undermines their efforts to be internationally recognized as a cohesive and peaceful group seeking independence.”

The historiography of the region, however, fails to pursue this thought in meaningful detail and, of course, no concrete action has been taken to determine the will of the people. It is probable, though, that consensus over the future of Kashmir by its current inhabitants is unachievable. In 2010, a survey poll completed by the London based Chatham House, found that independence was favored from 74% to 95% in the predominantly Muslim Kashmir Valley in Indian-administered Kashmir, but in the four districts of the predominantly Hindu Jammu part of Indian-administered Kashmir, there was virtually no support for independence at all (see

62 Ibid., 26-27.
63 Robert Hardgrave et al, 98.
64 Raghunath, 50.
figures 26, 27, 28).\textsuperscript{65} For Pakistan and the extremist groups operating in the Kashmir region, regardless of Kashmiri public opinion, resolution of this issue is all or nothing, and the possibility that the current line of control (LOC) (see image 4) could become permanent is unacceptable. Lamb summarizes the issue when he states that Kashmir involves the struggle between the ‘Medieval’ Islamic theocracy of Pakistan and the modern secular State of India and if it [India] gives way it will be a victory for reaction and obscurantism.\textsuperscript{66} Having said that, one conceivable solution to Kashmir may be along the lines of what occurred in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, where the country was eventually divided along ethnic and religious lines.

From the time Kashmir was annexed, both Pakistan and India have used their resources to build up their armed forces there. India’s larger economy is better resourced to withstand the effect of such sterile expenditure. For Pakistan, it was a disaster. Over the years it meant enhancing the power of the security institutions at the expense of all their other institutions and for the people of Pakistan, it meant progressive poverty.\textsuperscript{67} A conventional war or prolonged conflict between Pakistan and India would be much more to the detriment of the former given that India is a nation that enjoys seven times the population and an economic output nine times that of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{68} Despite their disparities, Pakistanis position on Kashmir remains militant and assertive. Lamb is very blunt in his assessment for continual Pakistani military aggressiveness:

\textit{The Kashmir question was of far less importance to India than to Pakistan, yet India controlled the most valuable portions of the state. She was under no real pressure to gain those portions held by Pakistan. She could maintain her position by a policy of masterly inactivity. In order to bring about any change in the status quo it was up to Pakistan to act.}\textsuperscript{69}

This assessment was true at the time of Lamb’s writing in 1966, however the India-Pakistan war

\textsuperscript{66} Lamb, 13.  
\textsuperscript{67} Abbas, \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}, 9.  
\textsuperscript{68} Economy Statistics sourced from Nation Master.  
\textsuperscript{69} Lamb, 80.
in 1971 would contradict this assertion when India took advantage of a perceived opportunity and launched a military initiative against Pakistan to stop war crimes occurring against the East Pakistani (Bangladesh) people. To gain an understanding and scope of the mistrust between Pakistan and India, it is important to briefly summarize the four wars between the two nations.

The first India-Pakistan war is often referred in the historiography as being reflective of Pakistan’s abiding belief in what has been coined as a “cultural discounting” of India. As Behera describes, “this is the belief that one’s adversary is culturally inferior and therefore can be defeated despite a strong quantitative advantage.”\(^70\) Other than to suppose a sense of religious, ethnic and moral obligation to the Muslims of British India, it is difficult to rationalize Pakistan’s aggressiveness at such an early stage in their nation building exercise. Sumit Ganguly further supports the cultural superiority complex when describing the first war as a direct result of false optimism. “Given the disarray of Pakistan’s social, organizational, political and military structures in the wake of Partition, it is hard to understand how any responsible Pakistani decision-maker could have believed that a war with India over Kashmir would result in Pakistani victory.”\(^71\) This certainly holds true given the post colonial transfer of military power favored India over Pakistan in the granting of 70:30 percent ratio (respectively) of military infrastructure according to the Independence of India act. According to Peter Kiss, this resulted in 150,000 men and 160,000 tons of war material going to Pakistan and India obtaining 88 Infantry battalions, 12 armored and 19 artillery regiments.\(^72\)

The first war commenced with a Pathan invasion of Kashmir in late October 1947 gaining control of several border towns. Shortly thereafter, India began to mobilize, launching a series of counter offensives and by spring 1948, had deployed 5 brigades to the region and was


gaining momentum. Tribal militias’ inability to check the Indian advance deep into the Kashmir valley resulted in Pakistan deploying more brigades and regiments to the region. By the end of 1948, however, Pakistan was losing everywhere, and with no resources in reserve to counter India’s superior numbers (2 divisions), resources and arguably higher level of combat readiness, it sought a ceasefire to the hostilities. In January 1949, a ceasefire took effect that resulted the formation of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and the declaration that the future of Kashmir was to be decided by a public plebiscite as already briefly mentioned under UN resolution S1996.

In 1965, Pakistan made another attempt to remove India from the Kashmir region by employing thousands of Mujahedeen under operation GIBRALTAR, with the goal of creating the conditions for a popular uprising or rebellion against India. This never materialized. Ganguly is of the opinion there was a widespread belief within Pakistan that the Kashmir region possessed a strong anti-India sentiment, which should have meant support for a Muslim-led invasion. He further suggested that Pakistan recognized India’s accelerating military power advantage and it would be only a matter of time before it dominated the region and therefore impact any future settlement with regard to Kashmir. As Lamb states, “the clash of arms between China and India in late 1962 provided Pakistan, in fact, with an admirable opportunity to force a Kashmir settlement.”

The “now or never” Seventeen Day War has been interpreted by scholars as a Pakistani failure to assess the military situation properly and then plan accordingly. This does not imply that Pakistan did not develop military objectives or have an operational plan, but rather that scholars debate whether the intent of the 1965 conflict was to free Kashmir of Indian influence or simply to weaken India’s resolve and restart stalled bilateral dialogue without provoking a general war. According to Pakistan’s former UN ambassador, Iqbal Akhund, the 1965 war was

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73 Ibid., 11-22.
74 Ganguly, 42.
75 Lamb, 101-2.
designed in the belief that Kashmir, lost on the battlefield in 1948, could be won back by mobilizing diplomatic pressures for imposing the settlement, and by seizing important Indian territory with the intent of exchanging it for Kashmir.\textsuperscript{76} This is critical, given the two stated possible objectives above, the war should would have been executed differently on the battlefield.

To free Kashmir of India’s military presence, Pakistan would have required the deployment of a massive military power in order to achieve a decisive victory, whereas, to set the conditions for negotiations, a short and limited uprising or insurgency might have achieved the desired results. Neither notion is really addressed in the research and the short duration of the 1965 war cannot be used to explain the aim of Pakistan’s aggression. Once Pakistan lost the element of surprise, the overwhelming pressure from the international community to cease operations made it only logical to support the latest UN resolution, resulting in another ceasefire with neither nation gaining a clear advantage in this dispute.

Unlike the first two wars between India and Pakistan, in 1971 a third war broke out in which India was the clear aggressor and possessed sufficient military advantage that ultimately forced Pakistan into a cession of territory. The perception that came out of the 1971 war was that Pakistan did not have the ability to control or deter the onset of war with its arch rival and it lacked the military capacity relative to India, and at best it was a middle power within the region.\textsuperscript{77} The underlying reasons of this particular conflict were actually rooted in Pakistani domestic politics. A long-standing demand for regional autonomy gathered considerable force in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and in March-April 1971 a full-scale civil war was occurring in East Pakistan. India intervened in the crisis to exploit a window of opportunity by deploying 3 corps into East Pakistan and conducting ground and air operations in the Kashmir region.\textsuperscript{78} The incursion into the Kashmir region was likely in response to the Pakistani pre-emptive strike

\textsuperscript{76} As quoted by Behera, 77.
\textsuperscript{77} Cohen, \textit{The Pakistan Army}, 13.
\textsuperscript{78} Ganguly, 51.
on airfields in India's northwest and to take advantage of a window of opportunity while Pakistani security forces were focused on East Pakistan, in the hope of progressing the Indian agenda in Kashmir. Sashanka Banerjee, who would not necessarily share this assessment, instead argues that India, as the defender of life and liberty, was compelled to act to curb the genocide being perpetrated by Pakistan as it attempted to stifle Bengali’s struggle for liberation from a perceived tyrannical rule. However, one of the key facets in researching history is whether the ethnic background of the author stating the history influences his/her particular analysis of an event. This inherent bias is common within all scholars and is often difficult to mitigate and as such, bias leads to dramatically different interpretations of the same event.

According to Bangladesh authorities, the Pakistan Army was responsible for the killing of 3 million Bengalis’ and countless acts of rape against East Pakistani women. Pakistan would later refute those numbers, but did acknowledge it was likely that the Pakistan Army killed 26,000 civilians during its East Pakistan operations. Although the debate continues to this day whether Pakistan committed a genocide in 1971, the Hamood ur Rehman commission did acknowledge the Pakistan Army as not only incompetent, corrupt, morally degenerate, and had licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership. Also, there was sufficient cause to convene a court of inquiry into atrocities of wanton cruelty and immorality against their own people. Eventually, the war was stopped by another UN Security Council resolution demanding an end to hostilities that resulted in the in the independence of East Pakistan and the current ‘line of control’ (frontier) within Kashmir.

Even as late as 1999, a fourth conflict erupted over the Kashmir region in response to Pakistani aggression that almost brought the region into nuclear confrontation. In May 1999, Pakistani-backed forces infiltrated into the Indian-administered area north of Kargil which

resulted in India responding with air strikes, massive artillery bombardments and conventional operations to destroy militant elements. Unlike previous wars, this conflict only lasted three months due to the potential to broaden into a wider nuclear conflict. Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs was clearly concerned when he indicated, “there was a disturbing report (National Security Advisor) that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible deployment.”\(^{81}\) This concern was further supported by US President Bill Clinton who stated, “it was clear that either side might decide to bring nuclear weapons into play. What the Pakistanis always tried to do was to get us involved to mediating the crisis in effect to create a negotiation in which the Americans would be involved.”\(^{82}\) The international community responded and without US support, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was forced to call upon his forces to withdraw back across the existing line of control. That in turn, resulted in a military coup in which General Pervez Musharraf seized power.

Although mutual nuclear capabilities\(^{83}\) have stabilized the region by having a bi-polar effect through the fear of common destruction, the nuclear umbrella has allowed Pakistan to rationalize the conduct of asymmetric operations against India to the detriment of long lasting peace. As outlined in Chapter 2, Pakistani-sponsored asymmetric warfare is predominantly occurring within the Kashmir region. Extremists operating deeper within India, however, enjoy indirect if not direct support from Pakistani security institutions. As noted in 2007 by Anne Patterson, the US ambassador to Pakistan, there remains no appetite within Pakistan to cease extremist support against India.

There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups [extremist orgs], which it sees as an important part of its national security

\(^{81}\) As interviewed by Cronkite, “Avoiding Armageddon - Our Future - Our Choice.”

\(^{82}\) Ibid.

apparatus against India. The only way to achieve a cessation of such support is to change the Pakistan government's own perception of its security requirements [India]… It is a known fact that Pakistan is behind the LeT. It was created by the ISI.\footnote{As quoted by Dean Nelson, WikiLeaks: Pakistan Continues to Support Mumbai Terror Attack Group, The Telegraph, 01 Dec 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8174482/WikiLeaks-Pakistan-continues-to-support-Mumbai-terror-attack-group.html accessed on 04 Jan 2014.}

As the issue of Kashmir remained stagnated at the close of the 20th century, much of the fighting that had been occurring within the Kashmir region was due to sponsored insurgency led by various organizations in what has become known as the intifada and fidayeen phases, in which the insurgency transitioned to using suicide tactics against Indian forces. Sumantra Bose characterizes the motivation behind the extremist activities as being linked to dramatic changes in the international arena that give hope to Kashmiris that they could gain their freedom from Indian rule,

\ldots if the Berlin wall could be dismantled, so could the Line of Control. The young Kashmiri guerrillas, were inspired by the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the face of Afghan mujahedeen resistance, and by the success of Tamil Tiger guerrillas in Sir Lanka in stalemating a vastly superior Indian military.\footnote{Ibid., 111.}

Complicating the issue further for India is the fact there are several insurgent groups operating within the Kashmir region, all trying to achieve different objectives but the common enemy remains predominately India. Raghunath summarizes the various factions within the Kashmir extremist as follows:

[T]hose whom the people of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan classify as freedom fighters because of their claims to fight for an independent state or federation of the regions of Jammu and Kashmir; political and apolitical activists trying to bring peace to the region regardless of the political status quo; and those who belong to militant groups classified by India as militants because of their ruthless violence against civilians. Although these militants follow different leaders and are not united, each group wishes to achieve fundamentalist hegemony by fighting the deployments of Indian troops on the Indian side of the Line of Control.\footnote{Raghunath, 47.}
The Kashmir dispute has dominated Pakistani and Indian relations, and ultimately is the driving force behind Pakistani foreign policy. As Graham Fuller notes, India has impacted the course of Pakistani Islamic and foreign policy in three ways. First India is seen as the chief strategic antagonist to Pakistan. Second, it contains a massive Muslim population itself, and finally, it is engaged in a long struggle with Pakistan over Kashmir – a struggle invariability characterized in religious terms.\(^{87}\) Since it is almost exclusively religion that distinguishes Pakistan from India, Pakistan is constantly driven to reinforce its Islamic character, in particular through ties with the rest of the Muslim world.\(^{88}\)

The region is still very much in dispute, with India claiming ownership of 63% of Kashmir, and the remaining portions shared by Pakistan and China. In all likelihood, a resolution will only occur through armed conflict rather than prolonged dialogue. It is estimated that thousands of lives in the late 20\(^{th}\) century have been lost in the intermittent skirmishes between religious extremist groups and the Indian security forces, trying to seek a resolution ranging from independence to union with Pakistan. Tahir Ami’s assessment of India’s heavy hand is blunt: “India has tried to crush the mass resistance of the Kashmir people through the use of brute force. It has ruthlessly pursued a ‘catch and kill’ policy towards all able-bodied youth, and engaged in acts of arson, looting, pillaging in Kashmir for the past twelve years.”\(^{89}\)

More disturbing is an event that occurred in 1965 at the UN security council when Pakistan officials quoted a story by “an angry young man” living in the Jammu and Kashmir region, “…somewhere in the vicinity of [Poonch Kashmir], Indians have cut off the breasts of our girls and held them up saying - 'here is your Pakistan.' 'seven members of our family have been taken

\(^{87}\) Fuller, 28.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., 29.
by the soldiers and butchered.”

It is difficult to quantify if such atrocities are still occurring within Kashmir given the volumes of propaganda and political rhetoric employed by both sides.

India has remained the primary focus of Pakistani security institutions with a permanent mobilization of the Pakistani military along the border with India since its inception, at the cost of significant domestic economic and infrastructure investment. More importantly, Kashmir has distracted the army from dealing with the growing extremism in the frontier regions and even in the major cities. Without a doubt, the acquisition of nuclear weapons within the region has changed the ability for the key players to wage limited war, and the emphasis on supporting extremist activities to achieve the desired effect will remain for at least the short term. In the end, as with any other conflict, the only solution will be dialogue but the real question becomes how many more South Asians have to die before serious negations are undertaken. N.J. Demerath puts it more bluntly: “While Pakistani politicians are eager to negotiate because they can rely on Kashmir’s overwhelmingly Muslim population, this advantage makes their Indian counterparts quick to refuse negotiations. By now it seems that any realistic solution will require pressure from international powers.”

After 9/11, the strategic importance of South Asia fundamentally altered with logistical support for the War on Terror in Afghanistan flowing through Pakistan and in a rare spirit of cooperation; it would appear possible that the Kashmir dispute could have been elevated to the international arena for resolution. But alas there was not any room for negotiation on the Kashmir issue in allowing logistical support to impending Afghanistan conflict was removed.

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when US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin told President Musharraf on 13 Sep 2001: “[the situation] was black and white, not gray, Pakistan was either with us or not with us.”92

The conflict between these Pakistan and India over Kashmir is the central lynchpin the web of instability that this study attempts to describe. It provides the justification for the continuation of dysfunctional national policies and the maintenance of the power and controls of the security and military institutions. Without some form of unforeseen intervention from an external agency, the status quo shows no possible resolution the near future.

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This study has accepted that extremism is a mindset that is characteristic of a social process within a mechanism of change, and creates a sense of militancy and fundamentalism that contributes to instability and social unrest. Within Pakistan, extremism is demonstrated by violence and communal conflict, and is indicative of a failing state. Given the clandestine nature of extremists’ activities, the sensationalism of the media, and the political rhetoric within South Asia, it is difficult to discern what is actually happening in the region. As Pakistan grapples with a growing number of suicide attacks, targeted killings, kidnappings, increased criminal activity and a rising incidence of drug addiction, it is symptomatic of the fact that the state was unprepared for the magnitude and endurance of the extremist campaign it has helped to create and sustain. The increased extremist incidents can be attributed to a growing resistance movement or as a countermeasure to the central government attempting to exercise control over regions that are traditionally autonomous. The Pakistani perception of what is occurring domestically may be more important than what is actually happening. If there is a perception that the legitimate government is unwilling, or more importantly not able, to provide enduring security, civil services or the rule of law, then the population will link its future to the extremist groups who have been filling the power vacuum, or worse, rise up in revolution. Pakistan is reaping what it has sown.

In contrast to other scholars who have focused on selective facets of social, economic or the institutional history of Pakistan, in this study the author examined the wide range of multiple sociological and cultural narratives to outline what is occurring in such a diverse state. This analysis shows that the rise of extremism is directly correlated to the state transformation into an increasing theocratic garrison state, which hindered its ability to conduct nation-building activities. During its formative years, Pakistan lost any sense of secularism and gradually
reforms introduced brought the nation towards an Islamic state. Further as a result of these reforms, Pakistan created a tiered citizenship structure based upon religion resulting in legalized discrimination. Over time, moderation and accommodation within Pakistan society has given way to a fundamentalist view of religion. Islam is the foundation on which Pakistan was formed and as Graham E. Fuller notes, “Islam should supersede narrow ethnic interests….Islam provides potential ideological glue that holds Pakistan together.”1 The religious idea of Pakistan has facilitated extremism through the implementation of religious law, which created social isolation, and ultimately a cultural rejection of moderate views. This religious ideal is the moral foundation for some extremist groups within Pakistan to pursue their vision of a theocratic state. The Sunni majority appears to be the greatest beneficiaries of the new Pakistan and perhaps this is the reason why the population continues to tolerate Islamic radicalism and extremism within its provinces, despite the inherent threat this poses to the state itself.

Underdevelopment, poor social investment and weak democratic or civil institutions have led in Pakistan’s disenfranchised youth to achieve a sense of personal value by turning to extremism. The continual influx of recruits from the lower strata of society provides an enduring resource to the extremist movement, resulting in civil order turning to chaos. Such a cycle created a self-perpetuating system that is a growing problem for Pakistan, which has elevated the importance of its security institutions to the long-term detriment of democracy. In examining Pakistan’s counterinsurgency response, it became evident that it was focused on conducting limited, ad-hoc security operations and not addressing the underlying foundations in which incubated the extremist movement. Pakistan’s failure to properly resource nation building activities and adapt a population centric counter-insurgency campaign in its fight against extremists, and instead chose to focus on its perceived threat of India in effect delayed addressing its extremist problem for another day.

1 Fuller, 5.
The India-Pakistan relationship centered on the Kashmir dispute which has festered since 1947, and continued beyond the end of the Cold War, has led to war in 1947, 1965 and 1971 and has also led to the brink of nuclear confrontation in 1999. Substantial literature has been written on the Kashmir dispute with a view to gaining insight into the underpinnings of this conflict within the complex regional dynamics. Many scholars continually reinforce the same historical analysis, which often reflects their respective ethnic national positions without providing fresh insight into the international maneuvering that has been occurring over the past sixty years. Early scholarly research focused on the political maneuvering by Pakistan, India and the West that occurred during the early UN debates through to the second Kashmir war. The next body of literature becomes more descriptive of why and how the wars were conducted, with linkages being made to third party activities. Contemporary research provides a good understanding of the ongoing insurgencies and how the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan elevated the Kashmir dispute to international importance to the West. Finally, the bulk of the scholarly research published in the past sixty years is focused on the role of religion within the region and the inherent differences between Hinduism and Islam that are reflected in the one or two nation theory. What is further lacking in the literature is any meaningful insight into what Kashmiris desire: accession to Pakistan, accession to India, the status quo, independence or no cohesive desire at all?

The issue of the right to self-determination of Kashmiris is one of the oldest unresolved conflicts still on the UN Agenda. Perhaps the complexity of this question is the very reason scholars fail to address it either through statistical methods or by other means. Once the will of people of Kashmir becomes known, it may either reinforce or dismiss Pakistan’s main claim of interest in the region. The significant question may well be whether Pakistan would accept Kashmir independence or 100% Indian rule of Kashmir. It is likely that a shift towards India in the regional balance of power would have to occur before Pakistan would accept concessions on Kashmir. The issue has become entrenched within Pakistani discourse and is a fundamental part
of the state’s identity. The public opinion polls identified in this study seem to indicate that the problem is that the region is not homogenous. Although Muslims dominate parts of Kashmir, the real issue is how to resolve the conflict and inherent differences between the two contending regional powers, secularism (India) and exclusivism (Pakistan).

Pakistan has always maintained an interest in Afghanistan affairs with a view to establishing an ally against India. This study highlighted the legacy of the mujahedeen and the resulting popularization of Jihad in Pakistan in the 1980s. It further illustrated the institutionalization of extremism and its supporting network was a product of the Cold War during the soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The ISI, with US encouragement, leveraged the madrassas to source mujahedeen to fight in Afghanistan. Both nations trained, equipped and in some cases, commanded extremist organizations within Afghanistan and after the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989 from Afghanistan these nations began to be victims of their own creations. Lack of foresight has cost Pakistan billions in lost revenue, tens of thousands in civilian and military causalities and reputation of being one of the most dangerous places in the world that has resulted in an entrenched, robust and resilient extremist movement.

The future security of the South Asia region is dependent upon Pakistan and India coming to a negotiated settlement over Kashmir and henceforth addressing the tolerance of religious extremism within their borders. Unfortunately, the Talibanization of Pakistan has already begun. At this time, the Taliban often appears more significant than the feeble government in Islamabad.\(^2\) In 2009, the central Pakistani government continued to legitimize Islamic extremism by recognizing the imposition of shai’ra law in a large portion of the KPK as it withdrew from military operations, unable or unwilling to dislodge the Taliban from their safe havens.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Lawrence Ziring, “Unraveling the Afghanistan-Pakistan Riddle,” *Asian Affairs*, vol. 36 no. 2 (2009), 68.

This radicalization is beginning to gain a foothold in India, in particular the Gujarat region, and only through a sustained effort toward addressing the conditions in which insurgencies thrive will collective security be achieved. As N.J. Demerath describes, “on 27 February 2002, a train car filled with politically active Hindu devotees returning from the Ram temple in Ayodyah was set on fire by Muslim extremists, and 58 people burned to death. Hindu extremists responded violently.”

Pakistan’s squandering of resources on the Kashmir dispute, its failure to rein in and free itself from the dominant and counter productive influence of security institutions, and the inability of the political system to respond to the needs of its own people is setting the conditions for it to become the world’s first failed nuclear state. The status quo is not working and it finally appears that Pakistani policy makers in 2013 are beginning to understand a new approach is needed as illustrated at the All Parties Conference on 09 September 2013,

We [Pakistan’s Political Parties] have been given detailed briefings by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Chief of Army Staff and Director General Inter-Services Intelligence, regarding the internal and regional security situation. We have been distressed to note that the situation has continued to deteriorate over the last several years and past efforts to control terrorist and extremist elements have not yielded the desired results.

However, in a region where tradition and the status quo hold an iron grip on people and situations, a profound sea change of political direction constitutes a herculean challenge. The long-entrenched power of Pakistani security institutions with the subsequent access to resources and political influence cannot be easily challenged given that the Army is the only effective institution within Pakistan capable of responding to the growing extremists threat. As Anatol Lieven states, “The [Pakistani] Army is a united and disciplined institution and as long as that remains the case, it will be strong enough to defat open revolt [against the state].”

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4 Demerath, 16.
will to reform these institutions will require widespread consensus, a trait not often found in the region’s politics. International pressures may sway the politicians but it is often counterproductive as extremists sell this to the Pakistani public as unwarranted western interference in domestic concerns. As George Santayana famously stated: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Unfortunately the historical record for Pakistan from the 20th century is indicative of a state that was too focused on the past, unfinished business from partition and focused externally rather than domestically. Pakistan’s failure to cease support for or tolerance of extremism is facilitating its failure as a state. It is just a matter of time. Pakistan cannot endure many more crises.

7 George Santayana, The Life of Reason, [or], the Phases of Human Progress, (Auckland: Floating Press, 2009), 312.
Figure 1 - Pakistan Extremism Paradigm
Figure 2 – Number of Terrorist Incidents and Resulting Killed & Wounded – 1975-2005
Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of New Maryland as quantified by Syed Ejaz Hussain.
Figure 3 - Extremist Groups in Pakistan over Time
Source: Stanford University - Mapping Militants Project accessed 14 Jan 2014
Figure 4 - Number of Terrorist Incidents over Time
Source: Terrorist Data Bank accessed 19 Dec 2013

Figure 5 - Fatality by Extremist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2013
Source: South Asia Terrorist Portal accessed 19 Dec 2013
Figure 6 - Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2002-11

The GTI uses four indicators to measure the impact of terrorism: the number of terrorist incidents, the number of deaths, and the number of casualties and the level of property damage. These indicators are used to create a weighted five year average for each country, which takes into account the lasting effects of terrorism. The score given to each country therefore indicates the impact of a terrorist attack on a society in terms of the fear and subsequent security response. Definition and Source: The Institute for Economics and Peace accessed 15 Dec 2013
Figure 7 - Pakistan's Public Opinion - Greatest Threat to Pakistan
Source: Pew Research Centre as of 2012, margin of error +/- 4.2 percent accessed 15 Jan 2014

Figure 8 - Kashmir Extremist Incidents 2004-2012
Figure 9 - Pakistan's 2012 Public Opinion - Attitude toward India
Source: Pew Research Centre, margin of error +/- 4.2 percent accessed 15 Jan 2014

Figure 10 - Cost of 'War on Terror' to Pakistan
Source: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, September, 2008 as published by the Islamic Development Bank in (Rs. Billion). Exchange rate of 0.01601 used as indicated by the Bank of Canada for 24 January 2008. Indirect Cost was calculated as loss of exports, foreign investment, privatization, industrial output, tax collection, etc.
Figure 11 - GDP of Pakistan (Current US$)
Source: World Data Bank

Figure 12 - Cost-Benefit Analysis Counterinsurgency on Democracy and the Rule of Law
During “warfare”, targets are usually the military and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings, and other military activities. All deaths - civilian as well as military - incurred in such situations are counted as *battle-related deaths*. Definition and statistical source: World Data Bank and the South Asia Terrorist Portal accessed 28 Dec 2013.
Figure 15 - Pakistan's Public Opinion - Attitude towards Extremism
Source: Pew Research Centre as of 2012, margin of error +/- 4.2 percent accessed 15 Jan 2014

Figure 16 - Pakistan Public Opinion - Support for Pak Army Operations against Extremist
Source: Pew Research Centre as of 2012, margin of error +/- 4.2 percent accessed 28 Jan 2014
Figure 17 – Pakistan Unemployment Rate 1981, 1998, 2012
Source: World Data Bank accessed 11 Jan 2014

Figure 18 - Pakistan's Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) 1990-2011
Source: World Data Bank accessed 11 Jan 2014
Figure 19 - Government Social Expenditure as percentage of GDP  
Source: World Data Bank assessed 15 Jan 2014

Figure 20 - Pakistan Population by age groups and sex (absolute numbers)  
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
Figure 21 - South Asia Poverty Headcount
Source: World Data Bank as of 2005

Figure 22 - Geospatial Analysis of Terrorist Incidents Pre and Post 2001
Source: Syed Ejaz Hussain, University of Pennsylvania
Figure 23 – Europe Bound Opiates Trafficking Routes
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2003
For a detailed description of the revision see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for surveyors to comply with the opium yield survey procedures.

Figure 24 – Opium Production Estimates for Afghanistan 2004-2012

Figure 25 – Changes in the prevalence of 15-64 aged people who inject drugs, 2008-2011
Figure 26 – Afghanistan Opinion Survey 2009
Source: The Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)

Figure 27 - Kashmir Opinion Poll for Independence
Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to become independent
Source: Kashmir: Paths to Peace, Chatham House, May 2010
Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to join India

Figure 16: The vote to join India

Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to become independent

Figure 15: The vote for independence

Proportion who would vote for the whole of Kashmir to join Pakistan

Figure 17: The vote to join Pakistan

Voting

For the whole of Kashmir to join Pakistan

evidence of polarized.

ranged say aside vote 1948/49 the join join India. But is this even possible? There is little evidence that the people of Kashmir would vote for an independent state. In the Srinagar district, in the Valley, the people would vote for an independent state with overwhelming support. In the north and south districts of Kashmir, there would be a majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the Bagh districts, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the J&K districts, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the AJK districts, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the Jammu district, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the Vale of Kashmir, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. In the Western Region, there would be a slight majority vote for an independent Kashmir. 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Image 1 - Ethnic Pakistani Groups and Percentage of Population
Source: Columbia University
Image 2 - Religious Breakdown of Pakistan
Source: Pakistan 2012 Census

Image 3 - Breakdown of Pakistan
Source: CIA Publications
Image 4 - Kashmir Region
Source: United Nations Mapping Service
Image 5 - Afghanistan Refugees in Pakistan as of 2007
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Image 6 - Population Breakdown of Pakistan
Source: World Development Indicators from the World Bank.

Proportion Percentage of Pakistan Population in Rural Areas

Source: Pakistan 2012 Census
2012 Population Distribution

- Punjab: 56%
- Sindh: 25%
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 14%
- Balochistan: 5%

Source: Pakistan 2012 Census
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CURRICULUM VITAE

Candidate’s full name: Sasha John Paul, CD

Universities attended: Dalhousie University 1997, Bachelor of Arts

Profession Highlights:

Currently employed at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa within the Chief of Force Development as a Capability Analyst. Previous employment includes instructing at The Combat Training Centre, Tactics and Infantry Schools including the following military deployments:

2012 Task Force El Gorah, Deputy Commanding Officer, Multinational Force of Observers, Sinai, Egypt;

2008 to 2009 Operation ATTENTION, Staff Officer - Regional Command South, Kandahar Afghanistan;

2005 Operation AUGURAL, Training Centre Second in Command, Thiès Senegal; and

2004 Operation HALO, Platoon Commander, Port au Prince, Haiti.