DEVELOPMENT AS PEDAGOGY: ENGAGING THE SOMALI POLITY IN THE RESTORATION OF THEIR CIVIL SOCIETY

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this work is to reimagine the act of development in Somalia as a pedagogical process. I do this by identifying how neo-liberal and imperial systems have guided development policy in a manner that instrumentalizes Somali citizens, making them agents of thin neo-liberal development, all the while not allowing them to work towards their own human flourishing. Using the works of John Dewey and Paulo Freire, I characterize the path to a humanizing form of democracy in Somalia as being possible only through a mutual process of conscientization and praxis, taken up by both the agent of development as well as the recipient. In essence, the dialectic that is formed is one where the Somali associative community represents the antithesis to the democracy of the West, and it is only through a mutual act of co-construction and praxis that a liberatory synthesis can be fashioned.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of three individuals.

To Lawrence Blake, my paternal grandfather, who taught me that inquisitiveness and a love for history were things to be cherished and cultivated.

To Alma Blake, my paternal grandmother, who taught me how important it was to carry an immense love for family and friends.

To David Marshall, my maternal grandfather, whose sense of humour and love for life are standards to which I feel I must strive.
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1. CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION

I pursue this research with the hope that I will learn something about the world in which I live. This thesis is an exploration of policy, but it is also the beginning of a personal ontology. The choice to examine development policy in Somalia is not new for people like me – white men living in relative affluence – but the end product of the exploration wants for a difference from my colonial predecessors. I hope to arrive at a place of conscientious understanding, and not prescribe different, but all too similar, ‘solutions’ to oppressed peoples.

It is necessary to introduce how I arrived at this study and something about my background. My name is Lawrence (Dave) Blake. I am the son of Lawrence Blake and Katherine Blake (nee Marshall) and grew up in Toronto, Ontario. My childhood was spent there and I saw little of the outside world, spending most vacations, holidays, and leisure time in the Toronto area. I grew up in relative comfort, and I cannot recall during my childhood ever meeting a Somali person or someone who identified as being part of the Somali community. I am sure I met or went to school with one, but the memory escapes me.

My interest in humanitarian development began at a fairly young age, fourteen, when I had the opportunity to attend a conference organized by Craig Keilburger, founder of Free the Children. That summer I had watched America go to war against Iraq, and I had wondered why the Americans were invading a nation in the Middle East under the pretence of proactive disarmament when the Cold-War had precipitated the nuclear armament of the United States. It seemed categorically unjust that a nation
would go to war and not critically interact with its own history. People were dying because of hubris, I supposed.

I quickly arrived at the revelation that if adults in positions of power could not see the risk in proliferating or keeping weapons of mass destruction, then children, or youth, might come to the conclusion that this ‘game’ was dangerous and categorically unjust. I founded a not-for-profit that advocated for responsible nuclear disarmament and the peaceful resolution of conflict. The vehicle for conveying the message was children and teenagers, and we saw some success at generating a dialogue – at least in the localities which contained members.

In high school I had the chance to meet and speak with retired Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the United Nations’ Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the Rwandan Genocide. He inspired me to enlist in the Canadian Army, specifically as a reserve infantry officer. His impassioned plea for compassionate intervention awakened in me those same sentiments that had germinated within a fourteen year old. It was never because I had glorified the service, though I respected the stories my grandfather told me, but that I saw myself as being capable of good-works. In a position such as that I could be the change I wanted to see in the world.

My time with the 48th Highlanders of Canada, an infantry unit in Toronto, allowed me the opportunity to meet men and women who had seen tours in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Sierra Leon and countless other places. Some guarded their stories closely, rarely speaking about their experiences in a personal manner, whereas others were quite open and often talked about their service in candid and critical ways.
There is a Canadian connection to Somalia (Razack, 2004), just as there is a
Canadian connection to Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone. The men and women of our
armed forces went overseas to help peoples wrest themselves from the chaos that
engulfed their nations during war and in some cases those same men and women count
their efforts as failures: Romeo Dallaire, to this day, struggles with mental wounds that
he will carry the rest of his life because of what he thinks he could have or should have
done. It is this connection, and the people I have met, that brings me to my research and
influences a bias that I must admit I carry. I will always be a white Canadian man
looking into the lives of peoples culturally, linguistically and politically different from
my own. This situatedness, my own political and ethical creeds, need not affect the
research because the thesis deals not with how the Somali people must organize
themselves. Rather, it deals with how developers arriving from the Global North must
view the act of development in the Global South and the relationships that are forged
during the process. I call for a review of policy because the lens of history has shown us
that too often the best of intentions result in the most horrible of tragedies.

1.1 Introduction to the Project

Somalia was colonized in the late nineteenth century by Britain and Italy, and
this began the process of supplanting traditional Somali political practices in favour of
imperial ones (Dawson, 1964; Kakwenzire, 1986). These were the very antitheses of the
indigenous laws that had governed Somali political relations for generations. Practices,
such as the xeer, a uniquely Somali answer to constitutional and inter-community law,
demonstrated a significant appreciation for the democratic process and a burgeoning
society that was critically aware of what it meant to be a deliberative community
Not only was pre-colonial Somalia ordered in a manner that bespoke democratic sensibilities, but it was also astutely aware of the role education played within the community’s progress (Lewis, 2008). The act of educating the young involved their participation in a dialogue that asked questions related to spirituality, politics, and the relation of past events to current problems (Lewis, 2008). I note this as being analogous to the problem-posing, a process of positioning one’s environment in a manner that can be critically explored, which I advocate for in Chapter Four (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007).

The colonial period laid the groundwork for the exchange of foreign oppressors for indigenous ones. Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime, which controlled the country from 1969 until its collapse in the early 1990’s, cultivated a sense of ‘muteness’ within the Somali polity, building upon what had already been started by the British and Italians. His rise to power was enabled by his ability to stoke a nationalistic sentiment that had been brewing since the Second World War. However, the military government of Barre instilled within the Somali people an intense mistrust of central government and inspired the revolt of more populist elements within the country’s north and amongst united factions in and around the capital, Mogadishu (Clark, 1992; Kaplan, 2008; Lewis, 1988; Menkhaus, 2006, 2007). This plunged the country into a civil war that has continued in various forms into the present. Concerted efforts at developing the country, wresting it out from the conflict, were begun in the early nineties after Barre fled (Clark, 1992; Webersik, 2004).

The modernization processes that had been begun under Barre during the 1970’s were cultivators of the violence that was seen in the early stages of the civil conflict (Lewis, 1988; Webersik, 2004). These were continued by developers that sought to
establish a lasting peace in the country. Early interventions by the United Nations (UN) failed because clan divisions had been exacerbated by the neo-liberal modernization process and fanned by the collective distrust of foreigners (Menkhaus, 2006). The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which took place during the early 1990’s, was a disaster, and further centralized development practice within the Mogadishu area and in the south of the country. The decision to send soldiers in the early 1990’s was merely a blunt instrument to solve a complex and centuries old problem (Lederach & Stork, 1993).

Since the initial missions, the handling of the development project has been shaped and guided by the UN, regional actors, and the international community. These interests seek out a solution that perpetuates a status-quo structure which views the Somali as a receptacle for ‘official knowledge’ (Apple, 2003; Freire, 1972). This status-quo, or stasis meant to avoid a social-cultural conflict, is exacerbated by agents who with the best of intentions argue that Somalis should be utilized as tools in their own complacency, forever situated in their role as the bondsman to a western lord (Hegel, trans. 1977). Despite the successes of Somaliland in the north, an area of Somalia that has declared independence and separated from the country, the progress made remains tentative and precarious (Kaplan, 2010; Lewis, 2008). There is the potential that truly indigenous community processes will be co-opted in order to serve an oppressive international system.

Efforts at stabilizing the situation by international actors have been indicative of a status-quo and thin approach to democratic development. The United Nations has struggled to remain neutral because it has operated from a base located in Nairobi, Kenya, far removed from the people it means to help (Somalia, 2012). The actions of
the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) led to the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a previous incarnation of federal government that was fouled by rampant corruption and ineffective institutional capacity. The United States has also contributed to the maintenance of the status-quo, with its war on terror perpetuating the violence that is waged by indigenous forces for a foreign interest (Little, 2012; Menkhaus, 2012).

The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and government forces deliberately target places of learning and the use of mortars against Al-Shabaab has killed hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians (UNESCO, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Kenya, Somalia’s neighbour to the south, has been accused of carrying out violent reprisals against refugees, and include the carrying-out of extraordinary renditions free from judicial oversight (Bachmann, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012a). Ethiopia, to the west of Somalia, has invaded Somalia on several occasions destabilising the region and interfering in local governance processes (Allo, 2010; A. I. Samatar, 2007).

The government of Somalia has been complicit in the practice of development as status-quo, failing to engage the polity in the constitutional formation process and working towards the balkanization of the country by allowing rampant cronyism (Menkhaus, 2012). It has done so by targeting educational institutions during conflict, excluding stakeholders from government meetings, placating foreign interests while ignoring domestic ones, and focusing on military operations instead of civil services.

Developing a lens through which to judge current development policy relied upon the philosophical works of several disciplines. The work of Freire (1972), Apple (2003), Dewey (1916), and Dale and Hyslop-Margison (2010) construct the pedagogical basis for development as pedagogy. The conceptual framework’s exposition of
republican and western-democratic theory serves as a foil, by which to judge current
practice. Far from being the legitimate outgrowth of a political history, I will argue that
current development processes largely ignores those precepts that republicans and
democratic philosophers alike argued were central to the functioning of a free state.

Status-quo development, as opposed to its humanizing form, relies upon the
production of official knowledge, the knowledge of what it means to be a democracy,
such that Somalis begin to alienate themselves from history and thus their traditional
forms of knowledge. This makes the Somali dependent upon foreign aid, which
cultivates oppression (Bohman, 2004b). Finally, development as status-quo relies upon
the Somali becoming an implicit iterator of their own oppression, and calls for ‘bottom­
up’ development that may indeed simply produce ‘Band-Aids’ for an already infected
and mortal process within the state.

Development as pedagogy, on the other hand, looks to cultivate a critical
consciousness within both the developer and the Somali. This is done through problem­
posing one’s history, co-constructing a joint narrative on what the relationship has
entailed over generations. Critical to this ideal is that the relationship between developer
and Somali necessarily forms a community, a product of interconnection and shared
experience. There is no neutral, and the developer seeks to understand that their own
liberation can result from practicing development as pedagogy, freeing themself and the
state from a destiny that had them pitted against one another in a series of zero-sum
games.

The Somali, fast in his or her own introspection, universalizes the democratic
project to meet his or her own needs and traditions. This forms the basis for a renewal
process that ends in the eventual creation of three distinct associative communities: the
Somali community, the developer or Western community, and a shared community. This is built upon the recognition that the Somali is a pedagogue of development, just as the developer is one, and together they must teach and learn from one another in order to reiterate the praxis that will ensure liberty and involved, efficacious citizenship.

1.2 The Research Question

This thesis begins with the question: why have multiple attempts at democratic development within Somali largely failed? It attempts to answer that question by pursuing a variety of leads, and asking the alternative question: what makes democracy work? By asking that question, I can compare current development policy to the histories of both the West and Africa, and assess current practice. Of particular note is the conclusion that it is impossible to avoid the developer-developed relationship (Pieterse, 1997). Due to globalized interdependence, it is necessary to study the ontological suppositions of both parties within the development dialectic. I characterize this as the African thesis, the western antithesis, and the hopeful synthesis arrived at through mutual problem posing and the practice of democratic development as pedagogy.

This research marks an effort to construct and implement a critical theory in relation to development programs in the Global South. That efforts to stabilize and develop Somalia, over the course of twenty years, have been unsuccessful is testament to the difficulty facing developers, whether local or foreign. This necessitates not just an analysis of current development policy, but also a historical review of Somali culture and politics, the construction of a critical theory for development and governance, and the application of that theory.
The choice to analyze and understand Somali politics and development policy in the Horn of Africa stems from a realization that the country presents a problem that has plagued humankind for millennia: how does one build a state? Machiavelli (trans. 1996) saw the problems facing lawgivers who wished to revive nations after collapse as immense. Polybius (1979) considered state founders, such as Lycurgus of Sparta, as integral to societal success and flourishing. The developers in Somalia attempt what the first lawgivers of any nation have attempted, and the fact that the whole of the Earth has involved itself in the affairs of one small nation in East Africa is a portent to how interconnected the planet has become in recent decades. This, in and of itself, serves to increase the possibility of domination occurring during the process of interaction (Bohman, 2004b; Pettit, 1997).

The agents attempting to develop Somalia are undergoing what Pocock (1975) calls a ‘Machiavellian Moment’. This is the moment when a newly formed state looks to sustain itself over time, and guard against factionalization, discord, and collapse. The aim of development, therefore, is a process that philosophers and political scientists have troubled over since the creation of the first nation-state. Somalia exists on paper, has defined borders, and even a transitional government. Yet, these do not make a state, nor do they ensure a state’s survival. Indeed, such a connection to the past – to a Westphalian tradition – may be what is preventing progress. Westphalian and colonial tradition seem to have inculcated within the Somali people an immense mistrust for many institutions of governance (Menkhaus, 2007).

In order to address the problem of institutional mistrust, policies must be developed that seek to remedy a feeling of non-control and foreign-interference that pervades Somali society. These sentiments, indeed the very act of armed conflict, speak
to a wider societal problem of disengagement. The Somali people do not have a functioning civil society that has sufficiently bridged disparate groups together in a cohesive community of participative citizens. Furthermore, Somali society has been unable to practice and engage in what Paulo Freire (1972) defines as praxis, or the critical reflection and action necessary for liberation. This is important because the purpose of any democratic state is to ensure the liberty of its people. Thus, it becomes the requirement of developers, foreign agents, and internal institutions to allow the Somali polity a chance to develop their human potential in a manner that encourages ‘thick’ democracy, represented by efficacious and active citizenship, and not push the ‘status-quo’ of thin participation and non-deliberation.

For any feeling of ownership to develop within Somalia, the people must recognize within their own communities gifts and strengths that move the nation towards cohesion. This is the vita activa, which is vital to the Machiavellian confrontation with the danger of state collapse (Pocock, 1975). This is the community learning how to build the institutions of governance from the bottom-up, and as a form of learning it can be deemed the education of citizens. In this ideal form of development it is the Somali, then, who teaches him or herself how to build Somalia based upon his or her skills and abilities; not upon the kindness, generosity, or intervention of another. As the people of Somalia begin to recognize these assets and strengths, the developer and foreign agent take on a role that is, instead of prescriptive, catalytic.

This serves as the basis for an analytical framework that will be constructed, and upon which current policy must be compared as to its suitability for the creation of citizens, instead of subjects of a foreign vision of order and success. Current development and intervention policy in Somalia centers upon institution building
instead of community capacity building. This development focus on institutional
construction allows for domination to occur, and is not seen as ‘education’, or rhetorical
positioning, but the provision of a political or humanitarian ‘need’. Best practice should
be seen as a form of citizenship education, where the aider provides a catalytic instead
of prescriptive role in the process. This could, according to the theoretical literature,
provide an iterative outlet for community members in Somalia to reengage in political
processes instead of taking on oppressive roles as actors participating in violent conflict.

The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the policies that have
been implemented by national, regional, and international actors within Somalia in order
to alleviate conflict and humanitarian crisis. This is done in order to characterize the
goals of development as the education of citizens, not the prescriptive application of
alien systems upon peoples. To do this I will: 1) build an understanding of current
development practice by constructing a concise political history of Somalia in order to
better understand current policy; and 2) construct an analytical framework by revisiting
citizenship education theorists, republican philosophers, and critical theorists in order to
argue that development policy must seek to engage indigenous peoples in the act of
‘problem-posing’ their relationship to the Global North (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem,
2007). The end result of this thesis should be an understanding that in viewing the
Somali citizen as a mere instrument in their country’s development perpetuates the
banking conception of development, and relegates their burgeoning democracy to a
status-quo that prevents active citizenship and perpetuates oppressive structures of
dependence.
1.3 Key Concepts

Neoliberalism

Neo-liberalism's first use, as cited by Boas and Gans-Morse (2009), was seen in the inter-war era by the scholars of the German Freiburg School during the period between the two World Wars. At the time it was utilized in a more often positive manner, a method of channeling liberal idealism into the 20th century. Its current use is often restricted to texts that criticize free-market economics and development policies. In this context, neo-liberalism becomes associated with Marxist critics, progressives, and anti-capitalism. It is often not the term used by those professing the benefits of neoliberal political economies (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009).

The inherent differences in worldview regarding neo-liberalism are quite apparent. When its initial inventors utilized the word, neo-liberalism was meant to define a process of liberalization that was more humanistic than laissez-faire (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). The term itself became more popular, and subject to only one definition, with the collapse of alternative liberal economies in the latter quarter of the 20th century (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). Thus, my interpretation of the term coincides with the processes of economic and political reform begun by neo-conservatives such as Ronald Reagan, and that is the integration of global markets into western economies. This is what Illich (1981) calls the pax economica, or economic peace, which he characterizes as an understanding that if humans are economic beings, then order will flow through their inclusion into interconnected capital markets.

Within this thesis, neo-liberalism means and embodies the negative and modern view of liberty explicated by Pettit (1997) – one that sees non-interference as the ideal
for civic freedom as this is attached to free-market libertarianism. In this regard, modern neo-liberalism is an *individualistic* philosophy that generates violence when the needs of one agent conflict with another (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). The philosophy is individualistic because it relies upon a reading of freedom as rooted in *individual* freedoms that coalesce around the ideal of liberty as non-interference. This freedom is notably non-pluralistic, and neglects to acknowledge that rote non-interference often results in marked inequality (Laborde, 2008; Pettit, 1997).

Neo-liberalism is functionally conservative, and this conservatism denies the activism that is required for critical interaction with one’s position in history and within the world (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010; Pocock, 1975). It hinges upon powerful social forces wherein “even conscious recognition of their negative outcomes appears to prevent… manipulation” (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 80). Neo-liberalism, and its spread through modern globalization processes, makes definite the definitions of citizenship and cooperation and this necessitates the individual to sacrifice free-will for a superficial inter-communal peace or status-quo (Bohman, 2004b). At its most basic, neo-liberalism’s purpose is to reorient national markets to serve donors, developers, and western interests.

**Status-quo**

The status-quo I often refer to throughout the thesis stems from the neo-liberal worldview encapsulated in current development policy, but is also based upon the understanding that the relationship between two individuals has forever been one of dialectic conflict – one individual seeks to overpower another (Hegel, trans. 1977). As human beings create structure and emerge from the world they seek to maintain that
structure which gave birth to them; whether it be philosophy, religion, or culture (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). The status-quo is an offshoot of the conservatism explicitly contained within the neo-liberal, as well as the new imperial, state, and it rejects the activism required of critically attuned and conscientious citizens (Freire, 1972; Pocock, 1975). This will form the basis for what I term status-quo development, or development that seeks not human flourishing but instead the continued inculcation of an entire people (the Somali) into the global marketplace (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

Status-quo, the original usage of it, comes from the Latin *in satu quo ante bellum erat*, or ‘the way it was before the war’. This ‘state of affairs’ becomes a way of describing the avoidance of social conflict, or the inevitable clash of thesis and antithesis. In this thesis, status-quo refers to the neo-liberal, previously colonial, desire for things to remain as they are; the avoidance of a shift in power or control. In the conflict between worldviews, and oppressor and oppressed, the status-quo can become a powerful force preventing change or movement in any direction that is progressive or regressive. I refer to modern development as maintaining this status-quo because it seeks to entrench technocratic and neo-liberal values, a less painful route than imagining new and progressive deliberative and co-constructed political spaces.

The theory behind its conceptualization can be found in Apple (2003), Dewey, Freire, Pettit (1997), and Pocock (1975). In this sense, the status-quo refers to an ideal of non-progress that is inextricably linked to the past and its fetishization. Illich’s (1981) concept of the *homo economicus*, as an implement of the *pax economica*, bespeaks an understanding that development is a western status-quo that perceives indigenous tradition much as the Athenians viewed their northern ‘barbarian’ counterparts. This
economic peace is the state of things before a potential conflict – and is desired because it is safe.

**Democracy**

Though Chapter Two develops a vision of the varying ways democracy can be approached, I take it to be a system wherein the citizen is capable of open and critical deliberation upon their position (Bohman, 2004b). In that regard, democracy is less a system of vertical accountability, than a way of living within an associative political and social community that stresses the provision of genuine political options and public discourse where such options “might be explored and debated” (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. xii; Dewey, 1916). Democracy, an ideal referenced throughout the thesis, is a discursive space and not necessarily a form of government, but a form of living together as beings of praxis.

**Development**

The thesis often uses the terms development and developers. This poses a potential hazard for the reader, who might question that if the thesis critiques current development policy, which is exploitive, what of those agents who seek to work with the Somali people in a non-exploitive manner? This work deals with a system of development that is dominated by actors, whom for the most part, have ideological interests antithetical to those of developed populations. After reviewing the second and third chapters, the reader should understand that the process of development is characterized by a dialectical conflict between worldviews – and this will guide any development taking place, regardless as to whether or not an actor has the best of intentions.
Furthermore, the definition of the developer is fluid; a developer can be an individual, organization, or state, and development can mean an act, a process, and a system of relation. While Freire emphasizes in his work an interpersonal relationship within education, he is also quick to condemn the power relations between society (oppressor and oppressed) as well as those within the school, or teacher (banker) and student (bank). In this regard, the definition of development throughout the thesis is meant to encapsulate the developer-developed relationship in all its forms: between people, institutions, and within conflicting systems.

1.4 Chapter Preview

Chapter Two presents a conceptual framework that builds upon three sources in order to construct a single lens through which to view development practice. These sources are: 1) critical theories related to education and civic epistemology; 2) the Western democratic tradition; 3) democratic practice in Africa; and 4) contemporary theories on development. The conceptual framework will form the basis for what I intend to introduce in the fourth chapter, the practices of ‘status-quo development’ and ‘development as pedagogy’.

Chapter Three presents a review of the literature pertaining to Somalia. It begins with an exposition of Somali culture and the geography of the region, familiarizing the reader with traditional cultural practices. It then moves into a study of the history of development within Somali, moving from the colonial era into the present. The literature review will then presents recent policies pertaining to the development of the country, and my critique will begin within this chapter. The section will describe policy by partitioning it into relevant clusters that group international, regional and domestic
together in their respective categories. A focus, here, will be placed upon ways in which developers have attempted to create a society from the ‘top-down’ through the creation of institutions. Just as Menkhaus (2007) writes that the people of Somalia have become increasingly resistant to centralized governance, this chapter will deepen that understanding to show how development policy has acted and continues to act as a vector of domination that deprives the Somali people of a much needed agency. These policies constitute a poorly realized neo-liberal mechanism for State building still trapped in colonial paradigms.

The purpose of the fourth chapter is to reframe the act of development to that required for participative citizenship in Somalia. Essentially, this chapter positions an alternative to current development practice and relies upon the policy analysis and conceptual framework in order to construct a dialectic between what I deem ‘status quo development’ and ‘development as pedagogy’. In the first case, ‘status-quo development’ is current practice, the shaping of aid and intervention to meet the needs of a neo-liberal system that is both implicitly and explicitly a vector of domination (Freire, 1972; Pettit, 1997). ‘Development as pedagogy’, on the other hand, requires that the agent (Somali) undergoing development processes be capable of problem-posing their condition within both a cultural and historical narrative, thereby enabling the creation of a critical consciousness (Freire, 1972; Glass, 2001). This consciousness iterates the ‘democratic good-works’, which are the goal of development processes, and revolts against the status-quo interpretation of the Somali as a receptacle for western (read neo-liberal) aid, which is the fountainhead of dependence and hence oppression (Bohman, 2004b).
The final chapter, Chapter Five, will make recommendations for further study and analysis. I recognize that the account presented in this thesis cannot encompass all the intricacies of a complex problem and a diverse culture. However, the shortcomings of my analysis will be noted and avenues of study that could add to the literature will be discussed. This chapter also serves as a conclusion, and I will finalize my case for ‘development as pedagogy’ and reject the status-quo application of aid to dispossessed peoples not just in Somalia, but in every nation where ‘democratic’ development occurs.

2. CHAPTER TWO: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROJECT

In this chapter I construct a conceptual framework to drive my critical analysis of development policy in Somalia. It is comprised of several parts, which when taken together illuminate an understanding of: 1) the concept of associated living and education for democratic life; 2) critical pedagogies, praxis and the Freirean concept of conscientization; 3) the western democratic worldview and its relation to republican thought; 4) the exploration of the uniquely African democratic worldview; and 5) modern theories on development. These parts, independent of one another, do not form a comprehensive response to the problems associated with domination (Pettit, 1997). However, as a whole this conceptual framework will prove a cogent method of
analyzing policy, and will result in a deeper understanding, not just of what democracy looks like in Somalia, but also how to structure further efforts at development.

The importance of bridging African democratic thought with western democratic thought is paramount. The thrust of this thesis is to generate a reconceptualization of the relationship between the developer and developed peoples. This conceptual framework is an effort in building an understanding that the African political landscape is unique, but not separate, from the western one. The epistemic act of coming to know oneself and another can serve to bind two agents together (Valk, 2009). Hopefully, these two agents will pursue an act of co-construction that results in a more cosmopolitan vision for the process of state building (Bohman, 2004b).

**Why critical theory and Freire?**

The choice to use critical theorists such as Freire stems from an understanding that much of the literature surrounding development is devoid of indigenous voice and perspective when written by western counterparts. Freire is chosen in order to establish the introspective necessary to undertake this project, and position myself such that I work to establish a joint literacy between the western and the Somali – as seen through the eyes of the colonial other. Building on his work in rural Brazil, Freire can be used to understand the processes associated with industrial progress, institutional development, and the experiences of indigenous peoples during the process and throughout their relations with developers (Glass, 2001).

**2.1 Dewey and the Democratic Community**

I turn to the work of Dewey to construct an image of what the democratic community looks like. Dewey (1916) viewed democracy as the act of communal living,
and he argues it was a dialogue that occurred between citizens regardless of political or social affiliation. This dialogue was important, because it allowed for the expressions of difference that would push society forward in the progressive act of sustainment (Wang, 2009). Education is something practiced inside and outside of the classroom, with the environment in which people live educating as much as the teacher in an institution (Dewey, 1916). This understanding adapts itself to the republican dialogue surrounding civic education or tutelage, and I note that common themes of learning to live within a polity (community) are found in the related democratic theories and worldviews presented by both western and African authors. As this is a study of an African nation, I recognize that the salvation of development may be in the work produced by Dewey, as he argued for the recognition of the community as a focal point of interest. This focus on discursive and associative political community will drive the argument of my thesis, and dovetails with the needs of African democracies.

When people make education the “mainspring of present effort” (Dewey, 1916, p. 56) they inhibit the progression meant to be achieved by democratic conceptions in education and focus instead on the maintenance of a status-quo that will result in the inevitable death of culture, society, and government because future generations do not become agents of thick democratic change (Apple, 2003). For Dewey, education is a means to reiteration, but also growth. Society becomes a microcosm of the natural world and takes on the characteristics of its creators.
Building
community

Education is both a conservative and progressive act, and the act of educating is meant to conserve that which a society holds imperative to its survival but it also works towards establishing a sense of progress (Dewey, 1916). This characterization of education is important because it lays the groundwork for how I believe developers need to be practicing development - there must be a respect for culture but also attention towards a goal that does not perpetuate the ‘status quo’ of neo-liberalism and the official conception of republicanism (democracy) (Laborde, 2008).

Dewey’s democratic society is not one that limits itself to the machinations of democratic governance and administration. Rather, it is a civil society that is about living together in a community. The purpose of education is preparing the youth for public life in relation to one another, much as Machiavelli sees the purpose that tutelage in the liberal arts is meant to serve. There is a communitarian value to democracy that must supersede the political in order for society to progress (Dewey, 1916).

The importance of recognizing democracy as associated living in the contexts of Somalia is found in the manner by which developers often focus on Democracy as opposed to democracy. By this, I mean that developers concern themselves with crafting the framework for political relations before they concern themselves with crafting the framework for community relations. This results in a thinly realized vision for the practice of associated living, or democratic life, also known as the vivere civile (Pocock, 1975). By focusing on capital ‘D’ Democracy, developers fall into the trap of ‘fixing’ democracy within a single moment in time (Wang, 2009). That ‘fixing’ results in the
inability for society to adapt to change as required, and because society is the creation of human beings who construct it as a means to cultural and social regeneration it is doomed to collapse under the weight of that change because all efforts to produce new arrangements are viewed as corruption of the neo-liberal status-quo.

Associated living within a democratic community also requires that the citizen be prepared to engage in the dialogue required of them. This point is expanded upon in my section on Freire, that neo-liberal democratic practice still relies upon a hierarchical structure means that the social dialectic of oppressor and oppressed is reinforced (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). Students, whether those in the school or those interacting with developers, are neglected by the pedagogues who should be teaching them the dispositional state that is active and involved citizenship.

One must separate this democratic conception of associated living with democratic politics because Dewey’s critique necessitates that students are entrusted with ‘re-enacting’ the democratic project in every moment possible (Wang, 2009). What this means for the construction of community is that participants, the citizens, are constantly involved in recreating their own relationships. The act of associated living is brought about treating the democratic project as something internal to one’s self; it is the habitual integration of pluralist and progressive tendencies into one’s ontology. Wang regards Democracy and Education as purposefully phrased, as Dewey sought not to limit the concept of democratic life to rote vocational education in the project of citizenship.

Associated living requires the individual to embody a democratic spirit that renews the community every day of their lives (Dewey, 1916). This renewal is not as simple as beginning from a ‘blank slate’ – there is a cultural lineage that is oft adhered
to (Dewey, 1916). Rather, the renewal is a form of sustainment, wherein history is not lost but solidified and improved upon. Sustaining the community already built becomes a project for the individual who embodies its spirit, and recognizes that it is inextricably intertwined with the relentless march of human progress.

**Sustaining community**

As society progresses it is apt to change, and that change demonstrates both a connection to the past and a forward look to the future. Sustaining the community is a practical act and it is meant to enforce through practice the democratic conception within one’s daily life (Dewey, 1916). Reiteration, in the manner that Dewey envisions, is meant not only to enact the democratic project but also to practice it (Wang, 2009). Through this the individual becomes better attuned to their own social situation, and they begin to co-create, this co-creation being the very lifeblood of the democracy. It is participatory because the process of sustaining the community requires active on-going involvement, not the mere act of passive choice that occurs every four years and is done when one leaves the voting booth.

Beyond the end goal of reiteration, Dewey argues that education, or the act of renewal, also has the aim of social efficiency and culture. By this, Dewey seeks to impart to the reader an understanding that lifelong education should seek to mitigate inequity. In short he seeks to enable all to pursue their calling and improve upon personal character. There is no feudal delineation which inhibits human flourishing (Hyslop-Margison, 2001). Development should take these as aims as well, as it is imperative that republican citizens share in a society that seeks to mitigate inequities. They must also develop a culture that is pluralistic and sensitive to the individual’s predicament.
When speaking of traditional education institutions, Dewey argues that schools will produce citizens capable of democratic practice so long as they respect the "epistemic ideals and critical dispositions required" for such participation (Hyslop-Margison, 2001, p. 82). That participation is contingent upon autonomy. Autonomy is contingent upon freedom, and this freedom is rooted in the belief that to be free within a democracy for Dewey was the liberty to engage in dialogue with other democratic participants. The relationship that autonomy has with democracy is that it is the basic, negative, prerequisite for citizenship – one must be unchained in order to act (Pettit, 1997). Freedom, in the sense utilized, is the ability to engage in democratic dialogue. This disposes of the oppressor-oppressed dialectic and enables community to become associative (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

According to Dewey, the act of reiterating democratic life, through education, is also dependent upon a culture that is both progressive and conservative. This conservative culture is one that lionizes the projects of generations past – recognizing their faults and accomplishments. The progressive culture envisioned by Dewey is one that is arrived at after generations of practicing associated living. With this in mind, Dewey argues that the antithesis to his free democratic society is the individualism that one must learn to combat through pedagogy. His 'humanity' was the associative community of beings:

"In membership in humanity, as distinct from a state, man's capacities would be liberated; while in existing political organizations his powers were hampered and distorted to meet the requirements and selfish interests of the rulers of the state. The doctrine of extreme individualism was but the counterpart, the obverse, of ideals of the indefinite perfectibility of man and of a social organization having a
scope as wide as humanity. The emancipated individual was to become the organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society.” (Dewey, 1916, p. 91-92)

This is the pre-political realization that as an associative community, justice as fairness is paramount (Honneth, 1998; Rawls, 1958). Justice becomes a central requirement to the community because if practiced as fairness – with each offered the same liberty – then the community is capable of free association (Rawls, 1958). Dewey requires his democratic community to be free, which means that the liberties enjoyed by all must not be arbitrarily delineated (Rawls, 1958). This develops a culture that is predisposed to respecting each individual’s freedom as connected to the freedom of the community – and not predicated upon any one person’s arbitrium.

**Culture and adaptation**

Culture becomes intimately enmeshed with the reiteration of society as different cultures all seek to ‘modernize’ themselves (Fallace, 2012). This process of arriving at modernity is not grounded in a linear temporality, but instead practiced by the critical analysis of how citizens relate to one another. Fallace (2012) argues that Dewey initially approached different cultures as deficient in some manner: a deficit approach that was hardly pluralistic. The end result of Dewey’s exploration was the realization that cultures not produced by Western political thought sought a similar end as those that had practiced the teachings of republican and democratic theorists (Fallace, 2012). This modernity should be viewed as the confrontation of the way things have been, in the hopes of arriving at progressive solutions. The ‘modern’ is neither scientific nor technical, but rather a way of being critically aware and involved in social restructuring.

What impeded different cultures from arriving at modernity wasn’t a lack of scientific knowledge, but instead a necrophilic preoccupation with the past (Fallace,
This wasn’t a love for culture that prevented societal restructuring; rather, it is through a lack of dialogue within the community that prevented societies from perpetuating themselves into the future (Fallace, 2012). In *Democracy and Education* Dewey argues that the only way to produce progressive change (development) is to interact with one another in a civil society. Fallace regards Dewey as having eventually arrived at a realization that in order for any one society to adopt another’s practices those practices must be changed to adapt to the receiving society’s ends.

Dewey and Fallace mount an argument for adaptation that is also produced in works by African political scientists (Mbabuike, 2001). What Mbabuike argues is preventing educational adaptation in the African context is also what Fallace (2012) argues Dewey recognized as preventing societies from reiterating themselves and moving forward into an unending modernity of constant change. This means that education must be adaptable to the culture it is meant to be adopted by, just as democracy must be ‘universalized’. This adaptation of social process, the means to modern ends so to speak, is achieved through a critical interaction and introspection. This act of adaptation is important, and drives the latter half of this chapter as I adapt the western democratic worldview to the African. Furthermore, that adaptation requires a criticality in everyday practice and one that ‘problem-poses’ the effort and result of both politics and political life.

2.2 Critical Pedagogy and Educating for a Humanizing Democracy

The issue, development policy in Somalia, depends upon a realization that there are two types of democracy capable of being practiced. The thick kind is wholly participatory where agents are capable of thrusting themselves into the political process and are acutely aware of their role and position in the world (Apple, 2003). The second
type of democracy is thin, which refers to a neo-liberal and libertarian vision for the
democratic project (Apple, 2003). This thin democracy sees the citizen as a consumer,
whose purpose is to drive the cogs of the marketplace and become a subject to its
machinations. This section looks to develop an understanding of how to arrive at the
‘thick’ vision, instead of the already realized ‘thin’ iteration currently practiced by many
liberal democracies.

The route to thick realizations of democracy is complex. This chapter is
constructed in a manner that hopes to make both chronological and practical sense. I
begin by defining the democratic community, and end by considering the pedagogy
required to generate this community. I include this section to help the reader understand
that the democratic project cannot realize its ‘thick’ form unless citizens operate with an
innate criticality; this criticality being the product of an adherence to the idea that reality
is socially constructed and reiterated by social means. Thus, the democratic project is
capable of being changed, mid-course, by agents possessing the appropriate tools.

Freire and liberatory education

Freire (1972) wrote *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in the hopes that he would begin
a dialogue on how to positively affect the democratic project through critiques of neo-
liberal and conservative economic, social, and political processes (Glass, 2001). This
sort of critique had one thing in mind: the liberation of peoples from oppressive
positions within a society constructed and sustained under the ‘necrophillic’, status-quo,
mindset of the oppressor. Simply put, Freire recognizes that in order to liberate
oppressed peoples the education of those individuals had to be constructive, as well as
critical of their position within the world. The oppressed occupy their current social and
cultural position not only because oppressive elements within the ruling class and
system kept them there, but also because they have become perpetuators of the oppressive system themselves – they have begun to embody and internalize the oppressive mindset (Freire, 1972).

In order to wrest one’s self from the position of the oppressed a person must begin to critically interact with the world around them as well as critically contemplate what their position means (Freire, 1972). This interaction and reflection is termed praxis and is a dialectical interplay between how history and culture construct a person’s position, and how that person constructs history and culture (Glass, 2001). Praxis is meant to achieve a shift in the mindset that perpetuates the culture of oppression, reconstituting the system that shapes the oppressive force in the first place (Freire, 1972). More than simply ‘thinking about’ one’s position and cultural history, praxis requires the individual to apply learned knowledge in a critical and progressive manner. It is only through understanding where one has come from that one can truly know where to proceed. Human beings are beings of praxis, and they are able to understand the historical reasons for their current situatedness (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

Freire recognizes that the ontological feature of human being, people as products and producers of history and culture requires that education for freedom starts with history (Glass, 2001). This education is meant to show people where they come from, and in turn show them how things can be different (Freire, 1972). Education practice that is critical requires an active form of learning, which rejects what Freire (1972) calls the ‘banking conception’ of education. This conception contends that much of the traditional practice of educating, thus shaped in and for the oppressive climate, concerns itself with ‘depositing’ knowledge in the student as though they were an empty receptacle incapable of their own free thought. Such a practice is wholly meant to
perpetuate the modes of dehumanization (oppression) that govern current economic and political systems, and ‘programs’ the individual to become complicit in their dehumanization (Glass, 2001). A student of ‘banking education’ becomes like an animal, merely living in a world constructed by others and not emerging from it as a free being.

To combat this complicity, Freire contends that we must begin to recognize the ontological vocation of persons as humanization. By this, Freire means that the purpose of all peoples is to re-humanize society, as most of it has become dehumanized. This relies upon the realization that it is impossible to oppress, or dehumanize, without first being dehumanized (Glass, 2001). This dehumanization occurs because of cultural processes, and thus Freire (1972) poses the problem that even those with positions of power in the oppressive society are themselves oppressed by the ‘official’ system. Liberatory education becomes not just about freeing the poor, disadvantaged, and marginalized, but also about freeing the oppressors from the chains they have placed upon themselves.

**Humanization as vocation and its barriers**

The vocation of humanization requires an individual to engage in *conscientization*, which is the practice of consistent engagement with one’s self and the society in which one lives (Freire, 1972). This practice is necessary for becoming humanized, and will eventually result in the humanistic revival of citizenship. This revival is only possible through engagement, which is an act of co-construction between the educator and the pupil where they both interact with a subject and come to an understanding together (Freire, 1972). Freire recognizes educators as vocational
teachers, insofar as they prepare the student for lifelong learning in being completely human (Glass, 2001).

Humanization is a process pursued throughout the entirety of a person’s life (Freire, 1972). This is not to say that progress cannot be made, but Freire recognized that society had no end to its history, much as Dewey did. Progress as human flourishing bespeaks a language similar to humanization through conscientization, and regards the democratic project as rooted in community life and thick democratic practice. The act of being human, for Freire, was connected to our ability to create meaning from our lives (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). That meaning is found in the societies that we sustain through corporate interaction with one another.

The vocation of ‘being human’ relies upon the autonomy discussed previously, which in turn allows the human to become free. That autonomy, for Freire, represented itself in the act of being capable to position oneself within a social and cultural history. Freedom came with the annihilation of the oppressor-oppressed dialectic sustained by neo-liberal structures and pedagogies in favor of a dialogic, or constructive process. Being human, and the act of humanization, is vehemently non-monolithic – it is a pluralistic vision for society wherein reinvention of the structure was possible through human action and reflection. People become less instruments of a neo-liberal political structure and more co-creators of that associative democracy envisioned by Dewey (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

Freire’s vocational conception of humanization faces barriers because of a cultural history that has emplaced within people the slave mentality (Godatti & Torres, 2009). This mentality enacted a ‘muteness’, which is comparable to the mentality expected today of citizens living within thinly realized democratic states (Apple, 2003).
The muteness of the oppressed makes community life nigh impossible (Godatti & Torres, 2009). Without recognizing the vocation of people as humanization, citizens remain mute and will continue to practice thin forms of democratic life.

The barriers to humanization are culturally and historically rooted, but can be removed by inclusive and open education processes that promote the practice of lifelong learning that allows for problem solving to occur in a truly open and engaged environment (Glass, 2001; Godatti & Torres, 2009; Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). This type of learning is precipitated by an education that prepares the individual not merely for a position in the global marketplace, but instills within the pupil a propensity for ‘problem-posing’, which allows and encourages critical inquiry and co-construction (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007).

**Problem posing, citizenship education and lifelong learning**

Problem posing is the process of educating for real-world change. The problem is posed to the student, who is asked to critically engage with the subject manner as though they are looking to fix it (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). This predisposes the student to the humanization process of conscientization, and prepares them for a life of civic action and reflection (Freire, 1972). The importance of this type of education cannot be understated, as the student is made to interact with community problems and find locally sustainable and intensely personal solutions (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

Examples of this type of education are found in the Citizen Schools of Porto Alegre, wherein students are asked to engage with community issues in a critical and progressive manner (Gandin & Apple, 2003). These schools effectively integrate the teachings of Freire, and allow students to "construct personal understanding through
successive stages of critical inquiry" (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007, p. 356). The Citizen Schools look to create in students an awareness of the varying ways in which their community is affected by historical injustices, and require the students to interact with that history (Gandin & Apple, 2003). In essence, these schools develop curricula that support successive stages of critical inquiry, not the instrumental learning often found in education systems prepping students for work in the global market (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

These successive stages of critical inquiry begin with the student, or agent of development, exploring their immediate perspective of the world and their situatedness (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). This enables them to become the critical agents of social transformation that Freire meant as the ends of critical pedagogy. Problem posing moves participants towards humanization, as they begin to confront the social history that has victimized them and relegated them to voicelessness (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). “Problem posing… has at its core a critical understanding of reason” (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010, p. 103) and this relies upon the lived experiences of the participants within a critical dialogue meant to wrest the oppressive dialectic apart and transform it into a discursive and humanizing space.

It is through problem posing that educators can begin to engage the tools of ‘thick’ citizenship within their students and co-construct shared solutions to communal problems (Gandin & Apple, 2003; Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). This sort of education has the objective of transforming ‘official knowledge’, that knowledge which perpetuates the oppressive system, for democratic and critical knowledge that aids in community building (Apple, 2003). Gandin and Apple (2003) argue that the Citizen Schools in Porto Alegre have resulted in the student not just understanding their place in
the world, but also working towards democratic solutions that are inclusive and
communitarian. This process of positioning one’s marginalized culture within a
community of cultures engages the criticality explicated by Freire as necessary for
conscientization.

The education that prepares a person for citizenship is lifelong (Hyslop-
Margison & Naseem, 2007). Freire draws upon the work done by Dewey in order to
structure his conception of civic education as necessarily ‘thick’. This is in stark contrast
to the sort of learning that is perpetuated by agents of ‘thin’, neo-liberal, democracy who
view the process of lifelong learning as rote retraining, or preparation as human capital
(Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). It is important to differentiate between the thin
version of lifelong learning as education for employability and the thick version as
critical interaction and reflection. Where one process is necrophillic as it seeks to sustain
an unstable and oppressive system, the other is progressive and co-constructive, a
process that recognizes the assets that are necessarily present in the community (Freire,
1972).

I focus on human capital preparation because this will illuminate problems
inherent within current development practice. The human capital model is noted by
Hyslop-Margison and Naseem (2007) as being ideological, insofar as it places the blame
for unemployment squarely on the shoulders of the worker who has ‘failed’ to train
themselves effectively throughout their lives. As developers seek to instill the tools of
public administration, citizenship and criticality in the Global South they must be wary
of utilizing a model that assumes there is a ‘right’ way of conducting one’s self
according to a neo-liberal (and implicitly colonial) rubric.
Lifelong learning as conscientization prepares individuals to practice thick forms of democracy within a community. This requires not just co-constructive education, which rejects banking conceptions utilized by neo-liberal human capital models, but also necessitates that educators problem pose curriculum such that they encourage critical reflection and interaction with an indigenous subject matter (Freire, 1972; Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). Just as the Citizen Schools in Porto Alegre problem pose curriculum in relation to the favelas (slums), so too must educators elsewhere problem pose curricula in order to engender the democratic conception within their pupils (Gandin & Apple, 2003). As individuals are prepared for critical lifelong learning they are better suited to rebuild communities in a manner that supports further growth. This is the reiteration called for by Dewey and forms a basis for the act of associated living that characterizes democratic society.

A humanizing form of democracy

The ontology of ‘being human’, according to Freire, is the act of being free to work, eat, laugh, speak, engage, and simply be (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). This requires that each member of the community be capable, and enabled, to freely associate with one another (Dewey, 1916) – functionally adapting ‘justice as fairness’ in order to liberate not only the associative community, but also the citizen (Rawls, 1958). This liberation enables the dialogue that precipitates from the ontological need for a voice that liberates human beings from the oppressive structures emplaced by neo-liberal practice (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

The associative community of Dewey (1916) requires that the Freirean conception of human ontology be adapted in order to be successful. His community, a
space of discursive post-political life, lives off the dialogue sustained by acutely aware
and active citizens. In Dewey’s community history is not lost, just as Freire (1972)
regards it as a necessity for liberation that one’s history be remembered and positioned.
Thus, democracy becomes more than just a hierarchical structure for government and
instead is shaped into a discursive agora, wherein the citizens discuss their relationship
to one another and the world around them (Bohman, 2004b).

A humanizing form of democracy is one that incorporates the ontological need
for voice found in Freire (1972) and the associative aspects of community found in
Dewey (1916). With these two precepts incorporated into the democratic society, the
citizen is able to interact with their peers and position themselves and their histories in a
manner that leads to them becoming less an instrument of the state and more a thick
participant in their own revitalization and liberation. This humanizing form of
democracy has a history in the western tradition that is often overlooked, and the next
section intends to unpack that understanding and redraw what democracy means to the
western developer.

2.3 The Development of the Western Democratic Worldview

The development of political thought in the Global North has a rich intellectual
history that spans across millennia. This section is necessary if I hope to blend my
culturally situated understanding of the history of democracy with the African
understanding. This interplay between understandings is a necessity; the relationship
that exists between developers from the Global North and the people of the Global
South is strengthened by knowing the ‘other’ (Valk, 2009). The purpose of this section
is to understand what a democracy looks like to the developer, what the benchmark of
theoretical success is, and what history grounds my understanding of the democratic and
republican project. I will draw upon classic, renaissance and modern theorists to develop an understanding of this democratic worldview as grounded in the republican tradition. This tradition is one that is governed by law and voluntarily accepted by the people—a civil polity (Pettit, 1997; Polybius, 1979). It is from this tradition that societies seek a way of structuring systems of relation so as to minimize corruption and maximize participation by the people of the state.

The western democratic political organization has two roles within it: the role of trustor and the role of trustee (Pettit, 1997). The people and the state occupy these two roles, respectively. In Western democratic thought, the argument is made that people emplace within the state a trust to govern, with governance being a method of controlling arbitrium, or the ability for one to arbitrarily interfere with another’s will (Pettit, 1997). That type of interference is noted as being domination, which lends itself to the breakdown of the political efficacy that is necessary for citizen involvement in the project of state building (Pettit, 1997). This term, domination, will be utilized throughout the thesis as it interplays with the oppression that liberatory education is meant to alleviate (Freire, 1972; Glass, 2001). With this in mind, the rest of the section should be read as a review of the goal such an education has in the Western tradition.

**Western democracy and its classic beginnings**

Plato (trans. 1997) in the Socratic dialogue *The Republic* informs the reader that those things which are “healthy... produce health, unhealthy ones disease” (p. 1076). In this regard he refers to the beginnings of any political society, and notes that the health and wellbeing of the state is inexorably linked to the political (read civil) health of the citizen (Plato, trans. 1997). It is a duty for the citizens to involve themselves in an education that promotes participation in the state, as it is through this participation that
justice is achieved. The ideal governor of the state was a person who ruled as a king and practiced philosophy. The ‘philosopher kings’ referred to in the text are concerned not just with what is just, but the absolute form of justice. These rulers are “keen sighted” (Plato, trans. 1997, p. 1107) and because they work towards a ‘pure’ form of justice that protects the liberty of all, the actual form and not the shade, they are better equipped to make law as opposed to those that do not recognize justice as a virtue.

*The Republic* calls for a ruling class of ‘philosopher kings’, men capable of leading the state based upon reason and logic (Plato, trans. 1997). An educated and rational ruling authority is an important part of the western democratic project, and this forms the basis for any argument proposing a form of citizen-education. The democratic conception that is a part of western political thought today is inclusive of the argument that men and women must be tutored in their civic practice. The Global North’s political worldview is shaped by this ideal; according to Yankelovich (1991) public judgement requires the ability to undergo a series of value based stages that are the result of information processes located within the individual. While Plato rejected the ability of the *demos* or mob to be able to govern themselves, Aristotle (trans. 1985) came to the conclusion that democracy could work so long as people had access to the tools of reason and reflection. The people, after all, were all beings of praxis (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

Aristotle (trans. 1985) in *The Politics* writes that, “the presupposition of the democratic sort of regime is freedom” (p. 183). This served to expand the democratic project to include the analysis that true understanding and interaction with knowledge could not occur without the freedom to pursue virtue. The western democratic conception holds that the state is a vehicle for the pursuit of justice, a personal
equilibrium that is the root of happiness (Aristotle, trans. 1985). The state, incorporated by individuals, protects the freedom that allows this pursuit. Building upon the work of Plato, Aristotle postulates that the democratic – indeed any – state requires the polity be sufficiently tutored. “Happiness is the best thing, and is the actualization of virtue and a certain practice of it”, and the majority of citizens must be able to exercise their propensity towards virtue in order to ensure happiness; freedom, justice, and a civil society (Aristotle, trans. 1985, p. 209).

For the common life, education must be had in common: a universal drive at the creation of citizens prepared for virtuous life in the state. It is in Aristotle (trans. 1985) that I find movement towards a more universal ideal for governance, as he sees fit to impart to the reader a conception of the citizen as universally trainable in his or her own civic-virtue. This training, the education of citizens, is an integral part of state building in the Western project (Aristotle, trans. 1985). The viability of a political entity relies upon ‘engineers’ that understand its machinations.

This Aristotelian focus on the preparation of the youth for individual and social ‘flourishing’ is punctuated with his understanding that the world created by men requires a criticality be imparted to the architects of reality (Hyslop-Margison, 2001). This criticality is non-mechanical in nature, and is an earlier iteration of the praxis mentioned in Freire (1972) that argues for a critical retrospection and action on the world (Hyslop-Margison, 2001). Aristotle arrives at his path for human excellence by making the case for the practice of praxis in the education of Greek citizens; which in turn prepares them for the active public life, *vita activa*, necessary for virtuous living (Pocock, 1975).
There is a connection to be made between Aristotle and Freire, with Freire’s conception of ontology intimately enmeshed with Aristotle’s understanding of the practice of politics. For Aristotle, politics were a means to produce happiness within the individual – human beings are beings of rhetorical praxis (Hyslop-Margison, 2001). Freire (1972) conceptualized the human ontology, our state of being, as a constant drive to create and sustain in a manner that is free (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). For Freire, the human ontology was a practice of politics that was social and associative in nature – the political community offered the human being a chance to practice his or her ontological need for voice (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). The Aristotelian practice of politics is the framework for liberatory vocation.

Polybius (trans. 1979), writing on the Roman Republic, argues that there are three forms of government: Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy. The antitheses to these three virtuous forms are the corruptions of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Anarchy. In book six of *Rise of the Roman Empire* Polybius makes the argument that there must be an inclusion of elements from all three kinds of government; a mix of kingship, aristocracy and democracy. He characterizes these forms not based upon ‘class’, necessarily, but rather on one ruler, a few rulers and popular rule (Polybius, trans. 1979).

It is these three species of government that build a republic. However, it is only rule that is voluntarily accepted by the people that may be called a kingship or aristocracy or democracy (Polybius, trans. 1979). Polybius (trans. 1979) concludes book six by describing some of the societies that have structures non-conducive to democratic success. He condemns Athens’ constitution as having no mixed form of government, thus no jurisdictional checks and balances necessary to prevent decline and collapse (Polybius, trans. 1979). Crete is an allegory of modern neo-liberal democracies, with
Polybius (trans. 1979) noting it as ruled by avarice and greed. The people of Crete, having placed no restriction upon how much property a man may own, viewed the accumulation of wealth as a virtuous and civic pursuit and viewing wealth as absolutely necessary for public life (Polybius, trans. 1979). It is in Polybius that I find the beginnings of egalitarian, communitarian, and more popular structures for governance. The early Western democratic worldview reviled the privations of neo-liberalism.

**Civic humanism and Italian republicans**

The classic Greek and Roman beginnings of western political thought provide a history that influenced the modern and renaissance thinkers of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Florentine conception of democratic citizenship was rooted in their civic humanism, which viewed a customary community – the church – as not so much a republic of citizens as an institution that maintained a status quo that left much of society disengaged and politically destitute (Pocock, 1975). There was an understanding in this democratic revival that individuals relying upon tradition as the only response to contingent happenings will not “apply their collective powers of positive decision” (Pocock, 1975, p. 49). The Florentines saw the republican polity as a discursive one.

Early republicans concerned themselves not just with the structure of society, but also with what made life noticeably better for the people (Pocock, 1975). This arose from what Aristotle (trans. 1985) noted as man’s quest to replicate the values he saw in nature. Thus, the republican polity was accepting of individual difference, and Florentine political thought argued “the citizen is he who can develop as many forms of human excellence as possible and develop them all in the service of the city” (Pocock, 1975, p. 88). Virtue as human excellence (Hyslop-Margison, 2001) was participatory,
and the republic relied upon the citizens taking an active interest in its survival: whether through the forming of a militia or by voting. Pocock (1975) argues that early republicans in Florence realized that the fewer 'effective' – virtuous – citizens there were the fewer the group of men ruling the city there would be. This left the state vulnerable to tyranny or oligarchy (Harrington, trans. 1977).

In order to function within that discursive framework in a virtuous manner, the citizen had to be able to grasp political mechanics with a variable ease. Pocock (1975) notes that the Florentine and Venetian theorists understood that the “citizen must have a theory of knowledge which allows great latitude for public decisions upon political events” (p. 50). This required an education geared towards public life, and the civic humanism of renaissance Italy adapted itself to a system that required at least some training in the liberal arts as preparation for democratic life (Skinner, 1981).

The liberal arts were viewed as essential by the civic humanists because they viewed ‘salvation’ in the triumph of a human freedom over the tyranny of an oppressor (Jurdjevic, 1999). The liberal arts, for these humanists, allowed the citizen an ability to become that being of praxis that Aristotle and Freire viewed as what separated human beings from animals. Moreover, the liberal arts were the means to triumph over tyranny – the republicans of the ‘communal era’ in Italy saw these arts as necessary for participation in a guild, and hence participation in the political community of Florence (Jurdjevic, 1999).

**Oceana and the English democratic worldview**

Harrington (trans. 1977) begins the preliminaries of the *Commonwealth of Oceana* by stating that “a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right... it is the empire of laws and not of men” (p. 161).
Harrington makes the argument for an equal commonwealth (republic) where the senate debates, the people resolve, and the magistracy executes. The separation of powers serves to check and balance any one individual’s ability to practice dominium, the act of arbitrarily interfering in another’s will (Pettit, 1997).

That the commonwealth, or republic, is nothing but the “national conscience” (Harrington, trans. 1977, p. 185) supports an argument for civic tutelage. The executive, or magistracy, must not be occupied for too long by the same group of men (Harrington, trans. 1977). Thus, the necessity of civic tutelage becomes even more apparent. The constitutional structure of *Oceana* is functionally egalitarian, and represents a call for equal citizenship across the spectrum of peoples. Harrington (trans. 1977) engages the reader to critically assess what makes commonwealths fall apart due to civil unrest: “a commonwealth that is internally equal hath no internal cause of commotion, and therefore can have no such effect but from without” (p. 274). The idea that equality is necessary for civil life extends to other republican theorists such as Rousseau (trans. 1987) who notes in his *Second Discourse* the role that inequality – especially the unequal distribution of property – had on a polity.

That these early political philosophers so cogently and saliently described the same functionally republican role for a government and a state is no mistake or coincidence. Just as there is a political history of Somalia, Canada, Great Britain or Greece there is a history of thought that built upon the works of Plato (trans. 1997). As Greek thought precipitated into Roman republicanism, which in turn influenced the Florentine renaissance and then led to the English Civil War, a history of viewing humanity’s need for liberty emerges. That liberty is vital to our understanding of a democracy, as liberty invokes in us a realization of agency: to be free is to be unchained.
To be free is to not suffer under the arbitrary will of another (Pettit, 1997). To be free is to have the liberty of movement, thought, choice and relation. It is no wonder that most states, to this day, pay lip service to the republicanism formed and improved upon in this first millennium.

Harrington grounds his political man in property, with Pocock (1975) noting that “Harrington emphasizes less the moral than the material bases of his personality” (p. 389). The emphasis, apparent in writings that appear in the early eighteenth century, is that republican philosophers busied themselves arguing that no one man or corporate agent should become so rich as to reduce the rest of the commonwealth to dependence and collapse (Rousseau, trans. 1987). This is nothing short of a re-articulation of classical republican thought, that indebtedness breeds corruption, which occurs at the top of the economic ladder as well as the bottom (Pocock, 1975). Much as Freire wrote that the oppressed internalize and reconstitute the mentality of the oppressor, so too does indebtedness breed corruption of the human being in every rung of civil society.

A commonality to all these political theorists is the view that civic agency, what Pocock (1975) terms *vita activa*, was a virtuous pursuit and necessary for the creation of a democracy. It will become apparent, in Chapter Four, that I believe the missing component in Somali development policy is an understanding of the importance of fostering the *vita activa* and that development agents seek only to encourage thin forms of democratic participation. Furthermore, this *vita activa* is what Dewey writes is the purpose to which education must strive in building an indigenous capacity for associated living. Thus, the republic relies upon citizenship education in order to sustain itself.
Modern theories in the Western tradition

The ability for states to finance large standing armies, and participate in the empire building that began in the eighteenth century, meant the lay person was no longer needed to perform as citizens in the classic sense (Pocock, 2009). The civic humanism that was popularized by Florentine political thought made way for a commercial humanism. As society became richer it needed less participation by the citizen to protect it (Pocock, 2009). Thus, the modern republic began to adopt a form of 'thin', or corporate libertarian, democracy that saw the citizen as a means to a commercial and industrial ends, the very definition of human capital, thus stunting critical engagement and reflection with, and on, culture and history. This is Dewey’s critique of the community that is created based upon an individual’s private interest.

Pettit (1997) argues in *Republicanism* that the liberal interpretation of republican virtue – the very definition of a thin democracy - has inculcated within numerous peoples and nations a laissez-faire attitude towards liberty. As long as the actor remains free from interference he or she is considered free by such proponents of libertarianism. The problem with such a libertarian approach to governance is that it does not measure nor pay heed to one’s propensity towards dominating another. Rather, it only heeds the action of oppression.

*Republicanism* makes the case to view liberty, or civic freedom, as non-domination or the freedom from arbitrary interference from a state, corporate entity, and individual (Pettit, 1997). If the republican state is based upon and ensures freedom from domination then it offers a way of justifying both egalitarian and communitarian institutions – the very institutions this thesis will argue are necessary for development. Pettit (1997) notes that liberty as non-domination differs from the negative and positive
conceptions of liberty. Positive liberty is that which is gained through executive action, negative liberty is achieved when an agent is merely free from rote interference. These two forms, negative and positive, are regarded as respectively ancient and modern, Aristotelian and liberal.

The state should concern itself with the liberty of the people, and ensure it through non-domination, because it acts to protect the agency of the citizen. Freedom as self-mastery, the positive form of liberty, is indeed a richer ideal than non-domination (Pettit, 1997). Yet, it is impossible to achieve participatory citizenship without freedom as non-domination. Pettit (1997) makes the case for liberty as non-domination by noting that it: 1) limits anxiety through curtailing the arbitrary nature of interference; 2) it reduces the need for strategic deference, as there is no need to placate the powerful; and 3) freedom as non-domination allows for people of the same social status, they do not need to “bow and scrape” (p. 87).

This codification in the laws of a person’s ontological need for liberty allows for a more inclusive and equal realization of public life, as Pettit (1997) writes: “To want republican liberty, you must have to want republican equality; to realize republican liberty, you have to realize republican community” (p. 126). This is the case because liberty as non-domination appeals to socialist, feminist, and multicultural advocates in that it sees capitalism as dependence of the worker upon a system, regards the vulnerability women face in many societies as arbitrary, and focuses on raising groups to the status of valued communities instead of factions to be oppressed (Pettit, 1997). Thus, the state becomes an active agent in ensuring liberty, whether through welfare, affirmative action, multicultural policy or benchmarks for gender representation. Pettit (1997) notes that calling for such a welfare state need not break from history or
republican thought, and argues Harrington (trans. 1977) is an example of someone who set such a historical precedent.

I note the purpose, outlined by Pettit, of non-domination to be ensuring egalitarian and communitarian ends for the commonwealth. However, this purpose is only enabled by the law upon which it rests. As Harrington noted that there must be an empire of laws and not of men, so too must republics allow for contestation of interference in the legal system (Pettit, 1997). This ability to contest an act of interference allows the populace an outlet for frustration and an ability to involve themselves, thereby encouraging participation in the creation of a more just state. This is progressive, in the vein of Dewey, and seeks not to idolize history but build upon it. The republic evolves because of this, and thus puts three conditions upon the republic: 1) the empire of law over any one person’s arbitrium; 2) the dispersion of powers; and 3) a counter-majoritarian principle, with minorities able to contest popular law if arbitrary (Pettit, 1997).

The republic, then, is a discursive space for public life. Pettit (1997) crafts a nation that is egalitarian, communitarian and responsible to all elements within it; not just the majority, wealthy, or powerful. This is a benchmark to which developers should strive, and nations should take note that such a state has the ability to craft civilized society in a way that ensures a return upon the trust invested within it (Pettit, 1997). As Putnam (2000) notes that the bonds of trust and reciprocity are what ensure a functioning community, Pettit (1997) argues that founding a republic upon laws that ensure liberty through non-domination allows the citizen to place trust within the corporate entity that is a republic: a nation where wealth, ideals, laws, and justice are all belonging to a common.
**Deliberative democracy and dialogic governance**

Building upon this history of republican and democratic thought is a movement that seeks to return the practice of democracy to renaissance Florence, or Ancient Greece. Deliberative democracy is a process wherein the citizen plays an integral role in coming to understand an issue or problem facing society (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004). This can take many forms, one of which is ‘deliberative polling’, wherein the citizens are chosen in order to establish a representative sampling and deliberate upon an issue. This process results in a vote, such that the citizens are able to democratically reach a decision upon important public policies (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004). This deliberative process is recommended in order to strengthen the social capital bonds that modern democracies must survive upon (Putnam, 2000). Putnam argues that the collapse of American political community can be traced to a collapse in the bonds of trust and reciprocity within a particular sub-stratum of that community. Envisioning a polis where the people deliberate, engage with one another, is one of the ways that Putnam (2000) and Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) propose to strengthen the democratic project in the Western world.

Note that Harrington (trans. 1977) wrote that the republic was built upon a pool of potential law makers, and the larger the pool the better the outcome. In this same vein proponents of deliberative democracy argue that society will become more connected and egalitarian if the pool of decision makers and analysts is widened. Rather than disallowing all experts from the policy or law making process, deliberative democracy seeks to include the citizen in a more horizontal approach to governance; a side-effect of the modern nation-state which holds millions of people (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004).
In addition to the deliberative process, there is a requirement for a judgement process within the public. Yankelovich (1991) contends that the problems with western democracy and eroding voter turnout have more to do with the public’s inability to engage themselves in the process than simply rote disinterest. Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) argue that responsible citizenship rests upon a mix of private and public citizenship—the want to address both passions equally. In this regard, the public citizen must consider what is good for his or her community, and the private citizen must discern what is best for his or her self. This stems from the citizen becoming *educated* to the fact that their non-deliberation on an issue threatens the efficacy of self-government. Yankelovich (1991) argues a similar tract, where he makes the case that the public does not need much in the way of ‘education’, rather, it simply needs to be told that it can have a tremendous effect on public policy decisions if it engages itself—regardless of technical knowledge. Both authors describe a situation where the public is held hostage by the assumption that ‘they do not know enough about their own lives and values’.

Enabling trans-national deliberative democracy is the republican conception of freedom as non-domination. Pettit’s (1997) theory encapsulates what Bohman (2004a) argues is the best way of ensuring that deliberation upon public issues being kept equal. In the decentralized, deliberative democracy, non-domination plays an integral role because it requires that multiple perspectives be respected based upon subjective legitimacy (Bohman, 2004a). Simply put, Bohman (2004a) uses the example of a recent Supreme Court of Canada case allowing the stories of aboriginal peoples into evidence during a trial as a way of showing how sometimes deliberative processes benefit from having a perspective present that would otherwise be silenced by uncritical equality— or freedom as non-interference.
Freire, too, saw the importance in having a deliberative space within the commons. The attention to pedagogical dialogics found in the final chapters of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* bespeaks an understanding that cultural invasion was the opposite of cultural innovation and synthesis (Freire, 1972). The oppressive reality forged by conquest replicates the muteness of society, and begets the modes of difference that shape the other. Freire’s response to this conquest is a call for the renunciation of cultural differences in favour of the recognition of ‘sameness’:

“To renounce invasion would mean ending their [the oppressor’s] dual status as dominated and dominators. It would mean abandoning all myths which nourish invasion, and starting to incarnate dialogical action. For this very reason, it would mean to cease to be over or inside (as foreigners) in order to be with (as comrades).” (Freire, 1972, p. 154).

This conquest is the alternative to deliberation, critical action and reflection. It is meant to signify the acceptance of an ‘official knowledge’ that is technical and non-pluralistic (Freire, 1972). Freire speaks of ‘cultural revolution’, which he takes to be a revolution of citizenship wherein the people become active civic agents capable of shaping their environment. This revolution is necessarily deliberative, and shapes both the foreigner and the citizen into a community of shared dialogue. Deliberation can occur within this space, because a synthesis of culture occurs between that which is ‘alien’ and that which is ‘indigenous’.

The importance of this brief discussion on deliberative democracy is found in Chapter Four, where I argue that the relationship between the developer and the developed peoples must become a deliberative discourse. The dialogue that occurs between the two of them remains democratic and fair only if both parties are capable of
positioning themselves and each other in their own respective histories. Though the history remains shared, it is invariably different because of the position each occupy in relation to one another. The critical republican vision of freedom as non-domination guides their relationship, while they both co-construct a joint vision of the future. Bohman (2009) views deliberative democracy as a transformational process in the same way that Freire viewed conscientization and praxis. This transformation occurs because the epistemic process of coming to understand a problem and make a decision is self-directed. Thus, the deliberation is self-transformative, as well as socially transformative, with culture being reimagined on a constant basis.

2.4 The African Democratic Worldview

There is no doubt that the republicanism and democracy I have thus far described is rooted in a history of Western political thought. This western worldview articulates several different realizations of the democratic state, and I have decided to focus and make the case for but one. This stems from an understanding that the African political worldview, one shaped and fomented in the colonial and post-colonial period, calls for a renewed attention to uniquely African systems of relation as well as more critical readings of democratic theory. This section seeks to build upon the body of work done by African scholars, and their contemporaries, who argue that republicanism can and should be adapted to African worldviews. This would negate any cause for alarm that arises from a potentiality for domination, and instead commits the democratic and republican project to assuredly indigenous ends. This section will: 1) critique the idea that democracy is a western construct; and 2) reflect upon the colonial impediments to democratic flourishing.
The critique of ‘western authorship’ and the Somali democracy

The republican state is meant to protect the liberty of the citizen (Pettit, 1997). That liberty is enshrined in the laws that govern human relation and these may take the form of rights. The development process has long concerned itself with the encoding of rights in the constitutions of the Global South, and these assertions of agency need not be viewed as maintaining an authorship that is Western in origin (Grovogui, 2011). Republican notions of liberty and equality are quickly seen in popular revolutions, such as the one organized by slaves in Haiti. Their preliminary constitution being representative of a wide range of republican idealisms that translated themselves into a vehemently anti neo-liberal state. Grovogui (2011) argues that republicanism and its associated necessity for the rule of law need not be Western in origin, and he makes the case that Haitian slaves arrived at the same realization as early republicans – that their ability to practice citizenship was rooted in their ability to exercise their own contemplative and active liberty.

Wresting authorship of the republican ideal from the Global North also need not be an exercise in futility. The same preoccupations with liberty, egalitarianism and community are found in the African political tradition. Somalia has a history of political practice that corresponds with the social contract conditions of republicanism, these taking the form of the sharia court system seen in the country presently and historically (Leonard & Samantar, 2011). Somalia has not met the Westphalian conditions of statehood since 1991, but local groups have exhibited a republican idealism that Leonard and Samantar (2011) call indigenous to the Somali political system.

The clan system within Somalia, while prone to abuse, is also starkly representative of Dewey’s (1916) associative democratic community. These clans
governed themselves, using the xeer, and related to one another through the passage of stories intimately connected to their past (Lewis, 2008). The xeer is a localized and indigenous legal framework that manages relations between and within the various Somali clans, and it embodies an associative character that relies upon a communal voice arising through story-telling (Lewis, 2008). This story telling process served a two-fold purpose: it was meant to teach younger generations about their history, and was also meant to inspire their interaction with the community at large (Lewis, 2008). The nature of the liberal education young Somalis received meant that it was community focused, and intended to sustain the community and its way of life. Progress was the intent, and the disciplines of poetry, rhetoric, and history were meant to allow the Somali student to better understand their cultural and social position and build upon it within the confines of the uniquely Somali worldview (Lewis, 2008).

The importance placed upon training and mastery of the arts served spiritual, cultural, and political purposes. A tribal chief was required to be able to defend a position steeped in the rich history of his clan, and relate events of the past to future problems. Much of this rhetorical process was done via the reading of prose, and a mark of a well-respected chief was one who could captivate an audience for hours with his logic and knowledge of history, and its relation to both cultural practice and Islam (Lewis, 2008). Lewis notes that this fascination with, and attachment to, knowledge is even more apparent today. Most clans have their own website that frequently posts a ‘poem of the day’ in order to teach important cultural lessons.

The Somali political community was a discursive space, in its ideal form, and while women were largely excluded it was still receptive of new ideas and policies (Lewis, 2008). The cultural agreements of the xeer were meant to be changed in order to
better reflect social realities. This was a fluidity that respected the intrinsic nature of human beings to change and adapt using praxis (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). The political culture of traditional Somalia embodied a form of praxis that necessitated their education in liberal arts meant for communal ends. This differs, dramatically, with how education is practiced in western democracies as a form of human capital preparation (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). The Somali political community regarded the tribe, community, as an associative and not mechanical space.

**Democracy and colonial impediments**

The democratic project that is explored in the Western tradition may be applied in a variety of ways. In the African context, this application lends itself to a neo-liberal and imperial form that shapes the political climate in Africa’s many post-colonial nations. This climate is the result of an insipid infiltration of the neo-liberal structure into the democratic lexicon (Myambo, 2011). The very definition of what a modern democracy is, for the most part, remains synonymous with capitalism and its fetishization, and this association does damage to historically grounded conceptions such as freedom; it becomes a virtue to protect private property and pursue capital (Myambo, 2011). Myambo’s (2011) argument, that neo-liberalism does damage to the democratic project, and our understanding of it, is analogous with the argument presented in Polybius (1979), that Crete’s state was doomed to failure.

By enshrining property rights in the codification of human rights, African democracies subject themselves to a neo-liberal world order that dictates how and why they must organize themselves (Myambo, 2011). However, the problems in Africa are often cited as unique to that continent; why are they not occurring in the Global North? Africa, rich in both human and natural resources, is one of the poorest regions on the
planet (Ndi, 2011). This results from a realization that the nations of Africa, for the most part, do not control their own development – they remain trapped in a post-colonial paradigm of dependence.

Ndi (2011) argues that the struggles facing African nations are not ones of internal unrest, as that is a product of colonialism. Rather, they are caused by a neo-imperialism that results from the African worker, labourer, and citizen being subjected to an economic climate that is controlled by foreign influence. This results in political machinations within African states to be geared towards interests not belonging to the African people, but towards private interests in the Global North (Ndi, 2011). The ideological struggle between social democracy and its neo-liberal counterpart has become embodied in the African political climate (Ndi, 2011). The protests of the 1920's seen in America, Canada and Europe by unionized workers have been transported to Africa because this is a place where the labour is done today.

The sorts of regimes that typically usurp power from an old 'democracy' in Africa, for example a democracy elected immediately after decolonization, have traditionally used the rhetoric of emancipation in order to gain power (Ndi, 2011). This transition, however, does little to emancipate the very people needing it such as the poor, the farmers, the labourers, and the miners. Instead, emancipation occurs for the military, the rich in the city; this is because freedom has become equated with the freedom to accumulate, the liberty to possess, and the liberal 'virtues' of capitalism (Myambo, 2011; Ndi, 2011). Ndi (2011) poignantly argues that in democracies established in old colonies, famine is widespread, poverty common and there is a noted lack of popular well-being. The colonial impediments to social democracy, a critical republic, are entrenched and difficult to overcome (Laborde, 2008; Ndi, 2011).
Even in the aid that is meant to democratize the continent critical analyses reveal that it is often just another tool utilized to ‘ground’ the impoverished masses and entrench neo-liberal and colonial systems of governance (Ndi, 2011). The democratic project is stifled in such an environment because loans impoverish nations and aid simply bolsters those capitalist enterprises that are the root of much inefficacy (Ndi, 2011). The solution is not necessarily more money, more development or more aid. Rather, the democratic project in Africa can benefit from acts that ‘sensitize’ (educate) the people in their right to democratic association and practice (Ndi, 2011).

Despite a relative wealth in human and natural resources, many African nations have struggled to ‘develop’. This has been the case, by and large, because economic policy within the liberal democracies of Africa is dictated by foreign interests that perpetuate colonial relationships between the people and the land in which they live. For example, the World Bank acknowledges that through ‘capacity building’ African nations can realize fiscal and social goals that are characteristic of their counterparts in the Global North (Mkandwire, 2010). However, these benchmarks often result in reliance upon a technocratic bureaucracy far removed from the general will (Mkandwire, 2010). Thus, the model downloaded to Africa by the Global North is inherently flawed, as it rewards patently undemocratic behaviour through remittances of aid and international loans.

Most African nations have tended to imitate their colonizer’s method of political organization (Ozor, 2009). For all intents and purposes this remains the case because little scholarship in traditional African political practices was pursued by the academic community during the period of decolonization (Ozor, 2009). The resultant African political landscape, then, was a fixture of the practices seen in the Global North; liberal
democracies, market capitalism and the institutions that support them. This, despite the fact that current research into the matter suggests that traditional societies in Africa practiced a form of living that was by and large democratic and participatory (Ozor, 2009).

2.5 Theories on Development

With this framework in mind, the question may be asked how it fits within current theories relating to democratic development in the Global South. This section is meant to position this work within the contemporary debates regarding the issue of development. As the previous four sections dealt with constructing a case for the practice of development as pedagogy, this section seeks only to position that within the current, and more mainstream, literature regarding development processes.

Participatory development

Chapter Four will argue that development must be reimagined to include a theoretical base built upon the work of critical republican theorists and pedagogues. In this vein, the development project becomes ‘participatory’, like the critical classroom. Cornwall (2003) argues that participatory development, when not attuned to the various hetero-normative power structures that exist within a society, can often lead to a marginalization of voices which do not belong to mainstream power enclaves; such as women, children, and the LGBTQ community. This ‘blindness’ to the gendered ways in which participatory development is often carried out means that civil agents are marginalized because of their objective position within a community, and not necessarily their subjective value brought to the vivere civile.
In relation to this conceptual framework, this interpretation of participatory development is analogous to the recognition that human beings have an ontological need for voice and are often not able to involve themselves in the development process because the way in which they experience the world differs from that of the developer. Cornwall (2003) argues that particular branches of western feminism, brought to the development project by western developers, can often have the effect of barring women from social processes. Development projects and systems, structured in a model that ignores the different experiences of gender in Somalia, would have the effect of perpetuating paternalistic modes of oppression even if women and other marginalized groups were included in dialogue. This is because the current structure of development ignores subjective, and positional, experience. In this manner, truly participative development must adopt what Laborde (2008) would term a critical approach, instead of a ‘traditional’ one. Rather than assuming women or other minorities are able to thrust themselves into the discourse, developers should work with them to uncover “the sensitivities of difference. Rather than the add women and stir approach…” to development (Cornwall, 2003, p. 1338).

Participatory development relies upon what Gaventa (2004) terms governance, and not government. In this sense, the author argues that public participation in the delivery of local and regional services is a civil right, and modern democracy depends upon such opportunities in order to flourish (Gaventa, 2004). In this regard, Gaventa (2004) imagines a community along the lines of what Dewey termed his associative community – where the citizens built a government and constitution not based upon hierarchy, but upon dialogue. One of the primary examples found in the text is of Porto Alegre, where public participation in budgetary meetings stems corruption and involves
the community in the creation of laws (Gaventa, 2004). This form of participation coincides with the critical republican’s vision for civil society, where the law is an empire built by the citizens it is meant to rule (Pocock, 1975).

Another integral component of participatory governance, and development, is that the power relations that exist within a community be named and addressed (Gaventa, 2004). Gaventa (2004) argues that in order for the community to become involved in a governance process, leaders and community members must learn how to map out the various relationships between the powerful and the community. This coincides with Freire’s vision of praxis, wherein the oppressed and oppressor seek to position themselves within a dialectic and learn how that position affects both themselves and the other. This is a form of environmental learning, and the theoretical base for it in this thesis is found in Freire, Pettit, and other critical theorists concerned with power and domination.

Post-development theory

In the literature, post-development theory occupies a space which holds that current modes of economic and institutional development are a result of western hegemony within the international community. An early theorist associated with this movement is Ivan Illich, who proffers that schools, indeed most modern institutions, have alienated men and women from their intended purpose (Illich, 1973). In the case of the school, people have become alienated from their learning because of social controls that pursue a human-capital approach to education (Illich, 1973). This builds upon the earlier work of Freire, and Illich’s (1973) contention that society must undergo a process of ‘deschooling’, or the move away from institutional education, engages the reader to
question whether learning is the result of structural and institutional forces, or whether it is an innate psychological process. In the contexts of the conceptual framework, Illich maintains a position that is advocated for in Chapter Four; development must be deconstructed such that it becomes about individual relations with the environment, and does not continue as a process engaged in by only ‘experts’. In this regard, Illich (1973) elicits the same concerns that Yankelovich (1991) has with a culture of technical control within government and in policy circles. By keeping development, or governance, technically beyond the citizen you alienate them from their own democracy and their own civic voice.

Another problem Illich associates with development is that it prioritizes the development of modern industry and markets to that of the strengthening of traditional industry and markets. An example forwarded is that subsistence farming be relegated to history in favour of the modern service and supply based economy in order to achieve a pax economica, or an economic peace (Illich, 1981). This economic peace, writes Illich (1981), protects the zero-sum game that exists within neo-liberal societies and it is wholly responsible for the violence seen in ‘developing’ nations where the worker becomes alienated from their culture and history. Much as Freire spoke of the alienation, or invasion, of culture and history, Illich (1981) makes the argument that development serves only one purpose in the modern world, and that is to spread the zero-sum model across the globe. This remains a form of cultural violence perpetuated against those that view peace as something more than simply the absence of physical violence.

Escobar (2000) contends that societies must begin to ‘unsettle’ the study of development, meaning that critics of post-development theory, and those that question the work of Freire and Illich, remain almost universally academics in the Global North.
Further to this point, development has become a vehicle for violence, the result of a modernity that sees ‘development’ and ‘conquest’ as interchangeable within history. Escobar (2004) maintains that the modern development movement, with a focus on economic instrumentalism, necessarily produces violence because it is about displacing culture in favour of the fetishization of capital. Analogous with African theorists, who posit that African development projects are under technocratic control by agents such as the World Bank, Escobar (2004) argues that economic development practiced in South America is controlled by global imperialism, but also through the inclusion of non-state armed groups which enforce the global ‘status-quo’. This argument problematizes the inclusion of western-centric worldviews within the blueprints of a development process, and questions the veracity of envisioned outcomes when the process used is so removed from indigenous experience.

A branch of post-development theory is that of reflexive development, which holds that while development is oft held to an external model of the industrialized world it is also not as reticent to reject the opinion of experts. Pieterse (1998) holds that reflexive development contains within it a feedback loop which sees the ‘expert’ trade dialogue with the non-expert. In this regard, reflexive development does not advocate for rote ‘deschooling’, as Illich did, rather it pursues a system wherein the critique of science is integral, but its disregard is not. Pieterse (1998) engages the reader to question whether the goal of development should be ‘human’, state-centered and institutionally guided, or ‘popular’, belonging to the individual and community.

The understanding of development as reflexive in nature coincides with Freire’s vision of societal conscientization and problem-posing relationships. In the reflexive model, experts and non-experts are equal partners co-constructing both a joint
development project, and a popular one in their respective communities. This understanding of what development should look like humanizes it, such that the role of the developer is not that of a technocrat, but of a student-peer. What matters most are not so much the agents involved, rather the direction and spirit of the project (Pieterse, 1998). This form of development correlates with the argument made in Chapter Four, and argues for the ‘deschooling’ of history, as the understanding that current institutions mislead the citizen’s understanding of one’s position within it.

**Participatory rural appraisal**

An approach to development critically enmeshed with the work of Freire is that of participatory rural appraisal (PRA). PRA stems from an understanding that rural peoples should have a say in how their ‘development’ is undertaken (Chambers, 1994). In this regard, PRA seeks to establish a dialogue between rural communities, oft overlooked by developers, and the developers who may not understand their very specific and diverse needs (Chambers, 1994). Specifically, PRA differs from normal modes of development in that it seeks out those who are marginalized, such as women, and allows them efficacy by ensuring the developer listens and does not rush.

The impetus for developing PRA began in the late 1970’s as analysts began to understand that despite the millions spent on development, rural peoples remained in abject poverty around the world (Bar-On & Prinsen, 1999). The development of this system began with an understanding that perhaps the instruments used to understand rural issues, developer-driven research, missed the ontological position of the people it was meant to understand (Bar-On & Prinsen, 1999). The earliest iteration of this new system was rapid rural appraisal (RRA), which focused more on data collection issues.
than the overt political critique found in PRA. A criticism of PRA is that it presumes that the people undergoing development retain all solutions to their problems within the community (Bar-On & Prinsen, 1999). The authors argue that PRA fails at developing critical self-knowledge within a population (Bar-On & Prinsen, 1999). However, what should be understood is that critical self-knowing remains a form of praxis, and cannot be expected to occur within the confines of a single period. Instead, PRA offers the opportunity to begin the process of knowing one's self and the other in a manner that establishes connections between worldviews (Valk, 2009).

PRA focuses its efforts on allowing indigenous knowledge to form the basis of development curricula and systems. This correlates with Freire's belief that indigenous modes of learning and understanding are just as legitimate as those of the oppressor or other. Illich (1981) advocates for a form of PRA by railing against the de-ruralisation of nations undergoing development processes, and the bias towards industrial as opposed to subsistence growth. The relation to Somalia can be no more clear, as much of the country remains populated by rural nomads who see centralized efforts at development as counter-productive and dangerous (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007).

It also stresses the use of participative household or community censuses, which seek to understand through a deliberative process the needs and situatedness of a peoples (Chambers, 1994). This relates to the deliberative polling advocated for in the deliberative democracy literature (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004). Furthermore, PRA allows non-literate peoples to relay complex social problems and processes to developers as the process is interactive and indigenously led (Robinson-Pant, 1996). Within the theoretical literature, PRA offers a stark alternative to modes of epistemic knowledge that seek out only that knowledge which is official (Apple, 2003). Instead,
PRA allows storied and personally-situated understanding to flow through the community and into the developer – allowing both to co-construct an approach to solving problems (Robinson-Pant, 1996). Chambers (1994) argues that the success of PRA hinges on it advocating that developers ask to be taught, and learning. This dovetails with Robinson-Pant (1996) who contends that PRA is a literacy practice and focuses on complementing different literacies in order to construct a shared one. The similarity to Freire’s (1972) understanding of literacy as coming in many forms, and the oppressive nature of only considering traditional educational models as benchmarks for success, places PRA within this thesis as a part of the practice of development as pedagogy.

2.6 Conclusion

What should be garnered from this chapter is an understanding of five key concepts: 1) Dewey’s understanding that democracy is a more expansive ideal than rote political process and is dependent upon individual action within a culturally associated, ever-changing, community; 2) Freire’s argument that community life, and thus political life, depends upon the citizen engaging in a critical form of ‘lifelong learning’ that problem poses their situation within society and the world; 3) an understanding of what comprises the western democratic and republican worldview, and what it means at the political stage to be a democracy; 4) what the African democratic worldview is comprised of, and an introduction to the Somali political community and communal living; and 5) theories on development and its practice.

The conceptual framework will be applied in such a manner to encourage ‘thick’ criticality and participation. Following from this, I will contend that development should be not only the creation of the pre-political associated and democratic community
(Dewey, 1916), but also the state that protects the citizen’s ability to engage in lifelong learning as conscientization, or humanization (Freire, 1972; Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007).

The amalgam of these two ideals results from the recognition that development must become a co-constructive process similar in application to the process advocated by Freire and practiced by the Citizen Schools of Porto Alegre (Gandin & Apple, 2003). By enmeshing the western and African understanding of culture and political history, agents working towards development will be able to situate themselves and their indigenous understanding, and work together. This is the ‘synthesis’ of the Somali with the developer, and a truly humanizing form of associative democracy requires such synthesis in order to begin to be constructed (Dewey, 1916). In understanding Somali history, as well as the political history of the people currently seeking to develop the country, we can confront the oppressive systems that have arisen due to a confrontation of worldviews and cultures (Valk, 2009).

I move now into an examination of the cultural, political, and social history of Somalia. Using this conceptual framework, the reader should begin to notice themes that arise from not only the nation’s colonial history, but present efforts at development. It is through this understanding of history that the critical framework may become a ways of restructuring the development project towards development as humanization and pedagogy.
3. CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT AND THE “DEVELOPMENT” OF SOMALIA

The purpose of this chapter is to ground our understanding of Somalia’s past and present. The first part, the political history of Somalia, serves a dual purpose: 1) it allows the reader to access a history of indigenous political thought that shapes how one views the present; and 2) it allows us to understand the past, and thus position the western role in the development of the country (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). This positioning builds upon the problem-posing exposited in Chapter Two, and recognizes the importance of building an idea of what Somalia was like before being ‘developed’ by western/colonial agents. This chapter, as much as it is meant to determine what the Somali political system looked like before 1991, is also meant to help developers problem-pose their own position within the construction of the modern Somali reality.

The second part of this chapter reviews contemporary development policy. Somalia, since the beginning of its colonization, has undergone what can only be
characterized as rote domination by agents of arbitrary interference (Pettit, 1997). The critical framework established in Chapter Two denotes two worldviews: the western democratic and the Somali-African. This chapter is an analysis of how those two worldviews, and their varying interpretations, have interacted in the last decade of attempted development.

The Somali citizen has been wrested of the critical efficacy needed for participative democratic citizenship by oppressive agents. These agents perpetuate a ‘thinly realized’ vision for the Somali state and in turn work, both implicitly and explicitly, towards the creation of a neo-liberal ‘status quo’ (Laborde, 2008). This is the dialectical alternative to viewing the dialogic act of ‘development as pedagogy’, the understanding that the Somali citizen is not a receptacle for neo-liberal aid and knowledge (Freire, 1972; Godatti & Torres, 2009). Rather, he or she is a co-constructor of a renewed democratic project with the community as the foci.

3.1 The Geography of Somalia and its Culture

Geography

Somalia is a nation of approximately ten million people situated in what is called the Horn of Africa. The Gulf of Aden, the sea which Somalia borders, sees approximately four (4) percent of the world’s oil shipped through it every day (Anderson, 2010). Its capital is Mogadishu, a once picturesque city that lies on the coast of the Indian Ocean. Since 1991 Somalia has been embroiled in a bloody civil war that has claimed countless lives and deprived the nation of a functioning economy (Anderson, 2010). Lacking ‘civilized’ institutions is how most people today see Somalia. It is a ‘Failed State’, bereft of the infrastructure that other nations identify as
vital to a functioning civil society (Kaplan, 2010). However, by problematizing the Somali conflict as a lack of institutional functioning, commentators merely perpetuate colonial attitudes that led to the rupture of indigenous lifestyles, thereby causing the conflict to escalate.

Kenya borders Somalia to the southwest, while Ethiopia borders Somalia to the west. To the north of Somalia are the countries of Djibouti and Eritrea (Lewis, 2008). Somalis belong to a linguistic culture known as the Cushitic speaking family, which incorporates ethnicities from these surrounding areas (Lewis, 2008). Though belonging to a similar cultural lineage, and speaking variants of the same language, the peoples of the Ogaden in Ethiopia and of Northern Kenya are regarded by Somali tradition as only capable of manual labour, a lower social class that is naturally dominated by ethnic Somalis (Lewis, 2008).

As of this writing there are three sovereign entities within the internationally recognized Somali state (Lewis, 2008). The south and central portions of the country are known as Somalia proper. To the north is the semi-autonomous state known as Puntland, which by its own volition wishes to see the south of the country reunited with the north (CIA, 2012). To the west of Puntland is Somaliland, which occupies the territory once referred to as ‘British Somaliland’. Somaliland is described by Lewis (2008) as the outcome of the “power of home-made democracy” (p. 93). These three regions exhibit differences of culture (agro-pastoral versus pastoral), clan affiliation, and governance structure. As Lewis (2008) puts it, the country of Somalia is “little more than a geographical expression” (p. x).
Culture

A nation of clans, Somalia is comprised of five ‘big-tent’ clans: the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darood, and Digil Mirifle (Lewis, 1998). The Digil Mirifle is regarded as a combination of the Digil clan and the Rahanweyne clans of southern Somalia (Lewis, 2008). These clans were subsequently split into the northern pastoralists (herders of cattle, camel, and goat) and the agricultural farmers of the inter-riverine region in the south of the country (Mukhtar, 1987). While conflict was present in pre-colonial Somalia, the people of the south were relatively non-violent and relied upon a complex hierarchical structure of varying jurisdictions in order to govern their respective societies (Mukhtar, 1996). While the Isaaq, Darood and Hawiye are northern Somalis, the Digil and Rahanweyne are primarily southern. These groups, north and south, speak a different language and have differing cultural practices. The peoples of the south speak Mai while the northern nomadic peoples speak Maha.

The Dighil Mirifle is regarded by Lewis (2008) as best suited to forming a rubric for Somali nationalism because they are the most open. Digil Mirifle social structure is commonly referred to as a melting pot of cultures, which remain open to accepting outsiders normally referred to as belonging to a ‘slave caste’ by their northern counterpart clans (Lewis, 2008). Such a differentiation between peoples is the result of both traditional ways of life as well as colonial paradigms that segregated peoples according to unrecognizable ethnicities (Lewis, 2008).

These clans, historically, were governed by unique cultural agreements known as the xeer (Lewis, 1998). The purpose of which was to govern the behaviour and relationships between and within the various clans. Essentially, this was the Somalis’ answer to codified legislation. It was a set of informal normative behaviours and laws,
long before the arrival of Europeans. Thus, the Somalia of the past began in its own time
the transition towards a system of governance that viewed the rule of law as
preventative of state corruption. This formal law, codifying not only a constitutional but
also a relational structure, is based upon African and Islamic influences present in the
region for centuries (Lewis, 1955).

The xeer, as practiced historically, was applied in three types of dispute between
clans: 1) that of homicide; 2) that of physical injury; and 3) that of moral injury. Injury
to women, historically, was dealt with under the third category as they belonged to the
community and were not considered as litigants (Lewis, 1955). Obvious gender-biases
aside, the Somali traditional legal structure was quite complex, and relied upon a form
of education that placed great importance on both religious tutelage, as well as
education in the traditionally liberal arts of poetry, rhetoric, and history (Lewis, 2008).

3.2 Somalia Before and After European Arrival

The Arab world had contact with the Horn of Africa for centuries before
colonization. Mukhtar (1987) characterizes Somalia as an epicenter of coastal trade in
the Indian Ocean, and cites evidence that Mogadishu, the current capital, was the center
of Islam in the early middle ages. He notes that Somalia was a place (not a national
entity, but a region) integrally connected to the trade routes of Asia and the Middle East.
It was a veritable trading hub that was a target “for merchants on their way to Hurmuz,
India, and Yemen” (Mukhtar, 1987, p. 143).

Somalia was a nation of city-states and was vitally important to early Islam as a
center for education and study. Mogadishu was, by all accounts, a hospitable city that
took in foreign students in order to allow them to study Islam and science more
completely (Mukhtar, 1987). This breaks from the vision of Somalia (especially Mogadishu) today as a failed state without a functioning economy and government (Kaplan, 2008, 2010). Indeed, one of the chief concerns of Somali civil society during this period was the eradication of illiteracy throughout the country, something that was achieved through the development of teachers that would travel in order to spread the word of Islam (Mukhtar, 1987). This Islamic tutelage integrated itself with Somali custom, forming a uniquely African and Somali version of the religion. Civic educational goals were achieved through the intervention of Islam, with teachers adopting nomadic lifestyles, if necessary, in order to tutor a nomadic population. Education was also, for the most part, clan-specific – clan elders took it upon themselves to teach the youth of the community about normative values and rules of behaviour (Abdi, 1998). This is the central aim of the pedagogical process, the education of actors capable of involving themselves in an associative and critical democratic community (Dewey, 1916).

This is a Somalia that meets the needs of what Abdi (2008) would say are a truly participative political community. He notes that the very act of colonization in later years served to ‘de-citizenise’ much of Africa. Despite the fact that education or religious tutelage was clan specific, it was necessarily concerned with the sustainment of the political community (Abdi, 1998). It served the purpose that Dewey sets out as being the aim of education, the “freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims” (Dewey, 1916, p. 98).

Immediately before European colonization, northern Somalia was a hodgepodge of clans and sultanates that competed for resources. The largest, and one of the most active of these pseudo-states was the Majeerteen - a group responsible for numerous acts
of piracy and conflict against British East India Company traders (Durrill, 1986).
Numbering close to thirty thousand in the mid-19th century, the Majeerteen began to
heavily rely upon British shipwrecks as well as trade with the nearby port of Berbera
(Durrill, 1986). This trade in livestock to the British required a substantial increase in
herd-size for the Majeerteen pastoralists, and as a result the sultanate began to rely upon
trade as a source of income. Due to this reliance, northern Somalia experienced some of
its most devastating droughts and famines during the pre-colonial period, as over-
grazing and unsustainable economic practices contributed to widespread pestilence and
death (Durrill, 1986).

Even before colonization, Somalia experienced the effects of the burgeoning
imperial power that Great Britain had become in the 19th century. British trade policy
and interference in Somali affairs, as well as nepotism on the part of clan leaders and
sultans, resulted in numerous hardships for the people. These precede the modern crises
caused by neo-liberal economic policy and globalization, but foreshadow the effect they
shall have on modern Somalia.

**Colonialism**

Europeans arrived in Somalia en-force relatively late into the period of
colonization. Dawson (1964) notes that the Italians officially took control of Italian
Somaliland in 1885, thirty years after the British obtained imperial representation within
Northern Somalia in 1855 (Kakwenzire, 1986). The British protectorate of Somalia,
which stretched along the coast of the country roughly opposite from Aden and the
Arabian Peninsula (Kakwenzire, 1986). With more European presence in the territory
Somalis began a concerted effort at resistance, which was spurred by religious influence
and the British threat to three central ‘pillars’ upon which the Somali political society was built. These were and still are faith, independence, and indigenous socio-economic institutions (Kakwenzire, 1986).

Much of the Somali resistance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, known as the Dervish resistance, was a result of Catholic Missions attempting to convert young Somali men to Christianity (Kakwenzire, 1986). Islam, for Somalis, served as a means to educate on the civic virtues and threats that potentially could cause the collapse of its institutions – Sharia and the xeer being integral to community cohesion. The collapse of Islam within the Somali territory would also mean the collapse of a culturally grounded education that Somali men and women had received for centuries. While this tutelage was Islamic its main purpose was not merely the impartation of a strict religious dogma. The education that Kakwenzire (1986) and Abdi (1998) describe is also meant to instill within the clans a sense of ‘togetherness’. Essentially, armed resistance by the Dervish militias focused on defeating the imposition of a colonial ‘official knowledge’ (Apple, 2003).

In 1910 Britain retreated entirely to the coast; the result of excessive expenditure in relation to the income the colony was generating as well as continuing armed resistance within the interior (Kakwenzire, 1986). British withdrawal, Kakwenzire (1986) notes, resulted in “a state of lawlessness and civil strife which spread to all corners of the protectorate” (p. 667) - most likely the result of a colonial destruction of culture in the preceding years. This period of anarchy ended in 1920 when Britain launched a final offensive against the Dervish and crushed the group’s ability to reorganize.
In 1928 the subject of implementing a national education policy was brought up, by native Somalis who had completed degrees in neighbouring Sudan (Kakwenzire, 1986). When these individuals approached the governor of the protectorate with the hopes of engendering a renewed focus on education development he countered with the idea that schools be set up based upon the ‘reform’ model used in England for delinquents. This was a colonial attitude, that Somalis were criminals or not able to understand/accept modern education practices (Kakwenzire, 1986). Education, though proposed by the Somali people themselves, was again deemed to be too expensive to implement.

In the late 1920’s Britain conceded former Somali interior holdings to the Ethiopian Empire (Barnes, 2007). This was followed by the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in the mid 1930’s, a move that Britain accepted as the Empire viewed Ethiopia as a dangerous regional adversary. It was in the lead up to the annexation that British politicians began wondering whether or not it would be better to abandon the entire protectorate. Kakwenzire (1986) notes that Winston Churchill, in his overseas travels, found Somalia of little value to Britain and advocated for the Somali protectorate’s abandonment – it was “barren, bankrupt and parasitical” (p. 665). This was countered by military strategists and government officials, who noted that Somalia’s proximity to the oilfields of the Middle East were of strategic importance to the Empire – foreshadowing the role that North Africa would play as a theatre in World War Two. Not only that, but they saw it as imprudent to abandon this part of Africa to other European powers. The end of armed resistance allowed Britain to refocus resources from the military to the ‘State-building’ apparatus – but in a way that completely ignored basic infrastructure development, such as education (Kakwenzire, 1986). Thus, Somalia became a nation of
peoples meant to practice a thin form of citizenship (some may argue as subjects) in
order to placate Britain’s need for oil.

Britain began to focus on developing the interior of the Somali protectorate after
the defeat of the Dervish movement and Ethiopia’s annexation. A renewed focus was
placed on the education of the polity, which up until that point had learned primarily
from religious teachers and from memorization of the Koran (Kakwenzire, 1986; Abdi,
1998). British officials saw a ‘modern’ education as the means to ending movements of
resistance against colonial government. However, the proposals made by the Colonial
Office were quickly quashed by the Treasury, which mandated that there be no
government sponsored education project or any other institutional development projects,
for that matter (Kakwenzire, 1986).

The Treasury’s decision to deny funding Somali development meant the Somali
people were denied any sense of involvement in the construction of what would become
the Somali Republic. Education, while one of the least expensive institutions to
organize, Somalis had been educating their youth for years with little money or any
organized framework, was deemed too expensive or resource intensive to implement.
Thus, the necessary foundation for a civic society was not constructed – the only lesson
learned thus far were ones of violence and oppression.

This preoccupation with ‘thin’ forms of citizen engagement is evidenced by an
obsession with what was deemed the ‘proper’ role of the Somali. A colonial attitude
towards the African citizen was one punctuated by the understanding that they are
governed by a colonial master, and are not participating in their own processes of
governance. The rejection of national education initiatives by the British as grounded in
an imperial and colonial understanding of the role Africa would play in the world
(Kakwenzire, 1986). Britain viewed it as being meant to serve imperial interest, not indigenous ones.

**World War Two and imperial de-colonization**

Britain's acceptance of Italian presence in East Africa ended at the outbreak of the Second World War. The war in East Africa ended dramatically. After the Italians captured British Somaliland in 1940, they were defeated in a series of campaigns by Allied armies within seven months (Lewis, 1988). By the end of 1942, all of East Africa had been occupied by Allied powers, and Italian holdings transferred over to the British. Victory in East Africa preceded Victory in Europe by three years, and this complicated British efforts at nation-building in the post-war decades. Lewis (1988) reports that after the Italian defeat, many farm owners, businessmen, and civil servants fled the region – requiring Britain to adapt itself to increasing social unrest and growing poverty. Britain, however, succeeded to some degree by allowing more Somalis into positions of authority and establishing security forces made up primarily of Somali volunteers (Lewis, 1988). Though the British Military Administration promoted a de-fascification of the region, they did little to truly integrate Somali traditional practices into government.

Throughout the war years, as well as immediately after, nationalistic sentiments (precursors to the Barre regime) were forming themselves in the capital (Barnes, 2007). Throughout the trustee years, which were a period of time when the victors of the war governed ex-axis protectorates, Britain made attempts to unify all of Somalia into a 'Greater Somalia', a goal of the Somali Youth League (SYL), but opposed by other international powers. The Somali Youth League had been founded in 1943; it was an
indigenous movement hoping to solidify Somali nationalism by blending the youth of the separate clans into an active political arm (Lewis, 1965). The British were sympathetic to such aims, and actively supported the SYL throughout the immediate post-war years. This relationship became complicated, when Britain decided to ‘gift’ the parcel of land known as the Ogaden to Ethiopia. The transfer of the Ogaden to Ethiopia severely upset the SYL, and Britain again found itself confronted by a popular movement critical of trustee governance (Barnes, 2007).

The political situation leading into the 1950’s was a direct result of fears within Somali society, and within the SYL, that Somalia would eventually be absorbed by the stronger Ethiopian Empire (Barnes, 2007). Though the divisions between political parties were largely clan based, the original basis for their formation was the intense nationalism and ‘pan-Somalism’ being felt by colonial subjects (Barnes, 2007; Mukhtar, 1996). Following the severance of the Ogaden from Somalia, the British made it apparent that their goal was the reunification of British Somaliland with the south of the country (Lewis, 1988). The British vision of a Greater Somalia trusteeship failed, in the end, not because of international opposition but because the SYL and citizens within the Ogaden began to view the colonial power as sympathetic to foreign interference from Ethiopia and non-Somalis (Barnes, 2007). This political position influenced the Barre regime, and turned the benign Ethiopia into a rival and repeated source of conflict in the west of Somalia (Barnes, 2007).

At the same time, Britain’s failed bid for the immediate creation of a larger Somali state that allied north and south resulted in it supporting the Italian bid to return to the south of the country – a point of contention for new political parties that had begun to arise during the post-war period (Barnes, 2007). The Italian Administering
Authority was accused of making reprisals against Somalis who held posts of responsibility under the British Military Authority after the wake of the Second World War (Ware, 1965). The Italians denied accusations of reprisals, even pointing to their opening of a School of Politics and Governance in Mogadishu. The school's curriculum incorporated Italian and Arabic language courses, political economy, history, law and instruction on the processes of the United Nations (Ware, 1965). Such an education failed to instil within civil society a propensity towards critical interaction with their British administrators, and merely maintained a foreign status-quo through the propagation of official knowledge (Apple, 2003). The focus of the curriculum was decidedly foreign, and had little in the way of Somali cultural courses.

The Italian Administering Authority hoped that, through the inclusion of native Somalis in political education, a sense of responsibility for trusteeship would develop within society. However, the UN disapproved of efforts at educating the Somali population in cultural history – this sentiment served as the reason for the Administering Authority to require Somalis attending higher learning to complete two years of school in Rome (Ware, 1965). This is, upon further scrutiny, at odds with what Ware (1965) reports was the goal of the UN, who wished to see a 'Somalization' of the political process within the territory. Thus, while the UN wanted to see participation by Somalis in governance, it did not see the merit in an education program that espoused the importance of indigenous culture or political process. This lack of sensitivity to the importance of culturally relevant education, and the effects that cultural education can have on civic and political participation, is to be regarded as one of the failures of the development process.
At the outset of the return of the Italian Administering Authority in 1950, the British and the United Nations made it a firm goal to see the south of the country totally divested of European trustees within ten years (Lewis, 1988). By 1956, Somalis had begun replacing Italians within government administrative positions and elections of local councils had begun to take place in the rural areas of the Somali interior. The British within their northern protectorate had begun similar processes, and in 1960, after both southern and protectorate Somalia had held national elections, they were unified under one constitution (Lewis, 1988).

3.3 Somali Independence, the Transition to Military Government, and State Collapse

This section deals with the period between 1960 and the late 1990’s. It is meant to flow into a discussion regarding recent and current development practice within Somalia. The purpose of describing the processes in the post-war period is to orient the reader towards the gradual adoption of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies, from colonial, and the context of subsequent efforts at development. Somali independence was the result of both indigenous desire for efficacy as well as a colonial need to unburden European powers following the Second World War. The post-colonial government was modeled on the previous European government, and the problems associated with that model are found in current iterations of government.

**Independence and post-colonial government**

Somali independence was won in 1960, but the period before this date was marked by intense political competition between the Somali Independent Constitutional Party (HDMS) and the Somali Youth League (Mukhtar, 1996). Ssereko (2003) argues
that the joining of Northern Somalia (British) with Southern Somalia (Italian) in 1960 exacerbated the clan differences that had developed over generations of colonial interference. These divisions along clan lineage were caused by what Ware (1965) argues was the composition of the political parties pre-independence. Prior to independence, Somalia was in the trust of the United Nations and much of the foundation for conflict today was laid during this period. It was during this period of trusteeship that the UN began holding elections for government officials, and inter-clan politics became ingrained in the governance culture of the country.

At the outset of independence, Northern Somalia (previously British Somaliland) had opened its first secondary school in 1960. This is in stark contrast to other previous colonial holdings, such as Ghana, which boasted dozens of schools and tens of thousands of pupils upon independence (Olden, 2008). This contrast bespeaks, as stated before, a colonial preference for thin citizenship – one that saw the education of citizens as a secondary concern compared to human capital preparation and resource management.

Lewis (1958) argues that the Somali political landscape was superficially changed by independence and the same cleavages of clan politics remained, with clan leaders operating as elite enforcers of the status quo. Indeed, the elite seemed to have a monopoly on knowledge, as only five percent of the population were literate at the time of independence (Ware, 1965). The period immediately after independence was one of turmoil, as the Somali Youth League echoed nationalist sentiments sown by the British in 1946 (Ware, 1965). Nationalism, or a pan-Somalia, was seen as a means of economic protection for the nomadic pastoralists of Northern Somalia. Unity, after independence,
was gained not through the education of the Somali polity, but by fanning the flames of nationalism in the service of a post-colonial vision of the country as 'thinly' democratic.

The parties operating in Somalia during the 1960's were clan ones (Davidson, 1975). When a seat in the Italian-styled Somali parliament was up for election, votes for that seat were easily bought by private interests. Davidson (1975) argues that because Somalia was such a poor nation, power-sharing was avoided at all costs by clan leaders because of a fear that enlargement of the democratic process would lead to a loss in profits accumulated via corrupt government practice. The elite were the ones with an education, indeed they were the only literate ones, and they had a monopoly upon the administrative processes that governed elections.

This monopoly on education served to create a vision for what Apple (2003) calls 'official knowledge'. Official knowledge is created when the ruling power or system begins to form the average person's understanding of the world in their own image. Apple (2003) argues that the production of official knowledge serves to marginalize groups that are antithetical to the hegemony of the time. Due to the fact that power sharing was avoided (Davidson, 1975) Somalia began to collapse because of what Harrington (1977) termed a lack of political leaders from which to choose. The potential pool of legislators was too shallow because of the premium placed upon education by the ruling elite.

The 1960's were turbulent years for Somalia, factionalization was rife within the new parliament, and the republic was constantly interpreted as being on the verge of collapse by nationalists within the government. Lewis (1988) notes that these fears may have been exaggerated, however he does argue that the haste to fashion Somalia into a western-styled republic downplayed the long held family and clan divisions that
governed Somali civil society. The republican system, modeled on Italy’s, was simply not built to accommodate a society unwilling to place citizenship above clan membership. Further to this fact, the centralization of said government created an atmosphere of disconnects between the north and south of the country; there was no phone or telegraph line between Hargeisa – previous capital of the northern protectorate – and Mogadishu.

Through the mid 1960’s, Somalis engaged in unofficial wars with neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia. Ware (1965) notes that the position of the Somali government was to arm Shiftas, nomadic warriors from the north of the country, who sought to wrest territory from Ethiopia and Kenya in an effort to build the Greater Somalia that had been talked of during the independence process. Part of this stemmed from a long held belief within government circles, and echoed by the Prime Minister, that the regions of Eastern Ethiopia and North Kenya were the homes of disenfranchised Somalis, separated by arbitrary lines on a map. Somalis in North Eastern Kenya were particularly vocal of their wish to join Somalia, and boycotted Kenyan elections in 1961 – only 1,622 people registered to vote in the region (Lewis, 1988).

Not only were regional conflicts occurring, but Somalia was quickly becoming a battleground of Cold War ideologies (Ware, 1965). Even in the early years of newfound independence, the western world augured against Somali success. Academics at the time (Reyner, 1960) suggested that Somalia would be dependent upon aid from the United States for generations to come. Britain severed relations with the Somalia Republic in 1963, after repeated demands that Britain support its wars against Kenya and Ethiopia (Lewis, 1988). This led to the republic becoming reliant upon aid and military support
from the Soviet Union, further straining relations with the west and causing the British to arm Kenyan groups that raided southern Somali villages (Lewis, 1988).

**Military Government**

Ware (1965) closes his article with the sentiment that “Nationalism on the horn of Africa may not augur well for world peace” (p. 184). He writes as Soviet planners were constructing an air-base in Somalia and providing the government with $31,000,000 in military aid (Ware, 1965). Davidson (1975) disagrees with what Ware (1965) wrote a decade earlier, noting that “there is no process of Soviet satellitization” occurring within Somalia (Davidson, 1975, p. 18). Somalis, for the most part, were not very concerned with world politics. Davidson (1975) notes that according to his experiences in the country at that time, power had fallen, not into the hands of Soviet puppets, but into the hands of those with a working knowledge of English or Italian (Davidson, 1975). This was a vestige of a dramatically high illiteracy rate (Ware, 1965), indicative of the role that the British wished the indigenous Somali to play in the creation of a new State, that of thinly participative and implicitly uncritical subjects. This level of illiteracy should be regarded as an impediment to the democratization process. In order for the polity to become sufficiently engaged in a civic culture they must be able to relate ideas to one another through language and preserve those ideas for future generations. This is the progressive nature of education, which is the preparation of society for rhetorical reflection and then action (Freire, 1972).

Siad Barre previously had been a general in the Somali army, who in 1969 led a coup against the republican government and won. Immediately following his assumption of power he declared Somalia a state dedicated to ‘scientific socialism’
(Lewis, 1988). The driving force behind this cultural revolution was a rejection of tribalism, tradition, and culture – and resulted in the Barre government destroying artifacts that were viewed as tribal in origin. A cult of personality began to develop around the new leader, with Lewis (1988) noting the resemblance to North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and China’s Mao Zedong.

Barre broke the long-standing military partnership with Russia in the late 1970’s. This followed several major events, including Russia’s decision to arm Ethiopian fighters during Barre’s war in the Ogaden between 1977 and 1978 (Lewis, 1988). The impetus for this betrayal was the Soviet Union’s interpretation of Ethiopia’s place within the broader Cold War; the Americans had pulled military support from the Ethiopian Empire following their hostilities against Eritrea. This left a power vacuum in East Africa that the Russians filled by attempting to become the regional protector. Lewis contends that the Russian withdrawal from supporting Somalia directly contributed to its loss in the Ogaden War.

The destabilization of the Barre regime began in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and as refugees poured into Somalia from Ethiopia, North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations began sending large sums of aid to the beleaguered government (Lewis, 1988). By 1982 Barre disbanded the government and took totalitarian control over administrative processes. This began a process of local and international resistance, with the Somali diaspora forming competing political parties both within Somalia and in London. Barre’s final acts of power were to be violent crack downs on dissenters, as well as a hastily drawn peace treaty with Ethiopia, which he hoped would lead Washington to begin delivering military aid that he could use to quell resistance movements (Lewis, 1988).
Due to the influx of displaced peoples mingled with militias, Siad Barre led an aggressive crackdown on insurgents now leaderless after the conflict, which in turn led to the creation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), who began a civil war against the government in 1978 (Clark, 1992). Clark (1992) notes that this war resulted in Barre treating the Isaaq clan as hostile to the country, which resulted in violent government-led reprisals against Isaaq towns and communities in the north. The reticence of northern Somaliland to rejoin the union can be traced to this time, as the area remains Isaaq dominated and intensely wary of Mogadishu (Lewis, 2008).

In 1989 the United Somali Congress (USC) was formed, and made up primarily of ethnic Hawiye, and began a war against Barre. This led Barre, in a final act of desperation, to unleash his army upon the largely Hawiye communities of Mogadishu, which resulted in the violent uprising of the entire city (Clark, 1992). Due to this violence, Barre was forced to flee the country and the army split into two camps: those who supported Mohammed Aidid – a former military officer and chairman of the United Somali Congress - and those under Somali businessman and local militia leader Ali Mahdi Mohammed (Clark, 1992). With Barre’s grip on power was lost, the capital and the rest of country slipped into a well-armed chaos. This was aggravated when American-bought weapons were quickly abandoned by soldiers who deserted the Somali army. Barre’s targeting of particular clan groups laid foundation stones for continuing clan conflict.

State Collapse

After Barre fled the country in 1991 it plunged into a violent civil war. Clark (1992) believes instability was ingrained in Somalia through mechanisms of
intervention that lacked local accountability. Webersik (2004) argues that the modernisation process that occurred over decades “played a significant role in shaping violence in Somalia” (p. 517). What Webersik notes as fuel for clan warfare was the nature of the commoditisation of pastoral means of production, and as Somalia became ‘modern’ the peoples who raised cattle all of a sudden also had to support the educated elite who lived in the cities. Colonial laws had required each Somali belong to a clan for the purposes of census, and this ingrained within communities a sense of ‘difference’, even when there was little subjective variance between peoples, something supported by others who note that the clans of the south were effectively pluralistic in their make-up (Lewis, 2008; Webersik, 2004).

Clan warfare was perpetuated by outside vectors, an example being Italy, which supported Mahdi and his militia within Mogadishu solely because he was able to arm himself sufficiently (Webersik, 2004). With the influx of weapons into the country following the collapse of the army, this seemed perhaps a sensible solution. Somalia also developed a culture of looting, as people became poorer due to their inability to find work in overcrowded municipalities (Webersik, 2004). While Davidson (1975) felt that pastoral farmers would benefit from Barre’s forced relocation of pastoral nomads for their economic well-being, one can quickly come to the conclusion that such policies exacerbated the problem experienced in the early 1990s. Traditionally, people had relied upon pastoralism to feed their families, and now they were unable to do so because of this relocation. The industrialization that Barre and his NATO allies believed post-colonial state formations required was a cause of the war. Somalia, long a pastoral and agricultural nation that tutored its citizens in those ways of life, was now an urban one where any meaningful political activity happened in the cities.
Repressive government structures under Siad Barre inculcated within the Somali people a resentment of any form of centralized government (Menkhaus, 2006). Thus, it can be inferred that as one group began to gain power in Mogadishu others would commit to resisting it - a sort of internalized ‘balance of power’ system. Menkhaus (2006) notes that in the first year of conflict, more than 250,000 people lost their lives to famine and war while a further million became refugees in neighbouring countries. The catastrophic toll on human life caused the US to intervene in the conflict, declaring in 1992 that it would conduct a peace enforcement operation in the country in order to protect humanitarian relief efforts (Menkhaus, 2006). In addition to the mistrust of centralized government, Barre’s scientific socialism essentially halted any ability of the clans to work through differences within a national political setting. These set the stage for the entry of the United Nations and other international actors, all in the hopes that they could stabilize the violence within Southern Somalia. This was complemented by the United Nations’ decision to send peacekeepers in 1992.

Chapter seven of The Charter of the United Nations delineates a responsibility of all signatory nations to allow the Security Council to deploy forces into a zone that it deems to be detrimental to world peace and security. The UN Charter is explicit that it is within the jurisdiction of the Security Council to intervene in the affairs of a member nation when it is decided that action or inaction on behalf of that member is a cause of concern for peace and security. As Somalia plunged into a civil war in 1991, the United Nations’ Security Council saw fit to intervene in the conflict, giving birth to the first iteration of the United Nations’ Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).

Security Council Resolution 751 notes that it is required, after the signing of a ceasefire in Mogadishu by belligerents, that a UN monitoring mission must oversee the
cease-fire in order for equitable humanitarian aid to be distributed (UNSC, 1992). Security Council Resolution 751 specifies that the operation in Somalia was to be under the control of a special representative to Somalia, and would involve security forces under the direction of UNOSOM headquarters. At the tail-end of the Somali mission in 1994, Boutros-Ghali (1994) wrote that “The establishment of a viable and acceptable peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community cannot impose peace on the people of Somalia; it can only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there” (p. 7). From this it seems obvious that then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali interpreted stability as a locally sustained phenomenon, with no foreign locus of control. UNOSOM found itself increasingly marred by targeted violence, as Aideed’s militia objected to what it saw as outside interference (Menkhaus, 2006). While UNOSOM failed to achieve stability within Somalia, the operation had the inadvertent effect of creating jobs within Mogadishu sustained into the present. This moved some people away from war and into business (Menkhaus, 2006).

The United States decision to send troops in 1992, in Operation Restore Hope, had a ‘centralizing’ effect on the country, which perpetuated the danger that democratic process would be overlooked in favour of foreign interests (Lederach & Stork, 1993; Menkhaus, 2007). One of the main targets of the military expedition was Mohamed Aidid and his militia, characterized as another dictator. The response to the crisis was focused on short term problems, not long term solutions (Lederach & Stork, 1993). A decentralized approach to negotiating peace should have been adopted in order to ensure the representation of a variety of interests, especially those of Aidid and Ali Mahdi.
Mohammed. UNOSOM and ensuing negotiations failed at allowing what Lederach and Stork (1993) argue would have been consensus building, the Somali way.

Another example of early international mismanagement is found in the Canadian experience within Somalia. The Canadian commitment to the UNOSOM peacekeeping mission, under the auspices of the UN, suffered a self-induced blow to its legitimacy when in 1993 two incidents shaped the public’s perception of the Canadian Forces’ role in stabilizing the conflict. On March 4th two Somalis were shot in the back by Canadian troops – one died (Razack, 2004). A few days later, on March 16th, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment tortured and sexually assaulted sixteen year old Shidane Arone; the severity of the beatings resulted in his death, which was witnessed or heard by 80 other soldiers (Razack, 2004).

These events, known as the ‘Somalia Affair’, contributed to Canada’s decision to leave the country in 1994. Similar events and crimes were committed by coalition troops from other nations (Razack, 2004), and these understandably sowed the mistrust many Somalis today feel towards western interventions. The initial UN mission was, by all accounts, a failure; despite Canada’s mission being a ‘tactical success’. Government collapse in 1991, and subsequent abandonment by UNSOM in 1995 (Anderson, 2010) resulted in much of the violence and instability Somalia experiences today. This has caused repeated attempts by international, regional, and national actors to engage in the processes of democratic development and crisis relief.

The following sections will elaborate upon the various actors currently operating within Somalia, beginning with international and ending with local, and will evaluate particular policies in order to establish a basis from which to begin Chapter Four.
3.4 International Management and Interference in Somalia

The United Nations

The United Nations currently operates a political office for Somalia (UNPOS) that oversees the peace process underway in the country. Started in 1995, after the withdrawal of UNOSOM from the country, UNPOS is an instrumental institution, at least partly responsible for the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and now the Government (UNPOS, 2012a). It is the mission of the political office to coordinate efforts by the United Nations in the development of Somalia and a Somali peace (UNSC, 2009). Furthermore, Resolution 1863 lays out that the political office must coordinate efforts in relation to the Djibouti Peace Agreement, and seek to build inclusive Somali security forces by establishing a trust fund (UNSC, 2009).

Mandated with the management of that trust fund, UNPOS oversees its allocation into different projects, including education initiatives for youth (UNPOS, 2012c). Abdi (2008) argues that political education in Africa must also be accompanied by “tangible programmes of livelihood improvement” (p. 404). He refers to these as policies that support African upward mobility and direct learning opportunities that help those who need them most. Thus, while the UNPOS’ trust fund is set up to create “service centers for unemployed youth and the rehabilitation of ex combatants” (UNPOS, 2012c) it is so removed from the country that there is no political connection to the people. The recent famine in Somalia continues to affect over one third of the population, which by all accounts severely hampers the ability of the Somali people to manage the improvement of their lives – despite the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu proper (Moon, 2012).
The UNPOS writes that it is working towards securing Somalia by looking for international donors able to fund the training of 10,000 police officers for the Mogadishu area (UNPOS, 2012b). The argument that police officers are needed is correct, but the issue remains that centralizing security efforts in Mogadishu plays into the fears of a populace that power will be myopically focused on one part of the country, as well as work as an arbitrary and coercive force removed from popular rule (Pettit, 1996).

**The United States of America**

Just as Britain and Italy served as vectors of domination, so too has the United States interfered in the affairs of the Somali people based upon their own agenda and self-interest. The United States’ financial support of the Alliance Against Terrorism and Restoration of Peace (AATRP), a loose collection of allied warlords, in 2006 only exacerbated violence within Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) (a precursor to Al-Shabaab) quickly gained popular support when it pledged to drive the warlords of the AATRP out of Somalia (Little, 2012). Little (2012) argues that the AATRP was responsible for the radicalization and mobilization of Al-Shabaab, noting that it is the radical elements of the UIC that found a voice during their conflict with the AATRP. From this I extrapolate that the United States played a partial role in perpetuating conflict, instead of pursuing dialogue and avenues of peaceful reconciliation.

The United States’ War on Terror serves as a rallying point for radicals, tired of the violence that they are subjected to by foreign oppressors. The United States, in using bombing campaigns in 2009 to attempt to dislodge Al-Shabaab, killed civilians in the
process and only strengthened the resolve of insurgents (Mentes & Hagerty, 2011). This demonstrates how foreign and arbitrary interference in the affairs of a people results in the breakdown of an associative community. Acting as an oppressive force, the United States merely causes groups like Al-Shabaab to internalize the oppressive mentality, which Freire (1972) identifies as a necrophillic preoccupation with power and dehumanization, or the love an oppressor has for the death of humanity in the other.

The United States, in their recognition of the TFG and no other alternative, has waged a war on civic-virtues and participative reforms within Somalia. The TFG, and now Government, is described as a warlord regime, with no legitimate mandate from the people of Somalia (Samatar, 2007). The United States serves as a vector of domination, and only as a reiteration of the imperialism suffered upon the Somali people in the 19th century. Samatar notes that the United States is unlikely to allow more indigenous governments that are truly participative to form, as their goals may differ from the prescribed American worldview and interrupt American security interests. Thus, American interests necessitate the development and maintenance of a neo-liberal status-quo. This status-quo is a denial of activism (Pocock, 1975) and the construction of ‘official’ democratic conceptions steeped in a Western worldview and tradition.

David-Odigie (2011) writes that Al-Shabaab bolsters its ranks from two main sources: foreign mercenaries from the Middle East, Central Asia and the West, and disadvantaged youth from the cities of Somalia. While foreign mercenaries remain a constant problem in Somalia, I will examine the UN’s response to the problem of youth combatants drawn from Somali society and its neighbouring country Diasporas. Of particular interest is the Dadaab refugee camp in Eastern Kenya, which houses a staggering proportion of refugees from the conflict.
Dadaab and the refugee population

The Dadaab refugee camps in Eastern Kenya were built to support 90,000 people but today sustain a sprawling population of 751,196 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2012b). Of this population, a half million are ethnic Somalis who fled their homeland at some point after 1991 (Lambo, 2012). Lambo (2012) writes that Somalis in the Eastleigh borough of Nairobi – south of the Camps - maintain strong cultural identities despite being in self-chosen exile for over ten years. This is because of the nomadic history of Somalia and the desire of many of those interviewed to return home at some point. What can be inferred through Lambo’s (2012) study is that refugees in the camps of Dadaab, much like those in Eastleigh, have similar sentiments towards maintaining, through education and community involvement, Somali cultural practice and heritage.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that a poor security situation within the camp, the result of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and kidnappings, means that residents of Dadaab are confined to the camp and cannot move beyond its borders (UNHCR, 2012b). The poor security situation is compounded by the fact that the camps are suffering from a humanitarian crisis due to a staggering lack of funding. The UNHCR notes that as of the 12th of April, 2012, Somalia has an external refugee population of over one million people and it maintains an internally displaced persons (IDP) population of 1.32 million (UNHCR, 2012d). In order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of development policy in Somalia, one must look to the policies that govern the lives of this vulnerable population.

Education within the Dadaab camps falls under the jurisdiction of the UNHCR, UNICEF and two partners: CARE International and the Association of Volunteers in
International Service (AVSI) (UNHCR, 2012a). The UNHCR reports that education policy within the camps covers a wide breadth, and focuses on: primary education, environmental education, peace education, youth education, secondary education, early childhood development classes, supporting education classes and youth capacity building workshop. Furthermore, the UNHCR noted the spontaneous birth of Duqsas, a type of Koranic school, around education and school tents that pupils attend before and after class (UNHCR, 2011a). Of the 970 educators employed by the camps, 186 are formally trained; the ones who require training are encouraged to enroll with AVSI classes in coordination with Mount Kenya University (UNHCR, 2011a). Reaching an enrollment of 100 percent in these schools will be difficult, as most girls drop out due to familial and social pressure by their Standard Eight year. Teachers are required to work double shifts sometimes, classes lack supplies and the overall learning environment is described as substandard in many of the facilities (UNHCR, 2011a).

The curriculum for the primary education of children, according to most accounts, is based on the Kenyan curricula meant for children of a similar age (UNHCR, 2011a). I believe this reflects the failure of development policy to utilize the assets that it should be devoted to the development of a Somali curriculum. As Apple (2003) notes, a non-native education curricula will and can contribute to conflict. While Apple’s case study explored the example of curriculum in Singapore, the situation in the early 1950's in Malay is similar to that in Dadaab, Kenya. A lack of connection to the greater Somali community means that youth have little ability to critically position themselves and their history (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007) within a constructive Somali narrative, and their ‘story’ begins to be defined by a foreign power.
In 2011, the UNHCR noted that the sporadic and informal creation of Duqsas represented an opportunity to allow the community of refugees greater ownership over their education facilities (UNHCR, 2011b). The UN agency suggests that further attention be paid to this synergy, and that such attention could allow the residents of Dadaab to actively engage in their own education. Were the residents to engage with a culturally and historically indigenous curriculum it would enable them to reflect critically upon their situation and work to change it (Glass, 2001).

Forced recruitment of children into the ranks of Al-Shabaab and the Somali army is reported by Human Rights Watch (2012b). Their report, *No Place for Children*, documents a palpable fear of both the government and opposition militias within the young population (Human Rights Watch, 2012b). This fear exacerbates problems associated with access to education, as children coming to the camps note that Al-Shabaab consistently uses schools in Somalia as staging grounds for attack, and government forces (including the African Union) largely ignore the implications that firing upon schools brings to their mission.

The recruitment of children attending school in the camps is also pursued by forces loyal to the TFG (Human Rights Watch, 2012b). This deprives children of their ability to tend to their education, which should serve to create civically engaged citizens. Much as Dewey wrote of the environmental factors that form the ways in which people learn, the children of Somalia are learning a way of life that is grounded in violent conflict.
3.5 Regional Actors: AMISOM, Kenya, and Ethiopia

AMISOM

The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) represents the African Union’s efforts at ending the war in Somalia and engaging the parties in a peaceful settlement. It was created after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, and mandated by the UN Security Council. Resolution 1744 sets out that AMISOM is to be mandated with the stabilization of the country. It is mandated with: supporting dialogue, safe passage, protection to infrastructure and government, the creation of stable conditions for humanitarian work and re-establishing the Somali security force (UNSC, 2007). With such a grand mandate, it is apparent that AMISOM must work with the TFG and the people of Somalia closely.

AMISOM is composed primarily of Ugandan and Burundian troops, and it claims to be intensely popular with the Somali people (AMISOM, 2012b). This characterization of the mission, as popular with the Somali people, is contested by Human Rights Watch (2011), which argues that a commission of inquiry needs to be established by the UN Security Council in order to investigate allegations of human rights abuses by AMISOM (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Their report, You Don’t Know Who to Blame, contends that AMISOM has indiscriminately killed civilians through its use of mortars against Al-Shabaab (Human Rights Watch, 2011). While AMISOM reported dramatic success against Al-Shabaab, the people of Somalia are beginning to mistrust the AU mission and its frequent use of mortars and artillery, which continue to cause collateral damage amongst the civilian population.
The Ugandan contingent of AMISOM has come under scrutiny, with journalists and academics questioning its conduct in Somalia after the 2010 Kampala bombings which killed 74 people (Fisher, 2013). The bombings, perpetrated by Somali Islamists, perpetuate the Ugandan self-image as the regional partner to the US in the War on Terror. Uganda’s ingratiation to its western counterpart potentially comes at the price of the citizens of Somalia, as Uganda’s forces work to fight terrorism instead of focusing on human security concerns. Fisher (2013) argues that the impetus for Ugandan entry into the conflict is not the result of neighbourly concern for the welfare of the people, rather it is a tool to manage donor perceptions.

The humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited, as it only facilitates the distribution of aid from NGOs and government programs. Despite this, commendable efforts have been made to ensure the people in and around Mogadishu are given reasonable healthcare. AMISOM has allowed Somali citizens to utilize combat hospitals, taking in approximately 12,000 patients every month (AMISOM, 2012a). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch (2011) reports that AMISOM agreed to designate certain areas of Mogadishu ‘no-fire zones’, meaning they will refrain from using area-of-effect weapons in places like Bakara Market, a prominent trading forum in downtown Mogadishu.

AMISOM must focus on how it conducts itself, as well as its mandate to secure for the Government a foothold in the country. By treating those it is fighting as all ‘outside’ sources of the conflict, AMISOM makes a critical failure and delegitimizes other combatants who are indigenous to Somalia and fighting what they see as a war against oppressive forces.
Kenya

Kenya’s involvement in the Somali conflict is at times supportive, but clouded by a near-constant practice of arbitrary interference, human rights abuse, and Kenya’s perpetuation of violence within the country and its refugee population. While AMISOM is made up primarily of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers, Kenya maintains its own force within the country in support of the Government (Chonghaile, 2012). Kenya, until recently, was the home of the TFG (Menkhaus, 2007) and supported policies and efforts at stabilisation that originated from the TFG in Nairobi.

Kenya maintains a complex relationship with the government and people of Somalia. Menkhaus (2007) notes that early in the 21st century Ethiopian interference in the Somali conflict caused militants from Al-Shabaab and its allied militias to flee into the area between Kenya and Somalia. This complicated efforts at discerning who was a refugee and who was a militant, which resulted in Kenya sealing its border to Somali migration for a period of several months. In 2011, Kenya retaliated for attacks made against it by Al-Shabaab through the invasion of the southern portion of Somalia. Little (2012) argues that the Kenyan responses to militant attacks within its own territory are destined to exacerbate the problem within Somalia itself:

The Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia merely adds another layer of complexity to a wretchedly intricate and seemingly intractable crisis. It also reminds us that outside interventions have not worked in Somalia, nor are they likely to work in the future, especially a prolonged invasion by a neighboring country. If famines are “man made” rather than natural events, as I have argued elsewhere… then avoiding a worst-case scenario has to be the immediate priority. (p. 194)
Speaking of the famine that has affected two thirds of the Somali population, Little (2012) says that the invasion by Kenya only caused more suffering. People flee the ensuing conflict between Kenyan soldiers and Al-Shabaab, thus losing access to food and established humanitarian relief points. The humanitarian crisis worsened, and reports that the United States and other European actors were funding the Kenyan response to Somali militancy only fueled immense distrust amongst the populace (Little, 2012).

Kenya is responding, according to Little (2012), to provocations from Somali militants and criminals. These provocations take the form of kidnappings, executions and IED attacks. In addition to the recent invasion, Kenyan officials have found it difficult to draft effective and sustainable policy that organizes and administers areas within its own borders. Dadaab and other refugee camps remain hotspots of criminality and dysfunction. These indicators of disengagement from civil society by Somali citizens are aggravated by the Kenyan response within the camps and along the Somali-Kenyan border.

Human Rights Watch (2012a) notes that Kenyan abuses against ethnic Somalis have included rape, torture, and murder, detention of civilians, beatings, and sexual assault. The organization reports that while the Kenyan national police indicate they will investigate reports of assault and rape by its forces, no concerted effort at examining allegations has been made (Watch, 2012a). This is confirmed by interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch (2012a), which notes Somalis who have been abused or assaulted by Kenyan officials feel little can be done, and rarely bother to make reports in the event of an assault by a police officer or military member.
I identify these abuses by Kenyan officials as a form of arbitrium (Pettit, 1997). Abuses by Kenyan officials only serve to inculcate a sense of ‘wrong’ within the Somali people, and refugees or internally displaced persons who come into contact with the soldiers of the Kenyan army or the police are subject to sustained oppression of will and political efficacy. This sort of oppression dehumanizes the Somali, and relegates them to receptacles of ‘aid’ arbitrarily administered by a neo-liberal regional power. This makes much of what Kenya does is maintenance of a status-quo.

Such behaviour is indicative of Kenya’s interest in maintaining its own security, but also contributes to the overall level of insecurity it feels, Bachmann (2012) notes that the policy objectives of the Kenyan government are not in the best interests of stability. Notably, Kenya has carried out extraordinary renditions to Ethiopia and Somalia (Bachmann, 2012). In 2007 alone, ninety individuals (twenty of whom were Kenyan) were forcibly delivered to counterterrorism experts in neighbouring countries. Bachmann argues that Kenya’s interests in the Somali conflict are inextricably linked to the United States’, and thus serve to maintain development as status-quo instead of working towards true democratic efficacy. Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia may be seeing success against Al-Shabaab (if success is measured by military victory), but is impinging on the ability of aid organizations to distribute much needed food aid to starving Somalis. Aid groups in the war-stricken south of Somalia are largely absent, and aid is delivered by local groups funded by Somali diaspora (Baldauf & Kioi, 2011).

Ethiopia

The recent policy of the Ethiopian government has been to intervene in the Somali conflict with armed troops under the ‘War on Terror’ (Samatar, 2007). Samatar
argues that the US and its allies on the UN Security Council blocked attempts, early in the Ethiopian invasion of 2006-2007, to censure Ethiopia for its aggressive posture and violent response to militantism that was, at the time, largely limited to the south of Somalia in Mogadishu.

The Ethiopian invasion, which preceded the UN Security Council’s resolution to send a peacekeeping force to assist the TFG in 2006, was a precursor to Ethiopian interference in the creation and structuring of the TFG (Samatar, 2007). Before the federal government became the Transitional Federal Government it was known as the Transitional National Government (TNG), which was the spawn of a conference held in Djibouti by Somali civil-society groups yearning for leadership (Samatar, 2007). Due to the fact that the TNG was largely incompetent, and that Ethiopia continued to fund violent interference perpetrated by resistant Somali warlords and clan leaders, the TNG collapsed and a new conference, organized by Kenya and Ethiopia, was held.

The second iteration of federal government for Somalia, the TFG, was dominated by the very warlords Ethiopia funded while the TNG was scrambling to wrest control of the South of the country from violent factions. Samatar (2007) notes that the Ethiopian backed TFG was absolutely unwilling, after its creation, to locate its offices in Mogadishu, they chose to remain in Nairobi. Ethiopian interference in the processes of government, and the backing of government candidates who had opposed the TNG, are examples of foreign vectors of domination – the TFG, and the Somali people, were subject to the arbitrium of a foreign power and thus unable to practice indigenous forms of political association.

The policy of the TFG to brand the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) as a terrorist organization was the result of cues from Ethiopian backers, who in turn received
information and support from the United States and various Central Intelligence Agency programs (Samatar, 2007). Due to the fact that the UIC was heavily represented in Mogadishu in 2006/2007, Ethiopia was given cause to invade with approximately 10,000 troops. The invasion, while supported by the US and other international actors, was in reality violating the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Somalia. By allowing armed soldiers to operate in the country, Ethiopia inadvertently contributed to the ease by which a person could acquire weapons, as well as the radicalization of disenfranchised Somalis.

The war between Ethiopia and the UIC is described by Allo (2010) as an unlawful act, even though condoned by the UN Security Council and the international community. Ethiopia, by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter and arguing that they faced an existential threat from Somalia, claimed that it was well within its rights to invade Somalia to fight the UIC after it had declared a jihad against the Ethiopian government (Allo, 2010). Even though the UIC allowed Ethiopian rebels to regroup and rearm in its territories as they sought to wrest control from Ethiopia in the Ogaden, the UIC was a de-facto regime, not a State Actor and thus Article 51 of the UN Charter was not applicable (Allo, 2010). Such an attitude is indicative of the banking development that governs current neo-liberal international policy. The Somali people became objects of development, instead of participating agents (Apple, 2003; Freire, 1972).

The Ethiopian force that invaded Somalia in 2006 and ‘liberated’ Mogadishu from the UIC operated without an international mandate and made its withdrawal contingent on the deployment of AMISOM (Allo, 2010). I contend that this is a clear example of arbitrium, and serves only to depress the efficacy of the Somali people to self-govern using indigenous political practice (Lewis, 2008). The functional result of
the 2006 invasion was the creation of Al-Shabaab, the radicalization of various sub-sects of the UIC, and increasing difficulties in providing desperately needed aid to starving Somalis following the 2011 famine. In creating an environment of violence, Ethiopia inadvertently restructured the ways in which Somalis learned. Instead of the environment teaching and requiring peaceful cohabitation it taught and required conflict for survival.

3.6 The TFG and Government: Neglect and Private Interest

The TFG, formed in 2004, was only supposed to be in power for a period not exceeding five years. What Menkhaus (2012) contends is that the transitional process, by its very mandate far behind schedule, is being sabotaged by corruption within the national government. This was due to the TFG’s propensity towards international travel, political in-fighting, and the diversion of foreign and humanitarian aid towards the capital. The current Federal government in Somalia, though only controlling parts of the capital and sparse swathes of land in the South of the country, is itself contributing to the inefficacy felt by Somali civil society, thus contributing to the conflict. Indeed, the fact that previous iterations of this government have been predatory, inflicting numerous harms upon the people, pushed some to the claim that the Somali people are better off stateless than living under a central government (Leeson, 2007).

A Somali constitution

Menkhaus (2012) argues that the Somali government has been branded as ineffective and unsustainable by most foreign donors and agencies. Despite this acknowledgement, it continues to be recognized as a legitimate government by the rest of the world and the UN. The UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) engaged the
TFG in a last-ditch effort to stabilize itself and send a message of legitimacy to the Somali people through the drafting of a Somali constitution (Menkhaus, 2012) and eventual ratification of the national parliament in 2012/

A barrier to the creation of a sustainable and inclusive constitution is, invariably, a weakly engaged polity. As the centralization of government in Mogadishu contributed to the distrust of the Somali people (Menkhaus, 2007), so too does an expedited process of constitutional drafting delegitimize the input that could be received from Somali civil society. Menkhaus (2012) recognizes that the constitutional process underway in Somalia is complicated, noting that:

Critical details about the process by which the constituent assembly and new parliament will be formed are vague or unstated. For instance, the Garowe Principles state that ‘recognized traditional elders assisted by qualified civil society members’ will nominate members of the parliament based on proportional representation by clan (the so-called “4.5 formula”). But the question of who constitutes a genuine clan elder is a matter of contention in Somalia, as is the designation of ‘qualified civil society member (p. 171).

This inculcates within the Somali polity a fear that such vagueness and lack of clarity are tools being utilized to sway the outcome in favour of particular domestic or foreign actors (Menkhaus, 2012). Implicit within the plans for constitutional drafting is an uncritical reflection on what the needs of Somalia are. The TFG itself was a vestige of the colonial era and a vehicle for interference by Ethiopian and Kenyan interests, and communicates to the Somali polity progressive action and criticality but in reality only works towards the maintenance of a status-quo that is both uncritical and thinly democratic (Apple, 2003).
Moving beyond the problems associated with the hasty writing of a constitution, I turn to the various ways in which the TFG and government has decided to disassociate with the people it is meant to govern. Menkhaus (2012) notes that the relationship between the TFG and certain clan stakeholders, to the exclusion of others, has the possibility of ‘Balkanizing’ the country into a plurality of clan fiefdoms. What is of increasing concern is the lack of security provided to rural areas, which is a reason for increasing movement of rural Somalis into urban settings. This has resulted in a growth of slums filled with citizens who have poor opportunities for employment in an urban setting (Menkhaus, 2012).

**Education**

It takes time to develop trust; democratic capacity building requires that developers commit to long term work with the populace. It is noted that the typical interval of aid focused on education, of six months to one year, is flagrantly insufficient to sustain any progress (Bethke, 2009). Thus, access to education becomes impeded when developers fail to remain long enough to succeed.

According to Moyi (2012b), the ability of children in Somalia to access primary levels of education is hampered, in part, by government neglect. While Koranic schools are seeing increasing rates of attendance in the conflict ridden south, formal institutions either do not exist due to war or are incapable of taking on students (Moyi, 2012b). Even in the north of Somalia, in Somaliland and Puntland, rural students are turned away from school due to poor institutional upkeep and the high cost of attendance (Moyi, 2012b).
These schools, especially in the south of the country, rely mainly on financial support from the community. The government, with a focus on security concerns and the war against Al-Shabaab, negligibly funds education within its zone of control (Cassenelli & Adbikadir, 2008). This means that generations of Somali youth are left without a formal education, which potentially puts them at risk for becoming combatants. Since the start of the war in 1991, Somalia has been unable to educate two generations of its people, and this will spill over into a third if the TFG is unable to effectively fund the necessary institutions (Moyi, 2012b).

The instruction of women is impeded by social and religious biases that see virginity as necessary for marriage. Moyi (2012a, 2012b) notes that this means parents of girls are likely to pull them out of educational institutions at an early age in order to preserve their virginity. In addition to this, government neglects the effect the absence of women teachers has on female school enrolment, with only 13% of teachers being women, girls are less likely to attend school when able (Moyi, 2012b). In Somaliland, considered one of the most stable regions of Somalia, 70% of mothers reported they have received no education in their lives. This is compounded by the effect war has on women, with Moyi (2012a) noting that girls have been forcibly recruited by armed groups to be domestic slaves.

The government has targeted the Duqsas within Mogadishu and elsewhere, under the assumption that religious teaching in those schools was preparing students to join the insurgency (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2010). Government backed forces deliberately attacked students and teachers, which forced many of the only institutions of learning in the capital to close. UNESCO reports that in 2008 all educational institutions (including universities) were
shuttered, in Mogadishu, due to targeted attacks by government forces. By denying the Somali people one of the vehicles for dialogue, which is praxis (Freire, 1972), the Somali people cannot effectively problem pose their position within the democratic development project (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007).

The complete lack of funding for educational institutions prevents a public good from being employed within the country, and this potentially hampers development. Tierney (2011) argues that universities can serve as incubators for innovation in a nation otherwise ravaged by war. This is complicated in Somalia, as it has only three universities to serve a domestic population of between seven and ten million, and all three of which have enrollment figures below five hundred. The university as a place for critical reflection and social critique is especially important in a country looking to ‘develop’ itself and prevent further humanitarian crisis.

Educational institutions, especially the university, are where the student is able to learn about the differences of other cultures. This will allow students, as well as their teachers, to access what Kincheloe and Steinberg (2006) describe as “new modes of cognition – a cognition of empathy” (p. 34). The importance here cannot be understated. Somalia is at war with itself and with the perceived ‘outsider’, and such a pedagogy of development would allow for Somali society to access the critical education of difference that exposes them to empathy. The government, by ignoring the importance of such an education and actively impeding it, by targeting educational institutions, is simply acting and internalizing the role of oppressor that the Dervish movement resisted in the 19th century. The education of the people and the support of schooling should be seen as a priority, and something worth protecting. The government complicates such a
resolution, as it continues to deny religious schools recognition as full partners in the development process (Cassenelli & Adbikadir, 2008).

Dependence

The government relies, primarily, upon foreign handouts and meagre taxes collected at the Mogadishu airport and seaport (Elmi & Aynte, 2012). This makes it a government that is unable to provide for its people, because it is reliant upon the generosity of foreign actors in order to sustain itself in a position of power. Furthermore, there is no transparency and the people see little return in the few institutions they encounter in their daily lives. Elmi and Aynte note that the ‘roadmap’ imposed by international actors on the Somali government is completely alien to their indigenous political practice (Lewis, 1967, 2008).

The TFG’s policy of forcibly disarming clans plays a role in the resistance being fielded by Al-Shabaab and other militia groups. The TFG’s insistence on centralized control over the processes of government is being met with sustained violence and resentment, (Bryden & Brickhill, 2010) that coalesces with what Menkhaus (2007) reports is the major impediment to peace in the region - a growing mistrust of government due to the abuse of central authority. Bryden and Brickhill note that other organizations have seen success in the short term, such as the UIC and the governing body of that organization, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), due to the adherence to a form of Sharia law – indeed any written law.

Ali and Matthews (2004) write that the path to a sustainable (peaceful) society is walked in two stages. The first stage is the founding of what they term a ‘negative peace’ (Ali & Matthews, 2004), which they describe as the absence of violent conflict.
This should then, the authors argue, transition rapidly into efforts to construct a ‘positive peace’ (Ali & Matthews, 2004), a condition of assured human security and civic revitalization. As can be determined through a review of the literature the government is failing in its attempts to secure the negative peace, and seems to be hyper-focused on the crisis that conflict presents and not the day-to-day mechanisms of state building. In fact, Al-Shabaab, far from being ‘pushed to its limits’, is able to infiltrate government security forces and carry out attacks against installations and personnel with varying degrees of success (Menkhaus, 2012).

Militia groups align themselves neither with Al-Shabaab or the federal government, and are de-facto fiefdoms. The protracted war against Al-Shabaab is in essence a proxy conflict, being waged only in name by the leadership of Somalia but in reality uses the troops of Burundi and Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Menkhaus (2012) argues that this is the result of the perceived threat that Al-Shabaab poses to the Western and ‘developed’ world, as well as to regional actors. He notes that the perception amongst much of Somalia’s leadership is that the UN, the US, Europe, and African nations need the Somali government more than the Somali government needs them (Menkhaus, 2012). This means that a culture of complacency and brazen disregard for human security and national unity is adopted by many in government. Corruption is rampant, and this serves to inculcate within government officials an intense regard for the status-quo that neo-liberalism requires of government (Apple, 2003; Laborde, 2008)
3.7 The Creation of Al-Shabaab and the Roots of Piracy

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is a militant group that has its roots in the UIC, and was birthed in the conflict between the Islamic Courts and Ethiopia that began in 2006 (Ibrahim, 2010). The fact that Al-Shabaab adopted a form of Islam more in line with the Wahhabism seen in Saudi Arabia and groups like the Taliban further distanced it from the Islam of everyday Somalis (Ibrahim, 2010; Lewis, 2008). The intent of this section is to characterize an organization that is oft portrayed as connected to Al-Qaeda (these connections are rather weak) and threatening to world peace (it isn’t, at the moment) as the natural result of a people adopting the ideal of humanity defined by the oppressor (Freire, 1972). This is a consequence of disengagement, and bookends the problems that were exposed previously when two successive generations were denied the opportunity to critically reflect upon their world and their place within a democratic community.

Al-Shabaab is so loosely connected that competing militias in Mogadishu often come to violent altercation, fighting over territory and hegemony over a single city block (Bruton, 2010). Tentative alliances between Al-Shabaab groups and Hizbul-Islam, a nationalist extremist organization, are strained by Hizbul-Islam’s hatred for foreign interference. Hizbul-Islam sees the foreign backers and international militiamen of Al-Shabaab to be contrary to the best interests of Somalis (Bruton, 2010). This propensity to resist foreign interference by Hizbul-Islam has a cultural lineage in Somali society (Lewis, 2008) and supports a critique of the neo-liberal dependence of the Somali government.
The notion that Al-Shabaab would present a danger to the region if it were to gain power and is a terror threat (Kaplan, 2010) fails to account for two things: 1) it is grossly unpopular; and 2) the ‘terrorists’ are disaffected young men, not hardened jihadists (Bruton, 2009). The fact that Al-Shabaab draws a plurality of its membership from outside of Somalia is indicative of the lack of support it enjoys from Somalia proper. It has a blunt and uncritical interpretation of civic involvement, and the territory it occupies is often wrested from its control by irritated clans and local chiefs and business leaders who view its attempts at manipulation as contrary to their ways of life (Bruton, 2009). Bruton describes the membership of Al-Shabaab as made up primarily of criminals and disaffected teenage boys, and the intensely grotesque acts of violence reported in the media are oft committed by illiterate children in their teenage years as opposed to hardened jihadists. Al-Shabaab, Bruton (2009) writes, is not a multi-national terrorist network but a loosely connected political movement.

Early in its formative years as a political agent Al-Shabaab became increasingly resistant to participating in dialogue with others, even remnants of the UIC (Menkhaus, 2007). The ensuing war with Ethiopia pushed Al-Shabaab into the Somali conflict. Had the invasion not occurred the UIC would have likely been given a good chance at forming a rather equitable and accessible government (Menkhaus, 2007). This is in opposition to what some (Kaplan, 2010) would argue is a militant Islamist organization. Radicalization sped up due to not only regional interference in Somalia, but also by United States insistence that foreign policy align with its War on Terror (Ibrahim, 2010; Bruton, 2009). When a nation is able to bomb indiscriminately, and a community has no recourse to grievance, radicalization is bound to happen. This is the internalization of the oppressive mentality contained in the neo-liberal worldview.
Al-Shabaab should be viewed as intimately connected to the lack of education offered to Somali youth for the last two decades. Just as the TFG deliberately targeted Duqsas for attack, thus most likely eliminating the teaching of a more moderate form of Islam, Al-Shabaab led coordinated efforts to attack schools in Somalia in its campaign. UNESCO (2010) reported that Al-Shabaab militants killed students and teachers at an English language school in 2008 and afterwards set fire to the building and in the same document noted that Al-Shabaab used schools for arms caches as well as defensive structures, increasing the likelihood that education institutions would be targeted by government and AMISOM forces.

Evidence suggests that local clerics and religious teachers adopt a form of Islam that sees Al-Shabaab’s insistence on strict wahhabi forms of Islam as antithetical to Islamic teachings (UNESCO, 2010). Al-Shabaab has used schools as a vehicle for recruitment, with UNESCO reporting that a student alleges:

Al-Shabaab members came into his high school, interrupted the lesson, wrote down the names of students and told them they had to attend classes every evening “otherwise anything could happen”. During the classes, they were indoctrinated, pressured to join the armed group and given three days to make up their minds (UNESCO, 2010, p. 223).

As much as Al-Shabaab is the result of disengagement amongst Somali youth due to foreign arbitrium, it is also a vector of domination within the Somali political landscape and contributes to the costs accrued against children during war. UNESCO (2010) reports that children are frequently used as frontline combatants by the organization, comprising an estimated 30-45 percent of the ‘combat capable’ force for Al-Shabaab which bespeaks a critical need for the Somali government to begin
educating the young and allowing them to problem-pose their relationship to militant groups.

**Piracy**

Piracy along the Somali coast originated as a protectionist measure against illegal fishing operations that were depleting Somalia’s rich tuna schools (Samatar, 2010). In addition to the illegal fishing, corrupt warlords are allowing nuclear and chemical waste to be disposed of by multinationals along the coast, which Egal (2009) reports as causing livestock deaths, fertility issues and cancer. Sone (2010) confirms that Somali fishermen have explained that continued piracy continues because it serves as a ‘tax’ that they collect for breaches of international law and norms by unscrupulous corporations, though he is skeptical of its validity.

Since the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, piracy has seen a rate of growth meeting or surpassing one-hundred percent (Sone, 2010). Sone argues that the types of vessels attacked, fishermen, cruise ships, tankers and food-aid transports, suggest a motive that is vested in interests other than the protection of coastal water for artisanal fishermen. Samatar (2010) disagrees, and believes that the arbitrary neo-liberal interference in the daily lives of the Somali fishermen and people led them to piracy.

With four percent of the planet’s oil flowing through the Gulf of Aden every day Anderson (2010) notes the strategic importance and international attention that Somali piracy achieves. In 2010, piracy was the fastest growing industry in Somalia, and Anderson (2010) substantiates Samatar’s (2010) claim that piracy originates in the vigilante protection of tuna fisheries. International treatises meant to enable nations to
enforce their coastal waters fail to protect Somalia, which has no institutional representation in most coastal cities (Anderson, 2010).

Piracy, then, appears to have originated in what could be described as a participatory solution to illegal overfishing. While some disagree with this assessment, it is important not to overlook the history that grounds piracy (Menkhaus, 2009). Anderson (2010) and Samatar (2010) argue that the complex interconnectedness of the world has resulted in the unfair interference in everyday Somali life. Pirates are often "young men in their twenties who are illiterate, unable to work, and willing to die in order to make money" (Anderson, 2010, p. 331). Similar to the recruitment pool of Al-Shabaab, the majority of pirates are the disengaged youth of Somalia, the products of two generations of neglect and war.

3.8 Conclusion

Modern development policy in Somalia has thus far focused on crafting a nation in the neo-liberal image. Evidenced by these review, international, regional, and national actors all attempt to perpetuate a 'status-quo' that views the Somali citizen as a subject of democracy, not a participant within it. This thin democratic development (Apple, 2003) rejects activism (Pettit, 1997) and perpetuates a system that views the problem-posing of citizens as a dangerous confrontation with its goal, the creation of neo-liberal state structures that serve a wider internationally situated market interest.

As I move into a description of a reimagining of development practice in Chapter Four, it should be noted that much of the development work done in Somalia to this day has been instrumental in nature. Referent from the exposition within Chapter Three, developers have sought to 'secure' Somalia from terrorists, pirates, and instable
market conditions, in addition to the eradication of human suffering. While the latter is a
noble pursuit, the former bespeaks a neo-liberal vision of the Somali citizen.

Developers, both explicitly and implicitly, wish to see the Somali become an instrument
within the global market – an ‘animal’ that simply lives within the world and not a fully
human being emerging from it (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

This instrumentality, exemplified by the constant attention paid to piracy in the
Gulf of Aden, shows that the international community most concerns itself with the
market impact of instability within the Horn and not the human impact. Connections are
made between market success and viability and human flourishing, but these
connections are steeped in neo-liberal dogma. The definition of social flourishing for
developers has become instrumentality, and not self-reliance, self-actualization, or
community advancement (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).
4. CHAPTER FOUR: DEVELOPMENT AS HUMANIZATION, DEMOCRACY, AND PRAXIS

If there is anything to be gained from the review presented in the third chapter it is that Somalia has become a quagmire, resulting from ‘the best of’ intentions by the international community. The implementation of development policies by a multitude of actors maintained a ‘status-quo’ that perpetuated neo-liberal ideologies and ‘best-practices’ for democratic governance. The implications of this process are that developers begin to impress Somalis into thin forms of democratic participation, which regard the citizen as but a subject of (and not one working towards) ‘democratic’ governance (Apple, 2003). The outcome of neo-liberal oppression, the ability for agents and systems to dominate another, is thin democracy.

This chapter serves as a repositioning of the development process and democratic project. Whereas throughout history development is practiced for ‘status-quo’ maintenance, I argue that development must be practiced as pedagogy. This act of development, with the ‘thick’ democratic project in mind, seeks to engage the populace in the problem-posing of their current relation to not only indigenous agents within their community but also with the agents of development. It is only through this positioning of one’s self along a continuum of culture and history that critically attuned progress can be made, as well as through the act of associated living, which is realized through rhetorical action and contemplation upon a history that is shared, but understood differently (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010; Pocock, 1975).

4.1 Status-Quo Development

The root of status-quo development is the mentality that a citizen must remain ‘mute’, lest they upset the oppressive forces that govern community interaction (Freire,
1972). These forces form from a nexus of the ‘slave mentality’ brought by colonial powers and implanted during colonization, and are required for modern liberal democracies of the Global North to be able to control the means of the production of knowledge within Somalia (Apple, 2003; Freire, 1972). That knowledge is of what it means to live in a democracy, and developers maintain that it is in their image, one steeped in a history of Western political thought and practice, that Somalis must structure their society.

One cannot reasonably argue that the Somali conflict is a good thing. With hundreds of thousands dead, and a third of the country starved, there is a reasonable consensus that peace should be germinated (Moon, 2012). However, the devil is in the details, and how developers attempt to construct peace and democratic governance can greatly affect the longevity of that peace as well as the construction of critical avenues for democratic reform. At the very core of the problem is that developers, practicing status-quo development, are crafting an official knowledge that is indigenous to them and not the Somali people.

**Official knowledge, the status-quo, and cultural invasion**

In Chapter Three I examined current institution building initiatives within the south of Somalia. These have been noted as being removed from public participation and non-transparent (Menkhaus, 2012), governed by foreign interests in Kenya (Bachmann, 2012), Ethiopia (Samatar, 2007), and the United States (Samatar, 2007; Samatar, 2010). As developers begin to work towards structuring democratic processes within the country, they bring with them the political history of their home nations and regard it to be best-practice, instead of working towards the co-construction of a democratic project with the Somali people.
This non-indigenous political history is ‘legitimated’ by forces that are cognizant of the requirement that thin democracy needs to be practiced for neo-liberal state survival (Apple, 2003). By considering non-indigenous political knowledge legitimate, this in turn delegitimizes indigenous democratic practice because it arrives from a source other than the developer. The dialectic that forms, then, is one that pits the official practice of state development against the indigenous practice of community development, which is characterized by processes such as the xeer and traditional Somali law and tutelage in their own version of the liberal arts (Lewis, 1967; 2008).

In essence, the product of status-quo development becomes an official knowledge of democracy that carries with it a truth claim in favour of neo-liberalism and western conceptions for democracy and against indigenous culture (Tavares, 2003). This process of development, in and of itself, educates the people it touches through the environment it constructs (Dewey, 1916) and therefore renders (when it is practiced as status-quo) traditional values irrelevant at best or, at worst, counter-productive to the creation of the critical democratic state. Evidence of this is found in Chapter Three, where I note that the current government has viewed traditional participation in a Koranic school as being contrary to the national security interest (UNESCO, 2010).

This official understanding of what it means to be a democracy in Somalia is a compromise for the Somali people, but not for the agents of the development project. Whereas the Somali endures non-recognition, as is the case in Somaliland (Kaplan, 2010; Lewis, 2008), the Global North and regional powers have maintained their stranglehold on Somali federal policy as dominated by international security concerns (Little, 2012). The United States has sponsored, along with the UN and regional actors, a government that places the security of the ‘other’ ahead of the development of civil
society, the lack of funding placed into education and rural human security being but one example (Moyi, 2012b).

The development of an ‘official’ form of democracy within Somalia, one rendered in the developer’s image of the state, is rooted in that western authorship mentioned in Chapter Two (Grovogui, 2011). The ‘official’ democratic project within Somalia has become something foreign, and relegates the Somali into a position that denies them their ontological need for voice (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). There is an elimination of history that occurs when developers seek to ignore indigenous political practice or capability, and this does disservice to the associative ends which should be the product of any democratic project.

Essentially, this boils down to a form of cultural invasion and colonization, which Freire (1972) argues occurs when oppressors impose their own culture upon a peoples and “inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression” (p. 150). The cultural invasion underway in Somalia is one where western democratic thought is used for delegitimizing traditional political practice and law. An overt and insipid form of oppression; this ensures that:

Cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded; they begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders. In their passion to dominate, to mold others in their patterns and their way of life, the invaders desire to know how those they have invaded apprehend reality—but only so they can dominate the latter more effectively (Feire, 1972, p. 150-151).

Part and parcel to this cultural invasion is the idea that those who have been invaded (colonized) must begin to truly believe they are inferior (Freire, 1972). This is
exemplified in how developers delegitimize traditional life through the use of western-based school curricula, western styled government, and neo-liberal market participation. Developers, unwittingly, send a message to the Somali people that in order to participate in society they must become like ‘us’ – and give up the traditional in favour of the ‘modern’, ‘scientific’, and ‘democratic’. This was understood by Illich (1981) to be a component of the difficulty in establishing what ‘peace’ and development mean. Indeed, the difficulty in achieving development goals, writes Illich (1981), is caused by the insistence that modern economic peace remain integral to the development process. This means the relegation of subsistence farming to the archaic and the ‘undeveloped’.

A final example of what has become the official position of developers is the belief that certain groups, such as pirates (Kaplan, 2010; Sone, 2010), Al-Shabaab (Mentes & Hagerty, 2011), and others, are separate from the Somali community. While I acknowledge that the majority of Al-Shabaab are foreign to Somalia, groups such as pirates formed as a direct community-driven response to overfishing and coastal resource degradation by international actors (Samatar, 2010). By labelling these groups as ‘unwanted’ elements within Somali society, developers and the Somali government begin to render popular concerns illegitimate and contrary to civil ends. The rhetoric that surrounds such commentary on Somali ‘moral decay’ oppresses society into conforming to the official position of the outsider (Apple, 2003).

**Dependence and oppression**

A second result of the practice of development as status-quo is the dependence that Somalis have on foreign powers and aid providers. This dependence can be characterized as oppression, or domination (Bohman, 2004b; Skinner, 2002), and serves
to ingratiate the Somali government to the providers of aid and military support who could otherwise withdraw it if conditional policy benchmarks are not met. This dependence manifests itself in multiple ways, but is indicated by how the government has gone about the process of democratic reform.

The current federal government of Somalia is largely reliant upon two sources of funding: 1) the provision of international aid; and 2) the taxes collected at the Mogadishu seaport and airport (Elmi & Aynte, 2012). The roadmaps that structure this dependence, applied by international organizations and states, are largely alien to the Somali people and bespeak a dependence upon foreign ‘generosity’. Here, the developer becomes a mouthpiece for the neo-colonial impartation of ‘official’ democracy as the knowledge of how to ‘build a state’.

Dependence, as an affront to liberty as non-domination, is seen as an arbitrary imposition of conditionality (Pettit, 1997). These conditions, in the context of Somali development, are the ‘roadmaps’ that structure how the constitution was to be formed (Menkhaus, 2012). Dependence is also indicated by the repressive security apparatus that Kenya has implemented in the south of Somalia – hardly resisted by government officials (Bachmann, 2012).

Another demonstration of dependence, and thus a demonstration of oppression, is the perpetual war on terror being waged by the Somali government and its allies. While Al-Shabaab can hardly be labelled as non-complicit in the perpetuation of atrocities during the conflict, the lack of will exercised to open dialogue with more moderate factions associated with the militant organization (Elmi & Aynte, 2012) indicate that the Somali government is beholden to the interests of the United States and its allies. Not only that, but the constant fear of military reprisal – perhaps in the form of
increased drone strikes – urge the Somali government to take a ‘hard stance’ against those who could be partners in a democratic reconstruction. To ignore one stakeholder, albeit a violent one, is to demonstrate a dependence upon the status-quo that is dictated by foreign interests and required by the oppressor.

Finally, the reliance upon a Western model for development is indicative of a dependence on a normalcy crafted in ‘official’ democratic circles and by politicians who failed to note that the monopolisation of wealth in a few relegated the rest to a life of oppressive dependence and war (Harrington, trans. 1977; Laborde, 2008; Rousseau, trans. 1987). This is a result of western political history; as nations became richer they needed less thick forms of participation (Pocock, 2009). This has become a denial by the Somali government and its international allies, en-masse, of the activism engaged in by a critical civil community. Such a denial is a direct result of the commercial humanism that has stunted modern-republics and is typical of conservative, or thin, democratic visions for the state (Laborde, 2008; Pocock, 1975).

The dependence inculcated within the Somali people and government functionally denies them of their means to discursive praxis and humanization. In creating a structure that makes the recipient of aid dependent upon the giver, developers within Somalia enforce a dialectic that limits the Somali to the role of ‘observer’. This denies them their ontological need for social work and limits the creation of the associative community by ensuring that the developer limits the indigenous capacity for society to govern its interactions and resources (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). Insofar as dependence is posited by Pettit (1997) as a form of domination, it is also noted by Freire as a means to ensure oppression (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010), and
by Dewey as a way to distort the democratic project such that it meets the needs of the west and not those of Somalia.

The fetishization of neo-liberalism

It is noted that many African nations suffer due to the ‘fetishization’ of property by ‘indigenous’ governments and the related codification of private rights into universal human rights legislation (Ndi, 2011). Somalia, too, suffers from such a fetishization and this is apparent in how the Somali government has become corrupt and immersed in wealth (Menkhaus, 2012). Albeit, this wealth is unlikely to rival their political counterparts in the Global North, but it still leaves those in power a far-cry from the famine-induced starvation being suffered upon one third of the country (Moon, 2012).

The language that surrounds discussions regarding human rights is entrenched with capitalist and neo-liberal certitudes propagated by developers arriving from the Global North. The bureaucracy that governs much of the policy forming process within Somalia is hijacked by adherents to the neo-liberal vision (Mkandwire, 2010). Mkandwire notes that, throughout much of Africa, the development model is one that requires governments to become increasingly active in the exploitation of their natural resources. Somalia, with such attention placed upon the relatively low-risk problem of piracy (Sone, 2010) by the Federal government, seems to care more about that issue than rampant famine or dire human-security concerns in refugee camps. This is the case for many of the government’s partners, such as AMISOM, as well.

Essentially, Somalia has quickly become a country molded by the Global North to meet the requirements of the international market and its privations. For all the talk that surrounds constitutional formation processes and democratic capacity building, many of the resources are directed to defense spending, the defeat of Al-Shabaab, the
destruction of piracy, and the complacent partnerships the nation holds with Ethiopia and Kenya, both close allies of the United States (Menkhaus, 2012).

This fetishization of the market within development projects deprives the Somali people of their ability to define their own social processes and relegates them to a position wherein only the ‘accepted’ or ‘official’ voice is available (Laborde, 2008). What this means for critical introspection and action within the Somali community is that criticism of status-quo operations is seen as ‘violent’, and criticism of government or foreign development projects is labelled as anti-social. The second injustice caused by neo-liberal fetishization is the alienation (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010) of the Somali from his or her own culture. Instead of the Somali citizen working towards his or her own flourishing and associating within a democratic community, they are engendered to work for a global system that seeks security, stability, and above all else profit. This alienation occurs in the most implicit of ways, and is more than just a Marxist critique of capitalist labour, but also a realization that to labour for one’s traditional community is essentially human (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

**Indigenous democracy and the Hegelian status-quo**

Kaplan (2008) argues that developers must begin to access the traditional Somali practices of governance in order to be successful. He touches upon a role that could be used for the development of a truly humanizing form of democracy, but instead enforces the same status-quo that has been structuring development for the last two decades. Kaplan (2008) argues that the developer should accept Somali indigenous politics as best-practice for structuring institutions, allowing greater local ownership. However, such recognition still carries with the implicit relationship of master and bondsman (Hegel, trans. 1977).
Hegel (trans. 1977), in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, argues that upon the first meeting of two consciousnesses the two entities will engage in a battle to the death, resulting in one agent dominating the other. This slavery, the losing consciousness being mastered by the winning other, defines the dialectic that Hegel (trans. 1977) argues shapes much of human history. The result is that the master (oppressor) is denied the recognition from the bondsman (oppressed) he requires for humanization, and the bondsman begins to see his own agency in the work he produces for the master.

There is a nuance within the argument of Kaplan (2008) that is clearly observed when applying this analysis. Instead of the Somali owning his or her work towards democratic revival, he or she has become an instrument that crafts the necessity of the developer, which is a stable Somali community. Stability, while exemplifying the negative peace (Ali & Matthews, 2004) long sought by both Somalis and developers, is not conducive to thick democratic practice. While the Somali is notionally working under his or her own rubric, they are indeed being led by the same structure that has oppressed them since the colonial arrival. The neo-liberal interest in stability guides such indigenous works, which can hardly be considered the free action of a democratic agent practicing thick participation within the development process.

4.2 Development as Pedagogy and Praxis: The Developer’s Role

If development as ‘status-quo’ requires active involvement by neo-liberal interests, so too does development as ‘pedagogy’ require active involvement by critical practitioners. In this sense I draw from the work of Freire and note that the development professional is much like an educator, in that he or she practices a form of knowledge translation, which is democratic nation-building, and has as his or her pupil the recipient of ‘aid’. Within this exploration, that recipient is the Somali and he or she can either be
treated as an instrumental subject practicing thin democracy or a citizen who practices thick forms of participation. In that regard, the thin practice of status-quo development requires that the Somali be a receptacle for neo-liberal knowledge (Freire, 1972). The citizen is not required to critically interact with their history, nor are they required to involve themselves in functionally understanding their role in the development process.

The alternative is to begin to structure the relationship as one that revolves around co-construction and a mutual exchange of knowledge (Glass, 2001). Essentially, the developer and the Somali enter into a compact that requires both of them to problem pose (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007) their respective positions and histories. Where the developer will attempt to understand his or her peoples’ political history and role in the disenfranchisement of the Somali people, the Somali will attempt to understand their position within that history. The process will aid in the development of a critical consciousness of development. This is what engages people in democratic revival and frees them from complacency.

**Problem posing histories**

The ontological feature of human-beings is that people are products and producers of history (Glass, 2001). That history is cultural, political, social, and spiritual, and without it the present does not exist and nor can the future be produced. Thus, in order to produce thick democracy, a person must be able to understand what has prevented it, what their role in preventing it has been, and what it means for them to be participative citizens. Conservativism denies the activism that is required for such introspection (Pocock, 1975), and instead relies upon status-quo mechanisms — the production of official knowledge, the denial of thick avenues of participation to citizens, and the propagation of systems of dependence.
The developer carries a history of political thought that is distinctly western in character. This history, exposited in Chapter Two, begins with Plato (1997) and moves through the ages until the present. It is, by the developer’s very nature, impossible to wrest away from that history. All that can be done is to acknowledge it and the implications it has on their own actions (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). Questions to ask are: 1) what democracy (the goal of development) means for the developer; 2) what does the western tradition say about the construction of the democratic project; 3) how does the developer’s history impact the present of the peoples he or she wishes to help; and 4) what is the westerner’s traditional role in Somalia?

On the other end of this process is the Somali, and they too must ask themselves questions that are similar in character to those posed by the developer. These, following from the previous paragraph, are: 1) what does democracy look like, according to Somali tradition; 2) what does this tradition say about political processes and how they construct a democratic project; 3) how does the Somali’s history impact the developer’s, and how does the developer’s history impact the Somali’s; and 4) what is the Somali role in the Somali-developer relationship?

These questions, explored concurrently by both parties, enable a dialogue to ensue wherein both the developer and the Somali citizen are able to position themselves along a shared dialectic - there is no neutrality experienced by either party. Synthesis is achieved when the thesis of the developer’s democracy is merged with the antithesis of the Somali’s democracy. The process of problem posing histories aids in this synthesis, and focuses on the relationships between the colonial and the indigenous, in the vein of how the oppressed interact with the oppressor (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). Neutrality is not an option, as both parties begin to discover that they are mutually
complicit in the relationship crafted from their histories and interactions over the centuries (Freire, 1972).

This process enables both parties to engage in a ‘critical transitivity’ that exposes the intricacies of both implicit and explicit vectors of domination – oppression – within the developer-developed relationship (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007). For example, the developer may uncover through their exploration and dialogue with the Somali a history of colonialism that explicitly exploited Somali resources, but also implicitly oppressed the Somali into a position of instrumental dependence (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010), which is the result of the government’s reliance upon foreign military protection of the Mogadishu sea and air ports (Elmi & Aynte, 2012). The implicit nature of that dependence, resulting from an interaction that on the surface seems to be an attempt in aiding the Somali restore security, exhumes the critical transitivity within their joint exploration of problem-posing.

Co-construction and praxis

The very act of problem-posing histories begins to restructure the relationship between the developer and the Somali citizen. Instead of viewing the act of development as a form of ‘banking knowledge’, the developer and the Somali begin to see it as a mutual effort. That mutual effort requires consistent and critical upkeep and involvement.

Praxis is the process wherein a person critically interacts and reflects upon their present (Freire, 1972). There is a danger, when undergoing this process, to limit one’s self to ‘perspectival blind spots’ that ignore the role of the other in crafting a complete ontological and epistemological account of their respective histories (Glass, 2001).
Problem-posing, as described in the previous section, is absolutely necessary to avoid problems associated with unitary understanding and non-pluralistic certitudes.

For the developer, praxis should involve a repositioning of how they interact with the subject of their aid, the Somali, and it will take many forms. Based upon the dialogue that surrounds the historical exploration, developers can begin to understand their role not as a ‘Lawgiver’ (Machiavelli, 1996) but as a partner in the co-construction of a mutual relationship between sovereign peoples. For example, developers working for the United Nations will interact with the Somali people not as a force of benevolence, but instead as a mutual stakeholder in the relationship. This serves two purposes: 1) to limit the dependence, which is oppression, suffered by the Somali; and 2) to wrest from the UN its own domination under a system of oppression it has itself created (Freire, 1972).

Praxis requires that the developer apply learned knowledge in a critical and liberatory manner (Freire, 1972). Again, the problem posing engaged in by all parties provides the knowledge that is necessary to alter the system of oppression. More than rote reflection, praxis becomes analogous with the vita activa which is meant to allow the construction of political institutions that protect liberty and engage citizens in the construction of freedom (Pocock, 1975). This ‘active life’ provides the means to democratic ends, but again relies upon a liberal and critical education in order to germinate (Harrington, 1977). A developer from the United States should note that their own political history dictates that democracy can only be achieved when it is taught, and that teaching should be undertaken by critical pedagogues because they allow the student to come to higher standard of ‘knowing’, as opposed to just instrumental schooling (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). Critical pedagogy can be practiced by both
developers and teachers, with developers adopting a position of criticality. This allows the Somali to wrest themselves from the ‘functional’ (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010) or thin citizenship required of status-quo development projects, and instead adopt a position which encourages praxis.

**Humanization and liberating relationships**

Oppression requires that two agents conform to opposite ends of a single, shared, dialectic (Hegel, trans. 1977): one is the oppressor, the other the oppressed (Freire, 1972). This means that under a shared system of relation both agents are oppressed by a co-creation that is the system of oppression. Humanization is a process that occurs jointly, and as both actors work towards their own humanization they begin to allow the other to become more human as well. Praxis forms the base for such a process, and while Freire’s work instills the oppressed (Somali) with the task of humanization, it can be engaged in by the developer as well.

The neo-liberal process of development as status-quo is a system that oppresses the Somali people into accepting ‘official knowledge’, maintaining vectors of domination and dependence, and calls upon them to fetishize neo-liberal values in their own laws and communities. This same system, though, also requires that the developer deny themselves the very thing that makes them human: the ability to engage in a meaningful relationship with their counterpart in the Global South. Community should not be viewed as territorially bounded, and should be understood to encompass transnational relationships such as those between the developer and the developed peoples (Bohman, 2004b).

Bohman (2004b) argues that “the definition of democracy has to be expanded: democracy is not just a set of institutions that ensure vertical accountability between
citizens and representatives, but a particular type of inquiry dependent on deliberation” (p. 347). The type of inquiry that he calls for is, effectively, conscientization. This process relies upon individuals rejecting the ‘muteness’ that has relegated them to the position of an oppressed person (Godatti & Torres, 2009). With this in mind, the developer can be seen as being effectively silenced by systems that require their complicity. Examples, such as educators being given Kenyan curriculum and not indigenous frameworks for teaching, elicit a picture of mute acceptance of the status-quo by developers.

Humanization occurs when two people are able to engage in joint problem solving processes, in that they recognize one another’s efficacy (Freire, 1972; Godatti & Torres, 2009). Developers need only draw on their own political history of democracy and republicanism in order to find that such joint inquiry can lead to transnational democratic processes being formed – making it easier to help create institutional democracy in the countries where they work (Bohman, 2004b). This humanizing process is an expansion of the meaning democracy takes on, which includes the state of associated living within a political community of any level or composition (Dewey, 1916).

**Accessing western history and non-domination**

Liberating the relationship between the developer and the Somali citizen serves to humanize the dialogue between the two. There is a necessity for the developer to learn about their role in the oppression of indigenous political processes within Somalia, but there is also a necessity for the developer to critically analyze their own political history and relay democratic theory into practice.
Recognizing non-domination as the defining attribute of freedom is noted by republican and modern democratic theorists as being a necessary way of structuring rights and the law if more critical approaches to governance are to be implemented (Bohman, 2004b; Pettit, 1996, 1997). The liberal, or status-quo, argument for interference as the antithesis to liberty leaves room for systems or agents to act in ways that functionally deprive people of their freedom. The developer should access the traditionally republican definition of liberty as non-domination, not non-interference, in order to ensure their actions do not sustain covert means to oppression.

Developers in Somalia have a history of relegating the Somali people to dependence upon aid that can be construed as efficacy depleting and difficult for indigenous communities to challenge when the means do not lead to locally-owned ends (Bohman, 2004b). Examples of this are found in how the initial TFG was structured by Ethiopian, Kenyan, and foreign interests as a means of establishing representative ‘democracy’ (Samatar, 2007). Local leaders had to ingratiate themselves to the TFG in order to be seen as ‘friendly’, while others were unable to challenge the legitimacy of the government because it was backed by foreign powers capable of damaging livelihoods and security in non-consenting communities. This, then, becomes the grounds for power to be exercised in a manner that sublimates freedom to a few, and none, at the same time.

This dependence ensures that communities in Somalia are unable to practice indigenous forms of democracy and connect with a history that is vital to knowing the present. Dewey (1916) argues that geography and history are “two phases of the same living whole, since the life of men in association goes on in nature” (p. 218). Dependence upon a western democratic model, as a tool of social, political, and
economic oppression, denies the Somali the ability to connect naturally with their own histories and geography. Somalia, a geographic abstraction (Lewis, 2008), is the de-facto creation of colonial powers who relegated the people to dependence upon European ‘kindness’ and ‘knowledge’.

By looking to the works of the civic humanists, developers can begin to understand that to structure law in a nation and not observe it is the fountainhead for tyranny (Machiavelli, 1996). That tyranny takes many forms, but first and foremost it is the subjugation of the Somali people to laws that are not their own and far removed from traditional expressions of political efficacy (Lewis, 2008). The necessity of following the law is not just relegated to those laws that are made within sovereign states, but extends to the laws that govern transnational relationships (Bohman, 2004b) – such as those between the developer and Somali.

Developers must access such a history, and realize that the necessity for critical reflection upon it, through education (Aristotle, 1985), is not foreign to them. It is only after critically interacting and reflecting upon their own history that developers can truly engage in the praxis that characterizes critical pedagogical relationships (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). A humanizing form of democracy relies upon this conscientization, and also relies upon the realization that the West is not a closed system from the Global South – the two co-exist in the same discursive spaces.

4.3 Development as Pedagogy and Praxis: The Somali Role

One cannot ignore the Somali role within the development of Somalia, just as one cannot deny that oppression exists because of an oppressor. To simply flip the role, the oppressor now becoming dominated by the oppressed or the powerful becoming powerless, is to merely relocate the roles within the same system and change nothing
(Pettit, 1996). Noting that Somalia and those in the Global North share the same
discursive space, both partners in developing a more humanizing form of democracy
must undergo the same processes in order to liberate themselves.

The difficulty in re-crafting the act of development as a pedagogical process, a
learning experience for all involved, is that it becomes too easy to simply say 'turf out
the oppressors'. Such an act, while removing the original cause for oppression, does not
remove the system that will stay in place without undergoing a transformative process.
Thus, just as the developer must problem-pose their history, so too must the Somali.

The Somali as a creator of universalized democracy

Oppression, the maintenance of thin democratic forms and status-quo structures,
does not occur in a vacuum devoid of a relationship between two or more agents. There
must be, at first, a relationship in order for oppression to occur (Freire, 1972; Pettit,
1996). Traditional Somali political culture enjoyed a set of laws, known as the xeer,
which relayed complex social norms regarding political structures through entirely
accessible means (Lewis, 1955). That history is what Somalis must be able to reconnect
with, in order to revitalize their political and democratic community.

A major impediment to indigenous involvement in the development process is
the relegation of traditional political practice to periods of antiquity or 'history'. Part of
the problem-posing process requires that Somalis liberate themselves from under the
yoke of a transplanted history – one given them by developers and colonial masters.
Essentially, the Somali people require that developers begin to shape the relationship
such that dialogue regarding politics and democratic practice is not "fixed and
unchangeable" (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007, p. 357). Rather, Somali history
becomes something that is interactive, with indigenous cultural practice explored by its creators and relayed to partners in the Global North.

A common theme throughout the literature review is the implicit expectation of developers that the Somali be an accepting recipient of aid. This is the absence of what can be termed a 'political literacy', and the Somali can be seen as resisting status-quo development, or the 'naïve transitivity' (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007) of the neo-liberal democratic project that requires they adopt alien and oppressive political systems. Instead of crafting myopic definitions for democratic structure, developers can aid the Somali in the restoration of their civil society by universalizing the democratic project and allowing it to incorporate indigenous Somali and African traditions (Ake, 1993). By doing so, not only are Somalis enabling the interaction with their history, but also positioning themselves to critique the Western model and improve upon it for their own use. Universalizing democracy means that the democratic project within Somalia becomes not a child of western industrialization and colonial exploitation (Ake, 1993), but instead a procedural 'mutt' that incorporates the translatable from the Western tradition as well as the indigenous from Somali culture, such as the xeer.

Developers need to loosen their hold on the means to democratic construction, but Somalis must also grapple onto the process and own it. The status-quo has instilled within them muteness when it comes to political relationships with developers, constructing a reliance on 'experts' who explicitly and implicitly support the neo-liberal development agenda. By de-instrumentalizing the Somali within the development dialectic, they can begin to universalize the democratic project which will aid in the humanization of democracy and enable an associative community to form (Dewey, 1916).
Looking to the north, critically

The universalization of democracy for Somalia requires that the Somali critically interact with their own history and begin to shift the democratic project from one that supports the status-quo to one that incorporates their own indigenous values. Somaliland exemplifies the kinds of success that can be had when indigenous political processes and institutions are incorporated into the democratic project (Kaplan, 2010; Lewis, 2008).

Somaliland is an autonomous region of Northern Somalia that has functionally seceded from the rest of the country (Lewis, 2008). It is not internationally recognized as a separate nation, but for all intents and purposes acts as such. It has a government, ministries, defence capabilities, an education system, and complex relationships with foreign actors (Kaplan, 2010). Its peoples are primarily ethnic Isaaq Somalis, but the government maintains a complex system of dispute resolution processes for interaction between clans. This system is based upon traditional indigenous political practice, and closely resembles the pre-colonial xeer and other traditional laws.

The Somaliland government is made up of a bicameral legislature that has adopted many traditional elements of Somali political culture (Lewis, 2008). The upper house is comprised of clan elders, who represent the leadership of the traditional Somali political unit, and the lower house is elected by the public. Lewis notes that this system is unique to the development history of Somalia, having engendered tremendous success by avoiding the centralization of power or decision making processes in a few elites. Instead, local authorities are given the wherewithal to problem-solve and decide upon local issues that are of importance (Lewis, 2008). This exemplifies the type of work developers should strive to do. By allowing the Somali to generate laws and political
customs that are their own, development professionals can ensure that the citizen feels free to involve themselves in politics – it is no longer alien to them.

The UN has not recognized Somaliland as an autonomous state, and denies them the same partnerships offered their Southern counterparts in Mogadishu (Lewis, 2008). Such dislike for Somaliland political success is rooted in a fear that status-quo development will be irreparably harmed by unique and inventive responses to complex social and political problems. The people of Somaliland, in 1993, were largely responsible for self-disarmament, absolutely unaided by the UN and UNOSOM.

Throughout much of the 1990s, conversations regarding democratic revival in Somaliland were held with the support of approximately 150 elders who imparted their knowledge of traditional Somali practice to the public. A direct result of complex introspection and problem-solving, the current Somaliland governance structure bridges a gap between the democratic history of the West and the history of the Somali people (Lewis, 2008). Moreover, the people of Somaliland have essentially begun to work towards the universalization of the democratic project – it’s just that developers are absolutely unwilling to engage with the Somaliland state (Kaplan, 2008).

Though Kaplan (2008) calls for bottom-up processes of development to become the norm for Somalia, based upon the Somaliland model, he does not make the leap that is necessary to practice development as pedagogy. Instead, the author reinforces status-quo processes that are currently underway in the south of the country, albeit ‘owned’ by a different agent – the Somaliland people. Examples of this are Kaplan’s calls for an end to Somaliland’s isolation, as well as his explicit support of the privatization of essential services such as healthcare and education. Isolation, especially from entities such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and western powers, may be what has been a
key to Somaliland’s success – it has limited the dependence characteristic of loans, international aid, and tangible fiduciary support. Also, the privatization of certain civil services carries with it the possibility of these corporate entities damaging individual and civic freedoms if they become sufficiently internationalized – with supply chains elsewhere in Africa or the Middle East becoming more common and having greater purchasing power.

Local elites have successfully universalized the democratic project, recognizing that by building a de-facto state they create an empire of law above their own interests (Debiel, Glassner, Schetter, & Terlinden, 2009). Such an act draws from both the western and indigenous political histories, and provides insight into how statehood can provide discursive political space. In Somaliland, the state and the clan have equal shares within the government and a complex dynamic has emerged that utilizes traditional methods to resolve conflicts and legislate (Debiel et al., 2009).

Somaliland is a potential success story, but the complex interdependence of the current international system could still disrupt any good works being done in this nation. Its relevance in the argument for development as pedagogy is in how, unhampered by international or regional powers’ conditions, the Somaliland people have been able to critically come to a consensus on the problems that faced its civil society in the 1990’s (Kaplan, 2008). Also, it is a portent into how the universalization of the democratic project leads to successful development, opening up the democratic framework to alternative structures being the necessary result of joint problem-posing and praxis between the developer and the developed peoples.

Specific lessons generated from Somaliland for development agents within Somalia are found in how local actors are capable of creating successful institutional
structures based upon indigenous cultural practice. A telling feature of this lesson is that the people of Somaliland, absolutely unaided in the early 1990's (Lewis, 2008), were able to generate both negative and positive peace (Ali & Matthews, 2004) amongst their communities. Due to the fact that Somaliland was able to stabilize itself internally, without outside interference, workers from organizations like UNICEF and UNESCO are able to develop capacity within the region based upon local norms and customs (Bethke, 2009). The lesson generated from such instances is that long-lasting peace and security comes at the beck and call of the people within a community, and not from the interference of foreign actors.

Bethke’s (2009) report characterizes the success of Somaliland as being rooted in the capacity building done there, instead of ‘top-down’ development processes that avoided the centralization of power that occurred in Somalia proper (Lewis, 2008). Indeed, capacity building as characterized by Bethke (2009) points towards an understanding of development as situated entirely in a peoples’ ability to come to an understanding of their own history and position within the world. Examples found in the report include a call for a commitment to capacity development despite an unclear future, building trust within the developer-developed relationship, and the provision of tools such that a peoples can find for themselves the best way forward (Bethke, 2009). Essentially what Bethke (2009) calls for is a humanization of the relationship, where the agent within a fragile state is seen as a partner and co-constructor, instead of a tool to be utilized by the developer in order to elicit an outcome.

The Somali as pedagogue and the creation of community

To relegate the Somali participant within the development process to a position of ‘student’ or ‘learner’ is to deny them and the developer from the Global North the
opportunity to fully realize their human potential. A relationship, between two peoples, must be reciprocal if it is to be free from domination (Freire, 1972). Much as Freire saw the educator in his pedagogy of freedom as the caretaker of a student’s praxis, the developer can be viewed in a similar fashion. However, critical to the argument that development be practiced as pedagogy is the recognition that neither the developer, nor the Somali, is free. They exist within a system that functionally controls their relationship and thus forces their hand in dialectical oppositions, as the Lord and Bondsman were forced (Hegel, trans. 1977).

To recognize the pedagogical role that the Somali plays in her development is to acknowledge the Somali as a citizen capable of conscious reflection and action upon their reality (Hegel, trans. 1977). Much as Hegel argued that the Bondsman was integral to the Lord’s humanization, the developer cannot be sure his work is complete, or even good, if he does not recognize the Somali as a separate and ultimately efficacious agent. The Freirean role of teacher as guide through the process of mutual praxis, is adopted by both the developer and the Somali. The developer relays their position to the Somali, and the Somali relays their position to the developer. Such a relationship wrests the dialectic of master-slave, colonist-colonized, apart and imbues within both agents the propensity towards cooperative praxis and the eventual humanization of both the oppressor and the oppressed (Glass, 2001).

The importance, of recognizing both the Somali and the Developer as pedagogues, lies in the necessary goal of community living. The complex interconnection of a globalized world leaves no single nation, or peoples, separate from another. The act of associated living (Dewey, 1916) not only supports thick democracy (Apple, 2003) but also allows for future generations to train themselves in the
sustainment of the relationship, which is a mutually recognized freedom to act. When the first colonizers arrived from Europe, and met the Somali people, a community was formed around the dialectic exemplified by the Lord and Bondsman (Hegel, trans. 1977). As developers sought to ‘bank’ knowledge within the Somali, they perpetuated that dynamic and denied themselves – as well as the Somali – the means to living within a fully humanized and free community. By practicing development as pedagogy, and interrupting the status-quo of dependence, oppression, and official knowledge, the development process begins to shape the community into one that is both participative and indigenously owned. While the Somali owns her own political process, and the developer owns his, both own the relationship that is formed and recognize the other as a subjective agent that frees the relationship from the yokes of domination.

The importance of understanding the Somali as pedagogue is also found in the PRA literature, which understands that indigenous literacies are integral to the flourishing of civil society in communities that often do not see development funds (Chambers, 1994). In developing and working with indigenous Somali communities to develop a literacy of shared knowledge, the Somali and developer come together in order to teach and learn (Robinson-Pant, 1996). As developers begin to ‘ask to be taught’, they can instill within the Somali a sense of shared community that spans across the chasm between worldviews and build bridges that allow for social capital to accumulate between the two actors (Putnam, 2000). Practicing development while utilizing a form of PRA engages the deliberative processes of community, and allows the Somali to exercise their ontological need for voice (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).
4.4 The Associative Community and the Humanized Democratic Project

Wherever there is a development process underway, there is an associative community (Dewey, 1916) waiting to be formed. What this community looks like is dependent upon those participating in it. Central to reviving the development process towards a democratic and liberatory ends is the shared consciousness that develops between the Somali and the foreign developer. That consciousness is critical, and it is the product of problem-posing, praxis, and the act of humanization. Instead of merely utilizing Somali indigenous political practice as a tool towards a critically mute local-ownership, as Kaplan (2008) argues should be done, developers should recognize that they may be taught something about community life by the Somali, and not impress them into the role of thin democratic agents: slaves to a vision of democracy notionally Somali, but explicitly foreign.

Dewey’s associative community necessitated that the ‘oppressive benevolence’ of developers be negated by the discursive way in which the community interacted with itself. Ellermen (2007) notes that this interaction could supersede government interference, or developer interference, but central to a more humanizing democratic project is the idea that the community is able to construct itself in an associative fashion. The danger in not working towards an associative community, and instead structuring the democratic project as a hierarchical system, is that we “confuse the physical with an educative result” (Dewey, 1916, p. 26) and merely enforce the status-quo of human relations and democratic learning.

In expanding how they view the Somali participant, developers can aid in the construction of that associative community. Instead of recipients, the Somali becomes a partner, and the discourse that occurs during key infrastructure building is not one of
how 'it always has been done' but a dialogue that asks 'how this should be, or could be, done'. In essence, an associative community is formed between the developer and the Somali, and this in turn enables the Somali to construct their own associative community upon the developer's departure. The humanized democracy is borne from such an effort, as it is no longer about hierarchy (Bohman, 2004b) but about an individual’s and peoples’ ontological need for voice and humanization (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010).

4.5 Conclusion

Status-quo development can be practiced both explicitly and implicitly. The explicit forms are found when neo-liberal agents and interests interfere through the use of force, such as the invasion of the south by Kenya, or the use of drone strikes by the United States. Implicit forms are exemplified when analysts (Kaplan, 2008) call upon development professionals to pay lip-service to indigenous political practice, but merely utilize Somali culture as a tool towards status-quo perpetuation.

Development as pedagogy, on the other hand, is practiced when the developer and Somali engage in a mutual process of problem-posing (Hyslop-Margison & Naseem, 2007), which enables them to engage in a praxis that not only humanizes (Freire, 1972) both the developer (oppressor) and Somali (oppressed) but also engenders the creation of an associative community (Dewey, 1916) between the two actors. Such a process is liberating, as it begins to work not against the agents of oppression, but the system that creates them. Through accessing separate, and shared, histories and knowledge, the developer and Somali can come together and create methods of democracy that are thick (Apple, 2003). This renews the democratic project, and allows
the developer and Somali to begin constructing the associative community imagined by Dewey as central to truly participative public life.

5. CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The ideal state transcends the label of democracy in order to allow for an associative political community (Dewey, 1916). The second chapter of this thesis examined what the associative community was meant to look like – how it is built, how it is sustained, and how people adapt themselves to it. This is vital to the thesis because it allows one to adapt the African conception of democracy to the western, and construct a dialectic of development that is examined in the fourth chapter. Aiding in the understanding of associative democracy is a review of critical pedagogy, and how it prepares individuals for participatory citizenship.

After exploring the meaning of associative community, the second chapter explored the history of western democracy and republicanism. This examination paid particular attention to the theory of republican liberty as freedom from domination (Pettit, 1997). This was done in order to strengthen the argument that oppression is caused by explicit and implicit social forces, and that the early democratic theorists understood that oppression was antithetical to citizenship – whether one was the oppressor or the oppressed. Essentially, the act of dominating or the position of being dominated prevented one from humanizing oneself.

This flowed into an exploration of the African democratic worldview, and how theorists believe Africans experience democracy or understand it. The purpose of this
section was: 1) to introduce the reader to a critique of democracy as being rooted in the western tradition; and 2) to summarize briefly how colonialism affected the African experience of democracy. This was done before the third chapter, which looks at Somalia in particular, in order to prepare the reader for the in-depth analysis of development within Somalia.

Somalia was colonized in successive stages that ingrained within its people a memory and knowledge of oppression. Beginning in the late 19th century, Great Britain and Italy began to define the Somali’s experience with the west as one of oppressor and oppressed. This shaped their understanding of the world, and future generations translated this understanding into an intense mistrust of those institutions so often associated with western democracy (Menkhaus, 2007). In addition to this mistrust, the role of the oppressor and the mentality required by it (Freire, 1972) was quickly adopted by Somali politicians, and the oppressed began to internalize that role in their interactions with one another.

As the country began to break down, culminating in the ouster of Barre in the early 1990’s, Western nations quickly mobilized to attempt at restabilising the Horn (Clark, 1992). The first United Nations missions ended in disaster (Menkhaus, 2006), because Somalis were reticent to accept the help being offered by the same nations who had brought war, famine, and poverty to their nation. This sets the stage for successive attempts at bringing the country out of conflict and developing the institutions so associated with ‘democracy’.

The critique of current development practices has been centralized around the concepts of ‘thin citizenship’ and oppression (Freire, 1972). Democratization processes that focus merely on institution building relegate the ability of the citizen to create their
world to an afterthought. This focus on status-quo practices by the United Nations, United States, Kenya, and others has meant that the Somali becomes a ‘purchaser’ or ‘consumer’ of development, and not a participant in it. The deprivation of efficacy that this causes correlates with explicit and implicit avenues of domination that neo-liberal systems necessitate – the replacement of democratic association (Dewey, 1916) with a dependence upon another.

Characterizing more recent efforts at development has been an assumption that the way things have been practiced and built in the Global North are applicable and immediately adaptable to the Global South. The second chapter of this thesis noted certain contexts in which ‘western’ democracy can be universalized, these include themes of autonomy, liberty, and efficacy. However, multiple interventions in Somalia by international actors have attempted to impose their vision of democracy upon the people; examples being the Kenyan interference with the TFG throughout the 21st century, and the Ethiopian response to the UIC.

Driving this practice of development is the belief that the Somali is a ‘receptacle’ for official knowledge on what a democracy must look like. This is analogous with what Freire (1972) terms the ‘banking conception’ of education. Instead of the Somali being a student, and the developer a teacher, we see officials and policy-makers who view the African other as backwards, or incapable of crafting a functional civil society. Perpetuating this belief is the fact that the TFG resided outside of the country until 2012 and the constitution drafting process has had the effect of balkanizing the country (Menkhaus, 2012). This is not because Somalis are incapable of self-governance, but because regional and international actors insist on the process being driven by alien concepts and applications.
Finally, this thesis described the relationship between development as status-quo and development as pedagogy – creating a dialogic of development that pits a democratically thin process against a thick one. Development as pedagogy is characterized by a mutual recognition of efficacy and belonging, the Somali is recognized as capable and the developer is recognized as a catalyst. This signifies a commitment to co-construction (Freire, 1972), in that both agents undergo the praxis which is necessary for understanding and action. Furthermore, as the developer and Somali reject the status-quo, they begin to adapt democracy in different ways that are closer to Dewey’s vision of democracy as an associative community. This universalizes the concept, and allows the African and Somali understanding of democracy to enter the discourse and create meaningful institutional changes at the local, and national, level.

5.2 Conclusions

Development policy, to this point, has been practiced in a manner that perpetuates the status-quo and seeks to impart to the Global South an official knowledge that is germinated in the Global North by systems of neo-liberal belief and practice. That such knowledge, and ontological posture, is perpetuated in the educational and governance institutions of many of the world’s preeminent democracies is conducive to its mission in the Global South. Somalia is a battle ground, not only composite of arms and bombs, but of ideologies - with the clash of ideals and values taking place in the streets and plains of the south of the country.

Such a battle shapes the development dialectic that is exemplified in Hegel (trans. 1977). Upon encountering each other, official knowledge and indigenous practice attempt a struggle of dominance that perpetuates the status-quo. This fortification of the ‘way things have always been’ is only breeched when the agents of such a struggle
begin to access their histories in a critical and introspective manner. Whereas the Somali can access her history of native democracy and tradition, the developer can access his own history of republicanism and ancient democracy that, for all intents and purposes, is intimately familiar with that of the Somali. The dialectic ends when both sides acknowledge the existence of themselves in the other, and the expansion of the democratic community occurs when they begin the praxis that will shape a free state, as described by Aristotle (trans. 1985) and Dewey (1916).

Though the state and democratic community are different, indeed they serve different purposes, they both work towards the same ends. The state is the embodiment of the law, and protects the freedoms that are enjoyed by civil society and the citizenry (Pocock, 1975). The democratic community is the lifeblood of the state, and the praxis that it engages in pushes the state inevitably into the future, allowing it to flourish as though it were human. Human flourishing becomes the goal of the citizen, and a renewal of the law is the resulting product. I conclude that development policy must work towards this end, and more than just ‘bottom-up’ construction it is meant to enable the discursive space where learning can occur, both of oneself and of the other.

The certitudes that status-quo development carry with its practice must be done away with, because these lead to the exclusion of another from the community. Not only that, but these certitudes are the seeds of domination that oppress both the agents of status-quo development as well as the Somali people. Problem-posing, the development of a critical consciousness, and humanization are the only means to breaking that domination - the unrelenting march of a neo-liberal god through the world.
5.3 Recommendations

Policy recommendations

I identify eight particular policy recommendations that can be made based upon the critical analysis contained within this manuscript. These recommendations are documented within the literature, as well as constructed based upon a personal interpretation of the problem. They should also not be construed as necessarily specific to Somalia, but might be extrapolated to other nations where democratic development is currently underway.

1. The first concrete step developers may take to renewing the democratic project within Somalia is to begin modeling federal and local state institutions upon traditional Somali political mechanisms (Lewis, 2008). Granted, this does not ensure that democracy will be ‘thick’, or fully participative, but it does allow the Somali people to begin to define their position (Freire, 1972) within the development dialectic. Success, as seen in Somaliland, is largely because of this local ownership of the process - developers should be accessing that success in order to universalize it. This draws upon the work elicited in Freire, which argues that in order to be able to fully placate a person’s ontological need for humanization, they must be able to define and change their position through praxis (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). This is meant to avoid the manipulation that Freire (1972) identifies as a tool oppressors use in order to quell critical thought and action upon a problem. As Freire (1972) notes, to not use traditional institutions in development work is to participate in a cultural invasion. This is
where “the invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group” and “impose their own view of the world upon those they invade” (Freire, 1972, p. 150).

2. The second concrete step developers should take is to cease imposing specific, and ultimately alien, benchmarks upon the Somali people. These benchmarks are noted as being avenues of inter-state domination that deplete the efficacy of a given peoples by arguing that there is no claim to community before that of the nation state, and the citizens are punished because of institutional inadequacies (Bohman, 2004b). The contingencies placed upon development processes by institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund mean that executive powers, the ability to implement policy or form it, are wrested from the hands of the people. This is an overt act of domination, and does little to quell fears of foreign interference and oppression in an already skeptical and reticent society. Such contingent ‘aid’ must be stopped, as it relegates the Somali citizen to the occupation of an instrumentalized and ‘thin’ (Apple, 2003) conception of citizenship.

3. Building upon this last point, developers should seek to work with the rural and nomadic populations of Somalia in establishing self-identified benchmarks that coincide with a PRA framework (Chambers, 1994). This will allow the nomadic peoples of Somalia to establish successful associative communities in non-urban areas, displacing fears that developers seek only to centralize success within Mogadishu. Though PRA has been practiced across Africa to some success (Robinson-Pant, 1996), it has not been written about or researched within Somalia. The benefits of such an approach could be staggering.
4. Within the literature review I focused part of the discussion on the use of force by international and regional actors attempting to quell the rise of radical Islam and piracy. The United States, and other likeminded nations, must begin to acknowledge that despite millions of dollars spent fighting the war on terror in Somalia, little ground has been gained other than pushing terrorists into hiding and out of the capital (Moon, 2012). The use of non-proportional force, which results in harm to civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2012b), does little to engender positive relationships with the people. This is an explicit form of oppression, in which an entire peoples are “reduced to things” (Freire, 1972, p. 93) and labelled as an enemy without consult or understanding of their language and discourse (Freire, 1972).

5. By focusing on the problem of piracy, and treating it as an overtly criminal act, the Global North delegitimizes the initial concerns coastal communities have towards illegal fishing and the disposal of toxic waste (Anderson, 2010). Developers and the international community should make it policy to provide alternative means for community sustainment within coastal towns, while also limiting the exposure of civilian vessels to potential attacks. While illegal, piracy is a symptom of a problem and imbalanced power dynamic, and a harm-reduction policy would do well to stabilize the region. There is a lack of understanding amongst policy makers that pirates and militias are the result of a people looking to charismatic characters for a sense of purpose – peoples who have been left mute by oppressive systems and a lack of reciprocal dialogue are invariably drawn to act (Freire, 1972).
6. The maintenance of access to education within Somalia remains precarious for a majority of the population. This is the result of a poor security environment (UNESCO, 2010), and is complicated by social processes that limit women’s access (Moyi, 2012a). Developers, as well as the Somali government, should look towards strengthening the ability of students to attend traditional schools in the place of state institutions. The Koranic education offered in Duqsas was noted as being integral to developing within the Somali pupil a moral and civil education (Balslev-Olsen, 2009). These schools, if engaged by developers and their attendant funds, could potentially bridge the education gap currently experienced by younger generations. Fears that these schools, universally, radicalize their pupils is unwarranted and should be dispelled by those working intimately with them. One need only look to Malaysia where such schools have been completely integrated into state education apparatuses (Balslev-Olsen, 2009).

7. Looking to the model of the Citizen School of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Gandin & Apple, 2003), developers and Somali civil society can construct a state education program that engages youth in problem-posing their relationships with not just the West, but also with militant organizations and Somali civil society. This would mean structuring schools as integral stakeholders within community development, crafting a generation of Somalis intent on their own development and critically attuned to the problems they face. This would make the community surrounding these schools more apt to sustain the work done within them, and the pupils and educators would benefit from the community they are helping to create (Cassenelli & Adbikadir, 2008). By creating an innovative structure for
young Somalis to learn about their history, and critically interact with their present, developers allow the growth of citizens participating in thick democratic projects, stopping many of the reasons for violence. The Citizen School provides an example of how students and educators can craft the post-political associative community envisioned by Dewey (1916) and required for the machinations of a successful democratic state.

8. Finally, developers can initiate a process of problem-posing by engaging in concrete discussions with their Somali counterparts instead of adopting a position of ‘authority’ within the democratic project. The neutrality that many developers argue they possess is a fallacy of the western worldview, and this is noted by the Somali with whom they interact. Problem-posing histories should look like joint training initiatives that position the developer and the Somali counterpart as equals, communities should undergo consultation processes that validate their subjective interpretation of the work being done, and aid agencies that provide funds should universally accept Somali benchmarks instead of their own, or leave the country all together. Western nations should invest in human beings, instead of emerging markets, within Somalia, all the while looking to develop the capacity for universal education, human security, self-sustenance, and democratic participation. “The revolution is made neither by the leaders for the people, nor by the people for the leaders, but by both acting together in unshakable solidarity” (Freire, 1972. p. 124).

To view the aims of development, and its policies, as human flourishing is to encourage thick democratic reform and a civil community in lines with what was
practiced by Somalis before colonial arrival, as well as what the progenitors of western democracy saw as necessary for state security and freedom. Developers within Somalia have the potential to alleviate suffering, but only if they acknowledge the human nature of the people they are working to help. That nature is a consciousness that has been rendered mute, but still breaches the surface every now and again when offered the opportunity.

**Recommended future research**

This exploration and analysis of development policy within Somalia has opened avenues of study that are quite absent from the literature, or if present, stem from but a few voices. Somalia remains enigmatic in its complexity, and the problems facing its civil society have yet to be solved. Though a solution shall not be found in any one policy directive or international project, amalgams of efforts could potentially wrest the country out from protracted violence and the people from poverty. This thesis, an argument to practice development as pedagogy, has only breached the surface of what should be studied.

One of the policy recommendations I have made is to structure education initiatives such that they are constructive of democratic community, and allow the educators and students within to problem-pose their relationship to the causes of oppression and war, as well as engage in a mutual praxis (Freire, 1972) meant to liberate their societies. This, building on accounts of the Citizen School (Gandin & Apple, 2003), necessitates that policy professionals and development organizations understand the environment within which such an education would occur.
The Koranic duqsas that are the traditional forums for education in Somalia may provide the best options for citizens to reinvest themselves in their communities. These schools could, potentially, be providing the forum for democratic growth and introspection that this thesis calls for. Further research into both how these schools impart democratic knowledge to citizens, how educators and pupils visit contemporary problems in the curriculum, and how developers interact with the institutions themselves are all worthwhile avenues of study. This is not meant to simply be rote interest in an unrecorded phenomenon, but a study of the phenomenon that is development practice within one of the institutions necessary for democracy – the school.
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