From aid to atrocity: U.S. foreign policy and covert operations in Indonesia, 1949-1966.

Abstract

Amid the Cold War, the United States engaged in long-term covert programs designed to shift Indonesia into its sphere of influence. Between 1949 and 1966, the United States developed the Indonesian Army and Police Mobile Brigade, which would go on to carry out the 1965–1966 genocide that brought these groups to power. Although the Truman administration initiated the long-term project, each successive administration expanded it by funneling more arms, money, and training to the Indonesian security forces. These forces served as Washington’s bulwark against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the largest communist party outside of the Soviet Union and China. Drawing on recently declassified documents this thesis demonstrates how a sustained aid program contributed to the rise of a three-decade-long anti-communist regime; its legitimacy built upon the destruction of the PKI. Through an examination of these long-term covert action projects, this study provides new insights into the origins of the Indonesian Genocide and U.S. Cold War strategy in Southeast Asia; one rooted in interventionism and Cold War anxieties.